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Abstract 
Recent developments in cognitive linguistics have revealed how abstract meaning in 
language is shaped by bodily experience. We understand and express such concepts as 
time, causation, direction or love through metaphors that are shaped out of our sense 
of ourselves as embodied creatures (Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993). 
The diachronic analysis of syntax also shows how metaphor shifts lexical meaning 
towards grammatical meaning (Heine 1997). For example, in English and other lndo-
European languages, we use what Heine (1993) identifies as a propositional schema 
of possession to express how in having taken hold of an action, we have completed it. 
Thus we grammaticalise a possessive 'have' (haber, avoir, etc.) or 'ter' (hold in 
Portuguese) to express an immediate past, or finally, as in modem French, the past 
itself. 
Applied linguists are now asking how this cognitivist re-examination of the nature of 
meaning creation should impact upon language teaching (e.g. Low 1988, 
Lindostromberg 1991, Dudley Evans and St John 1998, and Boers 2000). One 
suggestion is that conceptual metaphors might prove an effective mechanism to help 
learners of specialist language group some forms of specialist lexis, using a 
conceptual metaphor such as 'cash is liquid', for example, to help students 
understand the language of finance, clustering and organising such terms as 'capital 
liquidity' and 'company floatation'. 
This thesis carries forward this exploration in a more comprehensive manner. It first 
examines the nature of metaphor in order to produce a useable construct. This 
construct differs from some mainstream cognitive views (e.g. Gibbs 1994 and Lakoff 
and Johnson 1999) in that it follows Glucksberg and Keysar (1993) in relating 
metaphor construction to class inclusion, and Glucksberg and McClone ( 1999) in 
affording similarity a role in metaphor interpretation. It treats metaphor as holding 
together three aspects of pedagogy: the nature of what is taught, the mechanisms 
through which it is learnt, and the learner's affective relationship to both. The picture 
of language and the language learner's mind that is produced rejects notions of adult 
acquisition and focuses upon the role of conscious learning through metaphor-based 
techniques. In the role of a participant observer, the author recounts how they 
implemented this in the classroom. 
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Teaching Language as Metaphor 
1 Introduction 
1. 1 The Objectives of the Thesis 
The objectives of this thesis are straightforward but broad. My aim is to map out the 
implications for language teaching of research into metaphor and the related area of 
cognitive linguistics. I will do this with a theoretical study that will sketch out the 
principles of a cognitive approach to language teaching. I will ground the principles of 
this approach in a description of techniques as they have been developed out ofthe 
classroom context. 
In order to achieve the goals of this thesis, I will first provide the reader with a brief 
summary of how the above view of metaphor has come to take its present form. As is 
common, this view will be called 'cognitive' because of its fundamental perception 
that language processing cannot be separated from the operations of cognition and 
that the structures of language reflect those of cognition as these are manifest in 
metaphor. 
Second, I will enumerate the ways in which the recent understanding of the 
importance of metaphor must change our view of how meaning is constructed in 
language. This change affects lexical and grammatical meaning. 
Third, I will state how the metaphorical nature of language reflects the metaphorical 
nature of thought. Metaphor will not be treated as a means through which language 
represents thought but as a process of mind. In short, metaphor will not be seen as 
representing thought but as a facet of it. 
Fourth, I will claim that in this wider capacity of metaphor as thought we can include 
an ability to learn. Metaphor allows us to obtain new knowledge. I will therefore 
argue that there is some coincidence between the metaphorical structure of language 
14 
and learning as it presupposes the construction of knowledge as a metaphor-making 
process. The nature of a language is, from one perspective, a reflection of our capacity 
to learn or to acquire it. We can therefore start to explore how the nature of what has 
to be learnt can be made friendly to the processes through which it has to be learnt. 
Although some pedagogical strategies make an intuitive appeal to this synergy 
between the nature of language and the nature of the learning process, conventional 
communicative methodology treats the description of learning theory and the 
description of language almost as separate disciplines. There are theories that will 
explain the nature of what is to be learnt and theories that explain the process through 
which it will be learnt. My objective is to show how these theories are in some sense a 
reflection of each other. My question is whether we cannot help the student by asking 
them to deploy in learning, strategies that have collectively been deployed over 
centuries to build what has to be learnt. These strategies can be broadly collected 
under the name of 'metaphor'. 
15 
1.2 The Evolution of Metaphor Theory 
1.2.1 Eall"Hy pllnnBosopllnica! perspectives 
Metaphor, as a facet of language and thought, is currently a topic of extensive 
research interest. The interest cuts across the fields of philosophy, linguistics, 
psychology, artificial intelligence, education and literary criticism. The emerging 
discipline of cognitive science, which combines the interests of many of these fields, 
has identified metaphor as a key area of enquiry and implicated it as crucial to the 
nature of thought. 
Although this exponential increase in interest dates largely from the late 1970s, it 
would be wrong to imagine that metaphor excited negligible concern prior to this. 
The classical interest in rhetoric and the associated 'art of memory' charted by Yates 
( 1 966) fostered a concern for metaphor as a device able to persuade, to move the 
audience and as a mnemonic to help the speaker organise their discourse. Studies such 
as those of Gi bbs (1994) make frequent reference to Aristotle's Poetics as seminal to 
our interest in metaphor. However, Aristotle is often wrongly identified with a view 
of metaphor that sees it largely as a decorative device. Mahon ( 1999) has pointed out 
that the Poetics may tend to over-associate Aristotle with the more general mistrust of 
figurative language that has become a hallmark of the Cartesian Philosophical 
tradition. Aristotle's 'Rhetoric' provides a more balanced account. 
Aristotle has also been called the instigator of what is now known as the comparative 
theory of metaphor (Gibbs 1994 ). According to this theory, a metaphor is a 
comparison between two terms that is made in order to explore the nature of one. 
Thus, to say that 'love is a rose' is to compare an emotion, 'love', to a flower 
possessed of a seductive scent and form that is protected by thorns. 'Love' can thus be 
expressed as beautiful, seductive and dangerous by being compared to a flower that 
has the same properties. 
Aristotle also touches upon the capacity of metaphor to name what is not named, or to 
serve the seemingly 'inveterate human urge' to 'to try to articulate what is as yet 
unarticulated' (Cooper 1993: 40). He does this in his famous example of how the sun 
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'casting forth its rays' has no name, unlike 'casting forth of seed' which is called 
sowing, hence we may come to speak ofthe sun 'sowing its flames' (Derrida 1972). 
Aristotle can be associated with two key attributes of metaphor, the transformation of 
a conventional meaning and the use of that transformation to represent a phenomenon 
which may be otherwise unnamed (Ricoeur 1975: 1 04). 
If Aristotle's approach to metaphor was in fact ambiguous, the Cartesian tradition in 
Western philosophy has been less equivocal. Cartesian thought proceeds on the 
assumption that the meaning of words can be fixed in the way that the value of a 
mathematical symbol, 'x', can be fixed in the premise of an argument, as 'x = 2' for 
example. The problem is that metaphor, as Aristotle observed, is partially about how 
words can change meaning. Metaphor thus holds out the prospect that an argument 
may try to secure meanings, which will be altered by the unfolding of that argument 
(Gibbs 1994). Metaphor threatens the clarity of sign-meaning correspondences. 
Another problem for the Cartesian tradition is that metaphor threatens the objectivity 
of rational argument with the involuntary interference of the mind that argues. 
Metaphor endows mind with the capacity to disrupt any attempt to give a sign an 
inalienable correspondence to a phenomenon in the world. In view of this, it is 
entirely consistent that the seventeenth century thinker, Thomas Hobbes (1983), 
viewed metaphor as 'degenerate'. Such a mistrust also finds a later expression in what 
Foucault (1974) characterised as the neo-classical aspiration to a univocal discourse. 
The univocal ideal must be wary of metaphor as a device that will unfix words from 
the items to which they should always refer. Metaphor dispenses with any possibility 
of the text as simply bearing the imprint of events. 
Such mistrust endured. Writing a century later, Hegel felt bound to distinguish 
between 'dead' and 'live' metaphor (Hegel 1931). Dead metaphor will often be 
unrecognised, as when 'we pursue an interest', forgetting that interests are incapable 
of movement and not susceptible to sudden flight. Live metaphor declares its unusual 
and often poetic nature as when we say 'Juliet is the sun' while knowing she cannot 
be. Yet Hegel's interest was to accommodate metaphor within thought. He wanted to 
counter the historical instability of meaning that metaphor brought to language and its 
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concomitant threat to metaphysical argument; hence his assertion that 'dead 
metaphor' has its meaning secured by the passage of history (Cooper 1986). 
However, such scientific developments as the formulation of Heisenberg's (1989) 
'Uncertainty Principle' and the accompanying understanding of Quantum Physics 
now make it increasingly difficult to perceive the world as a set of phenomena of 
fixed and certain identity that can have a secure representation in language. The 
realisation that the trajectory of an electron cannot be predicted pitches reality into a 
state where 'demarcations' are uncertain and the identity of objects is layered like a 
thin shell around the flux that defines their fundamental nature. In keeping with 
Quantum theory and, acting as an expression of it, a metaphor posits an act of 
observer interference in how we represent the core identities of objects and actions. 
1.2.2 The rehabilitation of metaphor 
Richards ( 1936) expressed a changing perception of scientific rationalism in The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric, one of the 20111 century's first significant studies of metaphor. 
Richards' contribution was to see metaphor as an 'omniscient principle of language' 
rather than as a marginal construct (1936: 92). Richards' other enduring contribution 
was his perception that a metaphor was constructed out of a tension between two 
terms, the tenor and the vehicle. In a metaphor such as the following: 
Life is a game of chess 
'life' is 'the tenor', or what the metaphor is primarily about, and 'a game of chess' is 
'the vehicle', or the tem1 that carries metaphor's descriptive force. The trope, or the 
metaphor in this case, arises from the tension between the conceptual differences in 
the meanings of these two parts. Thus, in the case of sentence 1, above, the 
fundamental difference between 'life' and a 'chess-game', the tenor and the vehicle, is 
what allows metaphor to draw attention to the hidden attributes of the terms with 
which it deals. 
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Richards ( 1936) revived metaphor as a topic fit for enduring attention and also created 
a consensus as to how it should be described in language. Recent treatments of 
metaphor express more awareness of the frequency with which it occurs in language, 
but have differed greatly according to whether they see the trope as a linguistic 
abenation, a surface rhetorical feature, a revealing attribute of language that demands 
description or a fundamental feature of knowledge construction. 
Black ( 1962 and 1979) treated metaphor as a linguistic aberration while remaining in 
no doubt as to its importance and centrality. Thus, he asserts that a metaphor such as 
1, above, is different from a literal statement because the topic, 'life', is not the 
phenomenon that it is said to be. 'Life' does not equal 'a chess game.' Black's other 
main contribution, is the interactional theory of metaphor (ibid). This is an important 
and enduring theory of metaphor and I will discuss it in the next section. 
L2.3 Interactional theory 
lnteractional theory sees a metaphor as being about two subjects: 'a primary' and 'a 
secondary' one. The adoption of the idea of two subjects raises one of the key tenets 
of the theory. The tenet is the importance of both parts of the metaphor in constructing 
its meaning. The two subjects interact in order to extract from each other the 
compatible meanings on which the metaphor is based .. For example, let us take the 
metaphor 2, below: 
2 Women are angels wooing (Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida) 
Basically, both the tem1s, 'angels' and 'women who are being wooed' cany what 
Aristotle called endoxa, or 'cunent opinions' shared by the speech community as to 
the possible meanings of a given term (Black 1979: 28). For example, no speech 
community at any time has conceived of women in courtship as being winged 
creatures who may literally take flight, or, in other words, as 'angels'. However, the 
attention paid to women during courtship means that they attract unusual reverence. 
As sacred beings, angels are also revered, at least according to the endoxa of the 
Christian, Muslim and Judaic speech communities. Therefore women wooing who are 
19 
angels are not winged beings because they are not perceived that way. A primary 
subject, 'women wooing' fails to extract a key aspect of the secondary one, 'angels as 
winged beings' and leaves others, 'reverence and beauty.' Therefore we can conclude 
that Shakespeare intends that when women are being courted, men treat them as 
objects of great beauty and reverence. 
1.2.3.1 Interactional theory: formal versions 
Black's theory has some more recent support. For example, in his study of pictorial 
metaphor in advertising, Forceville ( 1995) applies interactional theory to an analysis 
of visual imagery as it is used to produce a marketing message. The theory has also 
been developed in several more formal strands of analysis. Cohen (1993) attempted to 
accommodate metaphor within a view of meaning still largely based on componential 
analysis. According to a componential view, a given meaning can be logically derived 
from other units. For example, an angel has such components as +male and 
+unmarried. Cohen' s view is that the topic and vehicle of a metaphor will interact in a 
way where some of the components of the topic will cancel some of those ofthe 
vehicle, leaving intact a common set of meanings that the metaphor is created in order 
to identify. Thus, to simplify somewhat, in 2, above, (women are angels wooing) we 
could assume that the '+male' ofthe angel and its ' +winged-flight' are cancelled by 
the '+female' and '+human' of the 'women wooing' in order to leave the '+sacred' 
which is the meaning that the poet perhaps seeks. 
The example 2, above, does show up some of the difficulties ofthis analysis. Angels 
are not empirically verifiable and therefore their features cannot be logically deduced. 
Also 'sanctity' is arguably an attribute with which a phenomenon is endowed by the 
human mind rather than being one that things will intrinsically possess. We describe 
women as angels in order to confer angelic qualities upon them, not to discover those 
they already possess. Interactional theory forces the conclusion that metaphors are 
finally uninformative, telling us what we already know. 
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1.2.3.2 Interactional theory: dynamic type hierarchy. 
Way ( 1994) also explores a more elaborate view of 'feature cancellation' as a method 
to model metaphor within the artificial representation of intelligence. Way's (1994: 
122-149) approach is to model metaphors with the 'dynamic type hierarchy theory' 
introduced by Kelly and Keil ( 1987). Dynamic type hierarchy theory models the key 
features of a given term as a hierarchy. Thus in 3, below, a term such as 'car' might 
have the very general property of being 'inanimate'. Further up the hierarchy, 'car' 
might have the more specific property of being a vehicle and further still, the highly 
specific property of being 'a car' rather than a 'truck'. 
3 The car is thirsty (Way 1 994) 
The adjective 'thirsty', on the other hand will have the property of possessing the 
more general property of 'a need' Needs, however, are an expression of consciousness 
and thus a function of an animate phenomenon which cannot strictly transfer to an 
inanimate one such as a vehicle. Then, moving up the hierarchy to a greater level of 
generality, we will understand that a need is a 'requirement'. Requirements are not the 
product of only an animate consciousness; they are thus general enough to stand as a 
property of both cars and thirsty creatures. From this discovery of one common 
property we can move to that of others. The common properties produce 'the 
supertype'. The supertype contains the common properties for 'thirst' and 'car' that 
allow the first term to be an appropriate descriptor of the second. This would be 
'mobile entities which require liquids' since animals and cars share these properties. 
Way's argument is that the metaphor can be interpreted by working up the dynamic 
type hierarchy of the domains of the topic and vehicle until we find common 
attributes between each. Thus the animate finds common features with the inanimate, 
in this case mobility and a need for liquids in order to sustain the same. In order to 
create a set of common features, the ones that are not common, such as 'vehicles' and 
'animals' are masked. 
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1.2.3.3 lnteractional theory: isomorphism 
Black (1979) acknowledges his debt to Richards' (1936) tension theory in that what 
he terms the primary and secondary subjects achieve an isomorphic relationship 
within the frame of their basic dissimilarity. An isomorphic relationship is one such as 
that which pertains between 'temperature' and 'the mercury in a thermometer'. These 
phenomena are entirely different. One is abstract and the other a physical entity. Yet 
the behaviour of one clearly reflects the behaviour of the other, finding grounds for 
undeniable compatibility in their difference. 
Ricoeur (1975) also retained something ofRichards' (1936) tension theory while 
affording space to an Aristotelian notion of substitution within his theory. As stated, 
Aristotle perceived metaphor as having a dual function, that of ornamentation and 
substitution. The substitution was for a meaning that was unknown with a known one 
that was in some sense comparable to it, 'pour combler une vide semantique' (fill a 
semantic gap) in other words (lbid: I 03). For Ricoeur, the substitution occurs at a 
semiotic level since it is about the sign or word attaching itself to a new meaning. On 
the other hand, the tension is at the level ofthe discourse or of the semantics arising 
from it. The tension must be at this level because it is about how two terms are held 
together by a syntactic construction. The tension of the metaphor in discourse means 
that 'its most intimate abode' is 'the copula', which holds its two sides together and 
forces them apart through a simultaneous signification of 'is not' and 'is' (Lechner 
1978). The copula keeps the two aspects of a metaphor in being, proffering an act of 
substitution by similarity on the one hand, while disallowing it with its repulsion 
between unlike poles on the other. The tension mitigates against the possibility of a 
metaphor ever entirely taking over a meaning by being entirely similar to it and thus 
of lapsing into a nai've act of paraphrase. 
1.2.4 Jakobson and the combinative versus selective theory of metaphor and 
metonymy 
Ricoeur shows the influence of another notable thinker on the subject, Roman 
Jakobson (Lechner 1978). Jakobson and Halle (1956) and Jakobson (1971) had also 
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sought to identify the combinative and substitutive features of language as being 
represented in the way we construct figures of speech. The combinative function can 
be found in the way a word combines meanings and is summarised by another trope, 
or figure of speech, the metonym. A metonym may represent the entirety of an object 
through a part, such as when we say 'sail' and mean 'ship.' It may also represent an 
idea or organisation through its physical or spatial location as in 4, below: 
4 This is London calling 
meaning a broadcaster who is located in London. 
Jakobson's other language function can be understood as substitutive and this is 
summarised by metaphor because of how it works by substituting one meaning for 
another. Language thus exists between two contrary 'poles', the combinative, or 
syntagmatic which is summarised in metonymy, and the substitutive, or paradigmatic 
where metaphor exchanges one meaning for another. 
1.2.5 Grammatical metaphor in systemic functional linguistics 
Halliday (1985, 1993, 1994 and 2000) and Halliday and Hassan (1989) have also 
linked figurative language to grammar with a concept called grammatical metaphor. 
The Hallidayan analysis of language links the description of grammatical structure to 
the type of meaning that a language user wishes to communicate. Thus, a basic part of 
speech such as a verb will be linked to the expression of an action and a noun to the 
expression of a thing. Verbs that express actions are congruent but when nouns 
express actions as in 5, below, they are not: 
5 The removal ofthe hatch found no survivors 
A process, 'opening' is no longer expressed by a verb. This provides a definition of a 
grammatical metaphor as 'the expression of a meaning through a lexico-grammatical 
form which originally evolved to express a different kind of meaning' (Thompson 
1996). 
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Halliday's analysis of grammar according to communicative function is on the 
periphery of what one might normally construe as formal linguistic analysis. His 
interest in relating meaning to the rhetorical structure of text means that his analysis 
should not be altogether distanced from the rhetorical tradition in which thinkers such 
as Richards, Black and Ricoeur are operating. However, it is interesting, that, in his 
notion of congruent meaning, Halliday keeps faith with formal linguists by 
recognising that lying behind metaphor is what Levin (1993: 119) describes as a 
meaning that finally constitutes an 'unmetaphorical' or 'literal' paraphrase. 
1.2.6 Metaphor and formal linguistic analysis 
The post-war traditions of formal linguistics and logical positivism have been largely 
motivated by an interest in constructing stable meanings. One of the most influential 
exponents of logical positivism, A. J. Ayer ( 1936), argued for a deductive structure 
that would exclude metaphysical or transcendental meanings. Both the traditions of 
truth-condition semantics and generative linguistics have found metaphor problematic 
and thus have sought to marginalise it. In this endeavour, they have been true to their 
Cartesian roots. A formal semantic analysis, such as that of Katz and Fodor (1963), 
has attempted to relate meaning back to a linguistic or semantic competence and thus 
to separate it from other facets of knowledge such as background experience or 
context. 
1.2.6.1 Metaphor and formal linguistic analysis: metaphor and truth 
conditional meaning 
In the formalist vein, meaning had finally to be 'truth conditional.' This is according 
to Tarski's (1956) concept of a truth condition where 'a house was white, if and only 
if a house was white'. A statement that could not be validated against these conditions 
had no place in logical argument. Thus, 'a house is white' constitutes a literal 
statement if it is 'white' but might start to deviate from the same if it were actually a 
pale grey, carrying the meaning towards a metaphorical realm. The application of 
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Tarskian theory results in the placing of metaphor or any figurative use of language 
outside the zone of formal linguistic enquiry (e.g. Davidson 1979, Rorty 1989, Sadock 
1993). 
Sadock's view is that metaphor is meaningful by reference to a context that is outside 
the timeframe in which a statement is constructed. It may gather its meaning from the 
historical context of a term. Metaphor cannot constitute a subject of study in the 
discipline of synchronic linguistics. However, Sadock ( 1993: 57) remains troubled by 
how metaphor shows a language such as English to be in 'flux'. Relatedly, he 
acknowledges it to be one of the keys to language change. Metaphor threatens the 
assumptions of 'fom1allinguistics' because it shows that meaning can be dependent 
on factors other than the selection of a particular form. 
1.2.6.2 Metaphor and formal linguistic analysis: §earle's criticisms of 
truth-conditionaB approaches to meaning 
Searle (1978 and 1993) argues that we should qualify the extent to which the truth 
conditions of a sentence determine its proper meaning. He points out how in the case 
of the two sentences, 6 and 7, below, we know immediately the truth conditions of 6 
but would have considerable difficulty with 7. 
6 The fly is on the ceiling 
7 The cat is on the ceiling (Searle: 1993: 86) 
8 Sam is a pig (Searle: 1993: 1 05) 
This difference does not relate to the actual language of these statements but to how 
easily our normal 'background' knowledge can be applied to them. In the case of a 
metaphor such as sentence 8, above, we know immediately that what Searle calls the 
sentence meaning and the utterance meaning do not coincide, 'Sam' is a 'human', not 
the animal he is asserted to be. However, as 7 shows, the need to go outside a normal 
factual frame of reference in order to find a meaning is not just peculiar to metaphor. 
The 'cat' in 7 may actually be on the ceiling because a cat hater has splattered it over 
the plasterwork. We just have to work harder and through a longer chain of inferences 
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to understand that. In 8, we know that Sam is a human being not an animal just as we 
know that cats do not normally adhere to ceilings. Just as we have to search our 
background knowledge in order to grasp the adhesive properties of a splattered cat so 
do we to evoke the folk wisdom about pigs when we realise that Sam is actually 
human. In short, background knowledge plays a crucial role in our full understanding 
of even literal utterances and this understanding must be extended in order to cope 
with metaphorical expressions. 
1.2.6.3 Metaphor and formal linguistic analysis: metaphor and semantic 
field theory 
Kittay ( 1987) rejected the consignment of metaphor to a pragmatic domain or to an 
issue of background knowledge as in Searle' s analysis. Like Cohen ( 1993) and Way 
(1994) she made a bold and well-argued attempt to reintegrate metaphor into a more 
formal mode oflinguistic analysis by using semantic field theory. Semantic field 
analysis will typically examine a word with a field consisting of other words in a 
typical subject area. Thus, in Kroeber's (1909) well-known study of kinship, the 
meaning of one kinship term, for example 'aunt' can be determined through its 
insertion into a field of others such as 'brother, uncle, sister, husband etc'. The 
location of a term within a field will provide us with its literal meaning. In this way, 
we know what 'mother' means because of the surrounding field of 'child, father, etc'. 
A meaning will become metaphorical when the relations between items in one 
semantic field are introduced into another. Ifl extend Kroeber's example, the 
relationship between mother and child is one of propagation. In Sadam Hussein' s 
statement about 'the mother of all battles,' the mother's literal meaning has the 
relationship of propagation and thus a sense of source or genetic origin to a child. One 
can see that this part of the field is carried across to the threatened conflict. The battle 
as a 'mother' will propagate other battles reducing them to the status of its diminutive 
progeny. 
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1.2.6.4 Metaphor am! formaB Hnuguistic am!Hysis: metaphor and! generative 
linguistics 
Generative linguists have also found metaphor difficult to accommodate. The primary 
interest of 'the generative enterprise' is in treating words as entities with clear 
semantic demarcations. An ideal instance would be a case where a word can be said to 
denote one specific meaning in the way that a proper name denotes one specific 
person and that person only. Thus, words should be represented as 'bundles of 
necessary and sufficient features' (Taylor 1995) that amount to the components of 
phrases which are allotted a given position by syntax. A word requires features that 
make it compatible with the position that it has been allotted in a phrase, which is 
finally a function of the position that a phrase takes up in a sentence. In short, it has 
selection restrictions that permit or inhibit its appearance at a given point in a 
sentence. The boundaries of a meaning must therefore be clearly circumscribed. The 
nature of the selection restrictions for a given word forms a feature oflinguistic 
competence. According to these principles a metaphor represents 'a violation of a 
selection restriction' (ibid) and is therefore outside the domain of competence. Lapin 
(1981: I) asserted that this violation occurred when 'a term t modifies another term t', 
in accordance with the syntactic rules of the language and t and t' are respectively 
associated with incompatible kinds of entities. This was described as a violation of 
'sortal correctness'. In a similar vein, Botha (1968) held to the Hegelian distinction 
between live and dead metaphors. The death of a metaphor was synonymous with its 
acquisition of the selection restrictions that gave it a place in linguistic competence or 
in 'rule governed linguistic creativity' (Taylor 1995). New metaphors were a violation 
of the said restrictions. They amounted to 'rule changing creativity' and therefore fell 
outside the control of competence and thus of formal linguistic enquiry. 
1.2. 7 Metaphor and! relevance theory 
As said, there are clear reasons why the logical and generative traditions of semantics 
should decide they could not deal with an analogical entity. An obvious way to move 
forward from this is to accept that state of affairs and to regard metaphor as belonging 
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to a territory that Chomsky ( 1985) would call epiphenomenal. In this Chomskyan 
sense an epiphenomenon is an ethereal product of the core and phenomenal nature of 
competence. To regard metaphor as an epiphenomenon means that it should not be 
treated as a violation of the semantics of natural language because it is outside the 
core competence to which these belong. One can then treat metaphor more as a 
violation of the 'co-operative' maxims that according to Grice (1975) allow 
communication between individuals to occur. Thus, while a co-operative principle 
asserts the need for truthfulness, statements such as 2, 3, 4 and 8, above, are blatantly 
false. The statements' falsity necessitates that 'one seek, a figurative, co-operative 
intent behind the utterance' (Sadock 1993: 43). Such a necessity raises the issue of the 
principle according to which an interlocutor searches for a co-operative principle in an 
evident falsehood. One solution to this involves acquiescence to another Gricean 
maxim, that of relevance. In respect of sentence 8, above, (Sam is a pig), we reject the 
idea that Sam is really a snorting and inarticulate quadruped because that meaning is 
not relevant to the idea we manifestly want to convey or to the context in which the 
communication takes place. 
According to Sperber and Wilson (1985 and 1986), the Gricean maxim of 'relevance' 
should be perceived not just as one of the several principles that allows meaningful 
communication to occur but as a theory of mind. It is fundamental to our processes of 
thought that we heed the points that are relevant to us. In essence, this could be 
postulated as a theory of survival. Our existence depends on our ability to distil from a 
host of minor threats the one that is most likely to put our survival at issue. This threat 
would be marked as the most 'relevant'. In forming an utterance, we first try to make 
the utterance concur with the assumptions that we hold about it (Sperber and Wilson 
1986: 2). Equally our interpretation will be guided by the same principle. A second 
stage is to search the context for features that will be 'relevant' to the assumption. 
Thus in an interpretation of 2, above, (women are angels wooing), we know that 
'women wooing' are not 'angels'. Because the statement may violate our first 
assumption about wooing women and angels, we will therefore look in the context of 
angels for the implicatures that are most relevant to the information we are trying to 
convey; for example, virtue and sanctity. 
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Goatly ( 1997) has developed one of the most elaborate views of metaphor according 
to the principle of relevance. He treats the distinction between literal and metaphorical 
language as existing on a cline (ibid: 142-143). The point where we find ourselves 
between the strictly literal and the demonstrably figurative depends on the number of 
implicatures through which we have to work in order to discover the actual meaning. 
In examples 2 and 8, above, the number will be small. In the case of 2, this would be 
because of the partiallexicalisation of angel as a term for a sacred and sweet-natured 
person. In a case such as that of9, below, it is clear that the number of implicatures 
would be very great and the issue of relevance would never be totally resolved, 
making this highly metaphorical. 
9 Eternity is a spider (cited in Cooper 1986) 
1.2.7.1 Metaphor and relevance theory: cognitive criticisms 
Gibbs (1982 and 1983) produced evidence to show that people do not necessarily 
analyse the literal interpretation of a sentence such as 1 0, below, in order to construe 
it as an indirect speech act. Thus a relevance view would hold that 10, below, is 
understood tirst as 11 and only secondarily as 12: 
10 Can't you be friendly to other people? 
11 Are you unable to be friendly to other people? 
12 Please be friendly to other people. 
Such a sequence of literal to non-literal computation would entail that processing a 
sentence such as 10, above, would require greater cognitive effort. Gibbs conducted a 
series of reaction time tests where subjects were given two different contexts for a 
sentence such as 10. The first suggested the meaning should be construed literally, the 
second, figuratively. Thus, a literal context was suggested where a psychiatrist 
implied that their patient had a condition where they could not be friendly. A non-
literal context was given as one where an adult was trying to correct the behaviour of 
a quarrelsome child. The fact that under experimental conditions, subjects took longer 
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to compute the literal meaning than the figurative was taken as evidence against the 
adoption of a relevance view of metaphor processing (Gibbs 1994). 
1.2.8 1lllne cognitive view of metaphor 
Gibbs' conclusion that non-literal language does not entail greater processing time 
was used to support a cognitive or image-schematic view of metaphor processing. 
This cognitive view remains the basis for the largest research endeavour in the field of 
metaphor and has amounted to a re-orientation of how we treat language, the 
relationship of language and thought and the nature of thought itself. The 
development of a cognitive approach to metaphor can be considered as having the 
following strands: 
1) The reduction of metaphors as they occur in language to a finite set of common 
metaphors that are treated as conceptual or formative of the meanings with which 
language must work. 
2) A view that the way in which we treat a topic in any form of scientific or 
philosophical enquiry is skewed by the metaphors through which it is 
conceptualised. 
3) The observation that much language understood as literal is in fact highly 
metaphorical and that finally the literal/metaphorical distinction does not really 
exist in a definitive sense. 
4) The understanding that abstract language is entirely metaphorical in origin and 
can largely be reduced to a set of expressions that derive from our experience of 
our bodies and ofthe body's interaction with the world. 
5) The view that abstract language is an expression of universal conceptual 
metaphors resulting from our existence as embodied creatures in a state of 
interaction with a world governed by the laws of physics. 
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6) The view that some abstract language is a product of culturally specific conceptual 
metaphors. 
7) The realisation that the grammar of language is itself derived through metaphor 
from the awareness of ourselves as embodied creatures 
8) The view that language will reveal its relationship to thought through a diachronic 
study that shows how it has evolved from our experience of ourselves as 
embodied beings 
9) The development of the above eight insights towards a wider philosophical 
perspective or a 'cognitive science of philosophy' (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
L2.8.1 1I'he cognitive view of metaphor: conceptuaB metaphor 
In 1979, Reddy (1993) observed the inter-relatedness of the metaphorical expressions 
that we need to talk about a given idea. He showed how 'communication' is often 
conceived as a 'conduit' in that many expressions that discuss this topic employ ideas 
of opening or using a channel as in 'getting through, coming across, putting across' or 
'transfer' as in 'language transfer' (ibid: 189-197). Equally, the message itself is 
perceived as the container in the conduit as when we 'unpack a statement or 'search in 
text for a message'. The implications of this discovery were held to be widespread, 
touching upon, for example, the way we conceptualised and thus critically approached 
a communicative package such as a text (ibid: 179-180). 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) extended Reddy's analysis by exploring a series of 
metaphors through which we conceptualise abstract experience. Thus 'business' and 
'argument' are talked about as ifthey were 'warfare'. Equally, our visual field is a 
'container' reflecting our sense of ourselves as creatures contained by our bodies, 
with things coming into view, while 'time' has a complicated conceptualisation as 
differing trajectories in space or as money. The 'business is war' and 'the visual field 
is a container' metaphors can be seen as examples of conceptual metaphors. This is 
because conceptual metaphors are not an example of a use of language in text but an 
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instance of the common features of the language in which we talk about a given 
abstract topic such as 'love' or 'time'. 
Conceptual metaphors represent how we grasp and structure our reality. They 
supposedly establish the principles that guide our metaphor-making in language or in 
some other medium. 
1.2.8.2 The cognitive view of metaphor: metaphor and conceptual studies 
The observations of Reddy ( 1993) and Lakoff and J ohnson ( 1980) have triggered a 
large body of research into the links between metaphor and the manner in which a 
given topic or area of enquiry is conceptualised. For example, our understanding of 
medicine, illness and health can be made clearer when we understand the types of 
metaphor through which such topics are grasped. This is a type of study which is 
generating a large interdisciplinary enquiry that is of interest to social science, 
linguistics and psychology. Such a literature, which is already too large to receive 
more than a cursive treatment in this thesis, will be summarised in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
1.2.8.3 The cognitive view of metaphor: towards a cognitive poetics 
Lakoff and Turner (1989) have also initiated the use of conceptual metaphor to plot 
the emergence of imagery in literature. This has led to what has been termed a 
'cognitive poetics' by Tsur (1992). Gibbs (1994) and Gibbs and Bogdonovitch (1999) 
were more circumspect, however. They observed how the automaticity that 
characterises the processing of metaphors through stored conceptual metaphors 
should be differentiated from the reflective interpretation of imagery as it appears in 
text. 
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1.2.8.4 The cognitive view of metaphor: the irrelevance of the distinction 
between the metaphorical and the literal 
The cognitive interest in metaphor forms a coherent argument about the way we 
conceptualise, express and understand meaning in language. For example, we cannot 
separate the view that our thoughts about a subject are structured by thematically 
related sets of metaphors from the assertion that metaphor is fundamental to thought 
and that there is not meaningful distinction between literal and figurative language. 
Thus a text such as 13, below, might show that a lecturer is thinking as if their 
'lecture is a path' because they talk of a start point then describe their progress 
through the subject as if they were in motion. 
13 I will start at the history question, that is how the education system grew up. I 
will go on to what we are left with now. Last I will come to future changes. 
Yet few people would consider the use of these verbs to be deviant or figurative. 
Thus, because we start to understand that apparently normal uses of language are 
based on metaphor, the distinction between the literal and figurative starts to 
disappear. The opposite is also true. In order to agree that exhortations such as 'use 
the time' and 'put some time aside' inter-relate through a 'time is a resource' 
metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 65), we would first have to accept that these 
apparently literal statements are in fact figurative to some degree. In the final analysis, 
the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical can only be grounded in the 
agreement of a given speech community in respect of which expression is novel and 
outlandish and which now belongs to normal or literal use. 
1.2.8.5 The cognitive view of metaphor: how metaphors shape the way we 
think about a topic 
The way we think about a topic is partly determined by the metaphors in which it is 
expressed. If we take an abstract topic such as 'time', it is clear that it is impossible to 
think about it except as an animate or inanimate phenomenon in space or as the space 
between objects (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Therefore, we cannot simply conclude 
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that time can only represent itself through metaphor and that the apparently literal 
language of time is in fact highly metaphorical. Another conclusion could be that 
time, as we can conceptualise it, is an inference of the metaphors through which we 
express it (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). The consequence may be that metaphor 
fashions our approach to the problems posed by reality, society, politics or any 
domain of human interest. The metaphors with which we think and talk about things 
will exert some control over the way that those things are seen and will therefore 
effect the decisions that we make about them (e.g. Lakoff 1992). 
Lakoff (1992) wrote how the metaphors with which western politicians 
conceptualised the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait made it extremely difficult to make 
balanced assessment of the event. Lakoff (1995) extended this type of analysis by 
suggesting that the triumph of conservatism in the America of the 1990s could be 
related to the type of metaphor in which the liberal versus conservative debate had 
been framed. Fiumara (1995) also adopts this mode of analysis. She shows that the 
way metaphor steers conceptualisation will not simply guide how we view a given 
topic but can rehabilitate unacceptable practices. An example, that Fiumara draws 
from Peters (1985), is the view of the medieval philosopher, Azo, regarding torture. 
Azo perceived torture as 'the enquiry after the truth by means of torment'. In this 
sense, 'torture' is defined through a metaphor that emphasises one of its aspects and 
not others. The writer's major interest may be to rediscover torture through torture's 
alleged purpose and not through its effect. Metaphor begins as an instinctive method 
of finding and naming concepts that are crucial to how we structure reality, such as 
reason or time, but it ends as a way to exert conscious control over those structures in 
order to foster or protect a given social order. 
A related point in respect of Azo's torture definition is how this underscores 
Johnson's (1987) view of the traditional distinction between the performance of 
logical operations upon knowledge and the drawing of that knowledge out of the 
world. In this distinction, logical manipulation is subject to its own deduced 
principles. The principles are distinct from what is being manipulated. As Fiumara 
(1995) makes explicit, bringing knowledge out of the world is often achieved by a 
definition. Definition may often work first through ostension in that it proffers an 
agreed set of features in the item in question that obtained through examples existing 
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in the world. However, even here, the formation of a category involves the 
generalisation of an object according to some features and not according to others. 
This entails that we abstract away from the specific instance of the thing towards an 
edited construction of it. In defining abstract terms, the role of metaphor is clearer. 
The definition is achieved through a metaphor that must inevitably exert some control 
over the nature of the argument into which it is set. An item cannot be extracted from 
reality as token that is untouched by the process of extraction. It is reformulated by 
the argument for whose purposes it is extracted, thus blurring the boundaries between 
the manipulative process of logical thought and the nature of what it manipulates. 
1.2.8.6 The cognitive view of metaphor: Schon's (1993) theory of 
generative metaphor 
Despite the fact that cognitive thought about metaphor was extended towards this type 
of political and sociological analysis, one should also note that this interest in how 
metaphor frames meaning originates also in the quite different philosophical 
perspective of Schon ( 1963 and 1993 ). Schon ( 1963) showed how the solution to a 
given problem, whether about social policy, or whatever, would lie in the way that the 
problem was framed. Schon (1993) discusses metaphors as 'generative' of our 
approach to the issues under consideration, showing how planning will occur 
according to how a community is conceptualised. Thus a slum may be 'a disease'. 
This metaphor will be generative of a narrative, perhaps in this case of 'blight and 
renewal' which is the construction that we place upon the subject or the slum. 
1.2.8.7 The cognitive view of metaphor: Kuhn's structure of scientific 
revolutions 
Kuhn's (1970) work on 'the structure of scientific revolutions' also illustrates a 
differently derived interest in how we conceptualise phenomena that finds common 
cause with cognitive thinking about metaphor. Kuhn ( 1970) put forward a theory 
where major shifts in paradigms or in sets of theories meant that science could not be 
perceived as a single enterprise with a unifying set of perceptions. For example, prior 
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to Copernicus, Mars and the Earth had different category membership. After 
Copernicus, they were both considered as planets (Kuhn 1993: 539). Therefore, it is 
difficult to conceive of how those who preceded Copernicus could be said to be 
talking about the same thing when they said 'Mars' as those who came after him. An 
idea that Kuhn considers wrongly attributed to him is that a medieval view of Mars 
cannot be compared to a post -Copernican one because the paradigm shift makes this 
impossible. What Kuhn in fact claims is that there is 'no neutral language into which 
these terms, Mars and Earth, can be translated for the purposes of comparison' (ibid: 
1993: 540). 
Metaphor, according to Kuhn, can be described as ostension. Ostension can be seen in 
the process by which we understand that, say, chess, draughts and backgammon have 
enough shared features to let us to assign them to a common category, games. Kulm 
argues against Boyd ( 1993) and his claim that science uses metaphor in a process he 
calls 'dubbing' which is basically using an existing term to fill a semantic space. 
According to Boyd, dubbing occurs when a known tern1 names a hitherto unknown 
phenomenon. In this sense the unknown is given expression in familiar language 
rather than in a tern1 that is expressive only of its as yet unregistered meaning, hence, 
the metaphor 'dubbing'. An example would be the aquatic term 'cuiTent' for the 
electricity in a wire. Kuhn's view is that Boyd ignores the process of ostension where 
the unifying features of a 'current' in the aquatic sense and the electrical one are 
demonstrated by the similar behaviour of each. Kuhn' s view is that this demonstration 
of common attributes will create an aquatic narrative for an electrical phenomenon. 
Such a linkage means that electricity lives in water's conceptual shadow. According 
to Kuhn (1993), scientific terminology is therefore less than purely referential in the 
way that proper names are. Boyd ( 1993 ), on the other hand, sees dubbing as a process 
occurring in language. It is the use of a known term to name what is not known. One 
can see such a process most clearly in the naming an unknown child with a name that 
has been carried by others of the same sex. The child is not given the attributes of its 
namesakes. 
Ankersmit (1993) raises an additional point in respect of Boyd's 'dubbing' version of 
scientific metaphor. This is that the over-emphasis on the dubbing aspect of metaphor 
to plug semantic gaps may underplay its literary function. In the Japanese Haiku, for 
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example, the objective is to set up plain language in such a way that it does not so 
much name the unknown or rename the known but actually withdraws words from 
their apparent specification of concrete meanings (Ankersmit 1993). 
1.2.8.8 Tine cognitive view of metaplhlor: metaphor and! the construction of 
abstract thought: the image-schematic !basis of meaning 
Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) wider implication is that the entire apparatus of abstract 
expression is metaphorically structured. Effectively, we can refer to an abstract realm 
out of phenomena that can be processed through the senses. Johnson (1987, 1989, 
1991 and 1993), Gibbs (1994) and Lakoffand Johnson (1999) have elaborated this 
into what could be termed an 'image-schematic' view of meaning. 
In essence an image-schematic view of meaning holds that we create abstract meaning 
out of the sense of ourselves as a mind within a body. Abstract meaning expresses 
itself through the functions of the body or the way in which the body situates itself in 
the world. Image schemata are the mental images that we have of ourselves as 
embodied creatures and of our embodied interactions with the physics of the world. 
We use these images to form conceptual metaphors. 
Johnson (1987) gives as an example of this the notion of 'balance'. 'Balance' is a core 
concept in logical thought. We speak of 'balanced equations', 'balanced arguments' 
and balanced 'points of view'. Yet this notion of 'balance' derives from the fact that 
in the early existence of every individual, the attainment of balance and of walking 
upright is mapped as a key concept that connotes well-being and the ability to run 
with the tribe. To be unbalanced is to fall. Balance and a concomitant aspiration 
towards symmetry can thus be rooted in an instinct to stay upright and survive. One 
might infer that, indirectly, a survival instinct govems our perceptions of logical 
argument. 
The core concept of 'balance' as it is equated with the achievement of remaining 
physically upright creates a schema or mental pattem. This schema fumishes language 
with the material out of which it can express such abstract concepts as logic. More 
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contentiously, the schema may also provide a vehicle through which new metaphors 
are understood (Gibbs 1994). For example, if we hear the phrase 'a wobbly argument' 
for the first time, we will know that it means the argument is unsound because we 
can-y within the mind a schematic association between logic or successful argument 
and balance. 
Smith ( 1990) develops an image-schematic view of logical meaning in an 
examination of the language of psychology. Smith also examines the core 
assumptions in which logical positivism grounds its flight from metaphor. 'The 
formal components of a theory need to be metaphorically 'tied' to the observable or 
empirical elements' by 'links', 'anchorings', 'chains of sentences', and 'bridge 
principles' (Fiumara 1995: 5). The irony is that logical positivism eschews metaphor 
with metaphorical language. In the same vein, Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 170-234) 
analyse the highly complicated conceptualisations of causation, examining how 
'cause' primarily has a spatial link or 'path' connecting 'states' which are thought of 
as if they were 'locations'. Thus one can be 'led from one conclusion to another' as if 
from location to location. 
1.2.8.9 The cognitive view of metaphor: the cultural specificity of 
conceptual metaphor 
There is a further area of study that has derived from the view that all abstract thought 
is expressed through conceptual metaphor. This study addresses the question of the 
extent to which conceptual metaphors are peculiar to specific cultures and languages 
or are cognitive universals deriving from the facts of human existence. Such studies 
are in an early stage but have the potential to give a clearer insight into how the 
preoccupations of a given culture at a given time will shape the way in which its 
members talk about the world. Much English expression and idiom results from 
England's maritime history, for example, 'steer, drift, cast away, be can-ied along by 
the cun-ent, be in the stream, etc.' Such idiom shows how near-extinct socio-economic 
functions can persist as a formative cultural effect. 
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Intercultural studies are a growing area of interest. Studies of time and oftime's 
expression in language (Alverson 1995 and Nu3ez et al.1997) have always been of 
particular interest to those who wish to explore the relationship between culture and 
language. This interest was aroused by Whorfs (1956) now discredited view that 
different representations of time in the Hopi language entailed a different cultural 
construction. Both Nu3ez et al. and Alverson allow that time is grounded in such 
universals as 'time is space'. However, Hindi tends towards a more cyclic 
representation (Alverson 1995). By the same token, Lakoffhas discussed a variation 
of his 'up is power' as a metaphor of social organisation (1987: 274) between Indian 
cultural conceptualisations and those of English. Yu ( 1998) has also made an 
extensive study of both the common and culturally divergent conceptualisations that 
mark English and Chinese. 
1.2.8.10 The cognitive view of metaphor: grammar as originating in 
metaphor 
The view that abstract meaning evolves largely from a limited number of image 
schemata has triggered the wider study of the relationship of language to thought that 
has assumed the title of cognitive linguistics. Perhaps, grammar is the most abstract 
form of meaning since arguably it does not suppose signs that are specifically 
meaningful but controls the combinations of the same and thus creates from them 
meanings that these signs do not individually have. 
Cognitive grammarians have set out to show how such a feature as tense is also 
metaphorically derived. Langacker ( e.g.1990 and 1994 ), Heine et al. ( 1991) and Heine 
(1997) have put forward the thesis that it is not just lexical abstract meaning which is 
derived from the physical and from our embodied being, but grammatical meaning 
also. For Langacker, a core principle of language is reification. By this is meant that 
language evolves from the underlying metaphor that conceptualises an abstract idea as 
a thing, whether animate or inanimate. Grammatical meanings and the inflections by 
which they are sometimes carried are held to derive from a process known as 
grammaticalisation (e.g. Heine and Reh 1984; Hopper and Traugott 1993). According 
to the grammaticalisation thesis, certain words become more grammatical as the 
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language evolves over time and this process is achieved by metaphor. For example, a 
preposition may begin as the metaphorical development of a noun body part, 
reflecting the orientation of the body to the world (Heine 1 997). This can be seen in a 
word such as the English 'back'. In its function as a preposition, the word, which 
represented a body part, will assume a grammatical role, specifying the meanings that 
arises from the relationship between other terms. In a final, but far from universal, 
stage the preposition may become part ofthe morphology ofthe noun, thus creating 
the case endings of inflected languages such as Latin. 
It should be stressed that the role of metaphor in language change remains contentious 
within a school of thought about language that is fundamentally cognitive. Yet a clear 
principle is the view that the study of grammar is only meaningful if it is studied 
diachronically (Heine 1 997). Only in a diachronic study can one retrieve the image-
schematic origins of grammatical inflections that appear simply as abstract expression 
of an abstract organisation when viewed outside the context of their evolution. 
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1.3 Tllle Contributions of this Thesis 
The clear and overwhelming conclusion then is that although the nature of metaphor 
is still the subject of considerable debate, it can no longer be perceived as simply 
about the study of rhetoric but needs to be addressed as fundamental to thought and 
meaning creation. Metaphor studies are reworking how we look at language and its 
relationship to thought. The consequence is that if such studies insist that we look at 
language in a different way, they must therefore have some impact upon our thoughts 
about the teaching of language and even upon teaching itself. As I will explore, that 
task has already begun, but in a somewhat fragmented way. My objective here, will 
therefore be to draw these fragmented approaches towards a more consistent frame. 
In order to achieve this objective, I will first need to develop coherent understanding 
of metaphor as a process that is fundamental to cognition. Since the manifestation of 
metaphor is predominantly linguistic, I will therefore engage in a more extensive 
analysis of the phenomenon of metaphor as it appears in language. In order to throw 
more light on this question, I will also examine related figurative devices such as 
simile, analogy and metonymy, asking how far these can be regarded as distinct or 
overlapping categories of language use. I will conclude that metaphor cannot be 
identified according to formal linguistic criteria and that therefore it should be 
construed as a sub-linguistic phenomenon or cognitive process. I will then discuss the 
nature ofthat process as it is currently construed in the literature. My objective will be 
to map out a coherent perspective from which to re-examine our approach to language 
teaching. This discussion will make the following contributions to the area: 
1) It will reinforce cognitive arguments that one cannot construct a formal 
analytic instrument to show when language is or is not metaphoric. It will do 
this by: 
e showing how different interpretations can locate metaphor in different 
parts of the same sentence 
e identifying what I call a 'ripple effect', where a metaphorical meaning 
affects the literal sense of the words around it to a diminishing degree 
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2) lt will discuss how a given genre can make a term metaphorical and that this 
can invalidate truth-condition arguments because it allows a metaphor to be 
literal (respectful of normal truth conditions) and metaphorical at the same 
time. 
3) It will explore the nature of allegory as an extended metaphor and show how it 
differs from analogy. 
4) It will analyse proverbs as 'ready-to-wear vehicles' that are provided by a 
culture to dress topics with the relational structure commonly attributed to 
analogy. 
5) It will show how the common concept of analogy is constructed out of 
proportional metaphor. The concept of proportionality can identify analogy's 
distinctive nature but may not take full account of the broader capacity of 
words to disrupt proportional metaphors with their broader sets of 
associations. 
6) It will discuss the Hallidayan concept of grammatical metaphor and 
reformulate it as a cognitive construct by: 
e arguing that the SFL (Systemic Functional Linguistic) notion of congment 
language is grounded in the direct representation of physical events and 
objects and that these representations may actually be a means through 
which abstract ideas are conceptualised 
• concluding that a nominalised grammatical metaphor may not be a 
departure from congruent language but an exploitation of its 
representations in order to deal with the conceptual challenge of cause and 
effect relationships 
7) It will follow Glucksberg and McClone (1999) by arguing that metaphors can 
be seen as class-inclusion statements and make the further suggestion that the 
pleasure we draw from them originates in the satisfaction of finding a 
taxonomic home for a strange and potentially threatening phenomenon. 
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8) It will reformulate Jakobson's (1971) concept of metonymic and metaphoric 
poles by showing a continuum of different types of meaning creation between 
them, and showing how the metonymic pole can be classified in extremis by 
the extreme condition of autism. 
1 0) It will further explore the traditional view of similarity as a basis for metaphor 
and will suggest how this might be integrated into the image-schematic 
structures proposed by such as Lakoff and Johnson (1999). 
Next, I will set out the areas in which cognitivist perspectives on metaphor are 
impacting on language teaching. I will then suggest how these can be developed 
towards a coherent way forward for language teachers that both treats the 
communicative approach as lacking a solid basis in learning theory and undermines 
generative views on second language acquisition. Broadly, I will contribute to the 
area in the following ways: 
1) I will show how cognitivist approaches to metaphor can restore the synergy lost at 
the end of the behaviourist era between the way in which languages are learnt and 
languages are constructed. 
2) I will examine how some cun·ent methods and the broader approaches that they 
realise (e.g. Silent Way, TPR -total physical response- and NLP -nemo-linguistic 
programming-) may succeed because they make an intuitive appeal to the 
metaphor-oriented cognition that this thesis depicts. 
3) I will put forward an argument that holds generative views of language acquisition 
to be in contradiction not just with cognitivist views about the relationship 
between thought and language but with the generative premise itself. 
4) I will discuss how an understanding of metaphor can help teachers to construct an 
approach that appeals to both cognition and affect. 
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Last, I will substantiate this theoretical position by showing how it could operate at a 
classroom level. I will do this by outlining classroom techniques then by adopting the 
role of participant observer in order to recount how the techniques were implemented. 
I will recount the narrative of given teaching procedure as it unfolded in class and 
then will discuss how the technique was or was not developed in the light of what 
happened. I will contribute to the development of classroom pedagogy as follows: 
1) I will describe newly formulated techniques and discuss their implementation. 
2) I will recount the impact of the techniques upon different groups of adult 
students in several types of location. 
3) I will show how these techniques can be related back to the metaphor-based 
view of abstract lexis and grammar that is being described. 
4) I will indicate how student errors can be examined from an image-schematic 
perspective. 
I may intimate that a procedure evoked a receptive response from a given group of 
students. I will also argue in favour of a particular technique because it implements 
the broader cognitivist view of language pedagogy that I am trying to construct. 
However, I will not, at this stage, make any wider, objective claim about the 
effectiveness of the method that I am putting forward. This thesis is making a 
theoretical case, both through the nature of its argument and through a demonstration 
of how this can be realised at the classroom level. Concomitantly, the range of 
techniques, locations and episodes that I discuss precludes the construction of any 
broader and more detailed classroom ethnography. The objective here will remain one 
of theory construction. 
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2 Finding a Concept of Metaphor 
2.1 What this chapter is about 
This thesis is about an approach to teaching language. As such, it suggests that 
language should be seen in a particular way. I have called that view 'metaphorical'. 
By this I do not mean that language is itself a metaphor. I mean that language is often 
a product of metaphor-making processes. The corollary of this is that the mind that 
produces language has a strong orientation towards the understanding and creation of 
metaphor. Language reveals the tendency ofthe mind to deal in metaphor. My 
objective in this chapter is to set out exactly what I mean by this. 
I begin by examining what metaphor is from the perspective of how it occurs in text. 
In order to do this, I will look at textual examples that might conventionally be called 
metaphorical. Two uses of metaphorical language that occur commonly in speech and 
writing are idioms and proverbs. I will therefore give these some consideration. 
I will also examine some other uses of language that would also be called figurative 
and which could easily be confused with metaphor. Classical rhetoricians called 
figurative uses oflanguage 'tropes'. The tropes I will examine are, metonymy, 
synecdoche and the more extended use of non-literal language that is called 'analogy'. 
This study will make a more detailed analysis in order to support the argument made 
in my introduction that, finally, metaphor must be accounted for by factors that cannot 
be explained by the formal study of language (Sadock 1993). Metaphor cannot be 
accurately described according to its peculiar textual features. I will agree with Elgin 
45 
( 1983) that any debate as to whether a use of language is metaphorical or literal is 
finally an issue of how it is judged by a given speech community. This judgement in 
turn depends upon how far a given item has come to be considered a conventional or 
normal part of a language. 
However, I will not hold with Sadock's (1993) unease about the fact that metaphor is 
common in language but not open to linguistic description. I will stress that the 
problem of identifying metaphor in text must re-emphasise its ubiquity and hence its 
importance. I will further show how this provides evidence for a cognitive perspective 
on metaphor (e.g. Langacker 1990, Gibbs 1994 and Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
The structures of language are rooted in the way we process our physical experiences 
of the world. Conceptualisation is central to these processes. Conceptualisation is the 
way we represent largely abstract phenomena to ourselves. For example, let us take 
the word 'thought'. Thought has no existence in the way physical objects such as trees 
and rocks have existence. We cannot simply perceive 'thought'. We must 
conceptualise it. Abstract ideas have to be conceptualised through other things. Seeing 
one thing through another is central to the idea of metaphor. Poetic metaphor, as when 
Shakespeare's Macbeth says that 'life is a walking shadow', can be interpreted as one 
of the clearer linguistic manifestations of the larger cognitive process through which 
abstract meaning is conceptualised. It should be treated as the more obvious linguistic 
evidence for a much more important and ubiquitous cognitive process. 
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2.2 Describing metaphors 
I begin by looking at a clear and straightforward example of what a metaphor is. I use 
this example in order to set out the language with which a metaphor would normally 
be described. I take the example: 
14 She is the world 
and in order to show why this is a metaphor, I will undertake what could be called a 
truth-condition analysis. 
2.2.1 Describing metaphors: Tarski's truth condition semantics 
According to Tarski (1956) the meaning of a statement derives from whether or not it 
refers to its normal frame of reference. In other words, a statement is true, if and only 
if, it is true (ibid). Therefore let us suppose that the speaker of example 14, points to a 
person and begins the statement 'she ... '. If the person indicated is female, then the 
word, 'she', represents a correct and meaningful use oflanguage. Now let us suppose 
that the speaker continues 'she is 20 years old'. Then the statement is meaningful, if 
the person indicated really is twenty. 
Somewhat differently, let us further imagine that the speaker does not say 'she is 20 
years old' but 'she is the world' and points to a ship. Then it is clear that this 
reference is not to a female person but to a ship. Further the ship is not the world 
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because it is a ship. This statement violates its truth conditions. Strictly it should be 
meaningless. Yet what is anomalous is that most people would find this statement 
meaningful. Thus, we can perhaps say that at root a 'metaphor' is an expression that is 
meaningless according to its truth conditions but intuitively meaningful. It is this 
recourse to an intuitive meaning that makes it so difficult for formal linguists to deal 
with metaphor. 
Elgin (1983) suggests that metaphor can be accommodated within truth conditional 
semantics. She argues that we have to acknowledge that an extended meaning can be 
true or not true according to whether or not it fits its frame of reference. Thus, 'she' in 
the English convention can be meaningful when it refers to ships. 'World' can mean a 
place that means a lot to us. Therefore if 'she' is a ship and if the ship means a lot to 
the speaker then the statement is meaningful. The problem here, is that it becomes 
very difficult to know what is an acceptable extended meaning and what is not. 
Language is thrown into exactly the semantic flux from which formal philosophy and 
linguistics tries to rescue it. 
2.2.2 Describing metaphors: the structure of a copula metaphor 
Example, 14 above, (she is the world) is 'a copula metaphor' because it consists of a 
subject and a predicate with a form of the English copula verb 'be.' Scholars of 
metaphor often take this as a prototypical metaphor. By this I mean that discussions of 
metaphor often refer to this kind of copula sentence as if it embodies what metaphors 
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essentially consist of. For example, when Wollheim (1993) begins an account of 
metaphor in painting, he does so with these examples of copula metaphor: 
15 Juliet is the sun 
Religion is the opium of the people 
No man is an island unto himself 
These are not visually represented concepts. Wollheim uses them to typify what a 
metaphor is, whether it exists in visual or verbal form. Ricoeur (1975) went further. 
He even suggested that the essence of a metaphor exists in the copula verb itself. For 
Ricoeur, the copula binds unlike elements together while keeping them apart. 'A 
world' and a 'female person' are fundamentally unlike. The copula pulls them 
together. Drawing two different things together, however, may only suggest how 
different they really are. 
When we give linguistic form to a visual metaphor we may change its nature 
somewhat. This indicates that copula metaphors do not truly represent what 
metaphors are. Later, I will discuss other problems with treating the copula metaphor 
as prototypical. For now, I follow tradition and treat copula examples as useful ways 
to define some of the language with which we talk about metaphor. 
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2.2.3 Describing metaphors: tine topnc and! tine vehicle 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, I.A. Richards (1936) described a metaphor as having two 
parts, a tenor or topic and a vehicle. The tenor is what the metaphor is about. The 
vehicle carries the meaning ofthe metaphor. Thus, in sentence 14, above, (she is the 
world), the metaphor is about 'she' and the person referred to is therefore the tenor or 
the topic. The meaning of the metaphor is carried by the term 'the world'. Therefore 
'the world' is the vehicle. 
2.2.4 Describing metaphors: the T term and the V term 
Goatly ( 1997) has language rather than meaning as his main interest. Consequently he 
talks of a T term and V term. The T term is the word by which the topic is expressed. 
The V term is the word by which the vehicle is expressed. Thus, in the example, 
'Juliet is the sun', 15, above. The T term is 'Juliet' and the V term is 'the sun'. 
2.2.5 Describing metaphors: the grounds and the G term 
Goatly ( 1997) uses another, more controversial term, grounds. There is a common 
assumption that metaphors are based on a sense of similarity. In example 15, above, a 
metaphor is created because a topic, 'Juliet', is in some way similar to the vehicle, 
'the sun'. Goatly (1997) uses grounds in order to specify the nature of this similarity. 
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In consequence, grounds can be at least partially specified, by a G term. To illustrate 
this, I will extend example 14, above, (she is the world) to make sentence 16, below: 
16 She is a new world. 
In this sentence, the grounds of the similarity between the woman and the world are 
partly specified by the insertion of an adjective 'new'. We can now assume that the 
similarity between the topic, 'she', and the vehicle, 'world' relates less to the all 
encompassing nature of 'a world' and of the person and more to their newness or 
unexplored extent. The adjective thus limits the way in which we can interpret the 
metaphor. One can argue that the G term, which is an adjective in this case, furnishes 
us with the grounds of similarity on which the metaphor is based. 
Goatly assumes that metaphors are built when a topic and vehicle share grounds of 
similarity. I will examine the question of similarity and metaphor shortly. For now, I 
wish only to stress that this assumption about grounds of similarity is more 
controversial than it might at first appear. 
2.2.6 Describing metaphors: thinking about their meaning 
Goatly (1997) uses T term, V term and G term to label the words or phrases that 
represent topic, vehicle and grounds respectively. He therefore assumes that there are 
items of language or terms representing types of meaning within a metaphor. From 
such an idea we might assume that a prototypical metaphor is not really so much 
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about saying that one meaning is another, perhaps quite different meaning, rather it is 
about saying that one term is another, perhaps quite different term. 
Cognitive linguists are interested in looking beyond what simply happens in language 
towards how we shape meanings. Their interest is in how the nature of meaning 
shapes the nature of language. Therefore a cognitive analysis of metaphor will be 
based upon categorising and describing meanings rather than terms. Of course, these 
meanings can only be satisfactorily accessed and described by language. 
2.2. 7 Describing metaphors: semantic and cognitive domains 
Semantic field analysis examines the wider field of meaning in which a given term 
operates. For example, if we were to study the word 'iron', we would also look at 
toasters, vacuum cleaners, and other items within the household tools domain (Hatch 
and Brown: 1995: 33). Cognitive linguistics have also adopted this idea of a domain 
of meaning and perhaps extended it to cover other attributes. Thus, irons have the 
function of smoothing creases in cloth. They now operate with electricity and even 
connote types of domestic servitude. If it includes such associations, the domain of a 
given word can be treated as very large. It also overlaps the domains of other words. 
In analysing metaphor and analogy, cognitive linguists (e.g. Gibbs 1994, Fauconnier 
1997, Lakoff and Johnson 1999) have used the terms source domain and target 
domain in order to explore the wider meanings that metaphors create, or out of which 
these figurative uses oflanguage are created. Thus, in 15, above, 'the sun' operates in 
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the domain of where it is: the sky. 'The sun' also operates in the domain of its 
attributes: warmth, brightness, a source of light and of life. 
2.2.8 Describing Metaphors: source domain, target domain and 
mapping 
For now, my key point concerns the role of domains in the construction of a 
metaphor. In example, 15, above, 'sun' is referred to as the source domain while 
'Juliet' is considered the target domain. In order to make the connection between the 
source domain and the target domain, another term, map is used. 
Mapping means a transfer of meanmg from one domain to another domain 
(Fauconnier 1997). According to such terminology, a metaphor, as it occurs in text, 
represents a transfer of meaning from a source domain onto a target domain. I will 
now look more closely at an example from 15, above, to make this clear. 
The source domain for the first sentence is 'the sun'. As said, the domain of' sun' 
includes the attributes of giving light to the world, of brightness and hence, perhaps, 
beauty. When the sun is mapped onto Juliet, she will have some of its attributes. Juliet 
therefore has the ability to light up the world. Thus, the source domain of the sun 
maps onto the target domain of Juliet, and a metaphor is created. 
Another feature of the terms, source domain, target domain and map is that they 
assume some directionality in the creation of meaning in metaphor. Richards ( 1936), 
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Black (1962 and 1979), Ricoeur (1975) and (Ankersmit 1993) all assume that 
metaphor works in some sense by pulling the topic and vehicle together, as if to create 
something 'new' through a process of fusion. These analyses assume the movement 
of topic and vehicle towards each other. Gibbs (1994: 217) cites two metaphors that 
support the contrary argument that metaphors map in one direction: 
16 The butcher is a surgeon 
17 The surgeon is a butcher (Camac and Glucksberg 1984) 
Sentence 16 is a statement of praise and sentence I 7 damns the surgeon in question. If 
a metaphor worked by fusing two elements together then the syntax should not affect 
the way the sentence is interpreted. Yet clearly the word order of the sentence changes 
the meaning completely. 
It should now be clear that the terms, 'source and target domain' make some very 
clear assumptions about how metaphors create meaning. These will be discussed 
again at a later point and it may prove necessary to modify the issue of directionality 
that underlies these terms. Despite, their more controversial nature, I will use the ideas 
'source domain', 'target domain' and 'map', because, throughout this thesis, I will 
reinforce the idea that metaphor, as it appears in language, represents more ubiquitous 
processes of meaning construction. Although in the first part of this chapter, I will 
look briefly at metaphor as a linguistic fonn, I will look later at how these forms 
reflect how we grasp the world we see. 
54 
2.2.9 Describing metaphors: why copula metaphors are rnot reallly good! 
examples of what metaphors are 
In the preceding section, I used some common examples of copula metaphors. I used 
this type of example in deference to a tradition of metaphor scholarship and also 
because it shows clearly the properties of what I wish to discuss. This does not mean 
that this type of structure is central to what metaphor is or even particularly common. 
Examples with the copula verb are useful because they show clearly the paradoxical 
nature of a fonn that asserts something to be true when it is clearly not. 
There are three main problems with treating copula metaphors as central or 
prototypical: 
o they are rare relative to other kinds of metaphor 
o they make falsify our conception of metaphor by using a atypical fonn to identify 
how it works and what it consists of 
o many languages cannot make copula metaphors because they do not have a copula 
verb, yet metaphor itself is universal. 
The first problem is that even in a copula language such as English, copula metaphors 
are probably not common. Brooke-Rose ( 1958) and Cameron (1997) in an 
examination of spoken data, found that, in English, verb metaphors occur more 
frequently than the noun type, of which the most explicit is the copula metaphor. 
Copula metaphors identify the topic as a subject and a vehicle as a complement. But 
the topic and vehicle can only rarely be given a grammatical identity in this way. 
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Many metaphorical sentences do not have a topic that can be identified in the lexis 
MacCom1ac (1985). 
Lastly, we need to remember that many languages do not possess a copula and there is 
no equivalence in the way copulas are used across those languages that possess them. 
Chinese and Arabic are two major languages that do not have copulas. Arabic does 
construct meanings that even without a copula can be similar to those found in 
English. However, it is arguable that a single metaphor has a larger range of 
interpretations. Consider example 18, below: 
18 Ali al assad (Ali the lion) 
18, above, could be a titular phrase, equivalent to 'Ali the lion' in English. It could be 
equivalent to 'Ali is the lion' (Mohammed AI Ali, 1996, personal communication). 
We would need a context in order to know which meaning was being intended. 
Chinese, on the other hand, would sound strange if it were to construct a similar 
phrase without the addition of a conjunction to indicate that a metaphor is meant. In 
other words, we would need an equivalent phrase to 'Ali is like a lion' in order to 
build this kind of metaphor (Jin 1995: personal communication). 
Philosophers and linguists use copula metaphors because they exemplify these 
phenomena as putting metaphor's contrastive and unusual use of meaning on display. 
However, there is a danger that this type of example may distort the nature of what is 
under discussion and result in some false conclusions as to its nature. For example, if 
we are discussing whether 'Ali is a lion' really means 'Ali is like a lion', we are 
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embarking on a discussion of what 'is/be', the copula, really means. Is it'=' or 'like', 
for example? Yet this discussion about the semantics ofthe copula is irrelevant to a 
wider construction of metaphor because metaphor occurs in all languages, whether 
they have a copula or not. 
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2.3 Metaphor as it occurs in language 
One reason to discuss a metaphor as if it were a set of meanings rather than a set of 
words is that expressions can be metaphorical without their actually having words that 
correspond to both the topic and the vehicle (MacCormac 1985). I will now discuss 
some examples where this occurs. 
2.3.1 Metaphor as it occurs in language: verlb metaphors 
Metaphors often appear to be built around an unusual use of a verb. In such cases, 
there may be no word given which represents the topic. Consider 19, below: 
19 The tall ships nodded as they passed by (author's data) 
It is clear that the word 'nodded' is not literal, because ships do 'nod' when they pass 
each other. We cannot be certain what is meant by 'nod' in this sentence. However, it 
would seem that the rocking of the ship's masts approximates to the movement of a 
'head'. We might therefore be tempted to interpret this as: 
Source domain (movement of the head)~ Target domain (the swaying ofthe ship) 
where'~' means 'maps to'. But there is no way of knowing if the metaphor really 
begins and ends with the verb. For example, in order to understand the non-literal 
meaning of 'nod' we might have to think of the ship as like a person. We might have 
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to think that the passing oftwo ships is like the passing of two people who nod 
greetings before going on their way. Although there may be a metaphorical focus on a 
particular part of speech, in this case, a verb, there is no clear idea as to whether the 
metaphor begins and ends here. Thus, the following interpretation is also arguable: 
Source domain (the nodding of two people as they walk past each other)~ target 
domain (the swaying of two ships as they sail past each other) 
Goatly ( 1997) refers to the possibility of a topic referring to a whole world. In this 
sense a topic can carry a huge chain of associations with it. One might also say the 
same for a vehicle. In a similar vein, Schon (1993) refers to the capability of 
metaphors to generate a narrative. For 19, the narrative is of two people passing each 
other and, perhaps, a gesture of recognition or greeting. Then, for me, there is a larger 
evocation of a rural world in which strangers still acknowledge each other. It is plain 
that different people will construct different narratives. The greater the detail of the 
narrative, then, the greater will be the scope for individual divergences. 
2.3.2 Metaphor as it occurs in language: adjectival metaphors 
A given source domain can also be evoked through an adjective. Consider 20 and 21, 
below: 
20 He looked well-seasoned (author's data) 
21 I'mdown 
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Arguably, sentence 20, above, works as a metaphor because 'well-seasoned' would 
normally collocate with 'timber'. We are thus comparing a male person to some of the 
attributes of an elided noun, timber. However, the point remains that a source domain 
can be evoked through an adjective as well as a verb or noun. Example 21 (I'm down) 
makes this clearer, because it does not have an easily identifiable noun reference in 
the same way as 20. 'Down' is a physical position that is here used to map onto a 
mental one. The nouns we would use to elaborate on this are not easy to identify. 
An adjective or adjectival phrase can also take on a metaphorical meaning by 
modifying a noun it would not normally describe: 
22 We heard a colourful song 
23 The charred and burnt-out smell of that time comes back to me still 
Sentence 22, above, attributes qualities normally associated with visual things to an 
auditory one. This type of example can be called synaesthetic, There is a rare 
condition called synaesthesia which means that people actually perceive sound as 
colour, perhaps on account of some malfunction in the perceptual system. 
Synaesthetic metaphors however, help all of us to understand particular sensory 
experiences through other forms. 
Sentence 23 describes a smell through the remnants of the fire that may have been its 
cause. It is also worth noting, in this respect, that 'smell' is a sensation that does not 
have a dedicated set of adjectives, in the same way as other sensations such as taste, 
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(e.g. sweet, bitter and sour) or sight (e.g. bright and dark) (Derrida 1978). The reason 
for this is difficult to determine, but may relate to how the human physiology is 
relatively poorly adapted in its sensitivity to smell, particularly as compared to some 
animals such as dogs. Hence, smell, as a secondary sense, has never developed a 
descriptive language that is unique to it. 
2.3.3 Metaphor as it occurs in language: prepositional, particle and 
adverbial metaphors 
As discussed, although a metaphor seems to focus on a given part of speech, it is far 
from certain that it can be located in that part of speech. As a descriptive linguist, 
Goatly ( 1997) has a considerable stake in relating meanings to particular expressions, 
and thus in giving a clear picture of the lexical items that a metaphor touches and 
those that it does not. In order to achieve this, he employs a notion of semantic scope. 
Scope has been commonly applied to the analysis of negative sentences in order to 
show how much of a given sentence a negative applies to. In metaphor, the issue is 
how much of a sentence can be treated as metaphorical and thus as not having its 
meaning shaped by the figure of speech that is being used. For example, the scope of 
a metaphor can be located in prepositional phrases as in 24, below, where the 
assumption is that our idea of 'knowing' is unaffected by the metaphor that follows. 
However, since 'the corner' is the metaphor for how the future obstructs our vision 
'round' does not express a spatial relationship but a temporal one. The scope of the 
metaphor therefore extends across the entire prepositional phrase. 
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24 You never know what's round the corner (ibid: 1 09) 
Prepositions can also be interpreted metaphorically when they are better interpreted as 
adverbs or particles as in 25, below: 
25 She's coming down 
Though this may also follow from the metaphorical use of the verb, as in this case 
where 'come' is not a literal expression ofmovement but of an experience ofthe 
reducing effects of a narcotic. 
By the same token, the metaphorical focus can be shifted to an adverb as in the 
example, 26, below: 
26 She swore blindly 
However, even in 26, above, there is arguably no clear limitation of metaphorical 
scope. The subject, 'she', is by implication blinded by their action in order to swear as 
one who will not be distracted by the sight of events that run contrary to what they 
assert. 
In this sense one must always detect something of what I would call a 'ripple effect' 
when discussing figurative scope. By this, I mean that there may often be a 'rippling 
out' of the metaphor from the forms in a sentence that it most clearly affects. 
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2.3.4 Metaphor as it occurs in language: adjunct metaphors 
Metaphors will also affect whole adjuncts (Goatly 1997): 
27 I consider we are making a real sacrifice when we decide to break a lance with 
these opponents (Karl Marx) 
The metaphor is one of jousting. Marx is saying that a revolutionary movement 
should not become overly distracted by the need to take on the petty instruments of 
bourgeois power such as police and justices ofthe peace. The breaking ofthe lance 
signifies wasting effort in a conflict or 'joust' with such targets when we should be 
focusing on the real objective of fostering proletarian revolution. The fact that the 
entire clause is metaphorical means that we have to find the topic of the metaphor 
through context. Arguably, the adjunct can work like a sentence, as one complete item 
of meaning that has been added to another. 
Clauses that are adjuncts are arguably able to operate as semantically self-contained 
units or as sentences that have been appended to other sentences, albeit through a 
relative pronoun. It may be that they can genuinely contain a metaphor within them in 
the way that a sentence does. 
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:2.3.5 Metaphor as it: occurs in language: sentence mdapllnors and! 
implicit metaphors 
It should be clear that a metaphor can be contained by almost any class of word or 
group of words. We cannot see it as a linguistic peculiarity that can be identified by 
certain features of linguistic structure. Just as an adjunct clause can be read as a 
metaphor, as in the example above, so also can an entire sentence. Gibbs (1994: 213) 
calls these sentential metaphors and claims they are identified because their meaning 
is not shown to be anomalous by the internal meaning but in respect of the discourse 
in which they occur. Thus, if we hear 'The guard dog growled' when we can see a 
security guard but no dog, we will assume the reference is to a noise made by the 
guard. We will also understand that if the guard performs other dog-like actions, these 
cannot be interpreted as literal, either. The following example is the translation of a 
poem or haiku by the Japanese poet, Basho: 
28 The frog jumped into the pond. (cited in Cooper 1986). 
This poem raises a number of points about metaphor. The first point is that our truth -
conditional analysis would not tell us anything about whether this statement was 
metaphorical. To apply a truth-condition analysis, we could say that 'the frog jumped 
into a pond, if, and only if, a frog jumped into a pond'. We could then assert, that 
Basho, the poet, observed a frog to do just that, therefore the statement is literal. Yet, 
one must ask why the poet wrote down this famous observation and why it has 
become something of a cultural icon. The fact that the observation constitutes a poem 
of a particular kind indicates that it is supposed to mean more than we might imagine. 
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A plain and perhaps literal statement has become a metaphor simply because it has 
been placed in a type of text or genre, which signals that everything said should be 
treated as metaphorical. Yet the genre does not invalidate the truth conditions of the 
statement on which the poem is based. 
Another difficulty is that we do not really know what the metaphorical meaning is. 
This is because we do not have a topic for the metaphor. I could discuss the echoic 
sense of a frog jumping into a still pond, of a depth that cannot be plumbed. With less 
textual justification, I could say this poem is about a thought that cannot be found 
even as I take a mental leap after it. I could discuss ideas vanishing into a dark, 
quiescent void. Yet this is sheer speculation, albeit of the kind that helps to maintain 
the discipline of literary criticism. 
Example 28, above, is a literary example of a case where an entire sentence is 
metaphorical. Yet such cases are not in anyway confined to literature. Goatly ( 1 997) 
gives the example of certain types of proverbs such as 29 and 30: 
29 Too many cooks spoil the broth 
30 A stitch in time saves nine 
Both of these statements could have been uttered in a workshop by mechanics 
repairing a car. The topic of 29 could have been the number of mechanics trying to 
repair the same car and how there were too many of them. The topic of 30 could have 
been a worn bolt that had been replaced before it broke and caused greater damage. 
Yet these topics would have been inferred out of a context rather than stated. Proverbs 
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are idioms in the sense that they are expressions that use figurative language or 
metaphor in a repeated way to represent an agreed meaning. Yet unlike idioms, 
proverbs sum up some truth about the world and are therefore intrinsically 
meaningful. 
Proverbs are ready-to-wear vehicles available to dress any appropriate topic. The 
topic for 'cooks spoiling the broth' could be a garage with too many mechanics. For 
the stitching it could be replacing a tired rivet in a mechanical device. What is clear 
also is that the proverb is not applicable to a situation because stitches are like rivets 
or mechanics like cooks. It is applicable because of the fact that sowing torn cloth will 
prevent the tear getting larger just as replacing a rivet will prevent the mechanical 
defect from getting worse. In short, the proverb can be applied to a given situation 
because it shares what Glucksberg and Keysar (1993) term a relational structure with 
it. 
Proverbs are therefore not implicit in the same sense as the poem about the frog. They 
are common sets of circumstances that our culture gives to us as available to 
generalise about other sets of circumstance with which they have a common relational 
structure. 
According to a conventional description of metaphor use, a language user would 
begin with a meaning that required description and find a metaphor if their store of 
conventionallexis was inadequate. Aristotle's famous example of this was when he 
describes how we use the word 'sow' to describe how the sun puts out flames because 
we have no specific term for that event (Ankersmit 1993). In the case of the proverb, 
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that process begins to be inverted. The metaphor pre-exists the state of affairs or 
meaning it will name. It is part of the stock of language that is held in order to consign 
a state of affairs to category of shared and cyclical experience. It protects us from the 
threatening rarity of an event. This notion, of a metaphor that pre-exists that which it 
should name, can be exaggerated still further, making the inversion of Aristotle's 
conventional process complete. 
Cox and Theilgaard (1987) give an extreme and enlightening view of this capacity of 
metaphor to find otherwise inexpressible thoughts. They used metaphor in 
psychotherapy in order to help damaged and, sometimes, psychopathic offenders find 
and come to terms with memories that might otherwise be too painful to express. It 
may be that a given idea or linguistic formulation only becomes a metaphor when it 
attaches itself to something that it can express for which it would not normally be 
used. Yet the context of the therapy session endows every term with a metaphorical 
potential, scattering our stable core of meanings into a hunt for associated ideas. 
2.3.6 Metaphor as it occurs in language: implicit metaphors using one 
word 
Implicit metaphors do not always include an entire sentence or an entire clause. They 
can simply involve a word as in example 31, below: 
31 The slime came into the room 
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This is implicit in the sense that there is no word or phrase which corresponds to the 
topic 'slime'. The metaphor is created by a disjunction between a word and a referent. 
The referent of slime is normally a slippery organic substance. This referent is in fact 
a person. The referent is outside the sentence, perhaps in another part of the text, or 
even outside the text and pointed to by it. 
2.3. 7 Metaphor as it occurs in nanguage: metaphors beyolllld sentences: 
allegory 
A single metaphor can extend far beyond a sentence. A common literary device that 
exploits this capability is an allegory. Arguably, an allegory frames all the events of a 
story inside an extended metaphor. Like Gibbs (1994), I can make this clear with a 
famous 20111 century, English Allegory, George Orwell's Animal Farm. The 
underlying metaphor of animal farm is quite clear, it is that 'a farm is a pre-
revolutionary society'. 
A metaphor has specific entailments (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). When a metaphor 
has an entailment, we are saying that if a given source domain maps onto a target 
domain, the constituents of that source domain may also map onto the constituents of 
a target domain. For example, when thinking about Orwell's allegory, we know that 
most English farms have animals and a farmer, who is often the owner. The farmer is 
therefore a constituent of the source domain. Marx tells us that a pre-revolutionary 
society will have a ruling class which owns capital and an oppressed class that do not 
own capital and do not gain the full benefit of their labour. Therefore an entailment of 
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Orwell's metaphor would be that the fam1er is the capitalist because he owns the 
farm. The fann is the capital because owning it gives the farmer his income. The 
animals are the revolutionary proletariat because they own nothing. Those who 
understand Marxist revolutionary theory can then suppose that the animals will wrest 
control of the farm from the farmer just as the proletariat will wrest control of capital 
from the capitalists. 
Of course, not all the events of the book can be understood as entailments of the basic 
metaphor. However, it is clear that the main thrust of the action will be. For example, 
the emergent leader of the revolution is a pig. Those who understand the basic 
metaphor of the story will understand that the pig is not just a pig. Those who know 
the post-revolutionary history of Russia might assume that a revolution produces a 
brutal and cynical leader. Inside the farm metaphor, the entailment is that the leader of 
the revolution should be an animal that incites disgust. 
The 'current opinions' shared by the speech community as to the possible meanings 
of given term were called endoxa by a given speech community (Black 1979: 28). I 
would argue that endoxa are encompassed by a domain of meaning. Although many 
societies eat pigs, they also attribute unjust feelings of disgust to these animals. Pigs 
are dirty, slovenly, overweight and glutinous. A less traditional observation is that 
they are cunning and intelligent. Pigs have quite an extensive domain of meaning. 
Therefore, in Animal Farm, a core metaphor entails another: 'the leader is an animal 
that incites repugnance'. The pig is a common metaphor with an extensive endoxa of 
disliked attributes. The core metaphor of the farm is maintained but a satellitic animal 
metaphor is set up with its own set of entailments. 
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Allegories are stories that are structured out of the entailments of a core metaphor. 
Allegory is a genre that frames a text in such a way as to make everything within it 
and every described event open to a non-literal interpretation. Two other more 
fundamental points can be made: 
1) Readers or listeners do not need to challenge how they are operating in an 
extensive metaphor where little is allowed to be literal, they are content to operate 
in a metaphorical realm. 
2) An allegory is a fiction that is constructed to convey a specific message, yet the 
nature or force of that message can be extended through the entailments of the 
metaphor. 
This last ability of a metaphor to find meanings with which its author may not have 
set out leads us to a similar but much more ubiquitous form of extended metaphor, the 
analogy. 
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2.4 Analogy 
An allegory is an analogical fiction. An allegory is quite a rare literary form that has 
the properties of an analogy. An allegory begins with a metaphor, 'the farm is a pre-
revolutionary society', for example, that confers a metaphorical significance on 
everything that occurs within its frame and upon all its actors. An analogy also begins 
with a metaphor then explores the entailments and inferences of that metaphor. It is 
not a constructed narrative genre, however. The narrative of an analogy represents a 
much broader approach to problem solving. Allegories are analogies but analogies are 
not necessarily allegories. Analogies are associated, not with a simple mapping of one 
term onto another but with a more extended exploration of the similarities between 
the same. Consider example 32, below: 
32 'Expatiation' is the key to language they believe, the adaptation of an existing 
structure for a new purpose. The spandrels in the San Marco cathedral in 
Venice are used to demonstrate this point. Spandrels are the inevitable by-
product of mounting a dome on rounded arches which are placed at right 
angles to one another: they are the tapering triangular spaces formed between 
the arches. In the cathedral, these have been adorned with eye catching and 
delightful paintings: one, for example, depicts a seated evangelist above a 
slender water pourer. So stunning are these murals, that they are often the first 
thing noted by a visitor, who might as a first impression assume that the pillars 
and dome were designed purely as a mounting for the paintings. On, second 
thoughts, however, it becomes clear that the spandrels were a by-product of 
the cathedral's basic design, and the murals must have been a lucky 
afterthought. 
So according to the 'language is a spandrel' view, language is an ingenious 
afterthought, something which made use of a pre-existing powerful brain. 
(Aitchison 1996: 74). 
In this quotation, Jean Aitchison is putting forward a quite popular theory in the 
evolution of language. This theory can be expressed by the metaphor 'language is a 
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spandrel.' It should now be clear that we use metaphors so that the vehicle will tell us 
something about the topic. Just as when I say something about language in the 
sentence 'language is complicated' so I will set up a similar expectation when I say 
'language is a spandrel'. Yet, at first sight, this is not a very successful metaphor. A 
spandrel is not a word that is generally known. Even if someone knew enough to say 
that a spandrel was an essential structural item in some buildings that had assumed a 
decorative role, this still would not reveal a great deal. Therefore Aitchison spends the 
first part ofher act of analogy construction on describing the analogy's 'source 
domain'. The analogy is then given as a metaphor 'language is a spandrel'. 
The core metaphor is 'language is a spandrel'. Yet a spandrel is a feature of a building 
that bears no superficial resemblance to language. This lack of surface similarity 
between a topic and vehicle can be regarded as the first hallmark of an analogy 
(Gentner and Jeziorski 1993: 450). 
The question that then arises is how we should describe the nature of the relationship 
between the two domains. The analogy may arise from the metaphor where a spandrel 
is mapped onto language. A metaphor 'language is a spandrel' means almost nothing. 
The analogy arises when the writer expresses the parallelism between two logical 
arguments or narratives about two quite different things (Gentner and Jeziorski 1993). 
I illustrate this parallelism in figure 1, below: 
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Spandrel ~ 
spandrels look like a 
purpose-designed part of Q 
the decorative fabric of a 
building 
spandrels are actually 
making a decorative use of rl 
features designed for a L....:;t 
structural purpose 
inference 
Figure 1 
Language 
language seems integrated 
into a purpose designed 
structure of mind 
the evolutionary principle of 
expatiation: phenomenon are 
used for purposes for which 
they did not evolve 
the brilliant complexity of 
language makes it look as if it 
is using purpose-designed 
structures when really it is 
using those designed for quite 
different purposes 
We are saying that because language is a spandrel there will be an equivalence 
between the arguments we can make about language and the arguments we make 
about spandrels. The argument of the source domain and the argument of the target 
domain have matching logical structures. This could be summarised as follows: x 
(spandrels or language) seems to bey (a key part of the architecture of neurology or a 
building) but x is not y (language is not a key part of our neurology just as spandrels 
are not key parts of buildings). This match between the arguments of the domains of 
an analogy constitutes another core feature of how analogies are constructed. It is this 
systematicity in the relationship between the domains which is one of the accessible 
features of analogy as opposed to metaphor (Winston 1980). 
At first sight, it may sound like a surprising claim to suggest that an analogy allows us 
to think what we could not have thought of. However, we should remember that we 
have already shown how metaphors may exist in an implicit fonn, as proverbs, or 
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proverbial-like statements, waiting to track down and formulate ideas that might not 
otherwise find full expression. This quality of a successful analogy is its ability to 
provide an inference about the target domain. 
The inference that we draw from the source domain of a 'spandrel' is that a structure 
can completely disguise the function for which it was designed by adopting another 
role. In the 'language is a spandrel' analogy, the inference is not very powerful 
because it does not itself produce the idea that it expresses. It does not enable us to 
think what we could not otherwise think of. 
A more powerful example of the capacity of analogy to open paths to new ideas or at 
least to understand a subject from another perspective is provided by Holyoak and 
Thaggard (1995) and their analysis of the Galilean proofthat the earth could be in 
motion. An assumption was that dropping a stone from a tower proved the earth was 
not moving because a stone dropped from the top of a tower would fall to its base. 
Galileo showed this assumption to be flawed with an analogy whose core metaphor 
can be analysed as 'the world is a ship'. He argued that when you dropped a stone 
from the mast of a moving ship, the stone fell at the base of the mast. Therefore, by 
the same argument, the ship was not moving when everybody knew that it was. 
(Holyoak and Thagard 1995). Clearly there is no object or surface similarity between 
'the world' and 'a ship.' However, Galileo discovered a systematic set of relationships 
between an action performed in the world and in the ship. He further suggested a set 
of causative relationships in one domain, which mimicked those in another. Arguably, 
such causative parallelism makes the analogy more powerful (Tversky 1977). It is 
important to understand that this is not to say that an event in the source domain is 
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causing an event in the target domain. The point is that if the target domain and the 
source domain both have a structure that could be described as 'tf x happens then y', 
then they will establish a more systematic set of relationships (Gentner and Jeziorski 
1993). 
In our first example of' spandrels' and 'language' the development of parallel 
causative structures is less apparent. In Galileo's analogy, the relationship between 
the structures ofthe two domains is clearly symmetrical. Figure 2 may make this 
clear. 
Source 
ship !'¥ ¥ Ill Ill> 
drop an object from a ~ 
mast and the object falls 
at the base of the mast 
therefore the ship is 
not moving 
but everybody knows 
the ship is moving 
therefore this 
argument is flawed 
Figure 2 
Target 
world 
drop an object from a 
tower and the object 
falls at the base of the 
tower 
therefore the world 
is not moving 
therefore this argument 
is flawed 
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In both the source domain and the target domain of this analogy the logical structures 
are virtually parallel. There is an observation, the fall of an object in what appears to 
be a vertical trajectory, and a false conclusion drawn from it. There is evidence to 
show that adults generally prefer analogies that have this match in their relational 
structure (Gentner and Ratterman 1991). 
The Galilean example also shows how the source domain of an analogy may have 
attributes that the target domain does not. These attributes can be used to explore the 
target domain. It is a case of putting arguments in a novel context in order to see them 
better. In this case, that attribute is the fact that the movement of a ship can be 
observed. 
Analogues are often used to explore difficult arguments because they find new 
features which are not evident in the target itself. We can then use our capacity for 
inference to attribute those features to the obscurer nature of the target. This is why, 
for example, physics teachers will so often begin an elementary discussion of a 
difficult and unobservable phenomenon such as electricity by likening its behaviour to 
that of water. We even use aquatic language 'current' or 'flow' to discover the 
attributes of electricity that cannot be seen or conceptualised in another way. 
2.4.1 Analogy: analogies, models and isomorphic relationships 
Holyoak and Thaggard (1995) also discuss how analogies can be perceived as similar 
to models because of the isomorphic relationship between their two domains. An 
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isomorphic relationship means that when we perform an operation upon one 
component of a domain, the effect will be the same as if we perform it upon the other 
domain. For example, the items 'temperature' and 'mercury' have an isomorphic 
relationship. A change in temperature will affect a contraction or expansion of 
mercury such that the former phenomenon can be used to measure the latter. 
A model and its subject, should have an isomorphic relationship. Thus, engineers may 
model the hull of a ship and put it in a wave tank. They will do this because they 
assume that the behaviour of the model when stmck by waves will be the same as that 
of a much larger but equally proportioned object, provided that the ratio of the wave 
size and force to the boat's size is maintained. Or, put very simply, if a model that has 
a draught of six centimetres is capsized by a wave of twelve centimetres we can 
imagine that the same craft with a draft of six metres will be capsized by a wave of 
twelve metres. 
This isomorphic relationship is what allows the capacity of analogy for inference. 
Thus, we can infer that the six metre craft will be capsized by a twelve metre wave 
without having to build it in the way that Galileo inferred something about the 
unobservable movement of the earth by modelling it as the observable movement of a 
ship. 
It should further be said that analogies are not models, though sometimes the 
distinction is blurred. A model is conceptually parasitic upon the thing that it models. 
We identify the model boat as a model because it is a scaled-down version of a larger 
and more useful object. However, Galileo's boat remains itself even as it becomes an 
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analogue ofthe earth. It is not a model world by virtue of the experiment to which it 
plays host. 
The fact than an analogue can take visual or concrete form does not make it a model 
either. For example, a young child may say that a cardboard box is a boat, sit in it, 
push it across the floor and call this rowing. The box now has an isomorphic 
relationship with an imaginary boat. If the box moves, the boat moves. We can 
deduce that the floor across which the box travels is the sea and the carpet to which it 
comes is the shore. However, the box is still finally a box and has an identity that is 
not a product of the object that it may be asked to imitate. 
The example of the box reinforces one other more general point about analogy and 
metaphor. Analogy and metaphor are not necessarily verbal phenomena. The child 
names the box as a boat more with actions than with words. The analogue is created 
by the use to which it is put. The mapping of a box onto a boat is visual, or functional 
(on the grounds of the box's and the boat's shared capacity of containment) not verbal. 
2.4.2 Analogy: proportional metaphor 
It is also important to realise that metaphors can be distinguished on the grounds of 
how they may or may not lend themselves to development as analogies. Ortony 
(1993) suggests that there is a difference between a proportional metaphor and a 
similarity metaphor. Ortony's ( 1993) example of a proportional metaphor is given in 
33, and of a similarity metaphor in 34, both below: 
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33 My head is an apple without a core (Billow 1975) 
34 The man is a sheep 
The argument is that the topic, 'my head', in 33, above, is not being likened to either 
the attributes ofthe apple or the core. It is the relationship between the components of 
the vehicle, 'apple without a core', or one of the absence of a centre, which is being 
mapped onto the topic. 
I have also discussed how proverbs such as 'a stitch in time saves nine' also map 
relationally onto their target domain, as proportional metaphors or analogues. For 
example when a mechanic advises an apprentice that 'a stitch in time saves nine' they 
are not asserting a similarity relationship between sowing and car mechanics, but a 
proportional relationship between the consequences of not completing one action in 
time to stave off worse consequences. According to this view, we can modify our last 
argument that proverbs are vehicles looking for a topic and perceive them more 
precisely as analogues in search of a situation with which they can establish a 
proportional relationship. 
Fmther, there is a view that proportional metaphors extend into analogies more 
successfully because they are, from the outset dependent on a match between the 
arguments of their domains (Paivio and Walsh 1993). Thus, example 33, above, (my 
head is an apple without a core) depends on the common absence of a core or centre 
from both the apple and the head. Yet this argument may require some qualification 
for two reasons. First, if the metaphor depends on the relation between the two 
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constituents in the source domain, it should never be gravely altered by a change in 
the identity of the two constituents. Second, if proportional metaphors are the basis of 
analogy then similarity metaphor should not be readily extensible into analogy. 
In respect of my first point, if we consider example 35, below, we will find that the 
relationship between the constituents of the source domain, 'the chocolate' and 'its 
centre', is the same as between the relationship between 'an apple' and 'its core'. 
However, the meaning of the metaphor alters somewhat. The fact is that although the 
relationship between the constituents may be salient, the nature of the constituents 
will alter the manner in which the topic is being addressed. 
35 My head is a chocolate without a centre 
I could find an allusion to insanity in this metaphor, of a head that is about to melt and 
reveal its latent hollowness. Alternatively, it could be a description of a person who is 
admitting that they are appetising or attractive but intellectually empty. The point is 
that a given lexical domain will carry with it, varying sets of associations. Metaphor, 
itself, testifies to how we can highlight and suppress very different features in the 
domain of a given item of lexis. A domain cannot be semantically ring fenced so that 
it is reduced to a relational token in the power play of a proportional metaphor. 
Proportionality can never be more than an issue of salience in the description of 
metaphor. 
The second point is that we are perfectly capable of developing similarity metaphors 
as analogies. The question: 'why is that man a sheep' could invite a long saga that 
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mapped a series of relational behaviours between the sheep and the man. For 
example: the sheep follows other sheep, the man follows other men; the sheep gets 
lost when the other sheep get lost, the man gets lost when other men get lost- etc. 
This is not to deny that an analogy rests in the matching of relationships between the 
constituents of its source and target domains. Rather, I am saying that analogy rests 
more broadly on the manner in which the arguments of the domains are developed 
and that this may partially be dependent upon the wider frame of reference they 
evoke. The analogy does not rest in the nature of the metaphor from which it has been 
developed, even if some metaphors lend themselves more easily to analogical 
development. Finally, I suspect that an analogy lies not in the nature of the 
comparison being made but in the purpose to which it is put and the manner in which 
this draws upon the different constituents ofthe source domain. For example, there is 
nothing in the domains of the ship and the earth that could lead one to predict the way 
in which Galileo would use them. 
2.4.3 Analogy: conclusions 
To sum up the issue of analogy and metaphor: 
I) All analogies arise from a metaphor, or a basic mapping between two domains 
2) Not all metaphors are analogies 
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3) In order to become an analogy, the domains of the metaphor need development in 
an isomorphic parallelism from which inferences can be drawn 
4) It is possible that all metaphors have the capacity to be developed as analogies 
(those who doubt this can try a parlour game where the players are asked to 
develop an analogy out of randomly matched nouns). Whether or not a metaphor 
is developed into an analogy must depend on the purpose for which it is coined. 
5) There is evidence to show that interlocutors will find analogies more satisfactory 
ifthey are developed in such a way as to show a match in the relational structure 
of each of the domains (e.g. Gentner and Ratterman 1991) 
6) Analogies and models share the property of isomorphism in respect of their target 
domain, but models are conceptually parasitic upon the target. A model explores 
the potential behaviour of that which it models. Analogies furnish their target 
domain with a context inside which that domain can be perceived anew. 
7) Our capacity to draw inferences about the target domain from the source domain 
gives analogy a powerful role in how we argue and reason about the world. 
Inference allows us to reason about what we cannot know directly as a result of 
the events that we do perceive. We can have a physical experience of movement 
in a ship. We can never perceive the movement of the earth. Therefore we must 
infer features about the movement of the earth from the movement of a ship. 
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In sum, analogy can be an important tool in the development of thought, and its 
proper expression must be an essential part of the remit of those who foster language 
development as a key to all education. 
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2.5 Marked metaphors and elliptical similes 
In this section, I would like to consider another more conventional and easily 
identifiable form of lexico-grammatical marking for metaphor, one which accords 
with conventional grammatical analysis. 
A metaphor can have an explicit marker which actually employs the term 'metaphor' 
or some near equivalent (Goatly 1997). Thus, one can qualify a statement with 
'metaphorically' or 'figuratively', 'figuratively speaking'. One can also use phrases to 
indicate that one is speaking in an unusual way, as in 'so to speak.' Such insertions, 
though not uncommon, are very much a metalinguistic afterthought with which a 
speaker disambiguates what they have just said. 
Another more common use of language that may mark a metaphor is the insertion of 
'like' or 'as' between the topic and the vehicle. However, according to a traditional 
rhetorical analysis, this turns the metaphor into another type of trope, namely a simile, 
as in 36 below: 
36 And when it (love) is irrevocable, it is one way, like the path of a star (DH 
Lawrence). 
3 7 Irrevocable love is the path of a star 
38 Irrevocable love is like the path of a star 
Employing a truth condition argument about simile, one can hold that 36, above, is 
not anomalous (Davidson 1979). One can say that love is like the path of a star 
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provided it is like that. 37, on the other hand, challenges conventional analysis as 
'love' is not 'the path of a star'. Therefore in order for 37 and 38 to be meaningful one 
must first change it them into a simile as in 36. According to this argument, a 
metaphor is meaningful if it is construed as a simile. Metaphors should therefore be 
seen as elliptical similes (ibid). 
Support for this conclusion could be drawn from the way in which a language such as 
Chinese may require an expression of similarity in place of the copula it does not have 
if it is to build an equivalent type of expression. 
Another, rather different, conclusion could be that the copula 'is' in 37 (love is the 
path of a star) can in fact mean 'is like'. Support for this conclusion would lie in the 
fact that a copula in a given language can have a variety of meanings. In 39, below, 
for example, the reference is to a state that in all probability will not endure, whereas 
in 40 it is to one that will probably continue: 
39 He is in his room 
40 The sea is deep 
The difference in meaning is great enough for it to be signified in Spanish and 
Portuguese by the use of two different verbs: 'ser and estar'. The example makes clear 
how the English copula is used to represent different meanings. Therefore, if the 
English copula is polysemous, there is no reason why it should not include amongst 
its meanings the concept of resemblance as well as equivalence. 
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2.5.] lLiteral and Metaphorical Similarity 
However, there are some quite powerful arguments to suggest that not all similes are 
marked metaphors. Gentner and Jeziorski (1993) distinguished between two types of 
similarity, a literal and a metaphorical one. Thus, a literal similarity would exist on 
the basis of shared visual or physical attributes. It would posit two domains sharing 
features of their construction or their appearance. This is illustrated by example 41, 
below. A metaphorical similarity on the other hand, as in 42, below, does not posit 
such a sharing of visual or physical structure: 
41 The house is like the one in Spain. 
42 This house is the one in Spain 
43 This house is like a sliced melon 
44 This house is a sliced melon 
This distinction can be made clearer by the fact that if 'like' is omitted from 41, the 
sentence will change its meaning as in 42, both above. On the other hand, if we do the 
same thing with 43, we will produce a metaphor as in 44, with a meaning that may 
only change in its emphasis (ibid). 
However, Kittay (1987) has contested the basis of this distinction. A problem is that 
similarity should suppose a relationship that is in some sense constant, rather as a 
relationship of equality or inequality is constant. 
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2.5.2 Simile: constructing a model of similarity 
Goodman (1972) remarked how all things have trivial common properties, if only by 
the fact ofbeing things. Tverski (1977) produced a model where the similarity of two 
items is a not just function of the features that they share but also takes into account 
the weighting given to these features. This model would ensure that one house could 
be declared similar to another because the styles of the roofs, the windows and the 
nature ofbuilding materials were shared. If these features can be considered important 
or prominent then the similarity would be strong. Equally, it would be hard to find 
much that was prominent or shared between a slice of melon and a house. Therefore 
the coefficient of similarity would be low. Working with the same example, we would 
not say that the notion of one house being similar to a melon would be only against 
very loose criteria related to shape. It should be clear that the problem with Tverski' s 
theory in respect of metaphors or figurative similes is that it is an issue of individual 
judgement how one weights the prominence of features in any two items and the 
extent to which one finds them similar. 
The problem becomes more acute where the similarities are sought between an 
abstract topic and a concrete vehicle. Accordingly, in Cooper's (1986) example, 45, 
below, 'eternity' may not have either the structural or visible properties from which 
the grounds of a similarity relationship can be deduced, a point that Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) make in respect of the expression given at 46: 
45 Eternity is a spider (cited in Cooper 1986) 
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46 Love is a journey (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) 
Such statements are not capable of having a pre-established set of similarity 
relationships, arguably because the features of an abstract idea must be conceived 
within those of a concrete one. In other words, if eternity is similar to a spider, it is 
because the creator of the metaphor chooses it to be. 
2.5.3 Simile: metaphors as class inclusion statements 
One way round this problem would be to perceive a metaphor as an assertion of a 
similarity relationship, rather than as a discovery of one that really exists. This idea is 
not entirely distant from Glucksberg and Keysar's (1993) view, reinforced in a recent 
paper of Glucksberg and McGlone (1999), that metaphors are in fact class inclusion 
statements. One could simply push this idea a little further and state that some forms 
of class inclusion statement are in fact category assertions. By category assertion, I 
mean a statement where the language user is stating that item 'x', 'a bear', for 
example, belongs to a class or category 'y', brown bears, for example. 
We relate to the world by creating taxonomies where its phenomena are arranged into 
categories of varying specificity. The need to make category judgements is crucial to 
human and also to animal survival. Fish, for example, will learn to recognise that 
some other species are unfit to be eaten on account of their bright colouring (Holyoak 
and Thaggard 1995). When unknown phenomena are brought within a category 
hierarchy, they are brought inside a framework of knowledge. This is a key to 
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survival. It is a case of knowing that a person is without hostile intent and can be 
admitted to a group under the category of 'friend'. To assign category, of whatever 
kind, is tantamount to bringing a phenomenon within a knowledge structure which 
will determine the kind of treatment it should receive. Forms and sensations that are 
unassigned will threaten with their arbitrariness and unpredictability. 
According to Brown (1958: 140), a metaphor is a form of subordinate category 
relation (cited in Glucksberg and McClone 1999: 1542) except that the superordinate 
category is given the name of another. Examples 47 and 48, below, should make this 
clear. 
47 Love is a direction which excludes all other directions (D.H Lawrence. Author's 
data) 
48 Love is an emotion 
The argument is that sentences 4 7 and 48 are doing roughly the same thing. Each is 
attributing a class to the their subject. In 48, the class is an 'emotion'. This idea is 
quite normal. Love will normally be included in this category. Few would dispute 
that. In 47 'direction' would not normally be the superordinate category for 'love' but 
for a point of the compass. Therefore 4 7 is an assertion of common category 
membership for the topic and vehicle, in this case a sense of movement towards a 
point. This category would normally be assigned to something else and that is why I 
use the term 'assertion'. A language user is attributing 'class' to items against the 
norms of a language community. They are asserting a relationship that we may not 
have seen as existing. 
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Because category formation is intertwined with survival and with knowing the world, 
it would follow that the achievement of a category relation is satisfying. Metaphor, 
particularly a poetic or artistic use of metaphor, is associated with the location and 
classification of phenomena that may have hitherto been unrecognised. When we find 
an item a taxonomic home, we know where it belongs and are therefore no longer 
puzzled or alarmed by its strangeness. This relief at finding a cognitive space for the 
unknown may account for the pleasure engendered by metaphor. 
However, class inclusion arguments still leave us with the problem as to why this 
assignation of a category is acceptable and comprehensible. Class inclusion 
arguments instead of asking whether metaphors are understood through a similarity 
judgement must pose the same question to all class inclusion statements. In short, the 
issue of what is meant by similarity is simply transposed to the wider issue of a 
category judgement. 
In the metaphor, 'my job is a jail', 'job' and 'jail' are placed in ' the common 
category of something confining and unpleasant' (Glucksberg and McGlone 1999: 
1542). The sharing of category may constitute the basis of the metaphor. Yet the 
problem is then one of why this category can be successfully shared and whether this 
sharing of a category does not itself constitute the specification of the grounds of a 
similarity relationship. 
It could be that when a speaker says that 'Juliet is the sun' they are asset1ing that 
Juliet belongs to the sun category because she holds the property of 'brightness' in 
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common with that star. We are in fact invoking a similarity relationship in order to 
strengthen the assertion we have made. We do so because similarity relationships 
have huge significance for us, one rooted in our survival. This is not the same as 
saying the topic and vehicle are similar, rather, that the metaphor is partially creating 
the grounds of similarity that it employs (Camac and Glucksberg 1984 ). Further, we 
can accept that in the case of many metaphors the grounds for these similarities are 
not immediately apparent. The metaphor stands for an assertion that a similarity 
relationship exists and that its particularities should be explored. The success of the 
metaphor may depend upon the strength of the relationship that is discovered and this 
will in turn depend upon the other sets of similarity relations that we have stored and 
schematised. 
The belief that metaphor is stronger than simile is a traditional feature of rhetorical 
analysis that roots in Aristotle's work, the Rhetoric (Gibbs 1994). By this argument, a 
simile is hedging its act of class inclusion. Saying 'Juliet is like the sun' would put 
Juliet more on the periphery ofthe class of'suns' or brilliant objects that she is held 
to belong to. 'Like' is a kind of qualification. Juliet is 'like' this class of solar objects, 
not part of it. 'Juliet is the sun' insists that we situate her inside the category itself 
making a stronger assertion that we must look for the grounds of her belonging to it. 
One might take this further and ask if metaphors are not in fact mimicking the 
features of a class inclusion statement in order to create a sense of category 
membership, where the real grounds for this are weak. As I have said, conferring 
category membership upon strange phenomena is an act that is fundamental to our 
survival. Giving category membership to an item, saying an animal is a horse for 
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example, entails suppressing the features that mark it out as different from other 
horses. On the other hand, to say that something is simply 'like a horse' is to allow it 
to retain a greater sense of its individuality. In this sense, I could say that similes are 
exclusive in that they assert the integrity of the items being compared. Conversely, 
metaphors are inclusive in that they compromise the integrity of their domains by 
asserting that the target should be reduced to certain features that permit its inclusion 
inside the source domain. 
2.5.41 Simile: problems with similarity-based theories of metaphor 
The class-assertion argument encounters an immediate problem. Metaphors may be 
an assertion of 'class' that engenders a similarity relationship but the source and target 
domains of many successful metaphors do not seem to share any basic similarities. 
The metaphor 'love' and 'a journey' for example, have no grounds for similarity 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999) even though one may be likened to the other or be 
attributed to the class of the other in the metaphor 'love is a journey'. 
Yet the argument that 'love' and a 'journey' are not similar may be to over-simplify 
our notion of similarity and resemblance. Such metaphors may be what Glucksberg 
and Keysar ( 1993) call proportional in that they are based on a sharing of argument 
structures by the source and target domain. Thus, love departs from a 'beginning' and 
achieves a destination just as a journey does. The two domains have matching 
arguments. These matches are grounds for a similarity relationship, though the match 
is conceptual not visual. Now, it is true that there is no way of seeing 'love' in this 
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way before it is conceptualised in space as a kind of journey. Love is a relationship, 
not a walk in the park. But once we assert that the similarity relationship is there then 
we give ourselves means to chart the matching arguments that insist the source 
domain is somehow like the target domain. 
A further problem raised by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) about similarity is that even 
when a source domain and a target domain do share a similarity relationship, we do 
not make this relationship into the basis of how we use the two terms (ibid). For 
example, a metaphor that commonly enters many, if not all, languages, is 'knowledge 
is sight'. Thus, we commonly substitute the verb 'see' for the verb 'know' or 
'understand' as when we say 'I see' after grasping some point. Furthermore we could 
argue that 'see' and 'know' do share a similarity relationship as our strong 
predisposition to visual processing means that 'knowledge' is largely confirmed 
through 'sight'. However, there is no sense of similarity in the actual usage as one 
cannot literally 'see' what somebody 'means' (ibid). 
It is undoubtedly the case that we do not 'see' what 'somebody means' yet it would 
appear to be the case that we talk as ifwe can. Arguably, we talk as if we can because 
our sense of a similarity between the fields of knowing and seeing has facilitated our a 
transfer of information about 'sight' to 'knowledge'. In short, if knowledge is similar 
to sight then the things that we can know can be treated as the things that we can see. 
Another problem summarised by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) is that a given item, such 
as marriage, cannot be similar to two totally different phenomena at the same time. 
Thus, ifwe agree the truth of a statement such as 'marriage is a business partnership', 
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we would be unable to find meaning in 'marriage is children' because marriage could 
not be similar to two such different things and remain the same thing (ibid). 
However, this last assertion may over-identify a similarity relationship with an 
equality relationship. It is obvious that when 'x' equals 'y' and 'y' does not equal 'z' 
then 'x' does not equal 'z'. Yet it is not obvious that when 'x' is similar to 'y' and 'y' 
is similar to 'z' then 'z' is similar to 'x'. For example, sentences 49-51, below, show 
clearly how a given item 'my house' can be similar to two other items that are not 
similar to each other. This is because different features are used to construct the 
similarity relationship. 
49 My house is like Julie's because our walls are the same 
50 My house is like Helen's because the doors and windows are the same 
51 Helen's house is not like Julie's because neither the walls, the doors or the 
windows are the same and Helen's house is largely timber while Julie's is largely 
brick. 
Therefore, my conclusion is that we cannot hold the topic and vehicle of a metaphor 
to share abstract or visual features such that they can be said to have a pre-existing 
similarity relationship. However, I can argue that we are as a species motivated to 
seek out such relationships by our need to form categories. A metaphor acts as a 
trigger to that search and its success engenders the satisfaction that can only come 
from having afforded a conceptual home to the strange and the unknown. 
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Such a process may make it seem difficult to understand how we can as a species or 
as one of its tribes agree upon the similarity structures that a given metaphor will 
evoke. In short, we can quite often agree that one metaphor works whereas another 
does not. The solution here is to suggest that we have common patterns of mind that 
will help us to find the same sets of similarities among those divergent things. These 
will be discussed in section 2.8, below. 
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2.6 Grammatical metaphor 
I have put forward the notion that it may not be possible satisfactorily to identify or 
describe metaphor according to formal linguistic criteria. However, one form of 
metaphor may be closely related to the type of grammatical expression from which it 
is held to emerge. 
We should first note that in some grammars the aspiration is to deduce form as an 
abstract set of principles that generate meaning through the systems they impose. This 
is true ofChomsky's generative grammar (e.g. Chomsky 1959, 1965 and 1985). A 
quite different analysis would hold that a grammar evolves from the types of meaning 
that a language is seeking to express. The SFL (systemic functional linguistic) 
analysis of grammar is such an approach. The notion of grammatical metaphor 
derives from the desire to account for a linguistic anomaly as identified by an SFL 
approach where the grammatical role of an item is determined by the class of meaning 
that it has. This anomaly does not apply to metaphor generally, though SFL theory 
can be extended to account for that. It applies to something that happens within 
grammar, as it is understood by SFL. In order to explain and examine grammatical 
metaphor, I first need to summarise the basis of the SFL approach to language. 
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2.6.1 Grammatical metaphor: fundamentals of the §FL (systemic, 
functional, linguistic) position: Field, Mode and Tenor 
First, the SFL view is that a grammar is a product of the meanings that a given 
language is trying to express. A language itself should be perceived as a 
representation of the meanings that the members of a given society wish to represent 
so that they can communicate them to each other. Because a society will also furnish 
the context in which a given communication occurs and from which its meanings are 
derived, a language and its context are inextricable (Thompson 1996). A social 
context and a language affect each other (Lemke 1995). A social context is structured 
by language, and structures language in its turn. 
A social context consists of the variables Field, Mode and Tenor, where Field focuses 
on institutional practices, Tenor on social relations and Mode on channel, or the 
method used to communicate the message (Martin: 1997: 4). 'Field', 'mode' and 
'Tenor' combine as the constituents of register. They reach into language as 
metafunctions or as the broader labels of the communicative purpose ofthe text at any 
one moment. 
Field has an ideational role in language, Mode a textual one and Tenor an 
interpersonal one. Broadly, the ideational components oflanguage deal with the types 
of meaning that are being represented, or what the meaning is about. The textual 
component concerns the organisation or 'flow' of the message within a text and the 
relationship of the text to other texts (Martin 1997: 4). The interpersonal components 
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concern the type of social interaction for which the text is constructed, for example, 
journalist to the public or friend to friend. 
I illustrate the ideational, textual and interpersonal components of text with example 
52: 
52 Crumbly pastry encloses jammy fruit in a wodge of almond paste. If you want 
to really plump your tarts out use Merchant Gourmet Mi-cuit semidried plums 
(call 0800 731 3549 for stockists). (author's data) 
This text appears in a Sunday Times magazine so that its Field component belongs to 
magazines and their representation of the topic of cookery with the implicit 
advertising that may arise from this. The interpersonal component is the address of the 
culinary commentator to their public. This form of address is characterised by a 
certain informality, evidenced in the choice of non-standard language, for example 
'wodge' and 'jammy', and the use ofthe second person pronoun as ifto draw the 
reader into the writer's kitchen. The conditional 'if gives choice to the reader and 
respects them as able to withdraw from the text's insistence on a given procedure. 
Intertextually, the example is also quite complex. Obviously it draws some aspects of 
its structure from other culinary texts and the fact that it precedes the handing out of 
more explicit recipe instructions. It is also operating in a textual context of brands, 
labels and telephone numbers with the set of intertextual relations that these draw 
upon. 
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2.6.2 GrammaticaD metaphor: congruency and the construction of 
meaning 
It should now be clear that a key feature of the SFL position is that language should 
be analysed as a function of the meaning it is seeking to express (Halliday 1985). 
Thus, the grammatical system of a language will be wedded to the expression of 
different types of meaning. Let us consider examples 53 and 54: 
53 I saw him at dawn 
54 I hit him at the end of his shift 
Traditionally, sentence, 53, above, consists of a subject, 'I', a verb, 'saw', an object, 
'him' and a prepositional phrase or adjunct 'at dawn'. It should also be clear that if we 
are not working in a generative frame, we could deduce the subject from an analysis 
of the meaning of the sentence. We might look for the part of the sentence that is 
initiating the action. However, if we look at 54, above, we will notice that this 
sentence has exactly the same structure: subject, verb, object and prepositional phrase. 
Yet, we will also see that the subject is initiating an action in a much more direct 
sense than in 53. 'Hit' in 54 is clearly an action with a direct physical impact. 'Saw' 
in 53, above, is not an action at all but a mode of perception. 
We can say that the subject in 53 is a Senser because it is sensing something that 
occurs and that the subject in 54 is an Actor because it is accomplishing an action. We 
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can now make a further judgement that a Senser will typically be an animate subject. 
This is because animals have the capacity of seeing, hearing and feeling whereas 
objects do not. 
Another SFL term is congruent (Halliday 1985). Example 53, above, shows a 
congruent use of language because a Senser is typically an animate creature that 
senses events and, in this sentence, it is. Equally, 'saw' is nmmally a 'mental 
predicator' that discovers a 'phenomenon' and, here, it is. This usage is 'congruent' 
because the grammar and the lexis work in harmony with the purposes from which 
they first arose. 
According to Halliday ( 1985), then, congruent language is in some sense 'natural'. 
Congruent language will closely reflect the physical relationships in which language 
is grounded. Example 54, above (I hit him at the end of his shift), illustrates a clear set 
of physical events. The structure of language has evolved in order to express this set 
of physical relationships. By the same token, this type of congruent language is held 
to be typical of the speech of children because it reflects the simpler sets of physical 
relationships that make up their experience (ibid). The same should hold true for 
adults who are not inducted into uses of language that have grown up in order to 
recount a very specific set of social meanings as these are constructed in specific 
kinds of text. 
100 
2.6.3 Grammatical metaphor: aspects of time §JFL position: grammaticaD 
metaphor as a departure from congruency 
As already said, according to the SFL view, language and context interpenetrate and 
structure each other. A given context is a socio-linguistic product. As it evolves, it 
may oblige a given group of language users to communicate messages in ways for 
which its grammar was not explicitly designed. In other words, a context may start to 
detach language from the set of physical relationships in which language begins. 
Another example, 55, below, makes this clear: 
55 Dawn found him there 
56 He was there at dawn 
Congruently, the verb, 'find' requires a subject that is a Seeker. A Seeker should also 
be an animate being since 'seeking' is a function that presupposes the ability to 
initiate an action. Equally, 'dawn', as a time, might normally require a prepositional 
phrase, or adjunct, 'at dawn'. Accordingly, 56, above, is a congruent reading ofthis 
phrase. Example 55, above, departs from congruency because items in it assume 
grammatical functions they should not normally have. In this case an adjunct becomes 
a subject, or perhaps a locative subject since it is putting the person in a place. We 
could therefore call this an adjunct to locative subject metaphor (Downing and Locke 
1992). 
It is noteworthy, that I have used the phrase, 'departs from congruency' but avoided 
the simpler, adjective, incongruent. I am doing this because Halliday (1985) explicitly 
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rejects the term, incongruent. He does this because incongruency has an implication 
of deviance. Neither grammatical metaphor, nor metaphor per se is held to be a 
deviant form. Metaphor in SFL, whether grammatical or lexical, represents a socially 
inspired departure from a usage of language that is grounded in the physics of the 
world as they might normally impact upon us. 
2.6.4 Grammatical metaphor: forms of grammatical metaphor 
As I explained above, the SFL analysis of language refers back to the interpersonal, 
the ideational and the textual components of language. Grammatical metaphors can 
also be analysed in terms of these constituents. For example, one interpersonal 
function would concern an expression of doubt in respect of the information we want 
to convey. Typically, we would do this with a modal verb, as in 57, below. However, 
we might also perfom1 this function with the verb 'think' as in 58: 
57 It may rain 
58 I think it's going to rain (Halliday 1987) 
A congruent use of the verb, 'think' would be to represent a mental process. Therefore 
58 is a grammatical metaphor because it shows a Process functioning as a modal. 
This can be shown through a tag test (Halliday 1987), shown in 59 and 60 below: 
59 I think it's going to rain, isn't it? 
60 I think of people who are no longer here, don't I? 
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If we want to make a question by tagging 58, we have to tag the auxiliary 'is going' as 
in 59. One can argue that this is because 'think' is not the main verb, but is operating 
as a modal. This becomes clear if we look at example 60, above. In 60, we use a tag 
that agrees with the verb 'think', thus showing it is the main verb. The tag in 60 
shows that think, here, represents the cognitive process which, congruently, it should 
name. 
One interpersonal function, common in academic and bureaucratic texts, is the 
disguise of 'the source of a modality' in order to 'make it more difficult to query' 
Thompson ( 1996). In 61, below, nominalisation is used to ensure that a process 
'undress' is used not as a verb but as a noun subject. An instruction is made part of an 
established order that tries to compel obedience. 
61 No undressing on the beach, by order. 
62 Uncertainties surround the origins of this form 
In 62 above, Attributes, in this case, 'uncertainties', are not congruent because they 
operate as an Actor in order to disguise authorship and ensure that the text's assertion 
cannot be challenged. The text appears not to have been written but to exist as one of 
the indisputable facts of the universe it is supposed to evoke. In this sense, 
grammatical metaphor evokes the larger metaphor of the author-less text. Kress 
(1989) likened such texts to ghost ships, evoking the story of the Marie-Celeste, as a 
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craft found in perfect condition but without its crew. Similarly, such texts have just 
drifted into view, complete and comprehensible but with no author at their helm. 
It should not be thought that a grammatical metaphor is necessarily an instantiation of 
a single metafunction such as Mode. Arguably, several components of meaning 
configure 61 and 62 above. 62 (uncertainties surround the origins of this form) is the 
product of an agreement that has established that this metaphor is an appropriate form 
for this type of text, thus showing an intertextual effect. Equally, the Field of 'notices 
enforcing by laws' is stamped all over 61, (no undressing on the beach by order), thus 
indicating the effect ofthis metafunction. 
Example 63, below, also instantiates different metafunctions, though one suspects that 
the Field component is uppermost: 
63 Oil price rises may inflict some damage on the prospects of economic revival in 
the Far East 
64 Oil prices have risen therefore the economic revival in the Far East may not 
happen as expected. 
Example, 63, above, is a cause and effect statement. One event, 'a rise in oil prices', 
will affect another, 'economic revival'. Arguably, a congruent representation would 
require that an event, 'a rise in oil prices', would be given a causal linkage to another, 
'economic revival', giving something like 64, above. The grammatical metaphor is 
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again contained in how a Process, 'rise', is an Actor that is construed as able to 
'damage' an event. It is also a consequence of the nominalisation of the verb, 'rise'. 
Halliday ( 1993) has suggested that literacy itself has imposed a nominalising 
'pressure' on language. Literacy has been ascribed a tendency to extrapolate language 
from the physical relationships ofthe phenomena in which its structures are partially 
grounded. Scholars such as Ong (1986), and, less assertively, Olson (1994) have 
attributed to literacy the capacity to reify language or raise it as an object that we can 
scrutinise and examine. It is arguable that reification also entails the capacity of 
language to interact with itself as a system that does not seek justification in the facts 
of the world. 
In the world, as we perceive it, there seems, for example, to be a natural boundary 
between 'actions' and 'things'. 'Actions' can only be represented as an effect upon 
an object. 'Objects' are indubitably there. 'Actions' and 'objects' therefore have a 
different status that is encoded in language as verbs and nouns. Therefore a 
grammatically congruent use of language implies that verbs primarily represent 
actions and nouns primarily represent objects. In 63, above, two actions, 'rise' and 
'revive', impact upon each without the mediation of objects. They impact upon each 
other as if they were things. 
The representation of one process as having a causal impact upon another extricates 
causal sequences from the world of physical phenomena through which they are 
manifest. This type of representation is crucial to scientific and most western 
philosophical thought, hence Halliday's (1993) contention that scientific literacy has 
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precipitated this kind oftendency. Furthermore, the SFL interest in grammatical 
metaphor has engendered a further focus upon it as an abstraction that makes more 
difficult the comprehension of scientific language (Halliday 1993 and Ravenelli 
forthcoming). Therefore, grammatical metaphor has become a concern for those who 
teach students to produce the types of text in which nominalisation or nominalised 
cause and effect processes have become an important constituent. 
2.6.5 Grammatical Metaphor: problems with the concept of 
grammatical metaphor: the issue of scope 
The notion of metaphor as a grammatical disjunction may suggest one way to give 
one form of metaphor a clear identity. But it would be wrong to give the impression 
that this quite limited analysis is altogether without problems. 
First among these is the location of the metaphor itself. When I examined Goatly's 
(1997) analysis of metaphorical scope, I found that a metaphor can have effects 
beyond the parts of speech in which it appears to be located. Thus, at first sight, a 
metaphor may appear to be focused on a verb as in example, 19, above, (the tall ships 
nodded as they passed by). I noted that in fact the entire sentence may have to be read 
metaphorically in order for this use of the verb to make sense. I could say something 
similar about a grammatical metaphor. 
In grammatical metaphors, as in examples 47, 45, 46 and 55, above, a disjunction has 
occurred between the lexico-grammar and what it should conventionally express. As 
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said, the disjunction in these examples relates to the fact that a congruent subject 
function has been displaced. Nonetheless, there is no certainty that the metaphor is 
actually located in the displaced function of the subject, or for that matter, in the 
lexico-grammar at all (Holme forthcoming). Sentence 65, below, is a slightly 
extended version of 55, above (dawn found him there). Examples 65 and 55 could 
argue, that the verb, 'find' has simply been lexically extended in order to allow the 
transitive expression of what in the world is the coincidence of two events. Thus, we 
would not suppose that 'the dawn' has gone off to look for the end to an event. We 
might rather think that 'find' might be an economical way to refer to 'broke and cast 
its light on' to give 66 as the congruent reading: 
65 Dawn found them at the end of their shift 
66 Dawn cast its light on them at the end of their shift 
Of course moving the location of the metaphor does not normalise the structural 
peculiarity in which the grammatical metaphor resides. One may simply be 
constructing a rationale for this particular grammatical metaphor. Thus, an extension 
of the term 'find' requires that the adjunct functions as a Senser in this case. 
However, we would then have to say that the lexico-grammatical incongruency is a 
product of the metaphor and not the metaphor of the lexico-grammar. 
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2.6.6 Grammatical metaphor: problems with the §FL view of metaphor: 
congruency and language change 
Another problem with the SFL position concerns the notion of congruency, and the 
difficulty of knowing when an item is congruent or not. It is widely accepted that 
metaphor plays a considerable role in language change (e.g. Fox 1994, Heine and Reh 
1984, Heine and Reh 1991, Hopper and Traugot 1993, Langacker 1990, Thompson 
and Mulac 1991 and Ullman 1962). For example, in a process traditionally known as 
catachresis, a word is first used as a metaphor to mean something different from that 
for which it was intended. It may then come to represent that object or action more 
consistently than its original signification. Thus, the word, 'pursue' is currently used 
more in the metaphorical sense of 'pursue a course of studies' than in the original 
sense of 'following a person from place to place' (Sinclair 1991 ). A popular example 
(Ullman 1962) is that of the Latin for mouse, 'musculus', which was used to represent 
muscle, perhaps because it represents something small and animate, inside the skin. 
Over time the metaphorical meaning becomes the dominant one and the word itself 
may change in order to represent that which it originally represented. In this way, 
metaphor allows two or more words to be created out of one. Our sense of the new 
word as a metaphor will vanish as it becomes part of our normal usage. The word may 
become polysemous, representing its old meaning and its new, metaphorically 
extended one. Alternatively, as in muscle, after a transfer across languages, the 
original meaning may be lost and another word will come to represent it, perhaps 
through alteration to the phonology of the old. In short the metaphor will die as a new 
term is born from it. 
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Although it has only now become central to the diachronic analysis of language, this 
process of catachresis was given implicit recognition in the Hegelian discussion of 
dead metaphor, described in the introduction (section 1.2.1 ). Hegel recognised that 
metaphor had to be allowed in deductive argument if it could be tem1ed dead because 
its meaning had entered the lexicon with an agreed signification. An implication is 
that metaphor changes the agreed meanings of language and is thus a factor in 
language change. 
I have described how SFL does try to anchor metaphor in more objective, linguistic 
criteria. For example, as already observed, the interpersonal metaphor, 'I think it's 
going to rain', can be discovered through a 'tag test,' where the tag 'isn't it' highlights 
'rain' as salient, thus showing 'think' to be a metaphor of modality (Halliday 1985). 
However, although such a test may elucidate the referent of 'think' as Modal rather 
than Process it says less about why such a reference should be construed as 
metaphorical in late twentieth century English. It may be that this is simply a case of, 
'think' as process, being extended in order to create 'think' as a modal. In short the 
grammatical incongruency may originate in a lexical extension that occurs under the 
pressure of metaphor as a process in language change. 
The problem for an idea of congruent meaning is the same as for an idea of literal 
meaning. This is that finally there is no way of knowing when a meaning is literal or 
congruent. Metaphor is a feature that puts language in a state of flux, unfixing a 
meaning from one domain and shifting it towards another, where sometimes it may 
stick and sometimes it may not. The issue of what is literal or not is an issue of social 
agreement at any one time (Elgin 1983), and we are unable to stand outside our own 
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society and determine quite when this has happened at any given moment of use. The 
stabilisation of a metaphor as a congruent form is therefore more a feature of the 
phylogenesis oflanguage. Therefore, the issue of whether a sentence such us 58, 
above, (I think it's going to rain), is metaphorical should no longer depend on how we 
analyse its grammar but upon how we perceive the historical development of the 
meaning of 'think'. The problem becomes one of largely subjective judgement as to 
the degree to which the verb's new form is considered conventional and thus literal 
(Holme forthcoming). 
2.6.7 Grammatical metaphor: the problem of congruency: metaphor 
and the ontogeo:nesis of language 
The above-mentioned problem of deciding whether or not a metaphorical extension 
has become congruent, can be called a phylogenetic one. However, the SFL notion of 
congruence also has an ontogenetic nature (e.g. Martin 1997). 
Congruence aspires to a notion of 'directness' as if to imply, also, proximity to some 
less mediated form of expression (Halliday 1985). The geometric metaphor itself 
suggests symmetry, as if in the sense of a language that is in symmetry with an 
unmediated unfolding of events. Since congruent language supposes 'directness', 
metaphor itself can be associated with a departure from childhood, also from speech 
itself and, more generally, from natural language and its grounding in real world 
events. Metaphor, therefore, is arguably a feature of mature language use. 
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Grammatical metaphor, in pmticular, is treated as a symptom of a late phase in the 
ontogenesis of language. 
However, the assumption that metaphor is more to be seen as a symptom of mature 
language use may be unwarranted. Certainly, this assumption goes to the core of what 
we think metaphor is about. 
2.6.8 Grammatical metaphor: the problem of congruency: metaphor 
and the ontogenesis of language: metaphors in children 
The question I now want to ask, is whether it is really true that metaphor should be 
associated with mature language use. This question is important for our notion of 
metaphor as a departure from congruent language use. It also has a more general 
importance in respect of our enquiry into what metaphor is. This more general 
importance derives from the fact that if metaphor is a cognitive process that underlies 
our intuitive conceptualisation of new meaning then it would be surprising it were not 
exploited by children when faced with a need to express phenomena for which they 
have no language. 
Certainly it appears true that infant language is grounded in the world of physical 
objects. Even 'verbs' are relatively slow to appear. Infants' language differs from that 
of their caregivers in that they produce many more nouns than their caregivers do 
(Bowem1an 1996 and Parisse 1999). Yet even this quite low-level naming of objects 
is based upon some quite developed capacities of mind. Markman (1994) sets out 
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three assumptions that infants must exploit when they develop their ability to name 
objects. These assumptions are: 
o the whole object assumption 
o the taxonomic assumption 
o the mutual exclusivity assumption 
The whole object assumption is what allows children to treat a given object as a 
whole, rather than a set of distinct parts. They can therefore intuit that the name for an 
object does not refer to a part of an object but to an object itself. Thus, when a carer 
points to the arm of a toy bear and says 'teddy', the infant can understand that the 
whole object and not just the indicated part is being referred to. 
The taxonomic assumption is of particular interest to the thesis I am putting forward. 
This assumption allows children to treat phenomena as similar enough to each other 
to belong to the same category. Having attached the label 'bird' to a sparrow, they can 
re-attach it to a crow without prompting. I would argue that this taxonomic 
assumption supports a capacity to over-generalise a given category, making birds into 
insects or insects into birds. 
The mutual exclusivity assumption means that children tend not to give one object 
two different names. However, the fact of having a single name for a given object 
does not proscribe the attachment of that name to other objects. In fact, sometimes, 
very young children will produce only one word which they use very generally, 
without seeming to feel a need for other words. 
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Therefore, it would seem correct that infant language is very much rooted in the world 
of objects. Even actions, manifest in their impact upon objects, would appear to have 
a very reduced presence. However, it is also noteworthy that in order to speak, 
children must make similarity judgements of some kind and form categories upon the 
bases of these. Markman's (1994) taxonomic assumption underlies an ability to give a 
willow, an oak and a beech the name of tree. This assumption is one part of the quite 
elaborate cognitive development that must precede language .. 
The appearance of metaphor in children's speech is particularly problematic because 
it should now be clear that we are not actually sure what a metaphor is. We do not 
know its scope inside a sentence. The question of when it becomes a part of 
conventional language use is also uncertain. Evidently, the issue of whether a given 
child's utterance is metaphorical or not must partly depend on how we describe 
metaphor. 
Metaphor has been suggested as useful for teaching young children. The Suzuki 
method of violin teaching, for example, routinely personifies the violin and the child 
is urged to treat the strings as hot, cold and fragile (Gibbs 1994). Such a use of 
language may be a partial response to the impoverished nature of a specific musical 
lexicon. However, it would seem to assist rather than impede the understanding of its 
younger users. 
Piaget (1962) observed the use of metaphor in young children, with a child producing 
utterances such as a 'river is like a snake' (Gibbs 1994). Winner and Gardner (1993) 
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suggest children may be shown to deal in metaphor at any age at which their 
understanding can be tested. However, one problem in knowing when a given phrase 
is or is not a metaphor arises from children's common use of both lexical and 
grammatical over-extensions. Example 67, below, shows this type of extension at 
work. The child has learnt 'strangle' as 'to hold tight round the neck' then construed 
this as 'to hold tight round the wrist' when it will normally only apply to the neck. 
67 Stop strangling me! (child to an adult holding them tight by the wrist) 
(author's data). 
Winner in an extensive (1988) study of children's metaphor excluded these types of 
over-extensions from her definition of metaphor use. Her view was that language 
could not be considered metaphorical if the child was using a metaphorical extension 
to name a phenomenon for which a word already existed in the lexicon. Other 
research has supported Winner's (1988) very limited view of metaphor by casting 
doubt on the ability of young children to make a conscious response to the 
peculiarities of figurative language. Asch and Nerlove ( 1960) and Cometa and Eson 
(1978), for example, have looked at the ability of children consciously to interpret 
metaphor. Asch and Nerlove concluded that when we present children with 
decontextualised metaphors, they will interpret them literally. As Gibbs (1994: 404) 
attests, this has led to the view that children pass through a literal stage in their 
linguistic development (e.g. Asch and Nerlove 1960, Cometa and Eson 1978). This 
type of literal stage would concur with the SFL view of the infant as initially treating 
language as a manipulation of signs that represent objects. This idea can also be 
sustained empirically by the word counts and the tagging of parts of speech by 
Bowerman ( 1996) and Parisse ( 1999). Yet children do show a remarkable capacity to 
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deal with more abstract relationships and similarities between concepts (Gibbs 1994 ). 
Gentner (1977) has attested to their ability to deal with spatial analogies, for example. 
And it should be remembered that analogy explores the relations between the 
argument structures of two domains, thus extrapolating away from any sense of a 
metaphor as built upon a sense of physical similarity. Equally, Marks et al (1987) 
have shown how pre-school children have engaged in what could be termed a cross-
modal mapping (cited in Gibbs 1994: 413). Children can therefore map the perception 
acquired through one sensory channel (e.g. sight) onto another (e.g. sound), making 
them capable of understanding synaesthetic metaphor (e.g. a bright sound). 
More recent research has also cast further doubt on the view that children begin the 
acquisition of their first language by attaching a given item of lexis to a given 
meaning. There is no clear sense of a literal or symbolic stage where words stand for a 
particular item. Clark (1999: 32) describes how children will speak words without any 
clear idea of their meaning. They will then 'map' a given word onto a particular 
meaning. Nerlich et al. (1999: 365) suggest that these mappings can be termed over-
extensions when they are principled. The principles applied are perceptual similarity, 
the fact that one item is seen to be like another item, conceptual contiguity, as for 
items that are perceived as bordering, joining or touching each other, and items that 
are actually related in space and time. 
Finally, it is worth pausing to consider exactly what is involved in the creation and 
understanding of these lexical over-generalisations such as 67, above (stop strangling 
me) and 68, below: 
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68 It's a sun moon (three-year old child looking at a full-moon) (author's data). 
Winner (1988) suggests that very young children do not produce original metaphor in 
the sense of trying to represent meanings for which the lexicon has no equivalent. But 
this non-use of metaphor may be simply because the child's world does not contain 
meanings for which the lexicon has no equivalent. From a research perspective, 'new' 
should only mean 'new to the user'. Accordingly, if a child uses metaphor to force a 
tem1 to mean something it does not normally represent, calling the first donkey they 
see a dog, they are doing this because they do not know the term that would normally 
be used. They are in the situation of the adult who confronts a phenomenon that the 
lexicon itself has not yet named. If metaphor is to be implicated at all in category 
extension then it must emerge less as a linguistic fact and more as the cognitive 
process that underlies the child's attempt to represent meanings that are new to it 
(Holme forthcoming). 
Sentence 68, above (it's a sun moon), shows how a child perceives the fullness of the 
moon and conceptualises it through the sun because they do not possess the adjectives 
of shape or brightness to do otherwise. The sun is an object that exists in the domain 
of the moon. The domain might pertain to light-emitting objects in the sky. The sun's 
circular shape and brightness are made salient by their being mapped onto the target 
domain of the 'moon' by which it has been evoked. The metaphor thus employs the 
three categories ofNerlich et al. (1999: 365). The sun is contiguously related to the 
moon because both bodies exist in the same conceptual space. The sun has a 
perceptual similarity because its shape is used to describe the moon. More remotely, 
there may be some literal spatial relationship, as both objects occupy the same sky. 
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Scholars such as Winner under-estimate the phylogenetic evidence against what is 
made as purely an ontogenetic argument. We have already discussed how there is 
substantial evidence to show that metaphor acts as a mechanism in language change. 
Catachresis involves the extension of given language towards new meanings through 
metaphor. Every adult confronts meanings for which they do not have an adequate 
and ready-formed means of expression. Equally, when the child's lexicon is 
underdeveloped, they may lack a sense of category and its symbol for a phenomenon 
they encounter, therefore they extend one that they already have. Further, it is not 
difficult to assume that the child's instinctive deployment of metaphorical extension 
to compensate for their own lexical deficiencies will mirror the more consciously 
mediated process through which adults extend the greater lexicon in order to deal with 
the conceptual novelties that arise. 
Sentence 68, above, (it's a sun moon) is a clear instance of catachresis and as such 
shows how metaphor-making in language expresses an innate cognitive capacity. 68 
is a direct and spontaneous use of language and it clearly reveals how metaphor as a 
cognitive process can respond to its user's semiotic need. As such a response, it 
represents an act of what Hopper and Traugot (1993) would term subjectification, 
pitting a language's response to an individual's cognitive or expressive need against 
its wider mission in respect of furnishing a given social group with an agreed set of 
representations for meaning. 
The point I am making here is that from the outset, even as a child grounds language 
in physical phenomena, they are playing with the categories that they thus create. It 
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may be that even in the early stages oflanguage acquisition the grounding of a child's 
language in the world of objects and things is being interfered with by an ability to 
abstract the features of one item and map them onto to those of another. From the 
outset, metaphor as a cognitive process disturbs the status of language as anchored to 
one set of physical or 'felt' events by extending it towards others. Such an extension 
supposes a notion of early abstraction, for things cannot become other things, unless 
they have come to exist as mental constructs. 
Finally, I would conclude that when discussing grammatical metaphor (or any other 
form), we should be aware that metaphor is not a characteristic of mature language 
use. It can be perceived as part of the process whereby the child extends language 
made meaningful by one context towards another for which they do not possess an 
agreed means of expression. 
2.6.9 Grammatical metaphor: the problem of congruency: are 
grammatical metaphors difficult to understand or do they just 
express a difficult meaning? 
Sentence 70 is one congruent reading of 69, below: 
69 The US's decision to release 30m barrels from its strategic petroleum reserve 
helped to push oil prices back from a peak of $34 a barrel (Financial Times 
1/1 0/2000). 
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70 The US government decided to release 30m barrels from its strategic reserve. 
Thus, the US government helped to push oil prices back from a peak of $34 a 
barrel. 
In 70, the direct cause and effect relationship of 69 is no longer expressed. Instead a 
linking adjunct, 'thus', is used to underscore the cause and effect relationship of the 
two sentences and their expression of two otherwise separate events. Yet the adjunct 
may not render this relationship as clearly. I would argue that the adjunct may even 
make the logic ofthe relationship more remote and difficult to grasp. The 
grammatical metaphor grounds the cause and effect relationship in a physical one 
when the linking adjunct tries to express logic as it has evolved towards a more 
abstract connection. The grammatical metaphor employs the relationship of one 
object impacting upon another, then causing its movement. We can conceive of the 
two 'processes' as if they were objects in process of impact. 
Langacker (1990) perceives reification as being at the core oflanguage. Arguably, 
this is the interpretation of actions as things so that we can understand their impact 
upon each other. We may indeed prefer to think in a language that is grounded in the 
physical clash of objects. This impact of one object upon another is better represented 
by a grammatical metaphor than by its congruent substitute. Adjuncts are an abstract 
entity pointing up an abstract relationship. They may also have been derived through a 
path schema and a metaphor of spatial relationships, as can be seen in how a word 
such a 'hence' retains a spatial meaning (depart from hence) while being able to act as 
a logical connector. Grammatical metaphor represents abstract relationships through a 
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metaphor that treats actions or events as objects. In doing so, it makes causative 
relationship between them clear. 
A larger point is that grammatical metaphor may seem to emerge, not as a departure 
from congruent language but as an exploitation of the natural or direct relationships 
within it. I will return to this point when I start to explore the physical basis of 
metaphor. 
2.6.10 GrammatncaD metaphor: what we can learn 
Grammatical metaphor is a concept that may identify forms of language use that 
sometimes have a strong association with written language and modes of scientific 
thought. The identification of such forms as 'metaphor' rather than simply as a 
grammatical phenomenon 'nominalisation' may also have a pedagogical implication 
that I will explore in the second part of this thesis. 
My discussion of grammatical metaphor has been wide-ranging, and I have pursued in 
some detail because it has wider implications for our view of metaphor as a whole. I 
will now summarise what these implications might be. 
1) It is difficult to be certain that a given grammatical metaphor is not in fact derived 
from a lexical extension. Therefore the identification of grammatical metaphor as 
a grammatical anomaly may not tell us much about where the metaphor really 
resides. It is still difficult to identify a metaphor as having a specific grammatical 
120 
form or linguistic form forcing the cognitive conclusion (e.g. Gibbs 1994 and 
Lakoff and Johnson 1999) that metaphor is more in the province of thought than 
language 
2) Grammatical metaphors are an accepted part of current language use. There is 
therefore a sense in which they have become literal, and this will depend on how 
far a given community accepts them as such. Thus, what is literal and figurative in 
a language may simply depend upon the judgement of a group of native speakers 
as to what is a conventional or unusual usage at any one time (Elgin 1983) 
3) Grammatical metaphor is associated with mature language use but this may 
simply be because it deals with conceptually difficult ideas. Very young children 
use metaphor to plug their semantic gaps just as adults do. Therefore, like adults, 
children use metaphor when they use a word to refer to categories that it does not 
normally apply to. 
4) Grammatical metaphors may pose difficulties not because they are incongruent 
but because they represent ideas that are conceptually difficult. Grammatical 
metaphors may actually help to clarify the conceptually difficult ideas they 
represent. Grammatical metaphor may be a cognitively appealing way to deal in 
difficult and abstract ideas. 
5) If the SFL notion of congruent language is grounded in the direct representation of 
physical events and objects then these representations may actually be a means 
through which abstract ideas are conceptualised. Therefore, a grammatical 
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metaphor may not be a departure from congmency but an exploitation of the more 
direct representations of congment language that helps us to understand a difficult 
conceptual relationship (Holme forthcoming). 
I will show later how this view of grammatical metaphor is useful for teachers who 
want to make nominalised cause and effect stmctures more comprehensible by 
grounding them in the physical relationships through which they have been 
conceptualised (section 4.6.5). Students can grasp this use of nominalisation, not as a 
grammatical abstraction but as the metaphor of one object striking another (section 
4.6.5.2). 
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2.7 Contiguity, metonymy and category construction 
Contrary to some recent opinion (e.g. Gibbs 1994 and Lakoff and Johnson 1999), I 
have argued that we build metaphors around a similarity relationship or at least the 
search for the same. However, I should also point out that that some important 
figurative uses of language are clearly not dependent on a notion of similarity, at least 
in their pure or prototypical form. One such use is traditionally known as 'metonymy' 
and its related form, 'synecdoche', both of which may at least prototypically employ a 
contiguity relationship between their two terms. 
When it is interpreted literally, contiguity entails a spatial relationship, or the sharing 
of a common border. Thus, ifwe say 'a nice set ofwheels', we are using 'wheels' to 
represent a car, not because they are in any sense like a car but because they are a 
very important part of one. Wheels and car thus have a contiguity relationship and 
'wheels' in 71, below, are a metonym for car. 
71 You've got a nice set of wheels. 
When it is expressed in terms of physical space, the idea of contiguity is clear. A 
difficulty is that it may be possible to stretch out the idea of a contiguous or spatial 
relationship until it may start to become metaphorical. For example if we use 'an oak' 
and 'a pine' to represent the category trees, we could argue that this is contiguous 
because oaks and pines are included in the category of trees and 'in' supposes a kind 
of spatial relationship. Another schema of category representation is 'possession' as 
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when 'pines' are held to 'belong' to the tree family. Possession is also associated with 
an idea of spatial proximity, at least in origin. In a concrete sense, only 'have' what is 
in the hand and what is in the hand is close to us. In these examples, space no longer 
organises physical reality; it becomes purely conceptual and clearly our notion of 
contiguity must become conceptual also. 
If a contiguous relationship is the defining feature of a metonymy then it is clear that 
metonymic thought is as restricted or as extensive as our notion of space. If we 
include conceptual space within our definition then contiguity must become 
conceptual also. 
Knowing where metonymy ends is important to our discussion because it might help 
us to find where metaphor begins. Furthermore, like metaphor, metonymy is also 
essential to the new concept of mind towards which this thesis intends to redirect 
language teaching. Metonymy cannot be perceived as a surface use of language any 
more than metaphor can. 
Gibbs (1994) asserts the centrality of metonymy when he shows how most acts of 
description involve part-whole representations of a kind that characterise the trope. 
For example, in 72, below, a larger forest is evoked by the mention of a few of its 
trees in a similar way to how in 71, above, the larger category of car is evoked by one 
of its parts. 
72 He marched along beside the outlying trees; beeches and oaks; sentinels of the 
vast and varied forest beyond. 
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Overly detailed descriptions are rarely satisfying. Cognition copes better when a 
larger scene is evoked by some of its parts. This may therefore be a key function of 
metonymy. The trope may also reveal something even more important, giving a clue 
to how we construct and manipulate categories and thus to how we how we organise 
reality itself (Lakoff 1987). 
Rosch's (1975 and 1978) revolutionary contention was that categories were not stable 
and consistent entities to which phenomena did or did not belong. Thus, we do not 
recognise robins, eagles and ostriches as birds because they share such features as 
beaks, wings and feathers. Further, we do not set up a 'bird' category as meaning the 
sharing of the features, 'beaks, wings and feathers'. 
Rosch found categories to be anchored in cognition by a prototypical example. When 
studying how Americans formed the category of 'a bird', Rosch found that it was 
most often around the robin. The robin was central to their idea of what a bird was, 
with such species as the blue-jay, canary and blackbird, also being important. Species 
such as an ostrich was clearly peripheral, with the penguin and the bat ranked at the 
extreme edge of the class (Rosch 1975). A category, then is not a defining set of 
features that pre-selects which items belong to it and which do not. 
Lakoff (1987) developed Rosch' s ideas towards a conception of radial category 
construction. This radial model makes a more powerful assertion of Rosch' s 
contention that there is not a set of shared features which predetermine whether 
something is a member of a category or not. The members of a category which radiate 
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out from the central prototype do not always share any ofthe features of the 
prototype. Lakoff (1987: 85) cites the case of Japanese young women giving a child 
to an older woman to raise. That older woman does not exist within the English 
language model of motherhood and cannot be predicted by our prototypical example 
of it. She does not have a core biological or legal relationship to the child. 
In his work on definition, Wittgenstein (1953) predicts Lakoff's work on radial 
category construction, and his concept of family resemblance is now used to build 
some cognitive theories of category construction (Ungerer and Schmid 1996). 
Wittgenstein held that finally definition was impossible because the nature of a given 
category such as 'games' depended on the resemblances between its family of 
members. The resemblance between one group of the members ofthe 'game' family 
for example, chess, draughts and backgammon, might not be the same as that existing 
between another group, patience or running toy cars across the floor. Equally, 
according to a notion of radial category construction, a family member who is 
perceived as 'distant' cannot necessarily be linked to one who is seen as central 
(Lakoff 1987). Nonetheless, a chain of resemblances can be traced from the central 
member towards the outlying one. This chain means that adjacent family members are 
similar even if they do not share traits of similarity with all who are not adjacent. In 
this way, Uncle Tom may seem to be central to a family's conception of itself. He 
may have an uncanny resemblance to his sister, Aunt Edwina in every respect apart 
from her eye and hair colour. Aunt Edwina could also resemble her cousin Jane but 
only in respect of her eye colour and hair colour. Jane and Tom do not resemble each 
other but they share resemblances through Edwina. In this way people belonging to a 
family may not all appear to resemble each other. Yet despite this, we are able to 
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evoke a concept of category without difficulty. Such an evocation may depend on a 
metonymic facet of mind which, just as it allows us to evoke a whole car through one 
of its parts can let us evoke a whole category through one of its members. Metonymy 
may therefore play a part in how we grasp categories. 
2. 7.1 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: the meaning of 
metonymy, synecdoche and contiguity 
Before taking this discussion forward further, I should first make clear what is meant 
by metonymy, synecdoche and by contiguity. Broadly, a metonym is a figure of speech 
where: 
o one part of an entity stands for the whole 
o one item of a category or group stands for the category or group 
<::> single items are used to evoke a larger set of items with which they have a 
schematic or mentally established association (Lakoff and Turner 1989) 
In example 73, below, 'I saw two sail', the association between the item being 
represented (a ship) and the item representing it would have been very close when 
such expressions were used. The sail is virtually a part of the ship, although a 
detachable one. The part stands for the whole. 
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In 74, below, furniture constitutes a larger category than tables and chairs, 
particularly when it refers to the entire contents of a house. Tables and chairs thus 
stand for the wider category of furniture. 
75 shows how we can construct a place as representing a group of its inhabitants. 
People are tagged by the city in which they work. 
73 I saw two sail 
74 He moved out all the furniture in the house, stacking tables, desks and chairs at 
the end of the garde 
75 This is London calling 
76 The ballot box and the bullet (cited in Gibbs 1999) 
However, although Lakoff's (1987) description may give us an idea of the types of 
metonymy that we are likely to encounter, the nature ofthe relationship between a 
metonym' s two parts will still need further thought. 
The case of 73, above, is clear. Such examples can be categorised as expressing a 
relationship ofpartonymy for the clear reason that they are part ofthe idea that they 
represent (Seto 1999). This type of expression is traditionally called a synecdoche, 
which can be categorised as a sub-class of metonymy. My view is that synecdoche is 
prototypical metonymy since the contiguous or partonymic relationship is not in 
dispute. 73 also illustrates the role of metonymy in category representation (Lakoff 
1987). We have a collection of objects, sails, ropes, hull and hawsers, etc. The objects 
all share a nautical function. They belong to a category of ship construction. They 
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represent their larger family through their most conspicuous member, the sail. In this 
case, the family members are also attached to each other. They share spatial borders. 
The normal meaning of contiguity is sharing a spatial border. Part-whole 
relationships, such as that shown in 73, above, are clearly contiguous. However, 
contiguity may have a larger more general meaning. In the case of 76, above, for 
example, one might argue that London, the city, contains the people who broadcast 
from it. There is therefore a spatial relationship based upon inclusion. In 77, above, 
this spatial relationship becomes even less clear. An abstract idea, namely, 'armed 
conflict' is represented by one ofthe weapons with which it is waged. War is waged 
with bullets. Bullets exist in the field of war. They are therefore part of war's space, 
but in this instance the space is perhaps conceptual and a clear idea of contiguity is 
lost. 
Ullman ( 1962) argued that metonymy arises when two terms are within the same 
conceptual domain. This allows us to include taxonomic relationships within the idea 
of metonymy because things that exist in the same category will belong to the same 
domain of meaning in some sense. A 'bullet' will exist in the semantic domain of 
'warfare' and the ballot box in that of a peaceful electoral process. 
75, above (London calling), poses a greater problem, to the domain argument, 
however. It is clearly not metaphoric in that people broadcasting from a city are not 
evoked by that city any more than are its plumbers, carpenters and bus drivers. At the 
same time there is a sense of contiguity in that the people are located in the city that 
stands for them. But if the semantic domain of a city will incorporate everything that 
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exists in cities then there would be little that the name 'London' could not represent. 
Finally, we would need a very stretched concept of a domain in order to sustain 
Ullman's argument. Gibbs (1994) gives the more powerful example of how restaurant 
staff may refer to client by what they have ordered as in 'the ham sandwich is ready 
for his check'. Sandwiches and people are semantically related only remotely. 
However, they do in this instance establish a contiguous relationship. 
It is clear then that the basis of metonymy is difficult to discover. Some metonymies 
are based on clear contiguous relationships. Some represent a larger idea of category. 
Some operate within one semantic domain and some operate across domains. 
2.7.2 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: metonymy and metaphor 
as the opposite axes of language 
Jakobson ( 1971) built a larger theory of language upon this contrast between 
metaphor and metonymy. Like Saussure (1983), Jakobson perceived that we create 
meaning with signs either when we combine them with another sign or through 
selection and substitution. In this last process, language users select 'certain linguistic 
entities' then combine them into 'linguistic units of a higher degree of complexitiy' 
(Jakobson 1971: 72). 
The act of combining signs to create meaning is broadly a function of syntax. For 
syntax, finally, is the ordering of signs into meaningful patterns, whether as clauses or 
sentences. Like syntax, metonymy is combinative in that it pulls together elements 
130 
that are already in spatial juxtaposition, the head for the person, or the house for its 
occupant. Metonymy is therefore associated with the syntagmatic aspect of language. 
Metonymy is combinative. It summarises the relationship that brings a sign and a 
meaning together. 
Metaphor, on the other hand is selective and substitutive. Metaphor is substitutive 
because it represents one meaning through another, thus substituting it. This 
substitutive effect belongs to the paradigmatic aspect of language. 
Jakobson based his argument on the studies of aphasia resulting from damage to 
different areas ofthe brain. Damage to the area known as Broca's is associated with 
defective combination and hence metonymy. Damage to the area known as 
Wernicke's is viewed as critical to the substitutive role and hence has a link to 
metaphor. 
2.7.3 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: metaphor and metonymy 
as two sides of the same coin 
However, there is some uncertainty over whether aphasic studies and association tests 
actually provide the distinction that Jakobson implies (e.g. Kotch 1999). Further, it is 
not difficult to analyse metonymy as having some of the attributes of metaphor. Searle 
(1993), for example, views metonymy as a subclass of metaphor on the grounds that 
one thing is representing another through a different phenomenon. 
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By this token, a man of a large sexual appetite was once described and represented 
through the metaphor of a 'goat', doubtless because of the apparently frenzied mating 
habits of that animal. This appears to offer a clear instance where a relational 
similarity motivates a substitutive relationship. "Goat' substitutes for a kind of man 
because their patterns of behaviour are seen as shared. The source domain, 'goat' is 
thus mapped onto the target, 'a man', as in 'you are quite a goat'. 
Gibbs ( 1994 and 1999b) recognises that mapping is a constituent of metonymy but 
still holds that the mapping is of two approximate concepts. Since a 'goat' and a 
:J.; 'man' are not approximate, its use would be more of a metaphor than a metonym. 
Example 77 is used to summarise the distinctive nature of a metaphor: 
77 The cream puff was knocked out in the boxing match (Gibbs 1999b: 62) 
78 All hands on deck! 
The term 'cream puff can be used to describe a boxer without the boxer actually 
being mentioned. 'Cream puff thus substitutes for the boxer in the manner that a 
metonym, 'hands' substitutes for the people who will work with them in 78. Yet, 
there is a crucial difference. Pastries do not belong to the same domain as boxers. 
Therefore 77, above, is an example of metaphor, not metonymy (Gibbs 1999b). 
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2.7.4 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: how mapping does not 
make metaphor and metonymy the same 
Yet the issue is also the basis of the relation. In the example of the restaurant client 
and the ham sandwich discussed above, one would assume that the client has not 
acquired the features of the sandwich as a result of the mapping (though some who 
have worked in restaurants might recall such features being conferred). The sandwich 
is a label or tab through which the individual is identified by association. 
Another difficulty concerns the reason why we use metonymy. For example, why do 
we say, 'all hands on deck!' instead of' all sailors on deck!' In this case, the reason is 
clear. Physical work is generally categorised as manual, or done with the hand. This is 
another metonymic representation since the entire body and mind are used. Hands are 
used not because they are a metonym of the body but of the types of activity they 
carry out. If one employs sailors or puts them to work, one does not see their mind or 
their leg hauling rope, one sees their hands. Certain types of work make hands salient. 
Hands can thus be symbolic both of the work they do and the larger person that 
works. 
The point I am making here is that the relationship through which a rhetorician might 
define a trope, in this case, part-whole, will not provide us with a psycholinguistic 
rationale for its use. People are 'hands' because of the cultural perception of certain 
types of work. The domain of work sets up the trope even though the representation is 
part-whole, of a body by the hand. The trope, therefore, cmmot be altogether isolated 
within the relationship that it has to what it represents. Such a system of 
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representation requires a more extensive notion of a 'domain' of meaning, involving, 
perhaps, a substantial set of inter-related activities and meanings as may be held 
together by the way in which a given culture will frame the activities of its members. 
Such a notion is better constructed by Lakoffs 1987 notion of an Idealised Cognitive 
Model or ICM and the related concept of a radial category, just introduced. 
2.7.5 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: metonymy as a 
representation of an Idealised Cognitive Model (ICM) 
The ICM embodies not just a set of associated meanings for a given term, but extends 
also to the larger set of attributes that is provided by a culture. For example, a 
dictionary definition of a cow might talk about its being a bovine quadruped. A view 
of meaning as constructed out of several components might talk about some of these 
as +quadruped +female +bovine, but this fails to evoke through that single instance, 
the cow, our larger cultural construction ofthese animals, with their ponderous but 
productive bulk. This larger conceptualisation of the animal is furnished by its ICM. 
A reference to this larger construction also asserts the metonymic nature of language. 
We can talk about a given instance of a 'cow', for example, denoting one animal 
trundling down our village street. However, this single example evokes through its 
class membership the category itself as it is constructed from the ICM (Lakoff and 
Turner 1989). In Western culture such an ICM might evoke an image of a milk-
producing animal heaving its swollen udders between field and milking stall, In India, 
it would be a sacred encapsulation of fertility and a wider sacred principle. 
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ICMs may also help us to explore why metonyms establish themselves in language 
and hence expand our notion of what they are. As said, ICMs are mental constructs 
about the meaning of a given item that are imbued with the effects of a given culture. 
This cultural effect can account for the relative salience of some attribute of the ICM, 
which may in turn result in the way in which a metonymy is constructed. Radden and 
Koceses (1999: 21) give as an example, the evolution ofthe word 'hearse'. A hearse 
had come to summarise a larger set of ICMs associated with the apparatus of death: 
'the dead body, the coffin, the bier, the tomb, the funeral pall, the framework 
supporting the pall and the carriage for carrying the coffin. The movement became 
salient, perhaps because it was eye-catching (ibid: 20-21) or perhaps because of a 
greater cultural emphasis upon the procession as the public face of death. Cultural 
salience thus provides a kind ofmetonymic 'tab' through which we can mentally 
handle the entire ICM, as well as others that may be contiguous to it. The procession 
stands for the larger apparatus of the funeral. Thus, the meaning of hearse focuses on 
the procession. The processional vehicle stands for the procession and finally 'the 
hearse' means the funeral vehicle only. I illustrate this in figure 3, below. I also look 
at the example of 'hands' for work and 'hands' for the person and thus at the 
evocation of two different ICMs in a single instance: 
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Body, coffin, bier, 
tomb, funeral pall, 
framework procession 
supportin~ the pall, j 
carnage / 
The entire person Things you work on 
Figure 3 
Radden and Kovecses ( 1999) make an extensive analysis of the types of relationship 
through which a given item may become salient within an ICM, thus allowing it to 
stand as a metonym. In order to do this, they suggest that there are three types of 
ICM: 
• those that deal with the inter-relationship of signs to the concepts they evoke 
• those that construct reference 
• those that connect concepts. 
Sign metonymies allow us to evoke a concept through a specific instantiation of it. 
Dollars evoke the idea of money, for example. It is difficult to imagine a reverse 
instantiation of concept for form, such as the idea of money evoking dollars, unless 
through a 'tip-of-the-tongue experience' where we have an idea but cannot find a sign 
to express it. Another possible example can be provided by 'foreign language 
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learning, where learners cannot find a form with which they are familiar and which 
they know that they need' (Radden and Kovecses 1999: 24). 
Reference deals with the wider area of how a given item in the world is evoked 
through a form. Thus, one can have: 
• Form-concept for thing-event: the word 'cow' for real cow 
• Concept for thing/event: concept 'cow' for a real cow 
e Form for thing/event: word form c-o-w for a real cow 
The idea that 'form for thing' is metonymic can be reinforced by how people see 
words as somehow inclusive, or part of what they represent (ibid: 26). Metonymy 
also subsumes the meaning of one sign, such as 'the person', within another, 'the 
hand' or 'the head'. By the same token, the sign, in linguistics, can be perceived as 
inherently meaningful or as containing its meaning. 
At the conceptual level, we shift beyond the representation of an idea simply through 
a form, and extend it to that of the concept. For example, when we say, 'the buses are 
on strike' (ibid), 'bus' cannot be an event because it is incapable of strike action. It is 
a concept or an ICM requiring a driver who thus becomes what it will evoke. 
More importantly, the idea of the cultural salience ofthe vehicle (e.g. a hearse as a 
procession, the driver as their moving bus) helps to explain why some metonymies 
work and some do not. Example 79, below shows how 'buses' can be understood as 
standing for the people who drive them: 
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79 The buses are on strike (ibid) 
They can do so because our ICM of strike action is of an event precipitated by 
working people. Also, 'drivers' are essential to the action of the vehicle that stands for 
them, Conversely, if I say 'the seats stopped at the lights', meaning the bus, this is an 
unsuccessful metonymy because 'seats' are not salient in the ICM of 'stopping a bus'. 
In respect of differentiating metaphor and metonymy, however, we may simply have 
shifted the problem elsewhere, from the domain to the ICM in other words. The ICM 
might provide a useful clue to the relationship that underlies metonymy, Yet, like the 
domain, it has no clear boundary, put is part of a network of overlapping mental 
models. These models allow divergent forms and concepts to stand for each other 
without yielding a clear idea of whether one is metaphoric or metonymic. Likewise, if 
we wish to retain an idea of contiguity as underlying a metonymic relationship, we 
have first to perceive contiguity as conceptual or metaphoric and thus as representing 
the mental proximity between concepts. 
2.7.6 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: the problem of 
delineating an ICM (idealised cognitive model) 
It may be that the problem of the delineation of an ICM arises from the nature of what 
is being delineated. When discussing analogy, I argued that it was difficult to define a 
metaphor as purely proportional when it was dealing with words whose me.anings 
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would effect the nature of the relationship being discussed. Thus, to liken one's head 
to an apple with out a core was not quite the same the as to liken it to a chocolate 
without a centre. Even though the centre-periphery relationship is retained, it is not 
the same because the ICMs of a chocolate and an apple are so different. Each evokes 
another set of concepts, sweetness, fibrous flesh, seeds and their corresponding 
essentialism, brown flesh, or whatever. Our conceptualisation of a thing is not 
confined to that thing, although it may be largely limited by the need for an 
economical system of lexical processing. 
The point is that the symbolic nature of the lexicon, where a given word evokes a 
given ICM, is continually being threatened by the other ICMs with which that concept 
is associated. The extent of the undermining is partly a function of the degree of 
abstraction in which a language user will engage. For example, a form, 'head', that 
has a specific referent, an animal passing through a pen, will have its evocative nature 
constrained by its spatial connection to that specific instance, the passage of head 
through a pen. The nature of the activity 'counting heads (of cattle)' ensures that a 
partonymic relationship is simply that. The cow remains a creature and nothing more. 
However, an extrapolation of that creature from its existence in time into an 
unassigned mental representation, a concept, will mean that our model of that creature 
is no longer the sum of its parts, or even of place in which it exists. The cow is now a 
bundle of other ICMS, of thoughtless rumination, of egotism, of the negative feminine 
stereotype and thus becomes an insulting way to represent a woman. 
A conclusion could be that we start with a functional need; to count cattle or construct 
an insulting image of a neighbour. The functional need determines how we construct 
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the ICM; the cow as a physical form or the cow as a bundle of unappealing features. 
This construction supposes different levels of abstraction that will in turn keep the 
object conceptually and temporally intact, as head and hoofs moving through its here 
and now, or as an obese and ruminative abstraction than can jump barriers of time, 
space and species. In this last function, the spatial connection between concepts is 
stretched even beyond a conceptual existence and we find ourselves embarked upon a 
course of conceptual exploration that carries us quickly into the territory of metaphor 
and the mapping of unlike things onto each other. 
2.7.7 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: how metaphor and 
metonymy overlap 
It should now be becoming clear that metaphor and metonymy emerge from each 
other and that while it is possible to point to extreme cases where they are distinct, it 
is much more difficult to identify the point where they become different. It may 
therefore be simpler to think of them as existing in a complex (Goossens 1990) whose 
peripheries are defined by a literal contiguity at the metonymic end and a created 
conceptual contiguity at the metaphoric point. At the final pole, the topic is so 
different from the metaphor through which it is evoked, that it is finally, re-
conceptualised or reconstructed by it. Thus, 'eternity' is 'a spider' simply and only 
because someone chooses to evoke it as such and invites others to hunt down the 
associations arising from the category membership that is insisted upon. 
I can make this clear in figure 4, below: 
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The metonymic- metaphoric continuum 
The animal is their 
head 
j 
Metonymy 
Literal contiguity, 
partonymy 
The animal is a cow 
London calling 
j 
i 
I The bullet and the ballot box I 
Conceptual contiguity, 
taxonymy 
Figure 4 
[_-~ 
My neighbour is a cow 
j 
Eternity is a spider 
V 
Metaphor 
Conceptualisation 
of one thing 
within another 
At one end of the above continuum, we can be secure in our notion of a metonymy, 
because the underlying and literal spatial relationship is clear. Moving towards the 
centre of the continuum, the identity of forms and the relationship between them 
grows less certain. At the end point, we reach the situation of an idea that is chiefly 
grasped through a metaphor. The idea cannot be grasped without the metaphor. It is 
conceptualised through it, as something else in other words, and in order to 
accommodate the matching of two domains an act of category creation must occur. 
The example given is a preposition 'ahead'. 
A key idea in cognitive linguistics is how abstract meanings such as the emotion of 
anger are largely constructed out of our bodily experience of the world, and of the 
mental experience of our bodies ( e.g Johnson 1987, 1991 and 1993). Thus, anger is 
associated with heat because it may engender bodily heat (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). 
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By this token, Heine (1997) has looked at the origins of some prepositional meanings 
as rooted in how we orient our bodies towards space. In English, we can see this in 
the contrast between the adverbs of movement 'ahead' and 'back' with our sense of 
CJ' direction being derived from its association with these body parts and the head's 
associated visual orientation. Thus, to go forward is to follow the direction of the 
head, and to do the opposite is to follow that of the back, hence the adverbs 'ahead' 
and 'back'. Arguably, these adverbs are a step away from realising a more 
grammatical role in the form of prepositions. 
Conceptualisation is a key notion in cognitive linguistics and goes to the core of 
cognitive explanations of metaphor (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and 1999). For 
now, I am using this idea to represent an extreme view of metaphor in that it shows 
how one idea, such as the orientation of the head is being used to give form to 
another, that of forward movement. The abstract nature of movement in a given 
direction means that it cannot be conceptualised in its own terms. We can only think 
about it through the orientation of our bodies. Although the independent existence of 
the phenomenon is not open to question, our mental manipulation of it is entirely 
dependent on metaphor. Therefore this is metaphor's most extreme case. It is very 
different, for example, from describing a house as an upturned ship, since houses have 
clear and physical independence of ships and we require the idea of a ship only to 
visualise a peculiar feature of one example. Of course 'ahead' now belongs to the 
symbolic system in language. We have given it a meaning which is passed on with the 
language. However, in origin the term involves an extreme act of meaning creation, 
recalling how the 181h century philosopher, Vico, ascribed to early language users, 
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supreme poetic feats because they were engaged in an on-going use of metaphor to 
name an unnamed world. 
I should stress that this model represents a continuum. As such it represents the 
uncertain dividing lines between one form and another. It is difficult, for example, to 
know whether the notion of 'space' in the expression 'the race for the White House' 
should be classified as figurative and conceptual or as literal. The White House stands 
for a rank whose holder resides in the building of that name. The problem then turns 
around whether a rank can be located in a building. In order to accept that it can, we 
have to treat a position, the presidency of the USA in this case, as an object or as 
synonymous with the office-holder. The notion of contiguity arises, therefore from a 
prior metaphorical treatment of the items at issue. 
Gibbs' (1994 and 1999b) example of the 'ballot box and the bullet' stretches our 
sense of a genuine physical relationship still further. Bullets exist in the field of 
warfare but that 'field' is itself a semantic rather than a literal enclosure of space. 
Likewise, towards the further pole, one can argue about the exact position of an 
assertion of class membership such as 'my neighbour is a cow'. The question is the 
extent to which the metaphor reinvents the person through their attributed, bovine 
category and the extent to which they are able to retain their human identity, but seen, 
as if through the filter of the cow's form. 
In 'eternity' is spider, we may retain a grasp upon what eternity is, but because that 
notion cannot be visualised as a physical entity there is a sense in which the spider 
may crawl away with the concept it describes. The metaphor clearly has a relational 
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form in that there is some property in the structure of eternity with that of the spider, 
perhaps as consuming a human creature trapped in their web by the limits of mortality 
in a web that is being woven and rewoven without end. 
Metaphorical language posits a flexibility in how we interpret sign-meaning 
correspondences. It threatens the integrity of the symbolic system, suggesting 
that items can stand for what they are not. The suggestion that one thing can become 
another in the world of mental representation also means that one thing can become 
another to different degrees. There are no clear dividing lines between tropes because 
figurative language itself entails a blurring of the divisions between the items with 
which it deals. 
2. 7.8 Contftgunity and metonymic relationships: autism amll metaphor: 
the metaphork and metonymic poles: how the condition of autism 
may say something about the separation of poles and the distinct 
nature of each 
The model I put forward, figure 4 above, retains the distinctiveness of metaphor and 
metonymy, at least in a polar and idealised form. However, it does allow that 
metonymy, like the spatial relationship upon which it is based, will rapidly acquire a 
figurative nature. As we relate phenomena to each other through a notion of space that 
is increasingly metaphorical, so will we draw away from our need to talk about one 
thing through another that is attached to it in a literal sense. The division between a 
literal, partonomic view of metonymy and a metaphorical one could also be 
144 
reinforced by some reflection upon another language-related form of disturbance, that 
of autism. 
2. 7.8.1 Contiguity and metornym.ic reDatnonshnps: autism alllld metaphor: 
tllne nature of autism 
Autism is a condition characterised by such behaviour as a failure to respond to other 
people, a poverty of vocabulary, a paucity of facial expression and 'elaborate 
repetitive routines' (e.g. Klein 1975 and Kanner 1943). Additionally, language 
acquisition among sufferers of autism is often characterised by a tendency towards 
echolalia, that is the repetition of chunks of discourse as it has been heard. Language 
is not analysed as able to be adapted to new contexts (Kanner 1943). The key feature 
of autism is now taken as an interpersonal failure or the inability to relate to people as 
people. This has been ascribed to a failure to acquire what Premack and Woodruff 
( 1978), in an essay on animal intelligence, have called a theory of mind (Hobson 
1993). 
A theory of mind, involves, at root, the ability to understand one's own or others' 
mental states. A theory of mind is what allows one to predict the actions of another, as 
an inference of understanding one's own mental states (Premack and Woodruff 1978: 
515). For example, if we are hungry and food is before us, the reflexive response is to 
reach out and take it. A theory of mind entails the understanding and knowledge that 
we are hungry. Such a theory entails the experience of hunger as a concept we can 
name. It is the knowledge that this state of dissatisfaction can require several forms of 
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remedial action such as going to the refrigerator, going to the orchard or even planting 
corn. Hunger becomes a mental state presenting, perhaps, forms of planning, rather 
than a sensation to which one responds. A further, more sophisticated effect is the 
capacity to infer that another person in similar circumstances may also suffer this 
state. From such an inference one can predict that they may also opt for one of the 
remedies outlined, such as going to the refrigerator. The argument is that autistics are 
deficient in their ability to construct such a theory. Klein (1975) described how they 
let somebody in their presence feel as if they were a piece of 'furniture' (cited in 
Hobson 1993: 20). 
We can see deficiencies in the ability to theorise mind in Kanner's (1943) example of 
an echolalic child who on receiving a gift will respond 'You say "Thank you"' 
(Hobson 1993). In other words, the child repeats what they have been told because 
they have failed to fully construct themselves as a mind that can be embraced by the 
notion 'you' and which therefore does not need this form of self-reference. 
Significantly such pronominal confusions as this one between 'you' and 'I' are 
common in autistics (Hobson 1993), arguably because the pronouns' correct usage 
involves the construction of self and of others as individual minds embodying similar 
and different states. 
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2.7.8.2 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: autism and metaphor: 
autism and the problem of tmderstanding metaphor 
According to Baltaxe (1977) a 'pedantic literalness' has also been a fairly consistent 
feature in observations of autistic behaviour (Hobson 1993: 169). In short, the 
occurrence of metaphor would seem to be rare in autistics' speech. Happe (1995) 
discussed the problems that some autistics have with the interpretation of figurative 
utterances. An instruction to 'stick your coat over there' can result in a request for 
some glue (ibid). 
Asperger's syndrome sufferers are higher functioning autistics. Asperger's syndrome 
children may often over-attach a given item of language to the situation in which it is 
presented. For example, a child who hears the word 'independent' used as the 
description of a peer who dives into the swimming pool before their friends will 
thereafter interpret the word as meaning 'diving first into a swimming pool' (Cumine 
et al. 1998). 
I have already discussed how very young children will engage in a type of catachresis, 
stretching the meaning of a word until it represents other meanings for which they do 
not have words. I have suggested also that this process entails a process of abstraction. 
The abstraction occurs when the global perception of an object is disregarded and 
some of its features such as shape and location are used to describe another 
phenomenon. The sun is thus mapped onto the moon. Such metaphors as the 'sun 
moon' reveal a process that may be more important than they at first appear to 
indicate. 
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We should first return to our example of a child's failure to deduce the meaning of 
independent from a given context and consider how it is that a word such as 
'independent' as a description of character, can mean more than jumping first into a 
swimming pool. The meaning can be generalised because it has been abstracted away 
from a specific instance. When we say that a polar bear is a bear, we are identifying 
this creature not according to the specific properties that make it what it is but 
according to other properties that can be more extensively generalised. For example 
we say that it is a polar bear perhaps because it has white fur and an ability to swim in 
cold water. We say that it is simply a bear because of properties that are common to 
other bears; the shape of its snout and the thickness of its fur, for example. Now any 
use of a word to embody events other than a specific act such as jumping into a pool 
at one time involves an act of category creation. What we are doing is extracting 
features from an event that can be generalised to other events, which when applied to 
an individual may predict what they will do when confronted by such an event. In 
short, our generalisation of a term in order to let it describe more than a given instance 
must be tantamount to an act of superordinate category creation. Metaphor, as we 
have already argued, can be seen as just such a form of category extension and class 
inclusion (Glucksberg and Keysar 1993; Glucksberg and McGlone 1999). 
Autism is a syndrome and as such its manifestations vary. Dowker et al ( 1996) found 
and documented an Asperger' s syndrome sufferer who was something of a poet and 
as such, a user of quite elaborate metaphor. However, subject to such exceptions, it 
would seem possible to say that autism is often characterised by a failure to deal with 
figurative language (Happe 1995; Hobson 1993). 
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As we have implied in our reference to prepositional meaning and the terms 'ahead' 
or 'back', a key tenet in contemporary cognitive linguistics is that abstract meaning is 
largely, if not wholly metaphorical in origin. A failure in metaphor may precipitate a 
failure in abstraction. It is therefore unsurprising that autism should also be implicated 
in a process where a child fails to deduce the abstract properties of a word from a 
specific exemplification of it, so that they can apply them to other instances of a 
similar nature. For example, this means understanding that 'independent' refers to 
other events than jumping into a swimming pool. 
In sum, the capacity of a child to stretch the meaning of a word is closely bound up 
with their ability to extrapolate a meaning from one context to another similar one. 
This capacity for extrapolation is itself a form of category creation and extension. 
Metaphor would seem to be implicated in this form of category extension. The failure 
of many autistics to deal in this cognitive area, of which the clearest manifestation is 
linguistic creativity, highlights close relationship between our ability to shape and 
understand abstract language, to form superordinate categories and to extend them as 
metaphor to include what they do not ordinarily include. 
2.7.8.3 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: autism and metaphor: 
the issue of sociability and theories in the construction of mind 
Happe (1995) also searches for the relationship between the autistic's common failure 
to process metaphor and some of the better-documented features of their condition 
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such as poor sociability and the related failure to construct a theory of mind. Part of 
her interest is directed towards the issue of sociability and she cites Gibbs (1994) 
because of his linkage between sociability and the use of metaphor. 
Gerrig and Gibbs (1988) and Gibbs (1994) hypothesise that metaphors are often used 
to socially bond interlocutors because they assume the sharing of a common 
experiential ground. In this vein, Cohen ( 1993) suggested that a use of metaphor 
allowed interlocutors a greater social intimacy, in part because meanings are being 
created that are common to the interlocutors at a given instant. Thus, two speakers 
may describe 'Agnes' as being 'just like an elephant' in direct reference to her ability 
to remember. Yet, if they both share the knowledge that Agnes is also rather large, 
then they may be drawn together by their extension of a word towards a meaning to 
which they and not the rest of the world are party (Gibbs 1994: 135). 
Somewhat differently, Drew and Holt (1998) have researched the social function of 
figurative expressions in paving the way for a change of topic in a conversation or in 
closing it altogether. According to Drew and Holt 'salient metaphoric idiom' allows 
an interlocutor to summarise an argument so far and even to provide it with a climax 
(cited in Cameron and Low 1999). It may also be that because such idioms often 
function as existential statements, that is, statements of about existing in the world, 
they serve to bond the speakers by establishing their shared ground and its difficulties 
in respect of a larger reality. Thus, when two people finish a conversation about a 
relative's ill-health with an expression such as 'ah well, it never rains but it pours,' 
they may, as it were, be constructing a conversational niche inside a larger framework 
of world events and thus be reinforcing the grounds of their intimacy. 
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Many autistics may be excluded from these social uses of language by their inability 
to use metaphor. Alternatively, the limited ability to socialise may preclude an 
understanding of figurative language as a method of fostering intimacy. However, 
there may also be a larger issue here: one that concerns the construction of mind. Our 
sense of self as a mind or succession of mental states to which we can refer must be a 
largely metaphorical one when it is developed beyond the barest pronominal 
reference. The understanding of emotional or more generally, mental states occurs 
largely through metaphor, as when we express anger as heat, happiness as an upward 
state or loss and desolation through cold (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; 
Lakoff and Turner 1989; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). A defective ability to deal in 
metaphor must also amount to an inability to construct theories about one's own states 
of mind and thus to have a grasp upon the material from which one infers the 
existence of other minds. 
Furthermore, the inference of another mind, must finally be by analogy to one's own. 
Therefore, our construction of other people as alike in the zone of feeling and 
empathy but different in the area of character must finally be as likeness in difference, 
or as metaphor in other words. 
One further and quite interesting observation about metaphor, socialisation and 
category formation can also be made. I have stressed that a category's formation and 
its extension to include a given entity is most probably a primitive cognitive function 
that is essential to our survival. Predatory fish can recognise other fish as belonging to 
the category of poisons or non-food by dint of their dramatic colouring (Holyoak and 
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Thaggard 1995). The category of poison for some fish is built out of a quite basic 
similarity judgement (bright colours). I have also observed how metaphor creation is 
in some sense the extension of a category to include an item that was not thought to 
belong to it. Uncategorised phenomena must constitute something of threat. If we do 
not know whether a mushroom is poisonous or not, we would do well to assume that 
it is. Likewise, the inclusion of a phenomenon into a given category must constitute 
something of a relief, even if it means calling it a poison. Accordingly, I have 
speculated that metaphor as class inclusion may partly account for metaphor as able to 
provide satisfaction. For metaphor gives class identity to what is unidentified, and 
furnishes us with the relief of having found a superordinate home for the host of 
unknown feelings, sensations and phenomena that confront us. 
Even more speculatively, it is interesting to consider how two of the most basic 
categories into which we will arrange our fellow creatures must be 'friend' and 'foe'. 
Deficiencies in category extension may interfere with our ability to interpret people as 
hostile or friendly. Metaphor could thus link to sociability in the very fundamental 
way of being linked to the mechanism by which we categorise people as threatening 
or non-threatening. An inability to make metaphor may be linked to an inability to 
extrapolate our notion of friendliness as an abstract idea from the gestures and facial 
expressions of care-givers, then to extend this to strangers as they present themselves. 
Finally, if we were without the capacity to form metaphor we could also be without 
the capacity to construct the notion of a friend, thus finding ourselves in a world 
where every social encounter is potentially tlu-eatening. 
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2.7.8.41 Co1mt!guity and metonymic relationships: autism and metaphor: 
~mtftsm amn the metoimymnc jpOJe 
Hitherto, I have discussed autism as being associated with deficiencies in the area of 
metaphor-making and the acts of mental construction and reconstruction with which it 
can be associated. Although autism should not be universally associated with an 
inability to make and understand metaphor, it has been my argument that such studies 
of this condition will, when further advanced, do much to hasten our understanding of 
the role and function of metaphor. However, a question I have not heard asked is also 
whether this condition may also tell us something about the nature of metonymy and 
how far it is distinct from metaphor. 
In order to examine this question, it might be helpful to look at the following extracts 
from a monologue by a boy suffering from Asperger' s syndrome. The child is 
discussing his experiences of the day on the public transport system, or observing the 
movement of trains: 
80 and then west came in at three+forty+seven. And the r ware doors look light 
yellow .. square doors with the part. The next one was gonna have round doors. 
But it didn't. Square doors with light yellow inside an( d) going east came in. And 
I saw the square doors with light yellow inside going west through the windows. 
But the square doors with light yellow light inside they going east. And I let it go 
by. 
*********** 
And then at three +fifty the round doors going west went in the other side and I 
153 
and the round doors going east came in. And I saw the round doors going west 
through the windows of the round doors going east. And I saw the round doors 
going west through the windows of the grey coach and the round doors going east. 
And then I got in the round doors going east. (De Villiers' data: De Villiers 1999). 
This discourse manifests exactly the type of pedantic literalism that is generally held 
to constitute autistic speech. Phrases are repeated without regard for the patience of 
the listener: 'And I saw the round doors going west. .. and I saw the round doors going 
west'. The discourse shows a painstaking interest in certain details 'square doors, 
round doors' and, to the unsympathetic reader, an infuriating precision in the way the 
narrative is recounted. 
However, the narrative detail is not there simply to embellish the account. The details 
are the metonymic hooks on which the larger narrative hangs. Trains are the actors of 
this narrative and are represented by such seemingly insignificant features as their 
direction, door shape and door colour. These features, one assumes, are the items 
through which the larger actors in the scene, the trains, present and identify 
themselves. These details have a contiguous relationship to the objects they represent. 
Contiguity, here, is meant in the most basic, literal and partonymic sense. A given 
train is its round doors not because they are like it but simply because they are part of 
it. The clarity of the spatial relationship also impedes the details' evocation of a 
greater impressionistic whole. The description is so cluttered that it is difficult to 
develop a holistic picture of what has occurred. The train is the detail through which it 
is perceived. 
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This 'thing for concept' usage places the discourse a long way from one of the roles 
that Gibbs (1994 and 1999) identifies for metonymy. This was in description, where a 
few details can be used to evoke a larger scene, as when 'tables and chairs' are used to 
summarise and evoke the wider set of man-made objects that constitute furniture. By 
way of contrast, it may be useful to consider another very different and more 
evocative description of a vehicle where a whole is evoked through just this 
metonymic interplay: 
81 Through the gap between the front seats I could see the (gear) stick's dusty 
canopy of weary black rubber. Above that was a dark hole where the heater or 
radio should have been. Some charm made of bark, animal skin and beads 
dangled from the mirror (Authors' data: Giles Folden: The Last King of 
Scotland 1998: 25). 
Just as 81 makes clear how metonymy can adopt the larger function of what Gibbs 
(1994) terms a Poetics of Mind so, 80, above, shows how it may not. 80, above, 
makes clear how metonymy can have a highly literal origin and function. When 
rooted in spatial attachment, the metonym, door, for example, is the train for which it 
stands to an extent that may inhibit a wider and more evocative perception of that 
parent object. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the generalisation of category involves our transcendence 
of detail, at least until we post-rationalise the category as part of a scientific 
taxonomy. Too strong a sense of detail can clutter our capacity to generalise out of an 
abstract evocation of the object under consideration. It becomes interference. In a 
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discourse such as that of 80, where a thing-for-concept metonymy predominates, the 
things obscure the concept they should evoke. In this way, an essential capacity to 
generalise about the thing is limited. We cannot attribute polar bears to the bear 
family while we still insist upon their whiteness and their arctic habitat. 
Example 80, above, thus shows an extreme metonymic literalism. It also shows how 
metonymy when used in this sense is at an opposite end to metaphor. However, 
metonymy posits a relationship between one phenomenon and another in which our 
capacity to make metaphor can itself interfere. A metonymy is prototypically a spatial 
relationship between a topic and vehicle. However, the metaphorical quality of mind 
is manifest in the construction of space as conceptual or in the dissolution of normal 
category boundaries which allows for the larger evocation of a conceptual whole 
through one of its parts or through one its category members. In short we may need a 
concept of literal metonymy or synecdoche as laying the groundwork for our concept 
of metonymy. Thereafter, we may need to think ofthis relationship as figurative 
because it is one in which our capacity for metaphor interferes. 
2.7.9 Contiguity and metonymic relationships: metaphor and 
metonymy: issues and conclusions 
I undertook a discussion of metonymy because its nature might help us to construct a 
better understanding of what metaphor really is. The evident starting point was 
Jakobson's (1971) view that metaphor and metonymy are the opposite axes of 
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language. However, this view was found to be problematic because there are 
expressions where the dividing line between the two poles becomes unclear. 
Metaphor and metonymy were therefore best seen as poles on a continuum. Using this 
analysis, I can conclude that: 
1) traditional analyses of metonymy stress that it is a relationship based upon 
contiguity. However a literal view of metonymy cannot account for all 
phenomena that are generally considered to be metonyms. In order to account 
for such relationships as 'bullets' as belonging to the field of 'war' our notion 
of contiguity has to become conceptual. Conceptual contiguity (Radden and 
Kovesces 1999) is arguably constructed out of a metaphorical view of space or 
of a spatial relationship. Ironically, it is metaphor, as a cognitive process, 
which allows us to extend our view of what metonymy is. 
2) The notion of an ICM (Idealised Cognitive Model) was introduced with the 
possibility that metonyms are constructed out of some part of the larger, 
culturally constructed cognitive model that we have of a word's meaning. The 
metonym could be formed from a part of the model, which a given culture 
makes salient. The metonym then becomes a kind of cognitive 'tab' through 
which we manipulate the larger model. 
3) The reconstruction of metaphor as an opposite pole to metonymy brings us 
back to a more traditional distinction between metonymy and metaphor (e.g. 
Ullman 1962). Accordingly, metonymy can be seen as locking onto a pre-
existing relationship between its domains and metaphor as creating or 
asserting a relationship between the same where none may have been 
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previously recognised. The extent to which the relationship is considered new 
or unrecognised may mark the extent of the drift away from a metonymic pole. 
It may also be marked by how far the spatial relationship between topic and 
vehicle shifts from the physical to the conceptual until finally it is stretched 
out of existence. 
4) Some autistics are deficient in metaphor comprehension and metaphor 
creation (Happe 1995; Hobson 1993). This can be linked to two other areas in 
which autistics may also have problems: 
o lexical extension and generalisation 
o the construction of theories of mind and sociability. 
The role of metaphor as a cognitive process in these areas was discussed. 
Metaphor was thus shifted further from the linguistic to the cognitive domain. 
5) The possibility of metaphor as a cognitive process having a key role in our 
ability to extend categories and incorporate the unknown was linked, 
hypothetically, to our ability to find friends among new acquaintances and 
category membership for new phenomena. 
6) An extract of discourse from an Asperger' s syndrome sufferer was used to 
show how a literal, partonymic use of metonymy will exist without metaphor 
and perhaps impede a more generalised understanding with its need for 
abstraction and category formation. This literal type of metonymy defined an 
opposite pole to metaphor and to the nature of the mind that metaphor 
requires. 
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7) We can represent a domain through an item that is conceptually contiguous. 
and functionally or culturally salient, wheels for car for example. This type of 
representation would appear to be a distinct cognitive function. It would seem 
to be available to those who may have difficulty with metaphor, though some 
quite detailed research is needed to establish this. The indication is that 
synecdoche as prototypical metonymy is very distinct from prototypical 
metaphor. 
8) As the notion of contiguity becomes more figurative, I would also suspect that 
the resultant type of metonymy may be less used by those who are deficient in 
their ability to handle metaphor, though research would be needed to establish 
this. The reason for this may be that the relation between a part and a whole 
becomes metaphorical. In short metaphor, as a cognitive process, extends our 
ability to use, metonymy. 
9) A metonymy whose construction is assisted by metaphor can have the role of 
a descriptive device discussed by Gibbs (1994), where larger scenes are 
evoked through a few appendages. This is because category boundaries are 
blurred and larger sets of ICMS evoked by the few into which there is 
conceptual leakage. Thus, we can evoke an entire English village through a 
church and a few houses, because 'church' and 'houses' are categories that 
can act as cognitive tabs ofthe more detailed collections of forms that actually 
make up the village. 
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2.8 Image schematic views of metaphor and thought 
The above analysis of metonymy may give us a clearer idea ofwhat metaphor is not 
and where its boundaries lie. I have also shown the importance of metaphor by 
outlining the problems of finding meaning in a text produced by an autistic child 
where metaphor is notable for its total absence and where metonymy takes a 
disconcertingly literal form. I have said that metaphor can extend our sense of the 
contiguous relationship between things, but I have not said how metaphor can actually 
create a relationship between domains that sometimes appears apt and satisfYing and 
sometimes does not. 
For example, the highly metaphorical passage, 82, below, is spoken by Shakespeare's 
Othello and is generally held to be moving and affective. If we retain the meaning or 
at least its gist, but change the metaphors as in 83, the theme is altogether without 
force and might be considered parody: 
82 Here is my journey's end, here is my butt, 
And very sea mark of my utmost sail. 
Do you go back dismay'd? 'tis a lost fear: 
Man but a rush against Othello' s breast 
And he retires. Where should Othello go? 
(Shakespeare: Othello) 
83 Here is my dinner's end. Here is my desert 
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And sweet marked end of appetite. 
Would you get up and go? Don't be afraid, 
But come towards my empty plate 
For there you'll rest, since full men cannot eat. 
There is also the deeper issue of how people understand metaphors at all. I can argue 
that metaphor is a form of class inclusion (Glucksberg and Keysar 1993; Glucksberg 
and McClone 1999) and this may situate metaphor within the vital cognitive function 
of category formation. Yet, such an argument does not suggest either the basis of 
category or, more remotely, the reason for metaphor and why one given instance of it 
will be found meaningful while another may be less so. 
2.8.1 image schematic views of metaphor and thought: schema as a 
means through which thought patterns language 
As has been argued, similarity is a problematic basis for metaphor, even though it is 
clear that metaphors do provoke some sense of a similarity relationship within us. 
This will apply, whether or not metaphors are interpreted as class inclusion 
statements. Metaphors that map a concrete target domain onto an abstract source 
domain make this point most clearly. Some abstract ideas cannot be grasped other 
than through the metaphor. We should perhaps remind ourselves that this is not the 
same as saying that abstract ideas are brought into existence by metaphors. But even 
after such an insistence, we are still left with the problem that the abstract entity, like 
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a smell, for example, will only take a form capable of cognitive manipulation if it is 
within a borrowed identity. Thus, we only talk about smell as taste or sight. 
A key notion in the cognitive construction of mind and by implication of language is 
that of the schema. Fundamentally, 'a schema is a pairing of two patterns at unequal 
levels'. Thus, 'the steps of a dance are the schema of a dance' (Turner, 1998: 44). In 
one of the earlier formulations of a schema in psychological literature, Bartlett (1932) 
told Amerindian folk tales to students in London. He found that when they recounted 
the tales they would alter them to fit a patterning more typical of the European folk 
tradition. His conclusion was that our memories organise events according to 
culturally imbued patterns or schema. One cognitive argument in respect of metaphor, 
is fundamentally that metaphorical language is produced by and interpreted through a 
form of schematisation or patterning also (e.g. Gibbs 1994; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999; Johnson 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993). I will now explain what this means. 
2.8.2 Image schematic views of metaphor and thought: conceptual 
metaphor 
Interestingly, classical analyses of rhetoric grasped the existence of certain 
schematisations in the use of metaphor (Turner 1998). It is not difficult to see why 
this should be. Ifwe consider, 82, above, from Othello, we can see that the metaphor 
is schematised around the idea of movement in space, 'journey's end,' 'butt (end), 'go 
back', 'rush', 'retire' and 'go'. Movement is the predominant pattern and could be 
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called a schema. There are also two secondary schemas. They are secondary because 
they belong to the overall theme of movement but realise it in different ways. 
The first secondary schema is nautical movement, 'sea mark' (lighthouse or other 
terrestrial navigation point), 'sail'. The second schema latches onto one that recurs 
constantly throughout the play because of the main character's past as a soldier. It is 
that of warfare as in 'rush against a breast' (rushing against a breastwork in a 
fortification but in this case attacking Othello's person). 
In his well-known essay, published in 1979, Reddy (1993) made the larger point that 
such schematic groupings are shaped by another more general metaphor. Further, the 
suggestion is that it is that it is not just poetry but much everyday discourse that is 
structured by these metaphorical themes or root analogies, as Goatly ( 1997) calls 
them. Reddy's example was the now much cited 'communication is a conduit' 
metaphor. His argument is that our discourse about communication is largely 
structured in terms of a metaphor that perceives it as a channel or conduit. The use of 
the word 'channel' for radio or television makes this clear. Reddy (1993: 166) 
considers the following examples for when communication fails: 
84 try to get your thoughts across better 
85 None ofMary's feelings come through to me with any clarity 
86 You still haven't given me any idea of what you mean 
(Reddy 1993: 166) 
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I have already discussed how a preposition/adverb such as 'ahead' is constructed as a 
kind of dead metaphor. Reddy's contention was that such dead metaphor underlies 
much of the talk about the abstract notion of communication. The implication is that 
we see a message as an object requiring transfer by means of a channel which we 
have to open then maintain against the risk of obstruction. Further examples are given 
in 87-92, below: 
87 You know very well that I gave you that idea 
88 Marsha got those concepts from Rudolph 
89 Your real feelings are finally getting through to me 
90 Your concepts come across beautifully 
91 The passage conveys a feeling of excitement 
92 I can't seem to get these ideas into words 
(Reddy 1993: 189-191) 
Examples 87-92, above, show how the main metaphor is realised in subsidiary 
metaphors (Reddy 1993 ). These subsidiary metaphors are better considered as 
entailments (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). For example if a life, as in 82 above, is 
conceptualised as being in motion (here is my journey's end), an entailment must be 
that it is an object capable of movement. The entailment in 82 is contained in the 
metaphor of a ship, which is represented by the metonym of a 'sail'. Reddy's 
example, 89, above, shows the message as moving down the channel in fairly 
straightforward manner and thus exemplifies the basic schema. Messages have to get 
through the ether in order to be perceived. However, a conduit supposes something to 
travel down it. 91 shows the idea or message in a state of motion, as the object 
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travelling down the conduit. Similarly, if the transmission of a message requires that it 
be rendered into an object form that can be 'conducted' to somebody else then this 
entails a process of rendition as in 92, where ideas must be got 'into words'. 
Reddy ( 1993) did not suggest that communication can only be thought of in these 
terms. However, he did point out that it was very difficult to avoid the communication 
as a conduit metaphor when discussing this subject. There is thus an implication that 
the metaphor is conceptual. As has been said, this means that we cannot separate the 
way we think about communication from the metaphors in which we discuss it. The 
larger implication is that communication is an abstract idea that can only be grasped 
as an inference of something else (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). It requires a conceptual 
metaphor ofthe conduit if it is to be cognitively manipulated. The conduit is thus an 
image schema in that it is a topic that the mind makes available for the 
conceptualsation of such ideas as communication. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), in a now well-known book, 'The Metaphors we Live by', 
greatly extended Reddy's analysis to explore a larger set of conceptualisations built 
from metaphors. The book's wider view is that our discourse about abstract topics is 
made possible by metaphor. An implication, which was explored somewhat 
differently by Schon (1963 and 1993) is that our perceptions of particular issues are 
fashioned by the nature of the metaphor through which they are grasped. 
Thus, according to Lakoff and Johnson ( 1980), we discuss both business and 
argument in contemporary Anglo-American culture as if they were forms of warfare. 
For example, business people will 'outmanoeuvre the competition' in a take-over 
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'battle' then launch a 'price war'. Similarly, in a given argument, we can describe 
ourselves as 'taking the high ground' and in order to 'demolish an opposing case.' 
When we discuss states of mind we will often think about them as directional 
movement. 'Up' is positive as in 'on top of the world' while 'down' is negative as in 
'down in dumps' or 'depressed (pushed down from a high to a low point)'. Even more 
importantly, time is space, and cannot be conceptualised other than spatially or as an 
object moving in a spatial dimension, as with 'a long time' or a 'short way to go until 
six o'clock.' 
It is important to understand that conceptual metaphors are not textual entities. They 
are constructs that are used to describe the thematic linkages in the language that we 
use to talk about generally abstract topics in text. The linguistic realisations that 
instantiate conceptual metaphors may often be considered part ofthe literal, non-
figurative lexicon. For example, the metaphor that 'down is negative' might give us 
both the notions of 'mental depression' and 'political suppression' with their 
etymology of something or somebody being pushed or let fall into the ground and 
immobilised. Yet, because they have been conventionalised by the evolution of 
English over time, few would consider these terms as metaphorical even though they 
attest to a conceptual metaphor. 
Conceptual metaphors are sub-linguistic. They are a search for the analogical 
principles that shape much language but which will also lie behind visual imagery. 
For example, the 18th/19th century painter, Francisco Goya, etched a man and woman 
engaged in a vain and elaborate courtship then parodied their machinations with a 
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sketch oftwo dogs eyeing each other wantonly at their feet (see appendix 1). When he 
did this, he latched onto a common conceptual metaphor that gives us a reduced view 
of ourselves by likening us to animals and more specifically dogs. This conceptual 
metaphor also has a common linguistic manifestation in such expressions as 'it's a 
dog's life' or 'the dog end' for a remnant or left-over. 
Because of the analogical nature of conceptual metaphors, we cannot be certain if the 
manner in which we formulate one is correct or not. This is not simply an issue of 
wording. For example, if we consider sentences 93-97, below, it is clear that we can 
base them on conceptual metaphors that are common to all these examples, to a few, 
or only to one. We can thus treat them as generated by the same conceptual metaphors 
or by different ones. 
93 We must construct a new theory 
94 The theory is largely based upon an older one 
95 The theory is founded upon insecure evidence 
96 The theory that has arisen is somewhat weak 
97 The theory is unsupported by the evidence 
Thus, with the highest degree of generalisation, we can say that all of these employ 
the idea that 'up is positive' because theories are good when they stand up or rise. 
Slightly less generally, but still in respect of all these examples, we can talk about 
'theories as physical structures' or 'ideas as buildings'. This may seem weak in a case 
such as 92, but that is because we have come to accept that 'support' has an abstract 
meaning. In origin however, it would have been conceptualised as a support for a 
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physical structure. However, 96 and 97, can also be given quite different 
conceptualisations in that 97 views 'evidence as a support' and 96 sees evidence as 
the ground in which the structure is founded. It is clear, however, that all ofthese 
statements latch onto our need to see intellectual argument and theory as the putting 
up of physical structures in vertical space, and how we formulate that concept is not 
of great importance. 
Lakoff and Johnson's overwhelming conclusion is that we conceptualise a given topic 
with common sets of schemata and these schemata affect the nature of what we think 
about. Rational argument cannot be altogether separated from the construction of 
structures against gravity in vertical space. 
2.8.3 Image-schematic views of metaphor and thought: metaphor as 
created by a conceptual hierarchy 
The problem of formulating a given conceptual metaphor can never entirely be 
resolved, since we are any way attempting to give linguistic form to a 
conceptualisation that underlies language. However, some aspect ofthe difficulty can 
be accommodated within the notion of a hierarchy of conceptual metaphors as 
producing a particular textual realisation (Lakoff and Johnson 1999 20 1-202). For 
example, in the conceptualisation of intellectual structure, we could see 'up is 
positive' as more fundamental than the idea ofbuilding upwards and the structures 
that result. Broadly, two types of hierarchy are identified, inheritance or event 
structure hierarchies and entailment hierarchies. 
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2.8.3.1 [mage-schematic views of metaphor and! thought: metaphor as 
created by a conceptual hierarchy: event-struchue hierarchies 
Event structure hierarchies exploit the cognitive science concept of inheritance in 
order to structure our conceptualisation of a given event. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 
201) give as their example how somebody who has never seen an electric car can 
have quite a strong notion of what it will consist of. They know that such a car will 
have four wheels, probably a steering wheel, a driver's seat and brakes etc. Equally, 
they will bring to the idea some notions of electricity, such as the need to store it in 
batteries or to generate it. In sum, they inherit features from other prototypes of cars 
and of electricity in order to construct a kind of vehicle they may never have seen. 
A common conceptual metaphor is 'difficulties are impediments to movement'. From 
the notion of impediment we inherit the various ways in which this can take a 
physical form. For example there is the event of a physical blockage in a flow. 
Another type of impediment is the burden which when carried will slow us down. Yet 
another is a force that is acting against our purpose (a counterforce) (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999: 20 1-202). Thus, we inherit from the conceptual metaphor a set of 
divergent but similar expressions for problems. These expressions use more restricted 
conceptualisations. For example, sentences 98, 99 and I 00, all inherit the notion of 
impediments as burdens which is in its turn part of the inheritance ofthe more general 
notion of an impediment. 
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98 He staggered under the weight of too much knowledge 
99 She was bowed down with responsibility 
100 She was carrying the burden of his sorrow. 
2.8.3.2 limage schematic views of metaphor and! thought: metaphor as 
created by a conceptual hierarchy: entailment hierarchies 
We have already discussed how metaphors in text can possess entailments. Thus, in 
George Orwell's animal farm, the metaphor of 'a farm is a pre-revolutionary society' 
entails that the farmer will be the bourgeois capitalist. This entailment is proportional. 
According to a Marxist vision, the relationship of the farmer to their farm is the same 
as that of the capital-owning class to that of society. Entailments can also fom1 
hierarchies within the conceptual metaphors that underlie such textual realisations 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999). The hierarchies exploit the relational structure of each 
domain of a metaphor. Thus, if' actions are self-propelled motions', we can entail that 
'aids to action are aids to movement' (ibid). This relationship can be constructed 
logically. Thus, we can say that if actions are self-propelled movements, then things 
that we do to precipitate movement will also precipitate action. This entailment would 
manifest itself in the textual examples 101-103, below: 
101 lfthe project gets stuck then you'll need to push it on a bit 
102 We all need to pull together, to keep this on the road 
1 03 Once we have created some momentum, the business will grow of its own 
accord 
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All ofthese examples are associating action with forward movement and failure with 
a lack of momentum (ibid). In 103, the metaphors are mixed, which is a common 
event in discourse despite the strictures that traditional rhetoricians may place against 
it. Thus, created 'movement' leads to 'growth'. It is also worth observing that teachers 
perhaps traditionally advise against mixing metaphors in order to retain the integrity 
of a given conceptual theme and thus prevent the confusion of a reader having to 
chase down too many conceptual metaphors at the same time. 
In 1 0 1 the action needed to created momentum is to 'push', in 1 02 it is to 'pull'. Both 
101 and 102 exploit an entailment. The entailment is that what we do to precipitate 
movement, will also precipitate action. But it would be wrong to see a sentence such 
as 102 as wholly a product of that entailment. I will explain why in section 2. 9.4 
below. 
Finally, a hierarchy implies different levels of reduction in how we analyse a 
metaphor. Thus, 'aids to actions are aids to movement' will operate as the 
conceptualisation of fewer textual realisations than the more general 'actions are self-
propelled motions', since this last encompasses much of our notion of action. A 
hierarchy also implies that some conceptual metaphors operate at a different level of 
generality to others. One can, for example, suggest a final point of reduction and 
generalisation in seeing reification, or viewing an idea as a thing, as being at the core 
of all abstract language (e.g. Langacker 1990 and 1991 ). 
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2.8.3.3 limage-sclltematic views of metaphor and thought: metaphor as 
created! by a concephnan hierarchy: cultmran annd umnversai effects 
'Pulling together' in 102, above, may make sense because of the conceptual 
metaphors that it exploits. Yet, at a more specific level it also attests to a formulation 
that is cultural in nature. Britain's historical and cultural development is interlaced 
with its achievements as a maritime power. Sea-going activities are particularly potent 
as a source of language development. The confinement of life on an old sailing ship 
was also conducive to the creation of a privileged form of discourse. A phrase such as 
'pulling together' is probably made conceptually salient by the need for seamen to 
pull on ropes and cables. It could also be bound up with the activity of team rowing. 
Thus, a given text metaphor will be built from a hierarchy of conceptualisations that 
may be entailed or inherited. These may also be made salient by schema that are 
closely rooted in the nature of a culture at a given time (Lakoff 1987, Gibbs 1994, 
Lakoff and Johnson 1999). This constitutes one of the most potent effects of a culture 
upon a language. Arguably, also, it becomes a mechanism in cultural formation. For 
example, the maritime inheritance is rapidly becoming extinct as a contemporary 
feature of British life. However, it is maintained, albeit unconsciously, as a myth that 
fashions how the British people think about the world by the set of mappings that 
pervade the language we use. 
A common conceptualisation of time views the place where the speaker is found as 
located in the present, the future as spatially in front of them and the past as behind 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 140). Unusually, the Ayamaran language of Northern 
Chile places the future behind the observer and the present in front (Nu3ez et al. 
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1997) (cited in Lakoff and Johnson 1999). This reverses the more common 
conceptualisation of an individual going forward to the future. One might start to 
speculate how this may modify the western conception of the individual as marching, 
goal-directed, into the future. Thus, one might wonder if some ancient Ayamaran 
conception of an unknowable future can shape their language and so transmit a 
concept of the individual as unable to map out their future existence. 
By the same token, Lakoff has discussed a variation of his 'up is power' as a 
metaphor of social organisation (1987: 274). To be 'above' another typifies an 
expression of power, hence the idea of a 'raised throne' or a 'high table' and the 
opposite expression of deference through bowing or kneeling. In India, however, 
'society is conceived as a 'body' ofwhich the different castes are parts, with the 
lowest being the feet and the highest the head. The conceptualisation that high is 
powerful and low is weak thus receives a more direct representation in the structure of 
the body. The body of course adds its own aspects to the conceptualisation, since 
clearly, the high cast is not simply a 'head' because 'heads' are high but doubtless 
because they are directive of the rest of a given anatomy, as we can see in the English 
derivative of a 'head teacher'. 
Another example of cultural interference is to 'the body is a container' schema of 
Lakoff and Johnson ( 1980). This schema manifests itself in the English expression of 
anger which is expressed through the idea of internal pressure on the container, for 
example 'fit to burst' or 'an explosive temper'. In Chinese, 'the body is a container 
schema' (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), will realise itself in a different form. Anger, may 
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arise less from the bursting of the container than through the state of the organs 
identified by Chinese medical tradition as associated with that emotion (Yu 1998). 
2.8.41 [mage-schematic views of metaphor and thought: the invariance 
hypothesis 
Another feature of entailment hierarchies is that they entail structures in lower order 
conceptual metaphors or in text metaphors. The predictability of these forms of 
entailment have constituted 'the invariance principle' (Lakoff 1993: 215-216). The 
invariance principle holds that: 'metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive 
topology (that is the image schematic structure) of the source domain, in a way 
consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain' (ibid: 215). 
For example, I have said that all languages speak of time as space. In English and 
most other languages, a speaker conceptualises future time as being in front of them. 
Since the spatial opposite of 'in front of is 'behind' and because 'time is space', the 
invariance principle will ensure that the temporal opposite of the future, or past time, 
will be conceptualised as behind the speaker. We have also looked at an example 
(Nuftez et al.l997) of a conceptualisation of time that can be summarised as 'back to 
the future'. The invariance hypothesis would suggest therefore that we go forward to 
the past in Ayamaran. 
The invariance principle sets out parallel argument structures between each domain of 
a conceptual metaphor. In this sense, a conceptual metaphor is not dissimilar to an 
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analogy as described by Gentner and Jeziorski (1993) and Holyoak and Thaggard 
(1995). Gentner and Jeziorski (1993: 452) in fact hold conceptual metaphors to be a 
form of analogy. This implies that they are proportional in nature. 
If conceptual metaphors are analogies then it must be that the inferences drawn from a 
source domain are made applicable to the target domain by the invariance principle. 
In other words a set of structural relations would appear to exist between these 
domains. For an example, I will revert to the 'time is space' metaphor. As said, in 
English the future is in front of the speaker. Therefore, as implied, the invariance 
principle will not allow the past to be to the left or right of the speaker. This is 
because 'behind' is the opposite of 'in front' and 'the past' is the opposite of 'the 
future'. We can now draw an inference. ln this case it will be that 'we go forward into 
the future and back into the past.' Thus: 
the past ~ the space behind 
the future ~ the space in front 
therefore we walk forward into the future and back into the past. It may be therefore 
that the invariance principle reinforces the analogical or proportional nature of 
conceptual metaphors. 
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2.8.5 image-schematic views of metaphor and! thought: conceptuan 
metaphor and its construction of how we think about the world. 
Metaphor then can be perceived as a vehicle through which culture constructs 
language, and conceptual metaphor as the vehicle through which abstract ideas are 
grasped and by which they are shaped. This realisation has triggered a series of 
studies upon how metaphors shape the way in which a given mode of enquiry will 
grasp the world. 
For example, Bellezi (1992) looked at how the conceptualisation of the mind as an 
eye and the concomitant metaphor of 'sight as understanding' that structured the 
mnemonics of 'professional memorisers'. In most studied languages, we can say that 
the dominance of visual perception in the human sensory system leads us to 
conceptualise understanding as seeing. 
Bringing us closer to our theme, Block has brought the issue closer to English 
language teaching by looking at the metaphors through which we grasp the teaching 
and learning task (1992) or in which we frame the issue of second language 
acquisition ( 1999). Low ( 1999) has asked whether we can be said to conceptualise the 
text as a person in metatextual commentaries that treat discourse as an organ capable 
of pronouncing upon itself, as in the phrase 'this paper thinks.' 
The areas of sickness and medicine have triggered a great deal of related interest. 
Haraway ( 1989) looked at the rhetoric of war, defence and military technology that 
can be found in popular discourse on the immune system. Martin (1990) conducted a 
similar study of contemporary popular texts that found the dominant conceptualisation 
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of the body as a nation state. Interestingly, in this, popular medical discourse has not 
developed far beyond the more expert metaphors of the 191h century, which according 
to Barbera ( 1993) also conceptualised the body as a nation in conflict. Sontag ( 1991) 
explored how the sick are treated according to the way in which illness is 
conceptualised through metaphors of warfare. Lupton (1994) dealt with the 
representation of illness with metaphor as a more general study of how the disease 
and the body are treated in Western culture. Yu (1998) extended the search for 
conceptual metaphors of sickness and other abstract states into Chinese with the 
conclusion that some are specific to a given culture and language. 
Economics, business and politics have also received significant treatment. Morgan 
(1997) has put forward a set of different conceptual metaphors through which 
managers can re-examine their company structure, in order to determine the type of 
system they operate. For example, company structures can be organic or mechanistic. 
More interesting is Morgan's argument that an understanding ofthe structure as a 
given metaphor can help to release a manager's thinking from the entailments that the 
metaphors impose. In a less diagnostic and more descriptive vein, Schaeffner ( 1996) 
examined the cross-cultural misunderstandings implicit in political metaphor. She 
took as an example the very different German and English construals of the house that 
the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, wanted the European Union to be. 
177 
2.8.6 llmage-schematic views o1f metaphor and thought: conceptual 
metapllnor as tine means thrmngh which we tmdlerstand 
metapllnorican language 
Conceptual metaphor can be seen as more than representing how we understand a 
particular topic. Arguably, it is the mechanism through which we understand and 
create figurative language and concomitantly through which we represent and 
understand abstract thought (e.g. Gibbs 1993 and 1994, Johnson 1989, 1991, 1992, 
1993, Lakoff and Johnson; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Nayak and Gibbs 
1990). Some quite simple experiments have been conducted to try to show how this is 
the case. For example, subjects can be sensitised to expressions that latch onto a given 
schema by being given the schema as part of the context in which they will hear the 
expressions. Under such conditions, subjects are significantly more likely to provide a 
figurative interpretation of an expression (Nayak and Gibbs 1990). Thus, 'blowing 
one's stack' is more likely to yield a clear figurative meaning if it is put forward in the 
context of the schema, 'anger is a heated fluid in a container'. 
The first major conclusion is that conceptual metaphors are schematisations for other 
metaphors. They can be regarded as the patterns from which metaphors are produced. 
These schema should be regarded as active in the process of metaphor creation and 
interpretation even though they may be responsible for creating meanings that are 
regarded as part of our ordinary lexis (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). We can both 
exemplify and support this view if we look at language diachronically, or as it has 
developed over time. 
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2.8. 7 Conceptual metaphor and the diachronic study of language 
2.8.7.1 Conceptual metaphor and the diachro111.ic study ofnanguage: 
idiomatisation and DexicalisatioHll 
Let us imagine that two people are talking about their new manager and have the 
following conversation: 
104 A: There're going to be some sweeping changes 
B: Yes, she's what you might call a new broom 
A: A new vacuum clearer more like 
The first two expressions can be construed as conventionalised. The process of 
conventionalisation can be seen in two ways, as idiomatisation then lexicalisation. An 
idiomatic expression supposes a non-literal use of language which does not require 
great interpretative effort because it is conventional or common. Thus, when we hear 
the expression 'red herring', we will know that this refers to a move away from the 
main conversational topic. It means this because of the practice of using the strong 
smell of this fish to divert hounds from the pursuit of their quarry (Goatly 1997). Yet 
such a meaning cannot be worked out from the expression itself. We have to know 
that a 'red herring means a topic diversion' or else be given a very informative 
context, if we are to understand it. At the same time we retain the meaning of herring 
as fish and therefore perceive our use of the word to mean a diversionary topic as odd. 
Idioms operate upon this cline of having a meaning that is largely conventionalised 
yet understood as figurative. Sometimes the figurative meaning can be deduced from 
an understanding of metaphor and its origins can be traced to conceptual metaphor 
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(Gibbs and Nayak 1989 and 1991; Gibbs et al. 1989, Nayak and Gibbs 1990). 
Sometimes it is opaque. However, underlying the opacity will be a metaphorical or 
metonymic story, perhaps evidencing the effect of cultural practices upon language, 
as in the hunting example. 
As implied, an idiom's state of conventionalisation is made clear by how it is 
sometimes opaque. We cannot work out what a red herring means except possibly 
through context. In the example, 'sweeping changes', one could argue that this 
expression is certainly idiomatised. In fact, I would suggest that it is approaching 
lexicalisation because it is difficult to construct the use of 'sweeping' as an adjective 
in a way that would be considered literal. Even an odd expression such as a 'sweeping 
person' would more likely have the connotation of implementing changes than using a 
broom. However, the manner in which the second speaker develops the metaphor by 
describing the new manager as a 'new broom' shows how somebody may latch onto a 
conceptualisation that is active even though its textual product is dead and partially 
conventionalised. The final, unconventional metaphor, 'vacuum cleaner', makes clear 
how the schematisation is being grasped in order to create something odd, which also 
imports something of a different schematisation (the avaricious suction mechanism) to 
create humour. This is a constructed example, however it summarises a process that is 
constantly occurring in language. That process is the cognitive deployment of the still 
active schema that lie behind idioms or dead, lexicalised and partially lexicalised 
metaphors. I give another example where one speaker, referring to the donor of a 
large sum of money to a political party, takes up a schema suggested by a particular 
word then develops it: 
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105 'He was known as bullets at school and he's certainly handed the Tories a lot 
ofheavy-duty ammunition tonight' (Authors data: BBC television) 
A contrived example that shows the exploitation of a schema where lexicalisation is 
complete is given at 106, below: 
106 A: Because the train was late they had to hold up the one behind 
B: Yes one thing leads to another 
A: But sometimes people just can't get from the one idea to the other 
Our ideas of causality are expressed through an image schema of spatial connection, 
or 'a path schema' (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). This is made very clear 
in A's final comment about people not 'getting from one idea to another.' It is also 
apparent in the previous comment of B, using 'lead to'. Though the part lexicalisation 
of 'lead to' as an expression of causation makes this less apparent. In the first 
statement of B, 'the path' schema would not be present at all, as cause is expressed 
through the co~unction 'because'. Now, 'cause' has an etymological link through 
Latin to the idea of a spatial connection. However, we do not need to link this word to 
its possible origins in a 'path schema' in order to understand it, nor could one argue 
that its appearance here has been triggered by an activation of this schema. We have 
already attributed a role to this word. What is clear is that the schemata from which 
the word has emerged are still active in our conceptualisation of causation, if not in 
our understanding of the word itself. 
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I will now consider another example by looking at a process that implies greater 
abstraction than lexicalisation, that of grammaticalisation. 
2.8.7.2 rrmage scllD.enmlltnc views of mdapllD.or anndl tllD.oungllD.t: connceptunan 
metaphor and! ttoe dliacllnronnic stundly of hmgunage: lanngunage cl!nange 
Many students oflanguage change, but perhaps most notably, Heine and Reh (1984) 
and Hopper and Traugott (1993), have pointed up a process of grammaticalisation and 
described the role of metaphor within it. I have already described how certain words 
become more grammatical as the language evolves over time. I took as an example 
how a preposition may begin as the metaphorical development of a noun body part, 
reflecting the orientation of the body to the world (Heine 1997). This can be found in 
such English examples as 'ahead' (derived from head) or behind (derived from hind). 
These may develop in the next phase into grammatical particles as can be seen in an 
English phrasal verb such as 'go ahead'. The grammatical particles may develop into 
clitics and finally affixes, though this does not always happen. The process arguably 
involves a series of metaphorical extensions that cut across the boundaries 
traditionally separating lexis from morphology and grammar, questioning the 
usefulness of the traditional distinctions that linguistics makes between these areas of 
study. 
An example of grammaticalisation can be seen in the history of the 'future' in Latin 
and French. The early Latin kantabumos (we sing) was an affixation of 'bumos' a 
form ofthe verb to 'be'. By 'process ofphonological reduction' this became 
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'cantabimus' (Fox 1994). One can speculate that this involves the construction of the 
future as a place where we want ourselves to be, drawing upon a schema that Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999) call 'the state as location' metaphor or what Heine (1993) refers 
to as 'a change of state'. 
However, other schemata are also active. The schemata that drive language change 
undermine the grammatical forms that they create. Despite the stabilisation of the first 
Latin future, a second Latin future evolved as 'cantare habemus' or literally 'we have 
to sing,' which is itself an association between possession, obligation and bringing 
future events into the present by taking hold of them. This association is perhaps from 
the conceptualisation that owning an action perhaps compels us to perform it, because 
in holding to we are compelled to perform it, rather as addictive substances also gain a 
'hold' on our body and mind. This evolved into another suffix, presumably by elisions 
such as 'cantar (hab) em(u)s' that gave the future in French as '(nous) chanterons' 
(Fox 1994). 
However, the development of the future in romance still shows no sign of having 
ended. According to Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) 'a state as location' schema, a state 
of being is conceptualised as a place in space towards which we can move. 
Additionally, we should remind ourselves that 'future time' is considered as a spatial 
trajectory, most commonly positioned forward of the observer. We therefore see the 
future also as walking forward towards a state or action or as motion (Heine 1993). In 
English, this manifests as 'I am going to sing'. In French, it is 'nous allons chanter'. 
Interestingly, that future is now preferred in French to the grammaticalised 'nous 
chanterons (Fox 1994).' The cognitive argument would be that language is being 
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constantly driven in new grammatical directions by the manner in which a schema as 
fundamental as 'future time is trajectory ahead of the observer' will remodel linguistic 
expression according to its particular conceptualisation. 
A more general implication, that I will take up later, is that language posits a state of 
conflict between two needs. One need is to conventionalise meaning and create 
symbolic representation where 'x' means 'x'. The other is to categorise and tie down 
unknown phenomena and sensations by using metaphor to extend the stock of 
symbolic representations that we possess. 
2.8.8 Image schematic views of metaphor and thought: primary 
metaphor and the construction of abstract meaning lfrom bodily 
function and orientation 
I have dealt with the idea of conceptual metaphors as identifiable as the relational 
themes that underlie metaphor in text. Next, I looked at the idea of a schema in its 
broad sense as the mental plans that underlie how we store and reproduce or act out 
knowledge. We can now treat these schematisations more broadly still, that is, not as 
patterns that emerge in the form of a metaphor, but as the conceptual resource from 
which such metaphors are formed ( e.g Gibbs 1994; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
For example, let us consider an expression 'outcast'. This expression assumes that to 
be in a given a central position is good and to be 'cast' outside it is bad. An 
underlying conceptualisation is probably that the centre is good and the periphery (or 
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outside it) is bad. Let us consider another: 'that idea is absolutely central, it is not 
marginal at all'. This works with a related conceptualisation that 'being at the centre 
is important' and 'being at the periphery is unimportant'. Both of these expressions, 
the outcast and the central idea, describe quite different things and conditions. 
However, they both lock onto a common conceptualisation that can be summarised as 
'centre-periphery'. Clearly, we are moving to another level of generality. We are 
describing the fundamental schematic resources from which conceptual metaphors are 
built, and we can call these image schemas (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987) or image 
schemata if we use the traditional, Greek plural. Image schemata can be regarded as 
schematic representations of conceptual domains, especially those domains which 
serve as source-domains in metaphorical mappings (Lakoff 1987: 271; Johnson 1989, 
1991, 1992, 1993). 
The schemata put forward by Lakoff (1987: 271) include the following: container: 
part-whole, link, centre-periphery, path, linear order, up-down, and front-back. 
Johnson (1987): 126) found some others such as 'balance compulsion, blockage, 
counterforce, diversion, restraint removal, enablement, attraction, mass-count, cycle, 
near-far, scale, merging, splitting, full-empty, matching, contact, superimposition, 
iteration, process, surface, object, and collection'. In fact, 'the range of image 
schemas may not be fixed and may cover different levels of abstraction' Boers ( 1 996: 
26). Of course, much depends on the level of generalisation to which one wants to 
reduce one's analysis. As mentioned, Langacker ( e.g.1990 and 1994) takes a core 
principle oflanguage as reification. By this one can assert that language evolves from 
the underlying metaphor that conceptualises an abstract idea as a thing, whether 
animate or inanimate. Another key conceptualisation is our need to personify abstract 
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phenomena or at least to see them as animate beings that are capable of acting under 
their own volition. This can be demonstrated through the copula verb. Invariably, and 
across many languages, the copula whether in English, French or Japanese may retain 
an existential meaning, that is 'being' or 'etre'. Therefore the grammaticalised use 
where we say a 'book is here' may evolve from the schema 'death is absence and life 
is presence' which in turn entails personification. In short we attach the fundamental 
quality of our own being to the world around us. 
2.8.9 Image schematic views of metaphor and thought: image schema, 
primary metaphor and the construction of abstract meaning from 
bodily function and orientation 
As the highest point of generalisation or the highest superordinate category of 
metaphor, image schema also tell us something fundamental about how abstract 
meaning is conceptualised. In this they are not derived from representations or 
perceptions of the world, such as our visualisation of space, but more fundamentally 
from our sense of ourselves as embodied beings (Lakoff 1987: 271; Johnson 1989, 
1991, 1992, 1993) as we exist in space, subject to gravity and responsive to 
temperature. 
A key schematisation here is the container metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). 
Thus, we experience our bodies as containers and emotions as fluids or vapours as 
subject to temperature changes that pressure or relieve the body's containment, as 
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when we say 'let off steam' or 'stop pressuring yourself'. Containment also enters 
into how we express our search for ideas or thoughts as being lost 'within' ourselves. 
The argument is that such schemata are exploited by mappings that occur early in life. 
For example, an infant who stands for the first time, hauling themselves up on a 
coffee table or whatever, will experience a huge sense of satisfaction, perhaps 
displayed by a large smile. This event maps the physical experience of being 'up' 
onto the abstract one of being 'happy or fulfilled'. Grady ( 1997) calls such mappings 
primary metaphors, and from them one can entail a whole series of more common 
conceptualisations. For example, Johnson (1987 and 1991) has stressed the 
importance of our sense of 'balance' to the expression oflogical argument, as in 
'weigh the ideas' or 'a balanced equation'. This schematisation pattly functions 
through our sense of 'balance' as positive which may derive from other earlier 
experience of the pleasure of standing unaided for the first time. It represents one of 
the core set of schema provided by early physical experiences which we later use to 
map abstract thought. 
2.8.10 Image schematic views of metaphor and thought: difficulties with 
the idea of conceptual metaphors that are active in the 
interpretation of figurative language 
As has been said, conceptual metaphors can be perceived as schematisations, often 
dating back to the earliest moments in infancy which are active in the interpretation 
and creation of living metaphor and abstract language in text. The view is that 
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conceptual metaphors furnish the schema to which we refer the occurrences of text 
metaphor in order to interpret them. Thus, if I say, 'when he heard my news he 
exploded all over me', we can perceive that as meaningful because we refer it back to 
our basic conceptualisation of our body as a container and our anger as the heated 
fluids within it (Lakoff1987: 271; Johnson 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993). We will do this 
through the previously-mentioned perception that the text metaphor is an entailment 
of a conceptual one. 
We should remember also that it has been argued that a perception of similarity 
cannot be at the core of metaphor interpretation since metaphors can work well when 
they map between domains that are fundamentally unlike each other. A key example 
of this is the conceptual metaphor, 'love is a journey' where we talk about love as 
having a destination or purposes and passing through its various stages but do not find 
any real grounds for treating one as like the other (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Thus, 
when we hear a statement such as 'you and I have got as far as we can go' the 
argument is that we do not understand this by perceiving love as similar to a journey. 
We understand it by referring the metaphor back up a chain of entailments to the 
related mapping between the two domains that we have already schematised. This 
schematisation will perhaps relate back to a more fundamental mapping of purposes 
as destinations and to an image schema of action as movement. 
There are several problems with this analysis, however. We know that similarity must 
be understood as an emergent feature of metaphor. We cannot say that we interpret 
metaphor through a sense of similarity. Nonetheless, we do know that a sense of 
similarity is an emergent property of metaphor. We know this because many similes 
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and metaphors have approximate meanings and some languages do not always 
distinguish how they express the two constructs. 
Second, it has been argued that if we look at the scope of linguistic or artistic 
creativity and the extent to which it is meaningful, basing metaphor interpretation and 
creation solely on schematic entailments as opposed to similarity judgement would 
seem to be cognitively inefficient (Glucksberg and McGlone 1999). We would need 
to be engaged in active reference to perhaps thousands of schemata in order to 
interpret everyday language (ibid). The number required to interpret a complicated 
work of art could be difficult to quantify. 
Third, the same metaphor can have very different meanings according to the context 
in which it occurs. If a metaphor triggered a given set of schemata in order for it to be 
interpreted then it could not change meanings with this kind of facility (Glucksberg 
and McGlone 1999). Glucksberg and McGlone (1999: 1556) offer an example used 
by Lakoff (1993 ), 'Heather is a time bomb'. Lakoff s argument is that we understand 
this through the container schema, where the body as a container keeps fluid under 
pressure. This relates back to our early physical experience of anger and the sense of 
heat it engenders. But if we consider the expression 'diabetes is a time bomb', the 
time bomb's status in respect of heat and pressure is irrelevant. What is important 
now is the time bomb's properties of an inevitable future catastrophe (Glucksberg and 
McGlone 1999: 1556). In short, different schemata are triggered according to the 
context in which a metaphor occurs. The only way we could find the right 
interpretation would be by finding the right relational similarity between the text 
metaphor and the schema appropriate to the interpretation that the context requires. 
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Fourth, the notion that there is no sense of similarity between the domains of 
conceptual metaphors may be over-dependent upon Glucksberg's and Keysar's 
(1993) earlier distinction between similarity and proportional metaphors. A problem 
with this distinction is that if we say that the domains of a conceptual metaphor share 
a relational structure rather than a visual similarity, we may actually be saying that 
sharing a relational structure is sharing a relational similarity. Similarity, in other 
words, is not necessarily a visual relationship. 
The assertion that one can have relational similarities can also be made in respect of 
the invariance hypothesis. It should be remembered that the invariance hypothesis 
holds that if' love is a journey' then going back to the beginning of a journey is then 
going back to the beginning of a relationship. The invariance hypothesis is making a 
statement about matching topographies between the domains of metaphors (Lakoff 
1993). Yet perhaps this matching is essentially a feature-sharing relationship, which 
amounts to a similarity-based one. 
It may be that the invariance hypothesis in fact argues not in favour of relational 
similarity but in favour of the isomorphic relationship that some scholars have argued 
as being a core principal of analogy (Holyoak and Thaggard 1995) and also of 
metaphor (Ricoeur 1975). In an isomorphic relationship, a given action in respect of 
one domain will produce a similar effect in respect of another domain. For example if 
heat increases by a given amount, the mercury in a thermometer will also rise by a 
given amount and an opposite event will produce the opposite effect (Holyoak and 
Thagard 1995). There is nothing similar about temperature and mercury despite the 
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fact that the one is virtually conceptualised through the other. What is interesting, 
however, is that we will form metaphors of heat as mercury. We will talk about 
mercury as if its behaviour were quite similar to the property its must measure. In 
short, an isomorphic relationship may give us unwarranted grounds to treat as similar 
the phenomena it locks together. Yet an isomorphic relationship may again be 
satisfying because it posits a relational similarity between the domains of two entities. 
Thus, mercury is like heat because an increase in one posits an expansion in the other. 
It is simply that our construction of 'heat' and 'mercury' must be larger in order to 
encompass this notion of a proportional similarity between them. 
2.8.12 Image-schematic views of metaphor and thought: metaphor and 
category formation 
I have asked whether our capacity to form metaphors does not relate to our capacity to 
extend existing category structures to admit into them unknown phenomena. Thus, if 
adults encounter a brightly coloured toadstool, they will probably put it in the 
category of poison without pausing to discover whether this is right or wrong. 
Similarly, as suggested, we operate with notions of friend and foe into which we will 
have to organise our encounters with the rest of humanity. If we are to make an 
equation between metaphor and our need to operate with a fluid sense of category 
then it is perhaps worth revisiting key research on how categories are formed. 
Some ofthe most influential work on category formation is that ofRosch (e.g. 1975 
and 1978) or Heider (1971 and 1972) as she was first known. Her early work was 
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with focal colours and the Dani children ofNew Guinea. This group were chosen 
because their language only names two colours and they were therefore less likely to 
be influenced by cultural preconceptions based on a broader spectrum of focal 
colours. Rosch' s initial experiment was a simple one. Children were asked to pick out 
a counter from a set of which one was in a focal colour. A significant number would 
opt for the focal colour. An offshoot of this research was the development of a 
prototype theory where it was held that a given category would be conceptually 
anchored around a category member that was held to be prototypical of it, just as the 
colour spectrum was anchored around focal colours. Her famous example was that of 
birds for Americans, recounted above (see section 2. 7). In an experiment her subjects 
were asked to rate different types of bird according to how good an example of that 
category they were considered to be. 
A clear outcome of Rosch' s work is that categories do not delineate a piece of 
conceptual territory in which phenomena are either inside or outside (Lakoff 1987, 
Ungerer and Schmid 1996). Birds can be central or peripheral in relation to the 
category they are assigned. In a previous discussion, I considered how the idea of 
class membership worked with a notion of spatial conclusion, as can be understood 
from the metaphorical construction of a term such as 'include'. However, this may 
falsify the idea of a category with the expectations that things are either outside or 
inside it. 
A second point is that we anchor categories through pre-established reference points, 
or some idea ofprototypicality. The form that these reference points take will vary 
considerably according to what is being categorised. Some objects will be categorised 
192 
more according to function than form. Others may be matched according to properties 
(Ungerer and Schmid 1996, Edwards 1997). If category formation is achieved through 
some perception of similarity, whether in the relation of function or form, this will 
furnish us with a broad enough concept of similarity to cope with metaphor. 
Two additional points can be carried through in respect of our analysis of metaphor. 
The first is the possibility of an association between metaphor creation and 
comprehension and category or class inclusion (Glucksberg and Keysar 1993). We 
can impose category boundaries upon the new and the strange because those 
boundaries are flexible. That flexibility is carried to an extreme when we declare that 
Juliet belongs to the class ofbright and light-emitting objects or 'suns'. We are 
finding a place where Juliet or Juliet's qualities can belong. 
Second, flexible boundaries suppose an appreciation of a new category exemplar as 
somehow sharing features with another category member; the movement of electricity 
as liquid, in a 'current', for example. Such feature-sharing cannot but be construed as 
the result of a search for similarity. 
In sum, metaphor-making involves an assumption of fluid category boundaries as well 
as a sense of similarity. It is therefore tempting to see metaphor making as an extreme 
act of category creation, or at least an exploitation of faculties that are involved in the 
same. 
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2.9 .Finding a concept of metaphor: conclusions. 
It should be remembered, that the object of this discussion is to carry forward a notion 
of metaphor that may inform language teaching, or even locate it with cognitive 
processes that are central to meaning-creation. In order to do this, the following points 
can now be made: 
1) Metaphor should be treated as a cognitive process. Active text metaphor is not the 
interest of this thesis except as the manifestation of a more significant cognitive 
process. The process underlies the evolution of language and linguistic 
inventiveness. It can be linked to the generalisation of language from a specific 
context to another similar one because it entails our establishment of a similarity 
between a new context and the one in which language was first presented or used. 
It entails the understanding of a new context as a metaphor of a familiar one. 
2) Metaphor as a cognitive process builds abstract meaning, both in lexis and 
grammar. Abstract expression, such as that of logical argument, may deploy 
limited sets of schemata, the idea of a path or spatial linkage, for example. The 
linkage between grammatical and lexical meaning will affect both linguistic and 
pedagogical approaches to both these domains. 
3) Surface text metaphors can therefore often be grouped and organised by schemata. 
Image schemata account for how meaning is organised in a language and form a 
resource from which meaning is built. These will often be rooted in the facts of 
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embodiment, in existence or in an embodied existence in a concrete world. Such 
perceptions will have cultural variation allowing for an effect of culture upon the 
construction of language and language upon the construction of culture. 
4) It seems more difficult to sustain Lakoff and Johnson's (e.g. 1999) argument that 
a metaphorical or abstract meaning is continually being referred back to one or 
several of a multitude of schemata in order for it to be interpreted. Further, the 
existence of a similarity relationship between the domains of a metaphor cannot 
be discounted and our need to form category judgements would imply that we are 
well equipped to find such a relationship. However, since the evidence for image 
schemata is cross-linguistic and overwhelming, it would seem that such schemata 
must at least act as a reference points to generate new metaphor and assist in their 
interpretation. Yet, the view that several conceptual metaphors are responsible to 
different degrees for a given textual example posits sets of overlapping 
conceptualisations and a fluidity that can only be accounted for by an analogical 
interpretation. 
5) Point 4, above, also raises the question of whether we should not extend our 
notion of similarity to include proportional similarity. The possibility could then 
be that proportional similarity could then be the mapping of a relationship evolved 
from a sense of the visual likeness of the things that have been mapped onto an 
abstract domain. 
6) Category structures underscore conceptual fluidity. They incorporate one concept 
(for example trees) into another subordinate one (for example plants). Category 
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incorporation occurs because something is seen in tem1s of fewer key features as 
when the distinguishing feature of a tree such as a trunk is disregarded for it to be 
seen more generally as a 'growing thing' or plant. Metaphors also employ this 
conceptual fluidity to absorb one thing into another. As Tverski (1977) has 
implied, the achievement of a similarity relationship is finally this ability to treat 
matching features as salient and those that do not match as subsidiary. 
7) If similarity is an attribute both of class formation and metaphor then it would 
seem to be productive to relate these two attributes particularly in respect of our 
ability to extend a given category in order to absorb something new. 
An outstanding problem lies in the contradictory nature of these conclusions. On the 
one hand, we have the notion that abstract ideas are conceptualised through concrete 
experience and exist as an entailment of the same. On the other hand, we are 
suggesting that the resultant metaphors are structured as a result of a similarity 
relationship. The problem now is that we cannot say that 'love' is like a 'journey', 
because, as an abstraction, 'love' will not have taken a prior form which is well 
enough delineated to be compared to anything. It takes form within a 'journey'. This 
is a consequence ofthe 'mapping' for the form 'journey' to the concept 'love'. 
But the emergent question is why such mappings will occur. 'Love' and a 'journey' 
are both abstract categories, though both become manifest in physical sensations and 
events. If I say, 'love is warmth', 'the need for love is hunger' or 'happiness is being 
up' then these metaphors show a clearer existence as a reflexive conceptual 
coincidence of an emotion and physical sensation. However, even here love pre-exists 
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the mapping, albeit as a raw physical need for milk or warmth or whatever. The eo-
occurrence of sensations will trigger our search for similarities between them, and 
these similarities may bind the mapping that occurs. Equally when 'love' takes on the 
attributes of love or some other infantile association, it is the fact of its eo-occurrence 
with those sensations that allows us to register a sense of similarity between it and 
them. I can hypothesise that 'love' has a primitive conceptual structure even before it 
is elaborated by metaphor. However, the elaboration in basic metaphor endows it with 
the more elaborate conceptual structure that allows a more mature cognition to 
enhance it further as a staged and goal-driven phenomenon, equivalent to our 
conceptualisation oflife itself, or as a journey, in other words. 
Logical relationships may show this more clearly. If we have to conceptualise 'cause 
and effect' as a spatial relationship, as a path, or a movement down a path this does 
not negate the existence of a cause and effect relationship prior to its 
conceptualisation. This relationship is part of daily experience, not just as a sequence 
that we initiate when we judge an action as having consequences. Even if the cause 
and effect relationship is formulated as an 'inference' of the spatial metaphor (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1999), it must have made some impact upon our perceptual apparatus 
and be stored there awaiting further elaboration. Cause and effect can be observed in 
the impact of objects upon each other and is extrapolated from the phenomenon 
through which it is made manifest. 
If we take another example 'time', it is evident that we are products of our spatial 
existence to the extent that we cannot conceive oftime as itself but must see it as a 
measurement of space or an entity with spatial existence. Yet, we form tense, albeit 
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by playing loose and fast with the facts of our embodied, spatial existence. And tense 
sets up a temporal reference that does not need spatial metaphor in order to be 
understood. Ifl say 'I did it' that is meaningful before it sets up an analytic reference 
to a time line or some other spatial instrument. 
By the same token, I have discussed how our expression of cause has been built as a 
spatial relationship, as a connection or 'path' in space (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Yet 
I would argue that cause is inherently meaningful without reference to the spatial 
metaphor in which its linguistic expression is rooted. This is not to say that scholars 
such as Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Gibbs (1994) are putting forward a post-
modernist agenda where logic or any other abstract thought is being constructed 
inside the metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson argue that the abstract idea is found as an 
inference of a metaphor but that it is there, in some sense, to be found (1999). The 
argument then shifts to a discussion of the nature of this prior-existence and the extent 
to which it can be said to have a structure, which can possess a similarity relationship 
to the metaphor through which it is expressed. Obviously this is variable but my 
supposition is that abstract concepts, as mental constructs, do not simply embed 
themselves in a metaphor as a consequence of some random coincidence. For 
example, this type of coincidence occurs when an infant brings themselves upright for 
the first time feels a sense of achievement and therefore constructs 'positive as up'. 
My supposition is that the infant already has a category of experience, 'happiness', 
which can find some fom1 of relational similarity with the concept, 'upwardness' that 
is strong enough to schematise the association of the two experiences. 
Three further points can be made: 
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1) a mental structure, such as a logical relationship, may exist not as an inference of 
metaphors formed by physical experience but as the pre-requisite for them. They 
have a need for the self-representation to which cognition responds. 
2) there are emotions, sensations, ideas, some sense of logic perhaps, which though 
lacking conceptual form must pre-exist in some shape as the target domain onto 
which the source domain is mapped. 
3) from the above two points it would follow that a raw concept can have sufficient 
identity to be held to be similar to something else if this process is unconscious or 
somehow prior to our obtaining full awareness of the idea in question. 
I now wish to carry forward this picture of metaphorical processes in order to examine 
how we should re-assess the teaching of the language that they have fashioned. 
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3 Reconstructing the theory of language teaching: 
teaching language as a figurative construct 
3.1 Summary of the issues 
It should now be clear that the study of metaphor, analogy and metonymy is far more 
than an examination of the surface linguistic phenomena that are associated with 
colourful, poetic or literary language. Metaphor reveals a great deal about how the 
mind: 
0 conceptualises the meanings expressed in language 
e copes with the new and the strange 
e acquires and uses new knowledge 
Metaphor cannot have serious consideration without reference to the broader areas of 
cognitive linguistics and cognitive science. The interest of cognitive linguists is not in 
language as an isolated or separate phenomenon that must be studied for the structures 
of systems that we can find in it. The interest is in how language reveals the wider 
mental processes out of which it has been formed and on which it is formed. Such a 
concern shifts our treatment of language as something isolated and unique towards 
one which understands its nature as bound up with how we learn and think. 
Turning to language teaching, it should be remembered that recent approaches have 
been constructed out of the following areas of study: 
e classical grammar 
e structuralism and behaviourism 
• (systemic) functional linguistics 
s theories of second language acquisition 
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These areas have not produced pedagogical theories that can be called singular or 
consistent. Communicative methodology, for example, divides into what Howatt 
(1984) calls the weak and the strong approaches. The weak supposes an interest in 
how we use grammar and lexical phrases to realise a given communicative function 
such as telling a story. The strong supposes a more over-riding concern with helping 
students to express meaning at the expense of accuracy. It suggests a meaning-
focused approach where students are distracted from thinking about language per se 
by their need to use it in problem-solving tasks, or 'procedures' as Prabhu (1987) 
called them. In this case, 'the invented example', whose objective is to put forward a 
given function, notion or structure, was replaced by 'bits of language lifted from their 
original context' or 'student generated' text (Cook 2000: 189). 
Language acquisition is, if anything, an even more divergent area of study. At one 
extreme, SLA theory is based upon Krashen's (1985) clear distinction between two 
processes: 
o conscious learning, resulting in a monitored and hesitant use of language 
o unconscious acquisition where learners rediscover the faculties that helped them 
to acquire their first language. 
At the other end ofthe SLA spectrum, scholars such as Ellis (1990) and Pieneman 
(1998) have shown a considerable interest in what are called cognitive strategies, that 
is in the learning processes that students employ in order to understand and reuse 
language. For them, a complete dichotomy between the natural and unconscious 
process of acquisition and the conscious and artificial procedures of learning would be 
false. 
Yet what I wish to stress here is the lack of a clear relationship between 
communicative language teaching theory and acquisition theory. On the one hand, the 
emphasis of communicative theory is upon the social use of language. The early 
interest was in whether the language taught had been analysed according to how it 
was used and whether the context in which language was learnt related to that of its 
future use. On the other hand, we can say that the primary conclusion to be drawn 
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from Krashen's (1985 and 1989) theory of acquisition is that the conscious analysis of 
language according to any criteria is not useful for language students. What is needed 
is a 'natural approach' (Krashen and Terril 1983) where a class is really a process of 
exposure to the comprehensible second language input upon which the students' 
faculties will work without being prompted. 
Therefore, if we were to simplify current language teaching approaches we could find 
them divided between: 
1) A descriptive theory that regards language as a social construct and hence treats 
language learning as a process of socialisation in the language, that is of simply 
using it to perform tasks that require social and hence linguistic interaction. Such 
tasks have been divided into the personal type, focusing on the individual thoughts 
and ideas, or their interactions with a given culture, and the decision-making type, 
involving an assessment of political, business or other dilemmas (Skehan and 
Foster 1997). 
2) A psycholinguistic theory that treats language description as either irrelevant to 
effective acquisition or even obstructive of it and which therefore encourages the 
student to ignore the nature of the phenomenon with which they have to grapple. 
The era of behaviourism, however, proposed a more unified picture. Language 
learning for Skinner (1957) was a process of habit formation. A linguistic habit 
consisted of knowing what words meant and knowing how they slotted into the 
grammatical patterns or structures of which language was composed. We obtained 
habits in respect of the structures of language through a process of constant 
reinforcement. In the language class, this reinforcement took the form of pattern 
drilling and there was no attention to meaning beyond the word. 
It is now recognised that behaviourist theories of language were only able to unite 
learning theory and language description by over-simplifying or even falsifying the 
nature of both the learning process and the nature of language. Yet the rejection of the 
behaviourist view has left teachers with a fractured theoretical base. On the one hand, 
they have to draw upon an increasingly elaborate understanding of the social use of 
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language. On the other hand, they must accommodate a view of the natural processes 
that learners' can employ (e.g Krashen 1981, 1982 and 1985, 1989, Krashen and 
Terrell 1985) as these are sometimes argued through the different frame of generative 
grammar (Cook 1992, Schwarz 1987, Schwarz and Sprouse 1992). 
The emerging discipline of cognitive linguistics and the study of metaphor is not 
about describing language. The interest is in the conceptual processes that build 
language. Also, as Deacon (1997) has stressed, languages can be treated as products 
of an evolutionary pressure, or of a Darwinian need for cognitive fitness if they are to 
survive. In other words, in order to continue and develop, languages must be passed 
down and learnt. The construction of language must therefore be tuned to the nature 
of the mind that has to learn it. Therefore, it might be that keys to the nature of the 
language acquisition may rest with the cognitive hooks that are embedded in a 
language in order to make it more learnable. Metaphor, in the very broad sense in 
which I have defined it, may constitute one of those hooks. Metaphor is a linguistic 
clue to how the mind structures meaning. Metaphor is also associated with our 
capacity to generalise our learning and to make a creative response to new 
circumstances. Metaphor thus could stand as a link between the nature of language 
and the nature ofthe learning process. 
I therefore want to ask the following theoretical questions: 
19 Can an image-schematic understanding of language be communicated to teachers 
and students as a vehicle that will help them understand the nature ofwhat they 
have to deal with? 
Cl!) Can this descriptive approach to what is to be learnt (i.e. language) be linked to 
how it is to be learnt? 
In order to answer these questions, I will look briefly at the nature of the learning that 
an awareness of metaphor will engender. This will demand a consideration of 
1. Metaphor as another addition to competence or as an extension of what must be 
learnt. 
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2. What our understanding of metaphor could tell students about language. 
3. How giving students an understanding ofthe metaphorical construction of 
language is in conflict with some SLA theory because it involves fostering greater 
conscious awareness of the nature of language. 
4. Why such SLA theory should be treated as incorrect from a cognitive standpoint. 
5. The type of learning framework our cognitive approach can offer students. 
I will now consider each of these topics in turn. 
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3.2 Mletapllwr as allll addlitiollll to what has to be learnt: a tack-on approach to 
metaphor and lallll.guage teaching: the question of a metaplhlorftc 
competelllce. 
Perhaps the simplest way for teachers to treat our growing knowledge about metaphor 
and language is as an extension to their understanding of what has to be put across. If 
the use of metaphor is essential to the complete and creative use of a language, then 
such a use must be framed as a type of knowledge and taught. One way to frame such 
knowledge is as another of the competences that are often thought to be responsible 
for the production and comprehension of a given linguistic utterance. 
Chomsky (1965) framed competence as a linguistic concept. By linguistic, one should 
understand syntactic and phonological, with the stress being put on the former. A 
competence was thus held to consist of the rules that produced or deciphered a 
language. To take a simple example, an English language competence would insist 
that we parse a noun preceding a verb as a subject. 
Hymes (1971) extended Chomsky's notion of competence with the famous criticism 
that a person would be thought mad if their linguistic competence consisted only of 
the rules that generated grammatical strings of language. A speaker also required rules 
that would make language appropriate to a particular situation if they were not to say 
things that were entirely out of order. A speaker therefore required a communicative 
competence. 
The notion of a communicative competence made the basic idea of competence into 
the subject of a kind of intellectual free-for-all. Other types of knowledge essential to 
language use were tacked onto the basic concept of a linguistic competence. For 
example 'strategic competence', according to Bachman and Palmer (1996), serves as a 
mediator between 'background knowledge' of a topic, language, and the external 
context in which it is to be used (cited in Douglas 2000). A metaphorical competence 
is one such extension. Metaphor appears to require its own competence because, 
although subject to hidden rules of appropriacy, it is disruptive of the more stable 
rules that form a linguistic competence. A metaphorical competence posits another 
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type of knowledge that language learners need to have. Low ( 1988) attempted a 
characterisation of the form that this extension to the learning task should take. He 
broke down a 'metaphoric competence' into such elements as 'the ability to construct 
plausible meanings,' 'to differentiate between new metaphors, conventional 
metaphors and idiosyncratic extensions of old ones'. He further saw it as incorporating 
an awareness of how to avoid the coinage of absurd metaphors and an understanding 
of the 'hedges' which signal whether a statement is to be interpreted metaphorically or 
not. Finally, he argued for the inclusion of the social sensitivity of certain metaphors 
such as the gender-biased extension of 'man' to represent humanity (Low: 1988: 130-
132). 
However, there are problems with the basic conceptualisation of this argument. The 
chief difficulty lies in the term 'competence.' Broadly, three arguments present 
themselves: 
1) A linguistic competence is a Chomskyan notion that was devised in order to 
frame the features of language that could be scientifically described. 
Extensions to the notion of competence are disruptive of this attempt to frame 
the predictable elements of language. 
2) A competence supposes a store-house ofthe fixed sign-meaning 
correspondences that are essential to the efficient processing of language. 
Metaphor is often threatening such correspondences, albeit in a principled 
way. 
3) The threat of metaphor to competence is not according to linguistic 'rules' but 
in accordance with schemata or mental patterns that lie outside language and 
which evolve from the more basic sense of ourselves as embodied creatures 
interacting with the world. 
I will elaborate on each of these points in turn. 
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3.2.1 A tack OIID approach to metaplluor al!ll<ll DanngUJiage teacllnnng: tlile coliB.cept olf a 
DhngUJinstnc competennce cannnnot lbe e)'(te~rndedl to cope witlln a type of 
llrnownedlge tlluat is not stridDy nnngUllnstuc 
A linguistic competence originally embodied the aspects of language that were 
susceptible to scientific enquiry (Chomsky 1965). This supposes that to describe a 
competence is to present the rules out of which language is generated as elements that 
are not open to the distortion and re-interpretation that surrounds issues of meaning. A 
competence represents the rules governing the generation of sentences as a logical and 
internally consistent system. Such a system attempts to assign functions to words 
independently of their meaning. As Searle ( 1980) has expressed it, the endeavour 
seeks to describe the syntax of a language as different piles of stones. When 
conceived of in this way, syntax exists prior to every verbal act and is the mechanism 
that makes that act possible. Such a competence is also self-contained. It supposes the 
generation of sentences through rules. But most importantly, these rules of generative 
grammar are not rationalised out of the wider issues of constructing meanings that are 
consistent with a given speech situation or the operations of cognition upon it. 
A cognitive view of language is not motivated by a search for the rules of language, 
as they are distinct from other facets of mind. It is motivated by an interest in the 
structures of language as these arise from other features of perception. Both the 
lexical and grammatical basis of language is perceived as evolving from how the 
mind processes its existence as a facet of an embodied existence in a physical 
environment (e.g. Gibbs 1994, Johnson 1987, Langacker 1994). For example, if we 
build prepositional meaning from body parts as when 'head' yields 'ahead', we are 
extending our idea of language outside the search for the rules that tell us when to use 
such an item towards an interest in the principles from which these rules have 
evolved. Such a search is not consistent with the notion of a competence as a set of 
rules or a computational system that is not subject to external interference. 
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3.2.2 A tack on approach to metaphor and language teaching: how mdaphow 
subverts the nature of competence. 
A clear and traditional need in formal linguistics is to allow a notion of competence 
that contains a set of stable relationships between signs and what they signify. In other 
words, to know a language is to possess a set of individual words and their meanings. 
Thus we understand that the string of sounds or phonemes that are the word 
'bachelor' will signify an unmarried man. However, in metaphor we find a process 
that can dismpt the stability of these sound-meaning correspondences and carry them 
off in another direction. 
Human systems often achieve an original effect by dismpting normal symmetries and 
correspondences. These effects are dependent upon some normal set of circumstances 
and are made meaningful by them. Metaphor is one of the mechanisms through which 
such dismption is often achieved. Thus, a metaphor is made possible by the sign-
meaning correspondences that it subverts. To take a very simple example: calling a 
person a 'bear' in English is meaningful because we possess an animal signification 
of that word that we superimpose upon the human referent. Our competence informs 
us that the word's referent 'a person' is not that sign's normal signification which is a 
furry animal. We then constmct a meaning out of the tension between the word's 
normal signification and its abnormal referent, though the precise nature of that 
constmction is difficult and controversial. In this way writers and readers of text are 
able to 'weaken the constraints of probability' and 'see possibilities' of meaning that 
'might otherwise have escaped them' (Cook 2000). 
Once a word is thus unhitched from its normal signification it acquires an extended 
meaning potential, to use Halliday's (1985) term. This potential is difficult to limit or 
tie down. One cannot predict how the features of a given socio-cultural context will 
constrain these meanings within a frame that its users judge plausible. Metaphor is in 
part about the creation of that frame perhaps in interaction with a speech situation and 
the wider socio-cultural environment from which it arises. If, as in French, the bear 
(ours) has been partially lexicalised around a meaning towards which it was once 
metaphorically extended, (bmsque or clumsy in manner), then we are back in a zone 
of a normal understanding of meanings, or of a more straightforward lexical 
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competence. However, the lexicalisation of a term as a feature of that competence 
does not protect it from further extension to other referents by the metaphor making 
process. In sum, metaphor should be perceived as external to the idea of competence 
because it is a process that is disruptive of the normative correspondences and 
systems on which such a notion as competence would depend. 
3.2.3 A tack on approach to metaphor and language teaching: the principles of 
metaphor formation lie outside language 
My discussion in the last chapter showed how metaphor is a linguistic or visual 
phenomenon representing a cognitive process. That process exploits: 
1) our sense of similarity 
2) schemata that are built out of our experience of ourselves as embodied beings 
in interaction with the world 
In respect of our sense of similarity, it should be clear that our sense of one thing 
being similar to another is not peculiar to a given language. The sense may be steered 
by cultural conditioning, but it will also flout such conventionalised expectations by 
finding grounds of likeness where there appeared to be none. The sense itself may be 
principled in that it satisfies an innate predisposition to search out the features that 
will give things a taxonomic home, making knowable what is unknown. However, 
this does not suppose a search for similarities according to the prescribed rules of a 
language. As we have argued, a metaphor can amount to an assertion of a similarity 
relationship that the reader will be asked to consider and even construct. Thus to say 
that 'eternity' is a 'spider' will ask that we interpret the idea of time without end 
through our idealised cognitive model of spiders. That model may be subject to 
cultural variation. In South America or Australia, for example, spiders are more 
threatening than in Europe, though even here, an atavistic or folk model can make 
them into creatures to be feared. Yet a common model is subject to further variations. 
Some individuals are arachnophobic and some are not. Correspondingly, this does 
not suggest rules of similarity that can be framed as a competence, identified and 
taught. In short, the collective folk model only goes so far in constructing this 
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meaning. Metaphors invite individual interpretations that cannot be predicted by a 
competence. 
Conceptual metaphors exist as schemata or mental patterns that may facilitate the 
interpretation and production of metaphors as they occur in text. Thus our 
schematisation of 'time' as 'space' will facilitate our production and interpretation of 
such a statement as 'we have a long way to go before the end ofthe film'. It may be 
that such schemata have a role in fashioning our sense of the appropriacy of a 
metaphor (e.g. Gibbs 1994). For example, we will find statement 107 immediately 
meaningful while 1 08 is hard work at the least and could be simply dismissed as 
strange: 
1 07 The theory needs a securer foundation 
108 The theory's been dug too deep, it's sides need shoring up. 
Sentence 107 latches onto a common conceptualisation of ideas as buildings or 
physical structures. We are not used to thinking of theories as mining the soil beneath 
us. Because of this we have to expend quite a lot of processing effort to get any 
meaning from 108 at all. It would thus be tempting to incorporate 'ideas are 
buildings' as a facet of our metaphoric competence in English. 
However, an image schema is not a facet of the rules governing the language that we 
produce but a feature of how we conceptualise and interpret the meanings that 
language will utilise. It is a principle of meaning extension whose destination cannot 
always be predicted. For example, ifl develop a conceptual metaphor, 'ideas are 
buildings', I could obtain the following: 
109 'ideas are buildings' -7 
110 'philosophy is a work of construction' -7 
Ill 'philosophers are the navvies of the academic world' -7 
112 'like the gangs of navvies of old, philosophers disrupt the cultural landscape 
they descend upon.' 
113 'ideas build philosophers' 
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It is clear that although sentence 112 is still exploiting the schema of 109 it has taken 
in an entirely unpredictable direction. There is no rule that can predict 112 as an 
outcome of 109 with 110 and 111 as intermediary phases. A competence, because it 
sets up a notion of rule governed behaviour, would set out to make 112 the predictable 
outcome of 109. By this token, the notion of one metaphor as an entailment of a 
schematised conceptual metaphor can be treated only as a process of reasoning back. 
The entailed metaphor is not contained within the schema that has influenced its 
emergence in the sense that, for generative grammarians, a given syntactic structure is 
contained in the unmarked form of which it is a transformation. However, it would 
make 112 more immediately meaningful than 113, which inverts the proportional 
relationship between the topic and vehicle. A competence determines how we can and 
cannot say something in a language. Metaphor concerns what we may or may not talk 
about. We need to distinguish between the rule governed and hence predictable 
behaviour implied by a competence and the patterned or principled behaviour implied 
by one form's derivation from a given conceptualisation. 
It is clear, then, that we should not see our knowledge of metaphor as identifying new 
features of language that the student has to learn. The use of metaphor cannot simply 
be posited as the control of an aspect of language suggesting its own tacked-on 
competence. We should start to consider metaphor as a feature which helps to explain 
how language has come to take the form that it has. Metaphor posits a principle not 
only of how we conceptualise meaning in language but of how we make language 
serve our expressive needs. It both explains the nature of what is given and suggests 
how we adapt to what is new and strange when such adaptations are part of the wider 
theory of learning. Metaphor thus supposes a connection between the nature of 
language and the nature of learning thus re-opening the prospect of a theory that can 
forge a securer link between what the student has to learn and the nature of the 
process through which they will learn about it. My objective now is to elaborate upon 
the nature of that link. 
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3.3 RelatiirD.g the constrUllctiollll of meallllnng nn langm11ge to tllne colllstlr·Ulldnollll of 
mearnnllllg nllD. tllne mnll]dls of lai!Bguage HearllD.ers: D:now cogrnntnve perceptnollD.s of 
mdapHwr calllt nmpad UBpOllD. tllne Hang1llage HealrllltDllD.g taslk. 
In this section, I will set out some of the ways in which metaphor can relate the nature 
of what has to be learnt, or language, to the nature of the learning task, language 
learning in other words. The principles are as follows: 
1) Metaphor tells us about how meaning has been constructed in language over-
time. The pedagogical device that explains strange language or linguistic 
forms, is metaphor, the cognitive concept that describes how that language 
came to be. 
2) Metaphor is a means through which we explain to ourselves what is strange 
and unknown. Correspondingly, the role of metaphor in clarifying what is 
strange and inexplicable is intuited by many teachers who use its explanatory 
power. 
3) Metaphor represents cognitive processes that are implicated not just in the 
construction of language but in its acquisition. Metaphor must be situated in 
the learning process. 
Boers (2000) describes an experiment where conceptual metaphors are used as a 
device to help students group lexis according to the conceptual metaphors by which it 
has been fashioned. His results showed that students who used conceptual metaphors 
in this way had a significantly better recall of the lexis than those who did not. 
Lindostromberg (1991) made an earlier plea for teachers of English for Specific 
Purposes to pay greater heed to the metaphors around which some specialised 
discourse my be structured. Dudley Evans ( 1998) also suggested that conceptual 
metaphor could become an instrument that would help us understand the specificity of 
a given form of discourse. It might pay to examine the suggestions of Lindostromberg 
and Boers together. Teachers could, for example, help business students understand 
that the language of business is structured around warfare. This will not only give 
such students a greater insight into the specific nature of the discourse with which 
they have to deal but will also provide them with a better recall of the same. 
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The above example encapsulates the principle that I would now like to examine. Our 
conceptualisation of business as warfare will mean that business and warfare 
sometimes share the same forms of expression. The shared structure is not some 
similarity judgement, which is fossilised in language. As Lakoff and Johnson (1999) 
are keen to stress, such schemata remain active in how we conceptualise the world. 
Therefore, bringing students into a schema that builds language provides them with 
both a mechanism of meaning formation and a mnemonic that works because it is 
central to the nature of what is being learnt. This synergy between understanding how 
a meaning is conceptualised in language and the type of processes required to learn 
the resulting realisations in the lexico-grammar are central to the thesis I am trying to 
put forward. When the relationship is understood, we can then shift teaching away 
from supplying a social or communicative context that will stimulate the student's 
production of a correct form and towards the cognition out of which those forms have 
been built. 
3.3.1 Rehlting the constmction of meaning in language to the construction of 
meaning in the minds of language learners: metaphor expDains language 
by telling us how its meanings have been constructed over-time 
The first area that teachers should consider is how figuration is a process that 
manifests itself within the texture of a language. As discussed, some of the schematic 
structures of speech figures, such as the event structure metaphor (time is space) may 
be common to how humans everywhere organise cognition. They are accessible and 
universal principles underlying the representation of meaning in language. The 
derived principle for teachers is that their exploitation of such schemata may make the 
construction of meaning in language appear more systematic and less strange. 
Yet, it would be quite wrong to suggest that all schemata are common across 
languages. Even common schemata can produce quite different conceptual metaphors. 
For example, 'time is space' may commonly give rise to the conceptualisation of the 
future as in front and the past behind, but in Aymaran, in Northern Chile, the future is 
behind and the past before (Nufiez et al 1997). 
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A further assertion is that such entailments can often reveal a cultural effect that is 
peculiar to the language or language group in which they are situated, though the 
precise nature of this may be obscure. For example, many Indo-European languages 
consider an accomplished action to be possessed by the person accomplishing it, as is 
evident from the formation of a present perfect with the verb of possession (have or, 
in Portuguese, 'hold'). Obviously, the common schema can be ascribed to the fact that 
these languages have influenced each other and grown from the same root. However, 
we cannot tell students why the schema was selected in the first place. What we can 
do is show how an understanding of this concept of possession can position students 
at one of the centres of meaning construction in English, thus helping them to 
understand how this tense is used. 
An understanding of metaphor, therefore, will create a clearer understanding of the 
differences between languages and of the common attributes of cognition out of 
which the languages are structured. It will also foster an understanding of the different 
requirements of a particular context within a language. A given schematic entailment 
can apply not just to a given language or culture but to its subcultures as well. For 
example, the linguistic realisation of the schema could be even more specialised and 
be largely confined to a discourse that treats of a certain type of subject matter and 
addresses a particular form of relationship between a speaker and listener or writer 
and reader. In other words, a register may carry conceptual metaphors in a particular 
direction and students need to understand how this happens. For example: 'bug' in 
the sense of error in a computer programme probably evolves from 'to bug' as in to 
irritate which in its turn has developed from an image schema based upon the 
irritation caused by certain insects and perhaps more remotely from some primal fear 
of the same. Our uneasy relationship with the insect world then furnished a lexical 
item that next belonged to the register of computer software engineers. This has 
moved into French, and maybe other languages as well. 
Metaphorical extension develops language away from the bedrock of common 
responses to the experience in which its meanings may first take root. It insists that 
meanings lie hidden in the gathered layers of obscure socio-cultural contexts or 
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vanished speech situations. Thus analogical thought may sometimes cover its tracks. 
It opens paths that cannot be retraced or reasoned back to the same base point 
according to the application of a universally acknowledged set of principles. Such a 
point is made clearly by the opaque English idiom, 'a red herring' which was 
discussed earlier (see 2.8.13 .1 ). In this case, one could speculate that a 'path' schema 
(Lakoff 1987) is allowing us to conceive of a conversation as following a particular 
direction or course. The path 'schema' may explain the intuition that in most 
languages a word to be translated as 'direction' will have both a physical and an 
abstract sense. Thus, the phrase 'a conversational change of direction' will be 
comprehensible to those who first encountered the word in the context of moving 
from 'left to right'. However, the path schema does nothing to predict a manifestation 
such as a 'red herring'. The idiom evolved from the use of fish to throw hunting dogs 
of a scent (Goatly 1997), implying an unpredictable cultural individuation or 
historical coincidence of thought and event. It is further a derivation of which most 
native speakers are unaware. While one cannot equip students with the type of 
analytical skills that will trace back the schematic roots of an idiom such as 'a red 
herring', teachers might also consider whether they should give more thought to using 
a target language to teach students about its origins and its nature. Further, the 
metaphor ofthe hunt and the foul scent of rotten fish may well become a mnemonic to 
fix the idiom more securely. This proposal forms another clear example of how we 
can anchor language in the cognition from which it has been developed while paying 
less heed to an ephemeral and artificially induced context of use. 
A language is littered with such lost similarity judgements. It stands as a record of 
past cultural practice. Knowledge of the schemata from which a given expression has 
evolved will not help learners to acquire a reflexive command ofthat expression. 
Arguably, it may actually underscore linguistic differences by showing how common 
conceptualisations surface in very different meaning structures. 
Linguistic forms may relate to some conceptualisations that are common across 
languages and others that are not. Therefore, by putting metaphor onto the 
pedagogical agenda, I am not suggesting it as a way to deduce the universal principles 
of meaning construction. I am suggesting, however, that it does make a second 
language less strange by making its meanings appear more principled. To come upon 
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a foreign language as a synchronic construct is like being stranded in the world with a 
consciousness that is simply reactive and devoid of all powers of explanation or 
analysis. The provision of lexico-grammatical principles or rules of thumb may go 
some way towards helping students rationalise a language's strangeness. However, 
such a framework may categorise the nature of topology but will not explain how it 
has come to be. An awareness of metaphor can provide such an explanation. 
Understanding the conceptual core of a language will also help us to lead students 
closer to that centre. It will put them at play inside the network of schematisations 
from which the meanings of language have been formed. 
In thus starting to place students within the conceptualisations out of which a 
language is produced they may themselves become more adept producers of its forms. 
For example, if we extend students' schematic awareness, we will not simply say that 
the present continuous is formed out of the copula and the verb+ing. We might say 
that this is using what Lakoff and Jolmson (1999) call the 'state as location' metaphor 
where the copula is an indication of the occupancy of an action as if it were a location. 
We could push further and discuss the copula itself and its near-universal evolution 
from an existential form where 'to be is to live'. 'Presence' in a place or in an action 
is conceived through existence in it and by implication, 'absence' is perceived as non-
existence. When suggested as rule-of-thumb explanations of the copula, these may 
sound complex, but I will show how they can be simplified as aspects of the situations 
through which language is taught. In short, I will examine how one can make the 
context of linguistic practice into an externalisation or meta-metaphor of the metaphor 
by which the structure was first built (see section 4. 7). 
Teachers often neglect how their task is partly to help students towards a more 
successful manipulation of these 'poetics' (Gibbs 1994) of language. Cook (2000: 
192) has pointed out how CL T has ignored what Jakobson ( 1960) called the poetic 
function of language. This poetic function can stimulate a back-flow from 'forms' to 
the 'meanings' and 'relationships' between them that the forms represent (ibid: 193). 
Such a stimulation can in its turn free the student from the constraints of a formalistic 
notion of correctness and allow them to be carried towards an exploration of the 
concepts from which the language has emerged. In 'running riot' amidst a language's 
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conceptual core, students may also happen upon its principled and stable nature or the 
rules that guide such 'play'. 
Teachers also forget how the metaphor-based principles of meaning may be the 
product of a greater systematicity than was once imagined. An understanding of that 
systematicity could help students greatly. Without that understanding, students come 
upon what they perceive to be a language's 'idiom' as a baffling series of randomly 
shaped constructions, each of which has to be memorised as an individual entity. With 
greater awareness of both the schemata underlying all language and those underlying 
a particular language, students can participate in the creative process out of which are 
generated the expressions that they perceive as aberrant or idiomatic. They can thus 
establish a framework that can impose sense and order where there appeared to be 
none. 
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3.4 Metaphor is a means through which we explain to ourselves what is 
strange and unknown. 
Teachers have traditionally and intuitively used metaphor and analogy in order to 
explain obscure phenomena to students. It is a common feature of classroom 
discourse (Cameron 1997). Sometimes these instructional metaphors evolve from 
those through which the subject is conceptualised. Science teachers may revert to the 
liquid and flow metaphor through which electricity is conceptualised, describing it 
through a water analogy, sometimes to the detriment of their students' fuller 
understanding (Gentner and Jeziorski 1993). 
Gorden (1966), Williams (1983) and Nolder (1984) have all advocated making 
teachers more aware of how to use metaphor in science and mathematics teaching in 
order to aid understanding. Such understandings are linked to the wider conceptual 
role of metaphor. Williams (1983) for example, raises the issue ofthe lateralisation of 
mind and the association of metaphor with the right brain or creative side of learner 
engagement that is now a key feature of such training approaches as nemo-linguistic 
programming. Nolder's (1984) focus was largely upon the explanatory power of 
metaphor when it is used in direct instructional language. 
In considering the explanatory power of metaphor, we should first understand the 
difference between metaphor and analogy on the one hand and exemplification on the 
other. Thus, teachers of basic numeracy are not constructing metaphors of number 
when they illustrate addition by bringing together one group of blocks out oftwo. 
Nonetheless, the distinction is fine, particularly when one considers that the piling up 
of blocks may in its turn become the vehicle through which addition is 
conceptualised. Thus, when a teacher wants to exemplify a process, the example they 
use may become the metaphor through which the process is conceptualised in their 
students' minds. I should further make clear that this thesis holds that the fineness of 
this distinction testifies to the linkage between the power of metaphor as a 
pedagogical device and its existence as a mechanism of conceptualisation. The use of 
explanatory metaphor or analogy in the classroom is successful because teachers and 
students share a mind which conceptualises abstract meaning through metaphor. The 
teacher who says electricity is water is not simply elucidating the hidden nature of 
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electricity, they are orienting students towards the schema out of which our wider 
notion of electricity has been built. The power of such a procedure is made plain by 
Gentner and Jeziorski's (1993) study which showed how the metaphors through 
which people are taught a subject, 'water' versus 'a moving crowd' for 'electricity', 
for example, can exert a negative influence on their ability to grasp its wider nature. 
Similarly, Cortazzi and Jin (1999) have examined how 'the elicitation' of the 
metaphors through which teacher trainees and language students conceptualise the 
nature of teaching, learning and their role within these processes can have a 'direct 
effect' on the promotion of 'awareness' (1999: 155). 
Language teachers also employ metaphor almost intuitively in order to clarify a given 
linguistic point. In this case also, there may be a fine line between the process of 
explanation, conceptualisation and exemplification. For example, a popular method of 
illustrating the quite complicated past tense structure of English is with a time-line of 
the type shown in figure 5: 
Although I'd I was still eating When you But now I've finished 
finished the came 
main course 
Past 
perfect 
=======3~ 
Past continuous ~ ' 
Past simple 
Figure 5 
Present perfect 
Such a metaphor can be used in a direct instructional phase of a language lesson. It is 
a method for a teacher to explain differences in when grammatical structures are 
being used. The time-line operates through our most basic conceptualisation of time, 
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that is 'time is space', but it does not itself latch onto the types of conceptualisation 
from which the tenses themselves may have evolved. This time-line metaphor also 
contains exemplification. This is given by the contrived sentence at the top (Although 
I'd finished my main course, I was still eating when you came but I've finished now), 
which is mapped onto the spatial metaphor in order to show how each of these 
illustrated structures is used. 
The time-line gives us clear insight into the use of metaphor to clarify issues in direct 
language instruction. I would now like to elaborate upon why such forms are a 
powerful vehicle of classroom discourse and clarify the different ways in which they 
are used as well as the reasons for using them. Broadly, I will describe the 
explanatory force of metaphor according to the following categories: 
I) How metaphors can make it possible to talk about a given point (Nolder 1984) 
2) How metaphors can relate new concepts to old (Nolder 1984) 
3) How metaphors compel attention 
4) How metaphors can be used to restructure how we think about things and thus 
used for critical thought 
5) How the affective nature of metaphor can make content more memorable and 
help students' fluency and powers of self-expression. 
I will now look at each of these in turn. 
3.4.1 Metaphor is a means through which we explain to ourselves what is 
strange and unknown: metaphors make it possible to talk about a given 
point 
Our first point is that metaphors help learning because they may make it possible to 
talk about a point 'x' at all (Nolder 1984). This is clear in mathematics, which is by 
definition extra-linguistic. Such a point may seem less evident when reapplied to a 
subject that is linguistic. However, abstraction is part of any attempt to offer students 
explicit knowledge about their TL. The benefits of this explicit knowledge constitutes 
another issue and will be discussed below in relation to acquisition (see section 3.3.3). 
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For now, the point holds that to separate and generalise the rules of use of a language 
is to shift a class further into an abstract realm. Abstraction entails metaphorisation. 
Therefore, grappling with the abstract principles of language entails a shift towards 
metaphor. This can be made clear at the most primary level; in the way we actually 
talk about what a language is. 
Our discussion about linguistic competence implied that language does not take 
analysable form unless it is vested in something as something. For example 
Competence recreates language as a structure of mind, amounting to the metaphorical 
presupposition that 'language is a structure of mind'. Deacon ( 1997) discusses it as a 
parasitic organism. SFL (systemic functional linguistics) focuses on an individual 
language as a systematic representation of social meanings. In short, any systematic 
consideration of metaphor involves our construction of it as something else. Now this 
does raise the point ofhow far 'language is a structure of mind' constitutes a 
metaphor or a proposed intellectual framework and an objectivist elaboration upon the 
nature of what is to be studied. Yet one of the major planks of Lakoff' s (1987) and 
Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) thesis is that our notions of objectivism are suspect 
because it is difficult to separate metaphors from descriptive frameworks. 
Furthermore, the latter are represented as having been set up by the former. This is 
implied by Chomsky's (1985) own rhetoric concerning I and E language, where the 
ethereal nature of the external 'E' form is contrasted with the stable and hence 
analysable existence of the 'I'. In short, in order to form the basis of sound theory, 
language must first not simply be described as possessing certain features, it must be 
vested in something or conceptualised through it. This conceptual need for the 
authority of the concrete is developed when Chomsky borrows a cosmological 
metaphor and describes how after acquisition, I language resembles an unchanging 
universe and comes to exist in 'steady state'. At a more applied level, one can also 
see how metalanguage, as the language in which a language is described, will be 
metaphorical in nature, since the term implies the doomed enterprise of language 
rendering itself into terms other than its own. 
Metaphor, therefore, is a pre-requisite for linguistic discussion, both in the language 
and the linguistics class. The corollary to that is how explanations about language use 
will take form in the individual metaphors that are appropriate to them. I have already 
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presented the classic example of the time-line. A rule ofthumb that might appear to 
employ a more literal description may be making use of implicit metaphors. For 
example, teachers say the indefinite article is to be used with non-count nouns. Yet in 
order to conceptualise this, students must first set up a category of language called 
nouns such as person, place or thing, which may not actually correspond to what 
nouns are. They must envisage an uncountable noun when everything that can be 
indicated can be counted, and what may really be at stake is a cultural sense of what 
can be indicated and what cannot. 
A teacher's understanding of the metaphorical basis of language can also encourage 
useful extensions to the way they explain something. For example, teachers may 
explain the use of the past simple in English with the type of time-line given above. 
Equally, a situational methodology would focus on setting a series of past events in 
some example that emphasised their separateness from the present. A typical instance 
would be a convict recounting their life in prison. The prison walls suggest 
themselves as a metaphor of temporal separation where actions inside are over and 
retained in the past and those outside are connected to the present. One can make this 
procedure more forceful by fusing the situation and the metalinguistic explanation 
into a metaphor of temporal separation where we do not talk of imprisoned people, 
but imprisoned time and correspondingly the imprisoned verbs through which past 
actions represent themselves (see section 4.7.1). 
Using metaphors of time to teach tense can also be extended into actual classroom 
activities. Imaginary time-lines can be drawn across the classroom floor, with students 
using the appropriate tense as they move along these invisible paths. Zones can be set 
up to encompass students' past, future and present life with different sets of actions 
allocated to each. Teachers, attempting to subordinate teaching to learning according 
to Gattegno' s ( 1971) prescription will be familiar with using cuisinnaire rods to 
represent the spatial relations that we use to conceptualise time. They may, for 
example, use the spaces between rods to indicate different sequences in time, then 
connect them to elicit how the present perfect brings the past into the present, or erect 
barriers between them to show how the opposite case calls for the past simple. Even 
more commonly, gesture can be used to indicate grammatical structure, as when 
teachers point forward or behind to indicate a future or past tense. 
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In sum, metaphor enters the discourse of all successful language instruction and may 
then extend that discourse into the forms of exemplification that characterise the 
creative language class. Metaphor passes from what is said, to what is drawn, then on 
towards the actions and gesture of students. 
3A.2 Metaplluor is a means through which we explain to ow11rselves wlltat is 
strange and unknown: metaphors relate new concepts to old 
When examining conceptual metaphor, we explored the notion of a metaphorical 
entailment. At its simplest, this could be how understanding that the future is in front 
of us will give the entailment that the past is behind. It will entail this because just as 
the future is the opposite of the past so 'in front' is the opposite of' behind'. The 
metaphors of instructional discourse, whether it is gestura} or spoken, set up networks 
of understanding through which ideas can be related to each other. Thus, the spatial 
representation ofthe past can be extended towards the representation of the future. In 
this way, a time-line (see figure 5 above) can be put on the classroom wall as a 
diagram that is added to from lesson to lesson. It could begin with the division of the 
present, move to the past simple and perhaps end with the past perfect, as the time 
before time. 
The metaphor of spatial representation can be used in other ways as well. It can be 
used to deal with the English division of the present between what is limited and 
unlimited. The limited notion of the present continuous, for example, becomes a field 
of action in which the protagonist is seen as being placed, trapped even, or delimited 
by the continuation of what they have begun (see section 4.7). 
Thus single explanatory metaphors can set up networks built around a common 
conceptualisation relating different areas of knowledge to each other and putting them 
within the learner's grasp as distinct facets of a single system. 
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3.4.3 Metaphor ns a means through which we explain to ourselves what is 
strange and unknown: metaphors compel attention: the classroom as a 
trading floor of images 
Cortazzi and Jin ( 1999) show how metaphors can function as bridges to learning in 
that changes in the metaphors through which something is conceptualised amount to 
new understanding. As they also perceive, if change is to be affected, a teacher will 
try to draw students towards their own conceptual system. At the edge of knowledge, 
we will collectively and intuitively use metaphor to conceptualise phenomena that are 
previously unknown or dimly understood, exchanging and elaborating upon the forn1s 
that result. The individual student, of whatever age, is in this position when they 
confront and try to possess new knowledge. Possession of knowledge, to some extent 
entails either an understanding of the metaphors in which it is presented or its 
reconstruction within the conceptual system that the student brings to class. 
Classrooms are in this sense a trading-floor of images. Sometimes that reconstruction 
supposes that what is assumed to have been sold has been rendered into an 
unrecognisable form once it has changed hands. This can cause misunderstandings or 
mean that students learn the wrong thing. 
However, it should not be assumed that the passage of an idea out of one metaphor 
into another as it passes from student to teacher will, of necessity, entail its 
corruption. The conceptual system of a learner consists of the mappings that are 
conducted from the universals of the human condition, those that are constructed out 
of cultural difference, and those which are incapable of generalisation because they 
are a product of individual experience. This last can take the form of original 
metaphor. Yet individualisation may also be the weighting given to certain common 
conceptualisations. For example, metaphors of liquidity are common to the 
conceptualisation of instability and movement. Thus knowledge which is not grasped 
'flows over us' while cash which is easily exchangeable and mobile forms a 'liquid 
asset'. However, it would be interesting to test if those who have a stronger childhood 
contacts with rivers or the sea did not make liquidity into a more central part of their 
conceptual system than those who did not. The metaphorical aspect of learner training 
may therefore involve more than the creation of conceptual bridges from teacher to 
learner and learner to teacher. It may also involve the learners' understanding of their 
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own conceptual weightings so that they can vest knowledge in the metaphors that are 
powerful to them. 
As Cortazzi and Jin (1999) imply, student and trainee metaphors of learning and 
teaching are not simply vehicles that require adjustment in order to bring about a 
corresponding reconceptualisation of knowledge. Such metaphors can also be vehicles 
through which trainers adjust to the circumstances in which their trainees work, as 
well as to the nature of the esteem in which they hold themselves. Holme (1998) has 
suggested how the technique of participatory appraisal (PA) (e.g. Mukherjee 1995) 
that is commonly used for needs assessment in rural development and localised 
literacy projects can also have an interesting impact in the ESP classroom. A key idea 
in P A is to treat the community in question as owners of the information on which any 
intervention will be based. P A therefore draws together a series of techniques that 
help a given community expose the nature of their circumstances to themselves. In 
2000, with a colleague, Julie King and I extended this technique into the area of 
teacher training and baseline study for curriculum change and added to it the notion of 
metaphor as a means through which trainees might expose the nature of their 
circumstances. We asked seminar participants to produce metaphors of teaching and 
learning that corresponded to the situation in which they worked. The seminar was 
delivered in an area with a parlous political situation that was close to a zone of civil 
war. The school system had to support a swollen refugee population with a declining 
resource. Such circumstances produced images of the disparity between the traditional 
respect for education and the teachers' declining sense of self-esteem (education is 
lost time, teachers are intelligent fools, classes are crowds as against: teachers are the 
country's builders). Metaphor, here, is again a vehicle for discussion and a means 
through which students/trainees can explain their situation and thus ensure that any 
ensuing intervention is appropriate and properly targeted. Metaphor formation 
becomes another mechanism of participatory appraisal. It focuses participant attention 
on the nature of their own needs and orientates an intervention towards them. 
We could state therefore that metaphors compel attention because: 
e they come as a shared or ready-built bridge to knowledge 
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o they are vehicles of conceptual change and can thus give the bridge between 
teacher and learner another form 
o they let students vest knowledge in the vehicles that are powerful to them and help 
them visualise their own circumstances or explain these to others. 
Further, the metaphor should not simply be perceived as a flare that briefly 
illuminates a scene. The metaphor can itself be the vehicle through which the scene is 
expressed, drawing attention to itself as a key component of a discourse. 
3.4.4 Metaphor is a means through which we explain to ourselves what is 
stB:·ange and unknown: how metaphors can be used to restructure bow we 
think about things and thus used for critical thought 
Metaphor nails down new meanings but as it does so it will disrupt other sign-
meaning correspondences. The very mechanism that achieves semantic precision is 
born of semantic vagueness. There is rupture in the relationship between a concept 
and a form as when for example, a ship is no longer represented by the vessel moored 
in the nearby harbour. The concept may then trawl for dimly perceived ideas such as 
the sense of our life as adrift and ships are no just longer the objects moored nearby. 
The vagueness of metaphor can also be used as part of conscious strategy that proffers 
the impression of a precise answer that is actually very vague. The metaphors that 
allow us to discuss a topic without ever quite stating what is at issue can also permit 
an ambiguity that shields us from the consequences of what we say. Thus, for 
example, political discourse may abound with examples of how metaphor can be used 
consciously to obfuscate by shielding a politician from the need to give direct answers 
to questions (Good 1995 personal communication). 
Yet the political function of metaphor, is not simply to obfuscate. It can be become 
part of a conscious or unconscious attempt to mislead. The rhetoric of the Gulf War 
has been extensively analysed for how it uses metaphor in order to propagate the 
message that its perpetrators wanted heard (Lakoff 1999). We might take a more 
recent example, the constant repetition of the term 'degrade' as in 'degrade the 
226 
Serbian military infrastructure' in the recent Kosova campaign. This word gives the 
impression that NATO's bombing campaign, whatever its rights or wrongs, has 
blended each separate and jagged act of destruction into a smoother less inflammatory 
process that hastens the natural attrition of a greater wrong. By such rhetoric, the more 
traditional assumption that military objectives are territorial has been wished away. 
Proponents of critical literacy approaches (e.g. Stierer and May bin 1994 and M organ 
1997) and the critical discourse analysis on which it depends (e.g. Fairclough 1989 
and Hodge and Kress 1993 ), will be attuned to these euphemistic devices. Any 
elaboration ofthese views would require discussion of the post-modernist analysis of 
knowledge and its expression which would be too lengthy to undertake here. What 
can be said is that critical approaches to text have long infiltrated language teaching. 
A very basic and early example of this infiltration is when a straightforward exercise 
on distinguishing 'fact' and 'opinion' in text (Grellet 1981) can be extended towards a 
discussion ofthe linguistic devices used to make opinion sound like fact. Such an 
understanding can give students greater control over the forms that will allow their 
own writing to achieve a more authoritative stance. 
Understanding how opinion is disguised as fact can further be extended by a 
manipulation of the metaphors through which such an effect is achieved. These 
metaphors disguise the author behind the events that they recount and the 
fore grounding of the events as items that appear to have created their own narrative. 
Thus, using the ideas of Low (1999) one can inform students that authors use text as a 
persona behind which they hide, attributing to it the human functions of speech, 
narration, action, relocation, observation, hearing, thought and interpretation. They 
can then hunt down such expressions as: 
114 the form served as a marker (action) 
115 ...... 's study thus provides (provision) 
116 the conclusion speculates (thought) 
117 an important limitation of this study lies in the fact that (relocation) 
118 an important limitation of this study lies in how .......... (relocation) 
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Entailments can also be studied in order to find and memorise possible collocations. 
For example, teachers can point out that 'limitations must lie in something', eliciting 
'problems' and 'facts' as 'the container' oflimitations as in 'limitations lie in the 
problem that' as in 117, above. They can extend the study to an example such as 118, 
elaborating upon how a clause can be the container of limitations, thus revealing how 
text itself can be reified without the need for any metalinguistic assessment as to its 
factuality or more general nature. 
Even if separated from the post-modernist agenda, such a discussion has the clear 
linguistic purpose of enhancing students' control of rhetoric in the L2. A sense of 
metaphor and metaphorical usage in text can also alert students both to the meanings 
an author is trying to convey and to the nature of the devices that they can deploy in 
order to convey them. 
Recently, I asked a class to hunt for metaphors that discussed economic activity as a 
form of warfare in a text on the perils of globalisation and free trade. I stressed that 
this type of rhetoric was not unusual but asked how far its density in the text in 
question invoked the author's sense of a crisis by which we were about to be 
overwhelmed. Such critical approaches can be interlinked with the more neutral 
language teaching task of using image schema to organise lexical input. Thus, 
students do not gather lexis around the subject of international trade but around the 
topic of trade as warfare. I will look at this topic in more detail below. 
It has been suggested that our study of metaphor posits an idea of language as 
motivated (Heine 1997). Language can no longer be perceived as an abstract and 
randomly structured system for the manipulation and representation of meanings. In 
short, language can be characterised as produced out of its communication of 
meanings and those self-same meanings are produced out of the structures that 
cognition imposes upon language. 
The above proposition also allows the notion that ideas are not simply out there and 
found when our deductive reach becomes great enough. The answers that we give to 
questions are influenced by the nature ofthe questions that are asked. (Schon 1963, 
1993) Questions achieve this influence over the answers they evoke by employing the 
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metaphors in which the response has to be phrased. In a similar vein, Kuhn ( 1 993) has 
postulated that revolutionary changes in science are achieved only when the 
metaphors are themselves changed, allowing the answers to occupy a new conceptual 
territory. 
For language teachers and, perhaps, educators more generally, there are two main 
points to take on board. The first is the manner in which a metaphor can distort one's 
conceptualisation of a task. For example, an approach to learning that has been 
popularised in ELT is neuro-linguistic programming. The programming metaphor is 
important to this approach as it makes metaphorical assumptions about learning as 
mental re-orientation or even brainwashing. The issue here is not one of whether or 
not metaphors are necessary in order to characterise approaches to language learning 
because, clearly, they are essential to the description of any abstract process. The 
point is that teachers and trainers need to be aware of the manipulative power of 
metaphors and of a metaphor's capacity to channel thought in particular directions. To 
obtain such an awareness may further develop an educator's own ability to recast 
questions in new metaphors and thus to approach them from a novel perspective while 
generally fostering a more creative approach. As has been raised in respect of how 
metaphors compel attention (see section, 3.4.4, above), the development of this type 
of metaphorical awareness among teachers and trainees can instigate change in their 
own sense of how they should approach their work (Cortazzi and Jin 1999). 
This type of metaphorical awareness can further influence the even more difficult task 
of engineering wider institutional change, perhaps by influencing the way in which 
the institution's members perceive it. Morgan (1997) has proposed such an approach 
to the business community as a way for managers to review their organisation and 
how well its nature serves its particular functions. An important aim is the need to 
conceive the organisational system itself, less as a machine that delivers the product 
and more as a 'brain' or autonomous unit controlling the delivery process. A corollary 
of the 'brain' metaphor is the key 'learning' metaphor when the organisation is 
responsive to changes in the business environment not as a consequence of 
considerable re-organisation but as a facet of its nature, thus itself altering the way in 
which its members operate. 
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M organ's approach suggests the use of metaphor by staff to appraise their 
effectiveness. Its relevance is both direct and indirect. Language teachers could 
perceive this as a method to: 
€) appraise institutional or classroom organisation 
o promote classroom discussion, as in for example the appraisal of organisations 
with which the students are familiar 
e foster the construction of a critical discourse 
The last point again forges the key link between an instrument of criticality and the 
type of language used to express it. Thus in an appraisal of a classroom as militaristic 
and the teacher as too like a commander-in-chief, students are constructing a 
discourse of militarism out of the metaphor that fosters their powers of criticism and 
perhaps their awareness of their own learning environment. The same holds true when 
Morgan's work is given more direct relevance in the business language class and 
students are asked to appraise their own business organisations. 
In sum, a critical approach to metaphor is not simply a way to foster an awareness of 
the devices out of which we construct explicit and implicit meaning but is also a 
mechanism through which students can advance their expression of the same. 
Also, as I will now explore, such an understanding cannot be separated from the 
relationship between emotion and affect. This is because the power of metaphor to 
organise and reproduce new discourse must also be linked to its existence as a means 
through which students relate that language back to their own conceptual system and 
to the individual experiences of which it is composed. In this sense, it is a means to 
establish emotional ownership over language, treating it as responsive to individual 
need rather than as some imposed system that reformulates the student's thoughts to 
make them something other than their own. 
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3.4.5 Metaphor is a means through which we explain to ourselves what is 
strange amll llllnBrnown: how the affective nature of metaphor can make 
content more memorabDe and heHp stUlldents' fluency and powers of self-
expression. 
(Holyoak and Thaggard ( 1995) describe the mathematician, Poincare, as documenting 
his own creative process as sleepless nights when 'ideas rose in crowds' and were felt 
to 'collide' until they 'interlocked' as 'stable combinations' 'The most fertile' 
'combinations' would 'often be drawn from domains that' were 'far apart' (Ibid). This 
description characterises the paradox that is central to the idea of metaphor we are 
putting forward. On the one hand, the concept of an image schema suggests that 
metaphors arise from patterns and can be grouped in a principled manner. If metaphor 
is a key to conceptualisation, then it is essential to a process where uncertain 
meanings are given the identity of a known category. On the other hand, the 
'combinations' are not predictable or singular. The 'combinations' create patterns that 
cannot be predicted from the nature of their components. 
The use of metaphor as an artistic device indicates its capacity to have an emotional 
impact and its association with 'affect'. I have already hypothesised that part of the 
association between metaphor and emotional satisfaction may lie with a basic need to 
give unknown phenomena or strange sensations a conceptual home by locating them 
in our system of categories. For example, there are attributes of 'flowerness' that will 
make a flower what it is and which will be mapped onto other perhaps more marginal 
members of the species in order to allow them a conceptual home. Metaphor, as 
category extension, posits a breaking down of the detail of form into a less secure 
sense of the attributes that its topic and vehicle share. 
There is a tempting parallelism between this assault on the distinctiveness of a form 
and the nature of 'affect' itself. Simon (1982: 336-37) characterised affect as diffuse 
and difficult to classify when measured against the precision of cognitive operations 
upon 'strings' of'symbols'. It is as ifmetaphor, in suggesting an assault upon the 
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security of the symbol is symptomatic of a wider assay by 'affect' upon the integrity 
of cognitive operations. 
In example 119, below, a Polish Jewish immigrant to the United States describes how 
she coped with America's adolescent dating rituals and their impact upon a friend. 
English conceptualises time through space. The future is in front. Lives are journeys 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The author describes her friend's future as a road. The 
road is sunny and well-lit. Most of her readers will have images of such roads. These 
roads are largely peculiar to them and will evoke their own set of associations. 
Something as dimly perceived as the future of a person we will never meet is secured 
according to how each of us constructs a well-kept road. Metaphor proffers an 
opportunity for affective interference in a cognitive representation because its 
loosening of the sign symbol relationship constitutes a kind of permission for the 
listener or reader to reconstruct it in the web of their own associations. 
119 For marriage of course, is what this is leading up to. Penny's life, in her mind, 
opens out like a well-kept sunny road. She will be married. (Author's data: 
Eva Hoffman, Lost in Translation, London: Vantage 1998). 
The intrusion of affect here lets the reader assert conceptual ownership over remote 
characters and events. The character's future is intertwined with the reader's images 
of roads. Yet in this process there may also be a cognitive cost. The integrity of the 
prototypical form is lost when it must accommodate something that is not itself. The 
sunlit road is no longer just a road. The precision of the symbol 'a road' is sacrificed. 
A metaphor may be evocative and emotional because it risks the categories on which 
language depends, leaving a reader or listener to sway as if upon the edge of the 
impending dissolution of the forms into which they organise their world. Further, the 
cultural construction of the metaphor, where sunlit roads are evocative of a mild 
spring would be very different for those from desert countries where they proffer an 
endless band of tarmac melting into a haze. Proffering a metaphor therefore will make 
the author's control of their material hostage to reader's own web of culturally 
constructed associations. 
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The very existence of metaphor warns against our taking the contrast of cognition and 
affect too far. 'Cognitive operations' can be seen as riding 'piggy back' upon those of 
the emotional kind, (Bruner 1986). Affect helps us to represent cognitive operations to 
ourselves as significant and meaningful, thus presupposing their underpinning as 
emotionally significant and memorable rather than as insignificant, mental ephemera. 
It may determine positions in apparently rational argument as much as reason itself 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
Additionally conceptual metaphor and image schemata represent features of 
cognition, becoming the stabilisation of a shared response to experience. Emotion 
itself cannot be disassociated from category. Fiske (1982) shows an implicit linkage 
between prototype theory, category construction and affect. Thus the category of a 
politician will evoke negative affect and a school friendship the positive. Most 
interestingly, Fiske suggests that these category associations are schematised forming 
a pattern of pre-set responses to experience. I would argue that such responses are one 
of the ways in which a language is embedded in a culture. An extreme example might 
be how Spanish culture once despised bathing as a 'Moorish' custom and how 
consequently the Aztecs despised their Spanish conquerors as 'dirty'. Bathing had a 
different cultural significance and evoked a different web of associations. The 
increasing effects of cultural globalisation means that few of us have to deal with 
anything this extreme. But our switching between languages remains sometimes a 
switch between the schematisation of category and affect that might have formulated 
just such a disdain. It therefore remains that one of the more difficult features of the 
language learning task is to retain a sensitivity to an L2's common, affective 
underpinning while adhering to the value system out of which the learner's identity is 
constructed. Equally a quandary for the learner is whether they should risk that 
identity by attempting even a partial modification of it and for the teacher how far 
they should tempt the student towards that act of schematic re-engineering. 
The tension between notions of affect and cognition may also reveal itself in how the 
interest in affect has roots in behaviourist psychology. For example, Pavlov's interest 
was in conditioning emotional responses to specific phenomena as when an eleven-
month old boy was taught to alternatively like and dislike a white rat according to 
whether or not its appearance was heralded by a frightening sound (Davison and 
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Neale 1986). For the cognitivist, it may be more difficult to accommodate this 
evocation of responses that are free from conscious mediation. Metaphor research 
might prove to be a means through which these two opposing trains of thought can be 
reconciled, if only because it encourages the possession of meaning by individual 
schematisation of experience. 
The interest in how we can condition a subject into associating a phenomenon with a 
particular emotion works through to humanistic educational programmes and the 
interest in giving a learning objective a more intense emotional value. Such learning 
objectives can also be formulated as learning about oneself, as in the domain of 
psychotherapy. Cox and Theilgaard (1987: 18) discuss how psychotherapy can be 
'facilitated by the use of image and metaphor.' Thus, a subject's emotional world can 
be 'contained, changed or consolidated' by the use of poetic imagery. There is a 
potential, directional paradox, however, in that the objective of psycho-therapy is to 
begin with the superficial then to go 'deep'. By contrast, metaphor provokes an 
affective response almost before it is consciously understood, touching an emotional 
depth before a reflective surface. The paradox can be reconciled in that a goal of 
psychotherapy is to bring poorly formulated thoughts to the surface. Metaphors that 
are superficially mundane or 'faded' can suddenly be vested with significance as 
when a patient apologises for being late because a dentist has been taking their 
'crowns' off and the therapist asks: 
120 How many crowns have you had? 
Are you talking about teeth? 
I'm talking about crowns (I bid: I 05) 
And the therapist can then start to explore the significance of a 'crown' to the patient, 
perhaps returning to its literal referent or by playing with its other associated 
meanings in order to trawl for the thoughts that a subject may need to express. The 
alertness of a successful therapist to the metaphorical significance of a casually used 
term must have clear lessons for language teachers. They can focus on this casual 
emergence of meaning in an off-hand remark in order to help students track chains of 
associations. The associations will not only loosen students' thoughts and trigger the 
language in which to express them but may also help to explore the webs of meaning 
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out of which a language has been constmcted. In this way, a teacher can use a 
conceptual metaphor such as 'up is happy' to introduce language for describing 
positive states of mind (on top of the world, on an up etc.). The conceptual metaphor 
brings order to an idiomatic and superficially chaotic area of language. It also 
becomes the means through which students can explore their own memories. Thus, 
the metaphor guides them into a language's conceptual core and fosters an emotional 
identification with it. 
The importance of affect in language learning was made clear by Gardner and 
Lambert's much-cited study on motivation (1973). This showed how learners who 
were motivated by a desire to integrate into a culture would be more successful 
learners of that culture's language. Students were positively affected by the emotional 
pull of wanting to be part of a cultural group. Approaching the same phenomenon 
from a contrary perspective, Mitchell and Myles (1998) discuss the feelings of 
alienation and fmstration felt by adult migrants who cannot gain full access to their 
host countries' institutions because of their poor language. The implication is that a 
poor control of a language and a consequent failure to exploit a host country's 
institutions can compound each other in producing a loss of self-esteem and 
confidence that will in turn impoverish linguistic performance or inspire negative 
motivation in respect of the target language. A target language thus constructs itself 
not simply as an opaque and difficult system but also as one through which 
institutional access and full social participation is also made opaque and difficult. A 
positive response is in how a sense of metaphor can both help students to explore and 
understand such feelings while also bringing them closer to the cultural construction 
of a language and thus to a fuller mastery of its meanings. 
Issues of low self-esteem and a lack of confidence by users of a foreign language have 
fostered the interest of teachers and educators generally. Moskowitz (1978) has given 
one of the more powerful and practical expositions of how such an awareness can 
translate into clear classroom techniques. She also revealed an implicit understanding 
of the power of metaphor in the psychotherapeutic teclmiques that she makes 
available to the language classroom. Moskowitz understood the capacity of metaphor 
to form unfonned ideas, as Cox and Theilgard ( 1987) described it. She releases 
vehicles of thought that will track, concretise and carry back students' own 
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associations, motivating their use of the language with the need to describe that 
process and thus embedding the class in their own emotional life. In order to do this, 
she uses guided fantasies to help students make the target language memorable by 
daring them to make it into a vehicle through which they explored and expressed 
some obscurer attributes of self. The guided fantasy partly works by throwing out a 
metaphor, then stopping while each student pursues the thoughts that are thus evoked. 
For example, students are asked to pass a parcel that becomes heavier and heavier as 
each one loads it with their pain, then are left in silence to reflect upon what that relief 
of pain means to them (Moskowitz 1978). 
A more recent extension to this approach can be found in a collection of techniques 
known as Nemo-Linguistic Programming (NLP). A key concern for NLP trainers is in 
achieving personal change through what are called 'submodalities'. Submodalities are 
the generally unconscious construction of external stimuli within a subject. They may 
be the mental pictures that an individual constructs of particular concepts. They could 
also be the unconscious response to such factors in the immediate environment as the 
colour of a room (James 1994). Gordon (1978) named such representations, 
'metaphors' and saw an instrument oftherapy as arising from their manipulation and 
change. In this vein, Buckalew and Ross ( 1981) conducted a study in how the 
effectiveness of a placebo can be changed by the manner in which a subject sees its 
packaging (James 1994). The presentation of the placebo is thus a metaphor of its 
potential effect, exerting unconscious influence over the patient. A core NLP strategy 
is therefore to try to change the metaphors through which a given task is perceived in 
order to help a learner construct a more receptive attitude towards it. 
In the domain of language teaching and learning, this means first helping students to 
express their perception of themselves as language learners. Their perceptions can 
then be shifted by such techniques as anchoring, where they set their perception 
inside a different, perhaps more positive construction. A student who is poor at 
presentation will thus envisage themselves as a perfect presenter. In this vein, a 
technique called modelling could mean their taking a strong presenter as a model, then 
role-playing them. 
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It should be clear then that our view of metaphor does not simply enter the language 
learning arena as a means to help understand how language is constructed. Metaphor 
as a linguistic form is a representation of how the individual can fashion meaning in a 
way that allows it to reflect their emotional experience. A teacher's sense of metaphor 
can help them guide students into the conceptual core of a language, responding to the 
schematisation of its users' collective experience as negative and positive affects. 
Metaphor triggers sets of emotional associations and initiates an exploration of the 
language's own bedrock of positive and negative affect. In these senses, my sense of 
metaphor is far from being an addition to the learning objective. It entails a learning 
of language through a reconstruction ofthe processes through which language is built 
and upon which its emotional significances depend. I will now look at this more 
closely within the domain of learning and acquisition theory itself. 
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3.5 Metaqpllnor represents cognntnve processes that are nmpllncatedlnot just Jillll 
tille collllstnndnon oJf llallllgunage but Jillll its acquisitioiil. Metaphor munst l!Je 
sntUilatedl lillll the nearllllillllg process. 
My argument thus far has assumed that language learning is assisted by the 
development of both conscious and unconscious knowledge about how the language 
operates. I have suggested that a conscious or explicit understanding of the image-
schematic basis of a language and the principles on which this is based can facilitate 
its mastery and control. I have also implied that there are linkages between a 
conscious use of metaphorical forms and the affective and less controlled responses 
that these evoke. Such an implication suggests that the borderline between knowledge 
about language that is understood by the learner, and is explicit to them, and an 
unconscious deployment of the same may not always be clear. Unfortunately these are 
assumptions that many would question. 
The influence of form upon the development of second language competence remains 
a controversial issue in second language acquisition research. Much research assumes 
that adults have some access to the faculties that allow children to acquire first 
language forms with unconscious ease. An access to such faculties, it is argued, would 
mean that learning more about a language is unlikely to help us use it more effectively 
and may even impede that process. Krashen ( 1985 and 1989) assumes that there is a 
mental separation between the language that we acquire and that which we 
consciously learn. Learnt language cannot become acquired language. Our knowledge 
about a second language cannot therefore help us towards achieving the reflexive 
mastery that is associated with the first. Less radically, but in a similar vein, Jordens 
(1996: 443) concludes: 'it is not surprising that form-focused teaching, providing 
positive as well as negative formal input, does not appear to affect the development of 
intuitive structural linguistic knowledge'. His view is finally that what does change 
matters is 'the right kind of input at the right time' (ibid: 443). 
However, it would be wrong to assert that all students of language acquisition would 
adopt this position or even that they agree as to the nature of the processes they seek 
to describe. In contrast to Krashen (1985), such scholars as McLaughlin (1987), Ellis 
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(1990), Bialystock (1988), and Pienaman ( 1998) have all put forward theories that 
allow for the interpolation of cognitive factors into a process that they also 
characterise as linguistic. Such views offer something to those teachers who believe 
that acquisition can be advanced if learners first develop some conscious knowledge 
ofthe structures that they will have to use. Yet finally, even these views do not square 
well with the view of mind and language structure I am trying to advance. 
Therefore, there are two acquisition questions that my thesis will have to address. 
1) Is it any longer useful to put forward an approach to language teaching that will at 
some level involve students in thinking consciously about the nature of the target 
language? 
2) Does the view of a metaphorical mind that we are putting forward have anything 
to say about the process of language acquisition and learning itself? 
As I will show, neither of these questions has an easy answer and should demand a 
more extensive treatment than can be given in a thesis dedicated to so general a topic. 
However, in respect of the first, I do believe it is possible to demonstrate that the case 
for unassisted or natural classroom acquisition by post-pubertal learners is deeply 
flawed. I will make this argument in order to clear ground for an answer to the second 
point. However, this answer must involve an extensive reconsideration of the notion 
not just of language acquisition but of language learning. Here, my objective can only 
be to make some tentative suggestions as to how our ideas of second or foreign 
language learning could be re-examined from a perspective that is influenced by our 
understanding of how metaphor, language and conceptualisation inter-relate. The 
extensive theoretical and empirical study that such questions properly demand can 
hardly be begun here, however. 
Before attempting a summary of these issues, I should first make clear that my 
concern is with post-pubertal second language acquisition and/or learning. The first 
and second language acquisition of very much younger subjects may involve different 
features entirely. Whether our sense of metaphor could illuminate the territory of the 
younger subject is a question I will put aside for now. 
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The teaching strategies that I will put forward are intended for learners who are 
capable of extensive conscious thought about language and, therefore, my focus will 
be on how this group obtains second language knowledge. 
In respect of this group, I believe SLA (second language acquisition) theory that 
ignores cognitive factors to be flawed for the following reasons: 
1) There is no reliable way to distinguish acquired language knowledge from 
learnt language knowledge. 
2) Innatist theories of second language acquisition have a contradictory 
relationship to the Chomskyan ( 1978) theories of language from which they 
claim support. 
3) There is no satisfactory theory for how learnt and acquired knowledge interact 
to produce a given level of performance. 
4) Some SLA theory overstresses the uniqueness of the language learning/ 
acquisition task. 
5) The conclusions of metaphor research in cognitive science do not support the 
generative position on which some of the more consistent positions about SLA 
are based. 
6) There would seem to be little neurological support for an acquisition/learning 
distinction that is based on modular structures of mind. Further, theories that 
exploit notions of modularity may not be consistent with the ideas from which 
they claim support. 
Cook (2000) has made the further point that second language acquisition is an 
inherently unstable process. The conditions under which it will occur involve states of 
mind and environment that not only fail to repeat themselves from event to event but 
which are also subject to constant change within the experience of one individual. 
Explanations are bound to be inadequate when these depend upon the staged re-
configuration of a single and constantly reduplicated structure of mind. 
I will now set out these arguments in more detail. 
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3.5.1 Theories of metaphor and acquisition: there is no reliable way to 
distinguish acquired language knowledge from learnt language 
knowledge 
As has already been implied, a major problem with acquisition theory relates to 
difficulties with the term itself and how it is to be distinguished from learning. 
SLA theorists distinguish between second and foreign language acquisition (Lalleman 
1996: 3). Second language acquisition traditionally referred to a process of acquiring 
a language in a community where it predominates (ibid: 3). Foreign language 
acquisition would generally refer to a process that is outside the said community. 
For Krashen ( 1985 and 1989), the distinction refers to the nature of the mental 
process. Second Language Acquisition (SLA) is natural and partly mimics the 
processes through which the individual acquired their first language. Learning is 
conscious and posits an on-going conscious interference in the production and 
interpretation of language. 
On the face of it, to relate the acquisition and learning distinction to the features of a 
sociolinguistic environment is to make a claim that confuses the nature of a process 
with the setting in which it occurs. It is clear, therefore, that acquisition is only a 
consistent basis for linguistic analysis if it refers to a distinct psychological process. 
This psychological process could as well be triggered by a classroom environment as 
by one that is less contrived. Yet the problem now is that we are dealing with a 
distinction between two internal and unobservable processes. We have lost 
acquisition's distinguishing feature, namely the setting in which it occurs. Such a loss 
means that there is no way of knowing whether a given state of language knowledge 
is a consequence of learning or acquisition. 
The above situation means that all SLA studies risk circularity if they hold that a 
correct and reflexive command of language will result from acquisition whereas a 
hesitant, considered and sometimes erroneous use suggests learning. The circularity 
results from the belief that language performance is largely correct and reflexive if it 
is categorised and studied as an acquired competence. There is no method with which 
to suggest the language has been learnt. In short, the distinction is not open to 
disproof. 
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A solution might be to accept the sociolinguistic nature of the process. But there are 
circumstances which make even this distinction difficult. For example, one could 
accept that second language acquisition occurs in the country where the TL is the 
predominant mother tongue and foreign language acquisition occurs where it is not. 
Yet, the world abounds with cases where children go to a school to be taught in a 
language that is not their mother tongue and which may not be indigenous in any 
sense. On the surface the school functions as a kind of second language community in 
which the pupils perceive themselves as foreign. Such children may find no 
community outside school in which to practise that language. They may switch from 
classes where they consciously wrestle with that language to others where knowledge 
is assumed and they must focus on meaning. Yet once in the playground they may 
revert to some other community language. There is no clear sense in which such 
children are in a second or foreign language situation. The reality of socio-linguistic 
geography may thus break down a social distinction that is at least theoretically clear. 
3.5.2 Metaphor and acquisition: generative theories of SLA and Chomskyan 
(1985) theory 
Although Krashen (1985) does not actually justify his theory through a Chomskyan 
approach, the basic hypothesis he put forward has led its subsequent proponents back 
to Chomsky's ideas about language and mind. In this section, I will first show how it 
was necessary to go down this route if Krashen' s basic premise was to be sustained. I 
will next show how such a course is in fact at odds with the Chomskyan theory from 
which it claims to draw support. I will do this by looking at then questioning the 
following aspects of SLA theory: 
1) learning versus acquisition 
2) a natural order and the silent period 
3) SLA and the theory of Universal Grammar (UG) 
4) Second language acquisition and the modularity of mind 
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Of Krashen' s ( 1985) two different routes towards a second language, that termed 
learning entails a conscious process with perhaps an undue focus on form. The 
learning route might encompass the declension of Latin nouns by rote or the 
behaviourist drilling of structures in a manner that sought to help students towards 
their reflexive mastery. Learning could also describe the mental processes of a student 
in a commtmicative language class when, for example, they exchange information 
with a partner in an exercise whose objective is to provide practise in a particular 
point of lexis or grammar. According to monitor theory, such conscious learning 
results in an attempt to exercise conscious control over language. Such control makes 
a true facility with a second language impossible. 
3.5.2.1 Generative theories of SLA and Chomskyan (1985) theory: acquisition 
versus learning 
Some early cognitivist theory characterised successful learning through the notion of 
automatisation. Automatisation supposes a transfer of learning from a conscious to an 
unconscious domain (Zobl 1984). Thus, once patterns or routines are automatised 
they become part of the learner's unconscious repertoire and no longer require a 
conscious exploitation of cognitive strategies. For Krashen (1985), however, a 
reflexive control of some feature of the target language does not suppose the 
successful automatisation of consciously learnt knowledge but the unconscious 
acquisition of the same. The route to a second language by learning is held to be 
largely unsuccessful. 
For Krashen, the way forward involves the unconscious deployment of the mind's 
'language instinct' in order to process input. This input consists of the language that 
the learner hears and reads. According to Krashen, the input at one stage of learning 
should be slightly more complex than that which is processed at the previous one. If 
this is the case, the input will remain broadly comprehensible and it will be 
successfully processed. 
Krashen' s ( 1985) thesis has undergone considerable criticism (e.g. Ell is 1990, 
McLaughlin 1987), and some development (e.g. Schwarz 1987). The focus upon input 
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has been particularly problematic. Krashen characterises second language acquisition 
as a predominantly mental activity. The mental nature of acquisition makes the 
processes of language production largely irrelevant. Acquisition occurs when the 
mind processes comprehensible language input. The assertion is thus that teachers are 
mistaken when they treat the language class as an arena that requires a communicative 
and/or practice use of the target language between students. The focus of the language 
class should be upon the provision of comprehensible input, which the students can 
process. 
Many teachers and language learners have difficulty with the idea that the acquisition 
of a target language can be disengaged from its use. An intuitive pedagogical 
judgement would be that students who do not produce a language will not acquire 
productive skills. By the same token, it is difficult to accept that the practice of 
routines or patterns is unhelpful when so much classroom time is dedicated to that 
activity. Traditional language teaching is largely guided by the principles of 
presentation and practice. For teachers schooled by this intuition, it is difficult to 
reformulate a pedagogy in which practice is irrelevant. Another common difficulty for 
those raised on traditional pedagogy may also reside in how often the practice of 
whatever input depends upon breaking down a complex task into separate sub-
routines, each of which is drilled, mastered then readied for re-assembly. Such 
practices in language teaching accord with a more widespread assumed wisdom about 
pedagogy whether of sports, work-related skills or other forms of knowledge that are 
related to measurable perf01mance. 
Such assumed pedagogical wisdom is also supported by some early cognitive theory. 
For example, Posner and Snyder (1975) see that our processing of a given task may be 
both controlled and spontaneous. Controlled processing may involve conscious 
thought and will therefore be cognitively more demanding. Controlled processing will 
therefore require more cognitive space. We need to process some parts of a task 
reflexively in order to avoid cognitive overload. Yet, we also require controlled 
procedures in order to deal with situations that are unfamiliar or difficult. Arguably, 
reflexive processing would be obtained through practice ofthe parts. 
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Many teachers who have adopted quasi-behaviourist techniques of pattern practice 
will recognise a moment of pedagogical disillusionment that I experienced early in 
my career. I had drilled the 'going to future' to perfection. I then asked a student 
casually as he was leaving the class, what he was going to do that evening: 'I go see 
my father' he said after having evidenced a faultless control ofthe same structure in 
practice. According to Posner and Snyder, such a lapse is entirely explicable. The 
casual remark presents a new situation, perhaps forcing the student back to a 
controlled form of knowledge processing. The mistake can therefore occur. 
However, the argument can be made that second language teaching is different from 
other forms of teaching (e.g. Cook 1985). It is different because it does not depend 
upon an inculcation of the mind with routines that are strange to it but upon the 
mind's completion and structuring of data to which it is naturally attuned. In 
Krashen's case, his theory may allow for a development of the distinction between 
controlled and automatised processing towards that which exists between implicit and 
explicit knowledge. 
Explicit knowledge is found in the activities of the monitor, which interferes with the 
reflexive control of language. Implicit knowledge of a structure such as the present 
perfect would show itself through a correct use ofthe same by a student who would 
be unable to make explicit the type of context such as the indefinite past that had 
required its use. However, the development of a reflexive control would never be 
through conscious practice. It may even be that these underlying organisational 
principles used in an implicit control of language are already in place. Evidence for 
this has been sought most powerfully through the notion of a 'natural order 
hypothesis' and of 'a silent period'. 
3.5.2.2 Generative theories of SLA and Chomskyan (1985) theory: a 
natural order and the silent period. 
According to the 'natural order hypothesis,' we acquire 'the rules of language in a 
predictable order' (Krashen 1985: 1 ). Rules are here understood to be the rules of 
245 
syntax or grammar. This proposal was supported by several studies (e.g. Brown 1973, 
Dulay and Burt 1974). 
Brown (1973) has provided evidence to show that all children acquired certain 
morphological and grammatical features of English in the same order. Dulay and Burt 
(1974) tried to show how a similar order could exist in children acquiring their second 
language. Their evidence was based on how children acquiring a second language 
tended to make the same mistakes in respect of particular morphemes at the same 
sequence in time. 
The other key piece of evidence for acquisition used by Krashen (1985) was the silent 
period. This feature has been observed among children who when first introduced to a 
new language will fail to reproduce it for an initial period. Unless coerced into speech 
by a language class, they will be silent. At some moment of their choosing they may 
then reproduce the language. For Krashen, this provides evidence for how acquisition 
can arise from the silent processing of input rather than from extensive self-motivated 
practice in speaking or reproduction. This can also be taken as evidence for the 
mentalistic basis of second language acquisition. The hypothesis is not that the silent 
period is unproductive, rather that the child is processing input in order to formulate 
the language competence that may at some later point result in production. 
However, many difficulties with Krashen's thesis remain. First, there is some doubt 
about the universality of the silent period (Mclaughlin 1987). More difficult still is the 
question of how learners deduce when they can or cannot use a given grammatical 
structure. Krashen's (1985) answer is that the learner uses context and knowledge of 
the world in order to understand the language. Yet this entirely fails to explain how a 
child can deduce the rule for, say, passive formation, then transpose this to other 
appropriate contexts which further demand passive constructions that the learner has 
never actually heard (Mclaughlin 1987). 
Cross-sectional morpheme studies of the type that support the natural order 
hypothesis are also problematic. Dulay and Burt (1974) have been criticised for the 
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cross-sectional nature of their studies (Mclaughlin 1987). A cross-sectional study 
takes snapshots of the progress made by the population of a given group at a series of 
moments in time. Thus what is being measured is not the subjects' development over-
time but the accuracy with which they use a given morpheme in 'an obligatory 
context' at a particular moment (Mclaughlin 1987: 32). 
Yet, despite some weaknesses in the methodology of natural order studies, their 
hypothesis has quite general acceptance, even among those who, like Ellis (1990), 
perceive the conclusions that Krashen draws from them as unwarranted. 
3.5.2.3 Generative theories of SLA and Chomskyan (1985) theory: SLA and 
theories of Universal Grammar (UG). 
One way to substantiate Krashen's notion of acquisition was to rework Chomskyan 
theory concerning first language acquisition and make it apply to the second language 
case (e.g. Schwarz 1987). Chomsky (e.g.1985) sought an answer to the question, 
perceived as 'Plato's (Meno's) problem,' which asks how a child can construct 
language knowledge without knowing anything previously. Put in wider Platonic 
terms, the problem is how one can make sense of a body of knowledge when one has 
no a priori knowledge structures with which to do this. At the simplest level, the 
answer is that one cannot. Therefore, in order to learn something, one must possess a 
knowledge structure with which to learn it. In the case of language, this knowledge is 
perceived as a universal grammar or UG. 
Universal Grammar is held to be an autonomous and common core of rules that is 
common to all languages. A UG represents the parameters with which every human is 
born and which the infant subsequently uses to structure their seemingly random and 
incomplete linguistic input as the syntax that can generate a language. The child 
passes from an initial state when they possess only a universal grammar into a 'steady 
state' where the rules or parameters of this UG have been reset according to the input 
of their first language (Chomsky: 1985). As the notion of a 'steady state' implies, the 
parameters of a UG are reset as the fixed and autonomous syntax or 'I' language 
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which will govern the production and parsing of the language throughout its user's 
life. 
Krashen (1985) made no reference to UG. However, he asserted that second language 
acquisition arose from the mental processing of second language input. This assertion 
requires that the successful processing of input should result in the construction of a 
competence that would be responsible for future production and perception. The often 
limited nature of exposure to a second language means that it is likely to provide an 
even more impoverished or limited stimulus than that of the first. Therefore, in order 
to be sustainable, Krashen's thesis requires an in-built mechanism that the mind can 
use in order to structure and complete as a language competence the limited second 
language data to which it is exposed. 
Some earlier studies ( e.g Newmark and Rei bel 1968) had already argued that even 
classroom-based second language acquisition could proceed in much the same way as 
first, thereby suggesting that second language learners had available to them the same 
biological mechanisms employed by first language learners. It is not difficult to see 
how useful such a proposal would be to those who were eager to maintain Krashen's 
input-based model of acquisition. If second language acquisition is based on the 
successful processing of input one must assume a mechanism that will be responsible 
for this. This mechanism could be the same set of innate organisational principles 
upon which first language acquisition depends, namely a Universal Grammar. 
The suggestion is that the mature learner rediscovers the unconscious acquisitive 
processes of the infant by using their innate capacity to structure language from the 
impoverished and disparate linguistic stimuli by which they are surrounded. 
Evidence for the deployment of a UG in second language acquisition is varied and 
extensive. Supporting notions are that ofthe 'projection device' (Zobl 1983) and 
'accessibility hierarchy' (Gass 1979). 
The notion of 'the projection device' (Zobl 1983) treats grammatical rules as 
occurring in clusters. Thus if one basic rule in a cluster is learnt, this will trigger the 
learning of all the rules related to it. For example, relative clauses in English are 
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governed by several rules pertaining to the case of the relative pronoun and to its 
possible omission or obligatory inclusion. 
A connected and supporting idea is that of the 'accessibility hierarchy' (Gass 1979). 
This holds that the prior acquisition of what is held to be a 'marked' form will 
facilitate the acquisition of 'unmarked ones'. The notion of an unmarked form is also 
one that derives from theories of Universal Grammar. Unmarked forms are those that 
show themselves to be the closest expression in a given language of the syntactic 
structures that are common to all1anguages. Thus, if unmarked forms are acquired 
before marked ones then this can be taken as evidence for how the learner's 
acquisition is being guided by the universal parameters within rather than by the 
particular orders in which the external language data are presented. 
I illustrate, below, the accessibility hierarchy with three sentences: 
121 The person who came to dinner 
122 The meat that I ate 
123 It's a better book than that which you gave me 
According to the hierarchy, the first two sentences (121 and 1 22) are treated as being 
high up because their use of the relative pronoun as subject and object can be 
regarded as common in most languages. 123 is rarer and can therefore be regarded as 
marked or low down the hierarchy (Comrie and Keenan 1978). 
Gass (1979) and Zobl (1984) claim that they have evidence to show that when a 
syntactic cluster is first introduced high up the hierarchy or through unmarked forms, 
then learners will find it more difficult to manipulate marked structures. These claims 
can gather support both from the notion of an accessibility hierarchy and from the 
more profound contention that Universal Grammar is a factor in how learners of 
second languages structure and make unconscious sense of input. 
Research such as that of Zobl (1984) can also be used to question the idea implied by 
Krashen (1985) that a focus on form in the classroom will do nothing to advance 
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acquisition. The implication is that instruction directed towards form will assist 
students if it respects the learners' underlying natural order of acquisition. 
Yet, those who support the idea ofunconscious acquisition as qualitatively superior 
to conscious learning may over-emphasise the adult learner's lack of success when 
measured against a competence acquired from infancy on. The fact remains that some 
learners achieve a mastery of their chosen language that is marred by scarcely more 
than a flawed control of its phonological system. Many trainers will have found that 
the opening of the CIS and Central Europe has reinforced this last point. The 
consequence of these political events has been an increase in our contact with 
language specialists who appear to have obtained their very developed knowledge 
after very limited contact with native speakers of the target language. Instead, such 
specialists may attribute their achievement to a determined and conscious application 
of old behaviourist and grammar translation routines. They represent a phenomenon 
for which Krashen's basic acquisition/learning distinction does not provide a proper 
explanation. 
Yet one might argue that there is only self-deception among those who believe that 
they have proceduralised their conscious knowledge of a second language into a 
reflexive mastery. One might suggest that when such learning appears to be 
successful, it is not because of the conscious strategies that have been used in the 
classroom. The level obtained in the L2 is a result of processes which those involved 
do not fully understand. 
I could claim that while such speakers focused on their mastery of language forn1 they 
may have been engaged in an unconscious process of acquisition, but not of the 
language items with which they consciously grappled. The proposal here could be that 
the learner who consciously wrestles with the forms of a target language is also 
unconsciously engaged in processing other, perhaps unrelated, input. In other words, 
when an English language lesson is focused upon a language topic such as 'greeting 
and welcoming', the learner may unconsciously process input resulting from an 
explanation of when the British do and do not shake hands. The language whose first 
purpose was to support a cultural point might thus be processed as the input from 
which a spontaneous and natural use of language wiii develop. At the same time, the 
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lesson's linguistic point will remain irrelevant to the development of a reflexive 
competence that is achieved by mentally restructuring the language in which that 
point was embedded. 
The difficulty here is that we still have no explanation for the learner who may master 
a structure or area oflexis, then go out and consciously, then reflexively, use it. Few 
language learners would fail to remember having done this at some point or other and 
several have documented the occurrence of this process within their own learning ( e.g 
Gregg 1984). 
Another, and perhaps more complex, problem concerns the relationship between the 
language that has been consciously learnt and that which has been unconsciously 
acquired. Such conscious and incremental learning requires a more plausible and 
involved explanation. Because the question raises problems about the connections 
between different facets of mind, the explanation requires a wider theory of mind and 
examination of the way in which Chomskyan linguistics has been integrated into the 
same. 
3.5.2.4 Generative theories of SLA and Chomskyan (1985) theory: SLA and the 
modularity of mind 
To allow Universal Grammar a role in the construction of second language input may 
answer some questions about the nature of the mental processes involved in an input 
based view of acquisition. However, to give such an answer is problematic on two 
counts: first, in respect of the theory on which it is based and second, in relation to the 
questions it tries to answer. I will first consider it in respect ofthe theory on which it 
is based. 
Chomsky's perception ofUniversal Grammar is of a set ofparameters that are innate 
and autonomous. The parameters' autonomy also implies modularity in the sense of 
their being isolated from other mental processes. By this is meant that UG is a 
separate and autonomous feature of mind with which the human individual is born. 
Effectively, it is an embryonic 'brain language' (Burton-Roberts and Carr 1999). The 
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parameters of this module are reset by input from the first language with which the 
child comes into contact. A simple analogy would visualise UG as a series of 
electrical switches. The switches are wired in a particular way forming a pattern 
common to all people. The input resets the switches of the UG in order to create a 
given language grammar or i language, be it French, Ibo, Arabic or whatever. The i 
language is a syntax which is capable of generating and parsing the L 1. This entails 
that UG effectively disappears after the first language achieves steady state and the 
child matures. UG becomes the' i language' because it is restructured by it or because 
its parameters have been reset. Equally, the confused input of the language with 
which the UG comes into contact is ordered and completed as ani language. 
The consequences of this are clear for those who claim a role for UG in the 
structuring of second language input. Either UG is unavailable because it has 
vanished into the L 1, or Chomsky' s original theory requires substantial modification 
if it is to accommodate a generative view of SLA. There is of course no certainty that 
Chomsky' s version of his theory is the correct one. Yet, there are very clear reasons 
why Chomsky constructed his theory in the way he did. These reasons should be 
examined before we consider rewriting what must be a quite fundamental premise. 
If UG is available to second language input, then we will have to change how we 
think about it. An available UG would have to be somehow external to the part of the 
mind in which language, whether first or second, is supposedly restructured. It would 
have to be separate because otherwise it would be restructured into the steady state for 
which it was partly responsible. It would then cease to exist in its original form and 
thus cease to be available to deal with the second language. Therefore, in order to 
hold onto the idea of a UG available to second language learners, it would have to be 
isolated from the input that it structured. If this were the case, it would assume a 
different form. UG would no longer be a set of parameters that become the rules out 
of which a language is generated. UG would remain, as it were, underneath the 
language it has structured and available to organise quite different data. This is 
problematic on several counts. 
UG was not simply conceived as a faculty that organises input. It was a faculty that 
interacted with input in order to reorganise itself as the i language able to generate the 
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syntax of a given language. The theory of a generative grammar requires this view if 
it is to maintain its consistency. 
Generative grammar holds that the sentences which make up our linguistic 
performance are produced and deciphered according to rules and parameters that are, 
finally, structures of mind. Yet though part of mind, these rules can be deduced out of 
the linguistic episodes or 'tokens' (Burton-Roberts and Carr 1999) that are language 
performances. Our linguistic performances can reveal the structures out of which they 
are produced. For the generative position, this is axiomatic, because what generative 
linguists do is examine the language we produce (our e language) in order to discover 
the rules from which it is produced (our i language-). From these rules, one can find 
those that are universal to language, and which therefore make up a Universal 
Grammar 
If a UG is reconceived as separate from the input it organises, then it can no longer 
exist as a structure that can be deduced out of the language for which it is responsible. 
There is still no reason why we should not accept this change in the way UG is 
described. We could choose to give UG a role in the creation of ani language or of a 
generative syntax but extrapolate it from that syntax itself. Yet, to do so is to 
jeopardise the methodology through which the generative enterprise proceeds. 
In the Chomskyan model, syntax is conceived of as autonomous and separate. In 
large measure, it constitutes a language faculty and furnishes the structures of that 
faculty. The view that UG is implicated in second language acquisition would 
necessitate its becoming a filter that structures input according to its own 
organisation. Yet, this supposes a very different role from that which was first 
conceived. A UG whose parameters are reset according to the input of a given 
language will in some measure become the i representation of that language. Yet the 
implication now is that UG is reset by and arranges linguistic data. It then sends these 
data off for storage elsewhere before partially resetting itself as if in readiness for a 
second data stream. 
The problem that now arises is one of method of study and proof. The 'generative 
enterprise' is motivated by the desire to find in different languages the syntactic 
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features that are common to all languages. It can search for these structures in one 
place only, in the languages themselves. This is axiomatic to its being a linguistic as 
opposed to a psychological or even a neurological theory. However, ifUG 
summarises a set of regulatory principles that can be deduced out of a given language 
then it must exist within that language, albeit as a set of transformations from its 
original form. In this sense Chomskyan theory is entirely consistent. However, 
SLAIUG theory is now stating that UG is more a filtration mechanism or mould for 
data from which it remains separate. If this is the case, then its forms cannot 
necessarily be deduced from the product (linguistic performance) for which it is 
responsible. I will now explain why, 
If UG has a role in second language acquisition then this undermines the generative 
study of it. It becomes purely a structure of mind and there is no longer any way of 
knowing the extent to which it is in language or not. Metaphors can be treacherous or 
friendly to this argument according to the side on which one chooses to come down, 
and this is what makes this argument fraught with difficulty. If we retain the filter 
metaphor, we could say that language is shaped by the filter it passes through, and 
therefore the forms of this filter can to some extent be read through the forms that it 
imparts to a given language. However, let us take another metaphor, one which 
implies a procedural complexity that is more appropriate to the subject in question. 
Imagine that a language is a complex manufactured product such as a car (though it is 
far more complex even, than this). Imagine also that in future generations an 
archaeologist came upon a car but no sign of a factory. The only clues they had to the 
processes at work within the car factory would be the cars themselves. If this were the 
case, it would be impossible to determine the nature of the manufacturing processes 
responsible for the car with any certainty or detail. We might be able to analyse the 
constituents and even guess at an order of assembly. Archaeologists of course do just 
this, though with far simpler products and on the basis of a continuing tradition of 
manufacture. However, anything else would be surmise and such vital distinctions as 
those between just-in-time manufacturing and a nom1al assembly line would be 
entirely lost. IfUG is separated out from the language it reconstructs in the way 
implied, then it becomes the car factory and the linguist is the unfortunate 
archaeologist trying to reconstruct the parameters of its manufacturing process with 
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guess work and surmise. The fact that language is far more complex structurally than 
a car makes the generative linguist's task all the more impossible. 
Last, and perhaps more conclusively, something as fundamental to Chomskyan 
linguistics as the competence/performance, i/e distinction, disappears. There is no 
underlying structure residing in the mind-brain which can be found in language itself. 
Such structures have been taken out of language and their existence in the 
performance from which they were once considered deductible has been reduced to a 
question of surmise and guess-work. 
In short, if UG has a role in the organisation of adult second language data, it must be 
seen as separate from the input it organises. If it is seen in this way, it can no longer 
be latent within a spread of linguistic performances. Those who take this view will 
therefore undermine their own case because they are effectively saying that language 
has parameters which they can no longer determine with any surety from the data that 
language accords them. More profoundly, the notion of an ile language, competence/ 
performance distinction will itself start to disappear. Language knowledge is no 
longer a feature latent in linguistic performance or in the utterances and writing of 
language users. Language knowledge is a feature of the mental architecture from 
which it has emerged. Linguistic perfonnance may be marked by this architecture but 
does not contain its forms within their boundaries because the forms have been 
located elsewhere. 
UG/acquisition theory is inconsistent with the Chomskyan theory on which it is 
based. 
3.5.2.5 Generative theories of SLA and Chomskyan (1985) theory: the question 
of a modular mind. 
There is perhaps a more profound and more basic difficulty for second language 
acquisition theory in general. This difficulty was raised above and remains 
unanswered by the conscription of UG into the acquisition frame. This is the problem 
of how second language learners can claim to learn language either by rote or some 
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more sophisticated form of practice and finish with a workable though sometimes 
imperfect knowledge. Basically, we are asking about the status of learnt knowledge 
when we use language, if successful language use is based upon implicit or acquired 
language knowledge. Schwartz (1999) answers this question by developing Fodor's 
( 1985) theory concerning the modularity of mind. 
It is now an established principle of cognitive science that colour is not intrinsic to 
objects in the world around us (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Colour is a product of how 
the brain perceives the reflection of light striking different surfaces. Yet, unless we 
are colour blind, we have no choice but to allow our visual input systems to construct 
the world in colours. 
Fodor (1985) ascribes this reflexivity and isolation to all input systems. A second 
feature of the input system according to Fodor (1985) has already been implied in the 
directness of its connections to the sensory organs. This is that the input from one 
sense does not interfere with that of another. Unless we suffer from synaesthesia, we 
do not smell what we see. We may of course be able to construct a visual image of, 
for example, a burning tyre from the smell of rubber. Nevertheless, when we go and 
look for the source of the smell, we may find that it was not a tyre but a foam 
mattress. In this way, we can disengage what our eyes tell us from what our nose 
does. We can do this because the input systems that they use are isolated from each 
other. The point here is that perceptual processing is perceived as modular. Fodor 
( 1985) assigns sight, smell and touch each a separate module to cope with their very 
different kinds of data. More unusually, he also gives language its own module. 
To assign language a separate input module is much more controversial. The 
production of language is clearly prey to conscious manipulation at some level. Even 
as I write this, I can make choices about the syntax I will use to represent a given 
meaning. However, the manner in which a given structure will select parts of speech 
appropriate to a given position in a sentence is certainly much less a product of 
conscious control. Thus, we do not decide to put a verb after 'to' in a simple sentence 
such as 'I like to go.' We do so in unconscious obedience to the parameters that we 
have internalised. 
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Fodor is not so much concerned by the issue of language production raised in my 
above example, but by the question oflanguage input. Fodor's argument for the 
existence of a module dedicated to language input is first that just as we have no 
choice but to recognise visual input so we have no choice but to recognise the input of 
languages that we know as meaningful language. 
Another reason to view language as processed through a modularised input system 
relates to the sheer complexity of the task of decoding language. Fodor (1985) argues 
that human beings will play chess with differing and sometimes prodigious ability. 
However, the argument that some people have a natural facility for chess would never 
support the notion that there is a part of the mind that is naturally dedicated to chess 
playing. Chess is not a natural activity in the way language is held to be. Further, 
chess involves processes of encoding, projection and representation in which we 
choose consciously to participate. Yet decoding syntax presents a task that is more 
complicated than reasoning out the possible positions to which a given chess move 
may lead. The fact that we understand and produce language means that we do decode 
syntax. Unlike in chess, we perform this task while being totally unaware ofthe 
complexity ofthe analytical system we have to deploy and without any conscious 
choice over whether or not to deploy it. Our lack of awareness of what we do when 
we decode language is similar to the unconscious ease with which we process other 
sensory data. This lack of awareness argues strongly for a modular system whose 
most fundamental properties cannot be accessed by other cognitive functions. 
The importance ofFodor's views on modularity for students of first language 
acquisition should now be clear. He places what he perceives as the most important 
linguistic operations within an input module that is similar to those dedicated to other 
sensory inputs. Whether they pertain to feeling, sight or language such input systems 
will have within them structures, which organise the data with which they are 
provided. Equally these innate modular structures will also have their parameters reset 
by the input they receive. 
For Schwartz (1986, 1987, 1993) modularity suggests a solution to the problem of 
how older students can both possess acquired and learnt language knowledge at the 
same time. Holding to Krashen's acquisition/learning distinction, she advances a 
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hypothesis where language knowledge can be divided into two kinds, with each 
occupying a different module, encyclopaedic or consciously learnt, and that which is 
naturally acquired through the involvement of a still available universal grammar. She 
has allotted each of these types of second language its own place or module within the 
mind and thus reinforces Krashen's (1985 and 1989) view that learnt language 
knowledge cannot become acquired knowledge. 
In essence, Schwartz ( 1986, 1987, 1993) is seeking to have modularity both ways. 
The adult is allowed the capacity both consciously to assemble language knowledge 
and to retain this alongside that which has been unconsciously filtered through the 
intact UG of the input system. However, there remain many unanswered questions 
concerning the relationship of both these language modules to other functions of 
language and mind. 
The first question concerns the way in language is processed, through one module or 
another. The position of no interface between the two types of module supposes an all 
or nothing situation where processing is either conscious or unconscious and 
reflexive. Where processing is unconscious, the Fodorian language module comes 
into play. Where it is not, one assumes it is somehow routed through or out of the 
encyclopaedic module. 
The immediate problem is that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that explicit 
language knowledge can be automatised and its application can become reflexive. I 
have alluded to Gregg's (1984) argument that he could observe his own 
automatisation ofthe learnt components of a language. According to Mclaughlin's 
(1987) model, language is like any other complicated skill that is built out of modular 
or distinct processes. In the earlier stages of language learning these processes are 
fractured and not fully developed in themselves. Learning entails the amalgamation of 
the processes, the learner's fuller control over them and their consequent 
automatisation. Such an account would seem to offer a better account for the learner's 
sense of their integration of explicit routines into an implicit, automatised repertoire. 
In Schwarz's account, this must occur within the larger encyclopaedic module 
because according to her argument there is no interface with language module. 
However, this locus of mind now starts to lose its modular characteristics as it 
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operates with two quite different types of knowledge, explicit and implicit, as well as 
with several gradations of knowledge between, representing what is partially 
automatised, or used successfully on one day but not on another. 
The second question is the nature ofFodor's idea ofmodularity. Fodor describes 
sensory and language processing systems as modular. He treats linguistic input as 
being processed differently from other auditory input because linguistic input is 
intuitively recognised as language, and is hence interpreted in the way that visual data 
is processed as visual data and scent as scent. The construction of an encyclopaedic 
module situates modularity in an altogether different part of the mind. Because it is 
knowledge obtained through conscious learning, encyclopaedic language knowledge 
must interface with cognitive faculties. It cannot be modular, in other words, but it 
could be separate from the reflexive processing of language data. However, if it is 
entirely separate, then we would have to ask how this larger operation of mind can 
recognise language as language. The answer is that it could only do so through some 
metacognitive intervention, or the construction of knowledge about the nature of the 
linguistic input that is being received into the language module. This pre-supposes 
that the 'dumb' language module is not entirely dumb because it is allowing access to 
the wider operations of metacognition. If it permits such faculties to work on the 
language it possesses, one would have to ask why it cannot permit a two-way process 
where the operations of such faculties are not admitted into its own processes and 
automatised as a feature of its 'dumb' operations. 
Finally, there are larger questions about Fodorian modularity in respect of what is 
known about the structures of mind and language processing. I will deal these later, 
however, when I discuss how Cognitivist theories of mind call into question the larger 
Chomskyan framework. 
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3.5.3 Metaphor and acquisition: overstressing the uniqueness of the 
language-learning task 
Hitherto, I have tried to underscore the contradictions of SLA/UG theory. 
The enquiry was motivated by a concern about an approach to language teaching that 
would be unapologetic in how it asked students to give conscious consideration to the 
nature and evolution of language form, albeit in a way that would not normally be 
considered traditional. I will now question a more basic assumption of acquisition 
theory, and in so doing point the way to how it might be considered in the light of the 
somewhat different views of language on which I would like to found my approach. 
A problem with language is that in the case of infant acquisition, whether of one or 
more languages, one is confronted with a process that fails only when there is quite 
radical pathological, congenital or environmental interference. The near universal 
success of first language acquisition is the yardstick against which failure is judged. 
The question that motivates some SLA theory is that of why such success cannot be 
achieved in later life. Chomskyan theory has a simple answer for this. 
The natural mechanisms available to infants are no longer available to the adult. The 
early result of that assumption was the 'critical age' hypothesis, which will see the 
language learning facility as going into sharp decline after puberty (Penfield and 
Roberts 1959). In fact, Long's (1988) critical age study shows a gradual and 
consistent decline rather than the sudden loss of facility one would anticipate. Such 
gradualism could sustain the SLAIUG hypothesis in its need to rework Chomskyan 
theory. There is not the kind of sudden burying and isolation of the UG mechanism 
that Chomskyan theories about parameter-setting might predict. Rather than seeing a 
precipitous collapse in the accuracy with which syntax is mastered, one could point to 
a gradual decline in the ease with which we access what they might perceive as the 
language input module. 
SLA/UG theory also questions the assumption of failure in all post-pubertallanguage 
acquisition and thus must reformulate the classic Chomskyan model of parameter 
setting and steady state. The 'Full transfer/Full Accessibility' model of Schwarz and 
Sprouse (1994) holds that we start the acquisition process with the same access to UG 
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that is possessed by the L 1 acquirer. In order to sustain this position, it is necessary to 
place more emphasis upon successful cases of adult acquisition. White and Genesee 
( 1996) for example have identified groups of adult speakers whose attainment is 
indistinguishable from that of native speakers. The reason given for their achievement 
is that they have access to the same acquisitive faculties as native speakers. My 
argument would be that they have engaged in successful learning. 
It should also be remembered that these critical age studies tend to focus on error in 
grammatical structure. This is unsurprising on three counts. First, some SLA theorists 
are often motivated by a transformational generative view of language. Second, 
grammatical structures are salient entities that can be measured as right or wrong. We 
can quantify the production of correct sentences, and generative grammar, in 
particular, provides a consistent framework for their analysis. Such a framework 
permits the comparison of one case with another. Third, the focus allows a supportive 
but unmentioned circularity that is typical of generative arguments. Thus, one can say 
that acquisition is fundamentally about syntactic structure. Therefore, a flawed 
reproduction of the same indicates a flawed acquisition. 
However, for all we know, the cognitive load related to the acquisition of syntax may 
not be as great as that required for lexis, lexical phrases, collocation, colligation and 
idiom, not to mention the linguistic restructuration of primary metaphor maybe much 
greater. It will be difficult to make conclusive statements about critical age until we 
start to look at the longitudinal development of a larger linguistic picture. 
Additionally, studies that focus on syntactic error take a 'wrong or right' approach to 
their material. They do not perceive the student as on an approach path to a particular 
form, perhaps coming closer to it at one moment and veering away at another. 
Effective teaching and learning is not always indicated by the student 'getting it right' 
straight off but by the student being guided towards the correct form over time. 
In sum, I would like to underscore a point that finds its way into the conscious or 
unconscious practice of many teachers. A first language furnishes the learner with 
strategies through which to consider how they are building the second. To render a 
language learning process conscious, be it in relation to physical movement or mental 
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processes is to allow that it will have something in common with other learning tasks. 
Bialystock (1990) does not see a distinction in the way the mind processes linguistic 
and non-linguistic information. In learning, she postulates a useful distinction between 
analysed and unanalysed knowledge. Analysis in this sense does not constitute 
making knowledge explicit or conscious. It constitutes rather the sense in which it is 
unconsciously (or consciously) analysed as available to other contexts and situations 
than the one in which it is obtained. Her idea of analysis could even imply the mind's 
implicit awareness of how knowledge can be generalised beyond the context in which 
it was reflexively acquired. It is arguable that such an analysis would figure in the 
recontextualisation of any procedure; whether linguistic or purely cognitive, whether 
in the domain of sport, craft or other areas of human activity. There is also a sense 
here of category extension, to which I will return shortly. 
Finally, it must be mistaken to say that, because our learning goal has been naturally 
evolved, the strategies used to reach it should be solely natural and unconscious also. 
Language provides us with the means to think about language. To deny this is to limit 
our semiotic capability. A first language allows us an opportunity consciously to 
represent the meanings of a second. To deny ourselves this semiotic opportunity is to 
deny ourselves the possibilities that language affords us. 
3.5.4 Metaphor and acquisition: the conclusions of metaphor research in 
cognitive science do not support the generative position on which some of 
the more consistent positions about SLA are based. 
Thus far I have examined the problematic nature of second language acquisition 
theory in two respects. The first is in relation to the Chomskyan theoretical position 
on which it is largely based. The second concerns its relation or non-relation to wider 
issues in learning. I will now re-examine this issue in respect of a metaphor-based 
view of conceptualisation and of the relationship between language and cognition that 
I am putting forward. 
Gibbs (1994) asserted his intention in taking the 'cognitive' as opposed to the 
'generative wager' in respect of acquisition and language. His concern was with 
262 
whether one might study language as modular and structurally isolated from the 
operations of cognition that it seeks to express or should perceive it as inextricably 
bound up with these and even structured out of them. His position is very much on the 
cognitive side but his use of the term 'wager' implies that ultimately there is no certain 
evidence to support either position. However, there are searching questions that can 
be asked about the wider notion of universal grammar and Chomskyan theory in the 
light of a cognitivist approach. I intend to raise questions as they emerge from the 
cognitive and metaphorical view of language structure. It is not my intention to 
engage in a wider debate about generative theory. 
The central issue that a generative grammar poses for a cognitivist concerns the 
autonomy of syntax in language. Inside this question is the larger one of whether 
language should be studied as a feature of cognition, that is as a phenomenon that 
reveals patterns of thoughts that are non-linguistic or whether language should only be 
studied as language. 
A key tenet of Chomskyan linguistics ( 1959) is that the essence of language resides in 
a syntax that controls the organisation of a sentence without being affected by the 
meanings of the words or units in the sentence. However, for the cognitivist, syntax is 
bound up with a wider construction of meaning and mental representation. 
Cognitive linguistics traces the grammaticalisation of elements of language through 
metaphor-making. Thus we have seen how a future tense can evolve from our sense 
of moving on a trajectory to a future landmark and from the schema that 'time is 
space', 'the future is in front and the past behind'. Generative grammarians must 
ignore the evidence of this process in order to assert that syntax is an isolated and 
abstract set of algorithms with which we are largely endowed at birth and out of 
which we compute meaning. Yet not only does the generative position find it difficult 
to account for this evolutionary or diachronic evidence about the role of metaphor in 
language change, but there are other examples of how meaning (semantics) governs 
syntax. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 488-492) recount how the classic 'co-ordinate structure 
constraint' is formulated in generative grammar as purely syntactic but will in fact 
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succumb to semantic influence. Their argument is involved but is worth citing for the 
very important point that it makes. 
According to transformational grammar more complicated structures are built up from 
simple clauses by what is called movement. A co-ordinate structure is one that 
combines two clauses as in 'John ate something and Bill drank something.' If we 
were to treat one of these clauses as a separate sentence and turn it into the question: 
'what did John eat?,' transformational grammar would tell us that we would do this 
by changing 'something' to 'what' and moving it to the end of the sentence. We 
would represent the movement with an underlined blank space to mark where the 
'what' had been moved from as in 124: 
124 What did John eat ? 
However, if we do this when 124 is a clause that is part of a co-ordinate structure, 
then we will produce an ungrammatical sentence as in 125: 
125 What did John eat __ and Bill drank something? 
The fact that this creates an ungrammatical sentence gives transformational 
grammarians the co-ordinate structure constraint: 'no constituent can be moved out of 
a co-ordinate structure unless it is moved out of all conjuncts. (Ross 1967 and 1985) 
(Cited in Lakoff and Johnson 1999)'. 
Unfortunately there are many exceptions to this constraint. Among several that Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999) cite are 126 and 127: 
126 What did John go to the store and buy ___ ? (Ross 1967) 
127 How much can you drink __ and still stay sober? (Goldsmith 1985) 
Lakoff 1986 further showed several counterexamples in multiple conjunct sentences 
involving second, third and fifth conjuncts. Such evidence makes clear that there is no 
co-ordinate structure constraint in the sense of a mechanism that syntax has been 
imposed over lexis and meaning. Lakoffs (1986) solution was to see the cases 
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predicted by the original constraint as involving what he calls 'semantic parallelism'. 
By semantic parallelism he means cases where the conjuncts dealing with semantic 
fields can be considered parallel in the sense of dealing with contextually related 
topics. Thus 128, below, demands the constraint because the semantic fields of 'food' 
and 'drink' intertwine through the shared context of sustenance. Equally, parallelism 
could imply something antonymic as in 129, below. When there is no possibility of a 
shared context as in 130, and thus no parallelism, then, if the constraint operates, it 
results in a meaning that is too bizarre to be acceptable. One cannot generally eat a 
musical instrument, unless we were to move towards the register of children's jokes 
and riddles, responding with 'a chocolate cello' or some such. 
128 What did John eat and Bill drink (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) 
129 What did John build __ and Bill destroy 
130 What did John eat __ and Bill tune (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) 
131 What did John go to the store, buy ___ put ___ in his car, drive home 
and unload (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) 
132 What did Jolm eat hot dogs and Bill drink 
By contrast, 'the multiple conjunct cases that violate all-or-nothing movement are 
natural sequences of events in which VPs (verb phrases) with no movement either set 
a scene or change a scene', as in 131, above (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 492). 
Both of these violations show how issues of meaning can affect semantic structure. 
Clearly, generative grammarians have had to take these and countless other instances 
on board. For example they can remove 132, above, from the realm of syntax and say 
that it is pragmatically unacceptable (ibid: 494). But this forces Chomskyan 
linguistics towards a position where one can say simply that syntax governs only 
those structures which are immune to the type of interference from context and 
meaning that is illustrated above. This is an unacceptable circularity. We are saying 
that 'syntax is syntax if it works in the way we think syntax ought to work and if it 
does not then it must be something else'. Such a state of affairs renders Chomskyan 
claims about syntax unfalsifiable. Any instance of contrary evidence is treated as an 
exception and put outside the analytic frame in order to maintain the integrity of the 
basic idea (ibid). 
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By contrast, the emerging cognitive picture is of a syntax that is governed by issues of 
meaning and a of grammar that has evolved diachronically from an extension of the 
meanings of words rooted in mind-world interactions towards the more abstract 
specification of meaning relationships. 
Second language teachers and theorists of acquisition should consider two points: 
1) Grammar is a property of the meanings that language users wish to express. 
There is no stable concept of grammar, which can be constructed as a structure 
of mind towards which they can proceed in a measured and predictable 
fashion. Grammatical performance cannot of itself constitute a measure of 
progress through language. 
2) The separation between grammatical and lexical meaning is less clear than 
they might have imagined. The one has emerged from the other. Grammar 
does not arrange lexis but may be better perceived as a property of it. I will 
exan1ine the pedagogical consequences of this in the next chapter (section 
4.7). 
3.5.5 Mdapllnor and! acquisition: tllle lack of neunrologicaH sunpport for an 
acquftsitio1111./learning distinction tllult is lbasedl on modlunUar strunctures of 
mind!. 
A second and related point evolves from how Chomskyan syntax must be viewed as 
autonomous or separate from other mental functions. Edelman ( 1992) has pointed out 
that there is no neural network in the brain that does not have neural input from other 
parts of the brain (cited Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 480). F odor ( 1985) may answer 
this question with his view that the language module would not exist in complete 
isolation from other functions of mind. The language module's basic structures would 
be integral to it and thus isolated from neural input in a way that must hold true for 
other sensory systems. The module is thus hypothesised as allowing a two-way traffic 
with the other features of cognition while retaining structures that are integral to itself. 
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However, the picture of cerebral activity in relation to language that is now emerging 
is scarcely consistent with the type of modularity that the Chomskyan position 
assumes. Traditional brain damage studies, such as those of Broca (1865) and 
Wernicke ( 187 4) supported the idea of language modularity by associating language 
impairment with the two brain areas that now bear their names. Broca's area in 
particular had been associated with syntactic and grammatical problems, though 
initially more in respect of reproduction and thus of motor control (Deacon 1997: 
284). 
Yet a problem with brain lesion studies is that they are only associative (ibid). If a 
language function is impaired after damage to a given area, that area is implicated in 
the performance of that function. Imagine that after the lights went out in a house and 
despite having no knowledge of electricity one finally traced the problem to a faulty 
fuse box. One might then implicate the fuse box in the production of electricity. 
Clearly, it would be wrong to do so. 
Additionally, we may need to 'stop conceiving of the localisation of brain function' 
(ibid: 285) as if sight or language were simply products of the same. Brain functions 
may be organised according to an entirely different logic from language functions. 
Language could thus be perceived as selecting brain areas that suit its particular 
needs, yet language-associated areas, whether Wernicke's or Broca's, do not show 
any anatomical distinctiveness. Their lack of distinctiveness casts doubt on 
Chomsky' s ( 1985) contention that finally a language competence must have 
biological existence, unless by biological we mean only the connections that are 
formed in a standard neurological structure, as opposed to those that are performed as 
the universal structures that arrange input. Furthermore, one view now is that areas 
associated with language should be perceived more as 'bottlenecks' in the 
neurological activity that constitutes language and less as the organs that bear final 
responsibility for it (Deacon 1998). 
Penfield and Roberts (1959) initiated the move of brain function localisation studies 
away from a dependence upon negative evidence or damage. Penfield discovered that 
he 'could selectively interfere with different language tests that he gave his patients 
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when he 'passed low level electric current into the cortex near the presumed language 
areas' of the brain's left hemisphere (Deacon 1998: 289). Penfield's studies do 
possess some broad consistency with those based upon negative evidence. But 
overall, it is noteworthy that he found a symmetry of posterior and frontal functions 
which indicates a wider distribution (ibid). By this one means that the language 
functions activate brain sites at the front of the cortex as brain lesion studies might 
predict. However, interestingly, these functions are mirrored by similar activity at the 
back. Technological advances have since permitted more detailed studies. Ojeman 
(1953 and 1979) concludes that although there is some consistency between 
individuals, this is far from absolute. The brain does not suggest the rigid subdivision 
of functions of other organs. 
The localisation of language function is not open to doubt. However, there is no 
evidence that such localisation entails a neurological structure that is unique to a 
given linguistic function. It is increasingly difficult to postulate that language has a 
structure which is reflected in a cerebral architecture unique to the areas where it is 
located. Such a difficulty raises serious questions about an innate universal grammar 
to which all minds have access. These questions cast further doubt on the perception 
that first or second language acquisition occurs when linguistic input resets the 
parameters of that universal grammar. 
Although specifiable, language localities do show some variation. Such variation 
occurs in regions whose neural architecture is common to the rest of the brain. 
Individual variations in locality and a common neural structure do not support the 
picture of a language module as a physical entity possessing capabilities that are 
unique to it. Even less plausible is the mind's exploitation of that common 
architecture in order to separate the operations of language according to the nature of 
the linguistic input received. 
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3.6 Metaphor in the learning process: conclusions 
I have discussed how the requirements of quantitative, cross-sectional methods of 
study may distort the nature of the language that is under consideration. 
Syntactic structure may furnish useful criteria on which to base cross-linguistic 
comparisons about a natural order of the acquisition of syntax. Nonetheless, such 
criteria will say nothing about a sentence such as 133, below, which shows a mastery 
of a quite complex, albeit unmarked syntax, but is incorrect for reasons that may in 
fact be more revealing as to how older subjects learn and acquire language. 
133 A coat is an object which we support to disturb the wind (author's data) 
First, this sentence shows a misperception of the 'object' category in English. 
According to a system of logical semantics, a coat is indubitably an object. Yet we 
should consider Lakoffs 1987 notion of radial category and Rosch's (1975 and 1978) 
perception that category membership is not determined by a pre-defined set of 
features. To me an object in English would connote something solid and self-
supporting, perhaps, prototypically, a stone, not a composite of different things such 
as buttons, sleeves, collar and lining. The first inaccuracy, therefore, is that 'coat' is 
too far on the periphery of the object category. From this another entailment ensues. 
The flexible, non-object nature of a coat suggests that it is not supported by its wearer 
but hangs from them. We can support objects or their central category members but 
not coats. 'Disturb' is also problematic, though like the entire sentence it is almost 
accurate. Finally, coats stop the penetration of the wind. 'Disturb' connotes an actor. 
To me, 'coats' in English, represent a category that is too passive to intrude upon the 
wind's activity. It is interesting also that the prototypical function relates to wind and 
not to the more general concern about cold, tempting a supposition about a cultural 
effect, perhaps relating back to a climate where it is winds that disturb the more 
habitual warmth. 
In order to make this kind of analysis, we need a strong sense of the image-schematic 
origins of abstract thought and even of the cultural construction of meaning that is 
operating through them. Without this, the likelihood is that the error may be corrected 
but left unexplained. 
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A complementary approach to this error is from the perspective of over-
generalisation. I have already discussed how a child's error, using the shape of the 
'sun' to describe the moon, or 'strangle' to describe the pressure of a hand on their 
wrist can constitute an instance of catachresis, and process of mapping or metaphor 
making as it is integrated into language development (section 2.6.8). In sentence 133, 
above, I can find similar acts oflinguistic creativity by an adult in relation to an L2. I 
would suspect therefore that this deployment of a metaphor-making faculty does 
show, therefore, a link between the intuitive processes ofL1 acquisition and those 
used in the L2, in respect of the wider operations of cognition. This capacity for 
generalisation may also be one that we operate with some degree of consciousness as 
when we try out an expression whose meaning is deduced from one context in another 
that we consider analogous. The success of this experimentation relates to how far 
that analogy accords with inherent structures or store of similarity judgements that 
constitute the L2 or to how easily it can be treated as an entailment of the same. In the 
instance of 132, above, 'coats' are marginal objects and thus cannot entail a structure 
that is capable of support, so the expression fails despite the creativity that it displays. 
Such a type of analysis also has the merit of linking the type of error being made, not 
simply to the patterns of mind, or schemata, from which it has emerged, but to the 
underlying process through which these are being reformed in order to cope with the 
TL. As has been implied, it is not new for SLA research to take this type of extra-
linguistic approach and allow for the larger role of cognition. Ellis (1990: 184), for 
example, asserts 'the need to distinguish between knowledge and control of language 
in order to take account ofboth linguistic and cognitive factors'. 'Cognitive learning 
theory can account for how learners obtain control' of the L2, for example (ibid). 
However, such a view confines cognition to automotive issues of 'control' and 
disengages it from the explanation of what is controlled. By this I mean that there is 
still the divided process of a language as a mental construct or as a social semiotic, 
and a learning or acquisitive mind which is seeking to automatise its control of that 
language. There is no wider concern for how the underlying structures of that 
language may in some sense provide an insight into the processes that are seeking 
mastery ofthem. There is no understanding of how even grammar and syntax are seen 
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as products of the way in which the mind processes the interactions of its embodied 
existence with the world. 
Ellis implicitly abandons a rigidly modular mind, and allows that there is interaction 
between consciously acquired knowledge and its consequent automatisation. We 
would argue that once this step has been taken then we have to perceive language 
knowledge itself, not as a purely linguistic construct but as reflecting the wider 
operations of cognition. Though closed in its principled manipulation of these 
operations, language is open, in its responsiveness to change in the nature of the 
interactivity it represents. If this is the case, the mechanisms through which we 
mentally control a language's representation of meaning cannot be entirely 
dissociated from those with which we create that representation. 
An awareness of the 'poetics' of ordinary language (Gibbs 1994), then, is not an 
awareness of our having something more to teach. It is not an extension of the 
knowledge side of Ell is's (1990) equation. The awareness of metaphor can offer 
students a path into the conceptual core of a language, bringing a new understanding 
of how it works while linking that understanding to a re-appraisal of the processes of 
learning and acquisition. 
In order to summarise how our argument fits together, I will first remind the reader of 
the basis of our understanding of the role of metaphor: 
1) Metaphor permits the conceptualisation of abstract thought. Metaphor 
therefore underlies and makes possible abstract expression in language, 
whether this be grammatical or lexical. This has three broad consequences: 
1.1) metaphor is a key to the diachronic analysis of language, revealing how a 
language has come to take the form that it has 
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1.2) metaphor affords a conceptual home or a category to what is new and strange. 
It is therefore essential to the process through which we represent new 
knowledge to ourselves and establish conceptual ownership over it 
1.3) metaphor is a linguistic manifestation of a cognitive process. As such it is a 
means to study the wider cognitive basis of language. An understanding of 
metaphor is an understanding of how the structures of language and thought 
inter-relate. We may therefore falsify the nature oflanguage when we study it 
as an autonomous abstract structure. 
2) Metaphor cannot be separated from 'affect'. The affective power of metaphor 
is a reason for its use in the arts. I have speculated that this power may root in: 
2.1) the satisfaction of giving unknown phenomena a conceptual home, of 
affording the strange and the potentially hazardous the security of a taxonomic 
shelter 
2.2) the fact that this continuing offer of a conceptual identity is bought at the 
expense of secure sign-meaning relationships and of the category structures on 
which they depend. Metaphor posits meanings being something other than 
themselves and therefore suggests a conceptual leakage where the model of a 
concept evokes other associated models. Metaphor therefore initiates a kind of 
conceptual networking, setting us free to travel across the sets of our own 
associations involving finally the individualisation of experience from which 
part of our identity is constructed. 
I will now summarise the conclusions that language teachers can draw from the above 
points. 
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3.6.1 Metaphor in the learning process: a key to the diachronic analysis 
of language. 
Metaphor offers students a way to understand why a language has taken the form that 
it has. It means that language is presented less as a baffling and randomly shaped 
construction and more as the systematic extension of a core of common concepts. 
Some of these extensions can be rationalised through the nature of the culture in 
which a language is embedded and to which it gives expression. 
3.6.2 Metaphor in the learning process: metaphor affords a conceptual home to 
what is new and strange. 
Because metaphor is a means through which the mind conceptualises what it has not 
known and cannot see, metaphor is a means through which teachers can present new 
knowledge about language and of language. The presentation of language as a 
metaphorical construct is not only true to the nature of language, it makes language 
friendly to the nature of learning. 
New conscious and unconscious pedagogical strategies suggest themselves. Current 
conscious and unconscious strategies are reinforced. For example, students may be 
unaware of the metaphorical nature of a lesson where the teacher elicits the past 
simple through the gesture of pointing behind them or sets out the future as a point 
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they walk towards. However, teachers can make students aware of the present perfect 
as a structure of possession of the past, as a metaphor of holding what has just 
occurred in the hand. 
3.6.3 Metaphor ftn the learning process: an understanding of metaphor is an 
understanding of how the structures of language and thought inter-
relate. 
A study of metaphor warns against simplistic dichotomies between notions of 
conscious learning and unconscious acquisition. It supposes that acquisition cannot be 
constructed as a linguistic process because language itself is not an isolated construct 
subject to regulatory principles that are isolated from the wider operations of 
cognition. Functions of mind such as language are evidently localised but the 
structures that they borrow are common to the whole and testify to the inter-
relatedness of mental operations. This argues for multi-sensory classroom approaches, 
locating language within the other perceptual operations to which it gives expression. 
It also argues for an understanding of method as able to carry students between a 
conscious construction of language form and unconscious phases of self-expression 
and response. 
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3.6.4 Metaphor in the learning process: giving unknown phenomena a 
conceptual home 
Metaphor is an efficient way through which teachers can help students establish 
conceptual ownership over knowledge. It is efficient because it is the way in which 
we conceptualise new ideas. Metaphor can help students to vest new knowledge with 
the emotional significance of something that has been found by them and which is 
more significant to them. 
3.6.5 Metaphor in the learning process: metaphor initiates conceptual 
networking setting us free to travel across the sets of our own 
associations. 
The suggestion is that the classroom is set up as a zone of conceptual networking 
where students should hunt down the topics that are meaningful to them, giving an 
affective underpinning to their intellectual construction of language knowledge. They 
should discover a coincidence between the mechanisms through which meaning is 
built in language and those through which the resultant construct is acquired. Because 
that coincidence lies in the metaphor-based nature of language and learning, its 
discovery may also connect language knowledge to zones of affect with which 
metaphor will put the learner in contact. For the ELT specialist, metaphor enfolds 
itself within the three points of meaning construction/constructed meaning, learning 
and affect. It can thus conjoin the three aspects of successful language learning, as 
shown in figure 5 below. 
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learning 
Meaning construction/ 
constructed meaning 
Figure 5 
affect 
By adopting the role of participant observer, I now examine how this conception can 
translate into classroom practice and how the resultant procedures may require 
modification when they confront the realities of the adult language classroom. 
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4 
4.1 
Pedagogical Explorations: Teaching A Learner Friendly 
Language 
Pedagogical explorations: introduction 
In the last chapter, I looked at the different ways in which the metaphorical 
construction of language and of learning can be linked together. I argued that this 
linkage can offer a new perspective on why some current teaching methods succeed 
and on how we should construct other ways forward. The key point was that our 
conception of metaphor can vest learning with the emotional significance that is 
essential to learning's success while providing a key to the structures that underlie 
language. 
A still broader suggestion is that we can now think less about the relevance of 
hypothetical contexts to a learning experience and more about how the experience can 
be 'tuned' to the nature of the cognition out of which a language has been constructed 
and through which it is learnt. 
In this section, I want to make some clearer formulations about what this means at a 
classroom level. I will therefore examine the kinds of technique that put these broader 
ideas into practice. I will do this, first, by describing the research methods basis from 
which my observations proceed. Second, I will take various classroom procedures in 
turn. I will outline each in relation to the broader theory that I have put forward, then 
recount my own or another teacher's experience of these teaching ideas. I will next 
draw conclusions as to how the idea can be developed after the first act of 
experimentation. Third and last, I will turn to how a sense of conceptual metaphor can 
affect the analysis of student errors. I will look at some examples of student eiTors 
gathered from my own data and show how these can be explained and corrected 
through what I call an image-schematic approach. 
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4.2 !Figurative language for a figmratnve mind!: meHJ.OdloDogicaR issues 
First, I should make clear that this thesis is very much an exercise in theory 
formulation. In line with any qualitative procedure (e.g. Silverman 1985 and 1993), 
my objective is not to treat the instances described as examples from which it is safe 
to generalise about how language students should be taught or about how they will 
respond to a given technique. My objective is to recount what occurred when certain 
techniques were tried out with specific classes, then to ask whether they can 
contribute as an exemplification of how this approach might be realised. In this, I 
wish to take on the role that Richards and Lockart (1996: 2) characterise as that of a 
reflective teacher. Accordingly, I will recall the nature of the 'interactions that occur 
in a classroom and the exploitation of the learning opportunities that these offer, the 
form that a lesson takes, as well as the quality of opportunity a lesson provides for 
'authentic language use' (ibid: 2). Such recollections are not making a statement 
about the effectiveness of the method that is proposed. They recollect first how I set 
out to search for this approach in the classroom and then attempted to implement the 
clearer construct that emerged. They offer the reader a reflective discussion upon the 
narrative of that implementation and the perceived responses of a given group of 
students to it. 
Though all these episodes contribute to the exemplification of my approach, the 
nature of that contribution varies according to when they occurred in relation to the 
formulation of my thoughts about the topic. Broadly this variation occurs in three 
ways: 
1) They contribute because they represent an intuitive response to the sense that 
metaphor was important, encouraging the much later construction of the 
theory through the impact that they had. They also form part of a larger 
category of pedagogical activity which makes an intuitive use of metaphor and 
which this thesis is trying to provide with a credible post-rationalisation. 
2) They form part of the conscious search for a pedagogical response to theories 
of metaphor and language that have been discussed here and are thus the 
material of which it evolved. 
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3) They are generated by a clearer sense of how this approach should be 
constructed and stand as a narrative of its conscious exemplification 
The activity, 'Metaphors Looking for a Meaning (section 4.4.3) took place too early to 
contribute to any consistent act of theory construction. It constituted an intuitive 
response to what I then felt to be an important area .. My account is based upon notes 
taken at the time. One might also describe such an example as helping to form the 
perspective that Geertz (1983) termed experience 'distant'. By this, I mean the 
broader rationalisation of events that can occur after one can transcend the detail that 
may clutter a close observation of a scene. Now, it can contribute to this thesis both as 
a description of the unfocused experimentation from which it has emerged and as a 
classroom episode whose impact called for the more substantive rationalisation that it 
is putting forward. In this category, I should also include, 'Layering', (4.4.2), though 
the background, here, is somewhat different. This procedure was devised over 
eighteen years ago as part of an unpublished collection dedicated to the use of 
paintings in the language class. I revived it in 1998 because my exploration of the role 
of metaphor in constructing affective approaches to language teaching merited my 
giving it further thought. The revival of the idea within the framework of this thesis 
meant that its narrative is not a reflection upon a remote experience, but upon a tape 
of a class that was designed to further my research. 
The activity 4.4.1 falls into the second category. It represents an early, intuitive 
response to my interest in looking for a pedagogical direction that would incorporate a 
sense of metaphor. The shift in classroom direction from metaphor to metonymy was 
an unintended consequence of this view. Activity 4.6.1, 'When arguments are not 
ghosts', fits more easily into the cognitive framework that is being suggested here. 
Yet, it is a reflection upon a moment of classroom creativity that although it took 
place within the framework of my research into metaphor theory should be seen more 
as contributing to the eventual construction that illustrative of it. 
The other activities, 4.4.4, 4.6.2, 4.6.3, 4.6.4, 4.7 and 4.8, represent a clearer response 
to the framework that is being put forward. With the exception of 4.4.4, which 
describes a loser response to a view of category construction, these activities try to 
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evolve teaching procedures for a given item of lexis or grammar from the metaphors 
out of which they have been constructed. 
Table 1, at the end of this section, shows when the activity described was attempted, 
where and with whom. It also details whether the account was based upon the analysis 
of a tape-recording of a class or upon notes made at the time. In keeping with a thesis 
whose objective is to formulate a cognition-based view of language teaching, my 
greater interest throughout is finding what Hammersley (1990) calls a 'competence 
model' of classroom interaction. A competence model describes peoples' feelings, 
motivations rather than simply classroom behaviour. In view of the relationship 
between language, affect and cognition that is being put forward, I would also like to 
see such classroom interactions as inseparable from the wider operations of cognition. 
Where a tape recording was used, I would in replaying note down the different stages 
of the lesson in order to understand how it had developed in a manner that was 
different to that which had been planned. I then extrapolated the phases of the lesson 
that best revealed the direction of this classroom narrative and noted supporting 
comments and exchanges. All classes, however remote or recent, construct 
themselves as episodes in an unfolding narrative whose recollection is an 
acknowledged aim of qualitative research (e.g. Silverman 1985 and 1993 ). The 
narrative makes clear 'patterns of events', then separates these from both the 
researchers understanding and the analytical framework in which this is put forward 
(Banner et al. 1994: 45). 
One lesson was taught by a colleague, using the idea that I gave them. In this case, I 
recount the comments that they made on what occurred when I debriefed them 
afterwards. I also used a recording that the teacher made in the mmmer outlined 
above. I have also made some passing references to other lessons that I did not teach, 
using the comments and accounts that teachers offered me. However, I taught the 
majority of the episodes discussed, myself. In this I have drawn on a common 
principle of ethnographic research and cast myself as a participant observer. 
Participant observation is a response to 'the incremental and iterative nature of social 
life', entailing as it does, the involvement of the observer in its unfolding processes 
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(Rock 1979). A detached observer cannot construct a competence model of classroom 
interaction because it is about more than the superficial description of behaviour. The 
model requires the entrance of the observer into the process, either as teacher or 
learner so that they experience, then reveal, their own and others' engagement in 
episodes that are finally about the underlying cognitive processes that result in or 
evolve out of the interactions that occur. 
The observer's participation entails an eschewal of objectivism. As Blumer (1972) has 
observed of other types of social change (cited May 1997), the introduction of new 
classroom procedures will create a narrative that is interpretative. Interpretation is of 
course a construction of the observer's subjectivity, necessitating that their biography 
cannot be excluded from the research process (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). A 
core issue is also the analysis of that subjectivity. 
Here, the analysis of subjectivity involves the need to understand the commitment of 
the participant, i.e. myself, to the ideas that are being put forward, and thus to the 
salvage and recycling of their essential principles, even when their failure may make 
them seem fit for rejection. Combining the roles of participating observation and the 
authorship of the classroom procedure that is being observed may also have allowed 
me a greater freedom with the ideas, and more room for classroom creativity. This 
freedom resides in how I do not carry theories into class that must be tested then 
rejected or accepted, but rather bring models that must be adapted to the 
circumstances that arise. My objective is also to chart this process of adaptation and 
development, rejecting the ethos implicit in the recipe or resource book where 
teachers are like puppets being manipulated by the remote author's instructional 
strings. I hope to use the more incisive but more tolerant construction of a classroom 
narrative to show how core ideas are developed, stretched to new forms or rejected by 
a given group of students. 
In one case, the nature of the data differs because another teacher ise working with my 
ideas. An issue that now arises is how the teacher interprets the ideas and the fact that 
the class is responding to that interpretation. What occurs has to be treated as 
requiring a sense of two levels of subjectivity, that of myself, the researcher and that 
of the teacher. 
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Finally, I should emphasise that, while seeking justification in some of the precepts of 
qualitative research, this account of classroom episodes is not setting itself up as a 
full-scale research project, involving the record of a full classroom ethnography on 
the lines of Allwright (1988) or Hammersley (1990). The aim here is to show how one 
can teach towards the picture of the metaphor-making mind and the metaphor-based 
language that I have tried to describe. Accordingly, my interest is not in description of 
a given group of students and the unfolding nature of their interactions but in the 
development of techniques that fit different language levels and different learning 
objectives. This has set up a need to try out ideas with a wide cross-section of learners 
and has mitigated against any close study of a particular group. The instances that I 
recount exemplify how one might apply the approach that is being suggested. 
However, they cannot attest to the effectiveness of that approach in a wider sense. I 
have made, in earlier chapters, a deductive case for how we should approach language 
teaching from a new direction. My interest, now, is in setting out some paths towards 
the implementation ofthis scheme. These are paths that others will depart from or 
refashion according to the circumstances with which they are faced. In the table 
overleaf! have set out the details of where and when these approaches were tried out, 
who taught them, the composition of the class and the type of record used. 
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TabBe1 
Activity Section Date taught Teacher Location Composition Record 
Reference of the class 
Describing 4.4.1 25/02/1997 Author University of 6 students: Tape 
things as other Durham East Asia and 
than Middle East 
themselves 
Layering 4.4.2 17/0211998 Author University of I 0 students: Tape 
Durham Europe, East 
Asia and 
Middle East 
Metaphors 4.4.3 Approximate Author University of 30-40 students: Notes 
looking for a date: 04-06/91 Marien Africa 
meaning N'gouabi, 
Brazzaville. 
Congo 
Exploring 4.4.4 24/0211998 Author University of 5 students: Tape 
category Durham Europe, East 
construction Asia and 
and metaphor Middle East 
The lexico- 4.5.1 6105199 Author University of 6-7 students: Tape 
grammar of Durham Europe, East 
metaphorical Asia and 
expression Middle East 
When 4.6.1 9/02/98 Author University of 14 students: Notes 
arguments are Durham Europe, East 
not ghosts Asia and 
Middle East 
Cause and 4.6.2 14111/99 Author University of 9 students: Tape 
effect Durham East Asia and 
arguments Middle East 
Cause and 4.6.3 30/11/99 Author University of 9 students: Tape 
effect paths Durham Europe. East 
Asia and 
Middle East 
Theoretical and 4.6.4 21/01/00 Author University of 8 students: Tape 
empirical Durham East Asia and 
argument Middle East 
The present 4.7 10/11/98 Deborah University of I 0-12 students: Tape 
perfect M organ Durham European, East 
Asia and 
Middle East 
Prepositions 4.8 09/03/99 Author University of I 0-12 students: Notes 
and particles Durham European, East 
Asia and 
Middle East 
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4.3 Key features of a metaphor-based approach 
In the episodes that follow, I will look at how we can implement the followings 
aspects the suggested approach: 
1) Using metaphor in language, exploiting the relationship between metaphor and 
affect. 
2) Introducing students to how English sometimes marks simile and metaphor 
3) Introducing students to the role of metaphor in the construction of lexis and 
the subsidiary issue of constructing written arguments in English. 
4) Introducing grammar through its metaphorical construction 
5) Image schematic approaches to error analysis 
The first very general objective of using metaphor as a linguistic construct and 
exploiting its evocative and emotional force relates to its role as a 'live', identifiable 
construct that is able to stimulate students' discourse. My suggestion (section 3.4.5) 
was that this feature of metaphor may root in the paradoxical quality of disrupting the 
boundaries between categories in order to trigger a conceptual search while finding 
and nailing down new concepts. In section 4.4, below, I explore the classroom 
applications of this argument. 
The second area, examined in section 4.5, below, involves the language of simile and 
metaphor. Its theme runs counter to some of the ideas expressed in other chapters. It 
starts from the assumption that metaphor is not so much a cognitive process as an 
identifiable use oflanguage sometimes supported by distinct forms. A grasp ofthese 
forms allows students the creativity that is traditionally associated with the use of 
metaphor. It is therefore an important feature of language knowledge. Interestingly, 
however, the effect of metaphor use, subverts the emphasis upon the language through 
which it is expressed and carries the topic back towards the zone of affect. 
Each of these first two topics has the common feature of using metaphor, as an 
identifiable device in language, to stimulate classroom discourse. However, in section 
4.6, I move towards the more central focus ofthis thesis, which is the role of 
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metaphor in the conceptualisation of meaning. I examine the possibilities of using 
metaphor to help students construct lexical meaning. 
While remaining within the broader area of lexical meaning, the focus, in section 
4.6.2, is on the lexical expression of logical argument. I explore the pedagogical 
implications of the role of metaphor in logic's underlying conceptualisations. 
Even if they are not logically consistent, successful arguments may clothe themselves 
in logical language. Their texts comment on their own logicality. They do this overtly, 
as in the use of connectors, (e.g. however, thus, equally) or implicitly in the structure 
oftheir sentences, as in the use of a grammatical metaphor (speaking leads to calm). 
The language of logical discourse is therefore linked to the text's commentary upon 
itself as a purveyor of reason. Argument, therefore, invokes certain uses of metatext. 
Metatext in logical argument also comments on the texts organisation of itself, that is 
to say upon its functional arrangement or 'move structure' (Swales 1990). In English 
academic discourse, for example, a move from general statement to supporting 
examples, or from evidence to a more general conclusion is in accordance with the 
principles oflogical order to which the text may itself try to draw attention. The text 
may mark this shift with phrases such as 'for example' or 'Thus, we can see'. 
The language of logic, of metatext and the organisation of text as argument are all 
features that inter-relate closely. Their degree of abstraction, their consequent 
metaphorical nature and the difficulty they often cause both MT and FL students also 
means that they proffer a promising area in which to examine how to help students to 
master them through the conceptualisations from which they have evolved. I explore 
this area in 4.6.6, also under the broader heading of metaphor and lexis. 
In section 4.7, I look beyond the use of metaphor as a device to explain grammar and 
to illustrate its context of use. I consider the more innovative possibility of placing 
some grammatical constructions back in the prepositional schemata from which they 
may have emerged. The task is simplest when looking at the issue of prepositions and 
particle verbs in English. I also attempt a more ambitious look at how we could 
present some facets of the English tense system. 
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The last section, ( 4.8), bases its argument not on my accounts of teaching but on an 
examination of some of the errors made by my students. In this, I develop a theme 
touched upon in my conclusions to the last chapter (see section 3.6). Such a 
development involves an attempt to see how we can analyse errors as a failure to 
grasp the schemata upon which the required area of language is based. I suggest that 
certain errors are conceptual and that correction strategies can be constructed 
accordingly. 
These five areas for study are all furnished by the view of metaphor I have put 
forward. They show how we can exploit metaphor as a crucial agent in language 
change and the conceptualisations on which it is built. They indicate how we can use 
metaphor as a live element, or trope, to connect language to the emotions that 
motivate its use and make it more memorable. They furnish examples of how we can 
re-locate abstract language in its conceptual metaphors from which it has emerged in 
order to enhance student understanding of how it should be used and why it has taken 
the form that it has. 
Much of the text that follows has a section devoted to a given procedure. I have 
divided each such section into three or four sub-units. The first will provide an 
introduction that will situate the procedure within the framework of this thesis. The 
second will provide a summary of the aim ofthe lesson and the procedure used. The 
third will be a narrative of what occurred. The last will be a discussion about what 
occurred and the conclusions that can be drawn. In this last discussion I may also 
show how an idea was carried forward and integrated into further learning activities. 
Space considerations mitigate against a full account of all my experimentation in this 
area. However, some ideas that have not received the fuller treatment set out above, 
have at least been alluded to in a discussion. 
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4.4 Metaphor and affect 
The use of metaphor posits a certain procedural freedom, perhaps imposing its own 
analogical structure upon the class. Therefore it is inevitable that these activities go 
beyond their specific learning objectives. Both the language issues that the activities 
evoke and their capacity to evoke them remain an issue in what follows, even if a 
secondary one. 
I begin in an area that has been well-exploited in humanistic teaching, that of 
memories (e.g. Moskowitz 1978 and Dufeu 1994) and will look at the capacity of 
metaphor to evoke them. I then move forward to the use of metaphor in the expression 
offeeling and emotion in a technique called 'layering'. Next, I suggest how metaphor 
in literature can be used to make a wider emotional impact upon students and hence a 
broader evocation of thought requiring expression in language. The last activity of 
this section looks at the area of categories and prototypes when students are asked to 
describe prototype such as a particular 'house' which is evoked by a given category 
such as a 'building'. 
4.4.1 Metaphor and affect: describing things as other than themselves 
4.4.1.1 Describing things as other than themselves: introduction 
Affective and humanistic teachers have long tried to induce states of relaxation among 
their students in order to reduce their inhibitions and find childhood memories which 
because they compel expression may reduce the anxieties engendered by an 
unfamiliar language. The earlier interest in these techniques resulted in the humanistic 
encounters of Moskowitz ( 1978) and the Suggestopaedia of Lozanov ( 1978). As was 
clearly stated by Lozanov (1978), such techniques still originate in a behavourist 
concern for effective habit formation. In this technique, I tried to induce a state of 
relaxation in order to evoke memories that would foster linguistic creativity through 
metaphor formation. 
The exercise begins to engage students in a more active extension of word meanings 
by asking them to consider a text that showed how this process has contributed to the 
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development oflanguage. Another procedure is to challenge students' creativity in a 
more open manner by asking them to think metaphorically around a particular topic. 
Such procedures can also involve students in an exploration of the grammatical 
structures through which live metaphors and similes are made. This type of activity 
may also be useful with students whose language learning objective may also be an 
appreciation of literature. 
The encouragement of a more metaphorical expression in a target language has two 
features. One is a grasp of the structures through which live metaphors are expressed 
and another is a readiness to map concepts onto one another by finding new terms to 
describe familiar things. 
This coinage of metaphors, whether they are truly original or not, is part of the 
successful manipulation of a language. To encourage this process may also be to 
encourage student creativity and their sense of the margins that a language imposes 
upon this. Using a language in its fullest sense implies an individual learner finding 
within it the resources to make it serve their own expressive needs. They should be 
able to express experience as unique to them but as comprehensible to all. 
Clearly, metaphor formation must be the basis of any activity that has as its objective 
the creative language use implied here. A straightforward way to achieve this may be 
through eliciting descriptions in which the students have attained some emotional 
engagement. With adults, or even adolescents, memories of childhood are a rich vein 
to mine. This lesson type will be very familiar to teachers who have found that 
childhood or memory is a useful way to evoke language. 
4.4.1.2 Describing things as other than themselves: outline 
Aim: to use metaphor in order to make an affective response to a 
scene 
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4lA.L3 
Procedure: 
1) Students remember a scene from their childhood 
with their eyes shut, dwelling on all that is evocative about it; 
how it sounded and how it smelt.. 
2) One student describes the scene. The teacher tries to search for 
descriptive comparisons (metaphors) between that experience 
and others. 
3) Another student starts to elaborate upon the scene the first has 
started to describe. Others are encouraged to join in as if 
building a collective memory. 
Metaphors amll Memories: dlescribing tlllings as other tlhta111 
tlnemsellves: cllassroom narrative 
To begin, I asked students to close their eyes and to find one of their earliest 
memories. I prompted them with questions about the sound the memory made and 
how the scene smelt. After a few minutes, I asked one student to describe the scene. 
Their description was quite bland: 
Student: I was walking with my mother. There was a path. The path was very 
long and I was tired. I wanted to go into my mother's back. 
I drew a box on the board with a figure going inside it while putting another leaning 
against the outside. I wrote underneath the box: 'Into or onto?' and obtained 'onto my 
mother's back'. 
There was then an exchange about how in the student's country at that time a mother 
would carry a child in a sling on the back. Therefore using 'go into' was not so much 
a misunderstanding of a preposition as a literal attempt to convey a cultural practice. 
This was an interesting instance of a cultural impact upon the image schema out of 
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which a language has been constructed. The 'back' was being schematised as an 
extended vehicle for the child. 
Next, I asked: 'What was the path like?' The student hesitated before replying: 'There 
was a wood'. And it became clear that the insertion of speech figures into this 
description was not entirely appropriate for them. I asked the rest of the class to pause 
and to try to visualise the scene with the wood and to complete it in their 
imaginations. I then turned to another student and asked them to elaborate upon the 
scene. They elaborated that the sun had just set. They further embellished the 
tiredness of the child, stating that it was intensified by anxieties about whether they 
would get home before dark. There were sounds in the wood and the teacher diverted 
the lesson towards the lexis needed to describe sounds. The air of concentration in the 
class intensified. Seated in a 'horseshoe, they hunched forward as if focusing upon the 
some central point from which I had been careful to withdraw. Another student took 
the scene forward, but this time made a quite graphic insertion of a metaphor, using 
an it-was-as-(( structure that had been taught on another occasion. 
Student: 
Teacher 
It was as if I was alone in a, a wild place 
The jungle? 
But another student objected that the child was with her mother and would not be left 
alone. The originator of the scene agreed but acknowledged that such fears may often 
worry children. I tried to explain how loneliness could be a metaphor for a feeling as 
well as the description of the child's actual state. The class then decided to modify the 
figure and, after I had given some language input, said that it was one of 'fear of 
being alone in a wild place' and that this further increased their hope that the mother 
would pick them up and take them safely home. The discussion, with its unusually 
even participation, broke up that strong sense of concentration upon a central idea. I 
therefore moved the lesson onto the next stage and asked the class to listen with eyes 
closed while I ad-libbed an embellished account of the class's collective memory. 
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~.41.1.4 Discanssno111 
Teachers who take even a moderately affective approach to their work will already 
understand how such memories find in students language which they did not know 
they had. This then motivates further acquisition by opening up areas of meaning that 
their competence cannot express. Such areas of meaning achieve expression in a 
dialogic interaction between student and teacher. An interesting elaboration of this 
procedure is given here and involves making the memory collective, and thereby 
mythical, as if to give the class itself a sense of emergence from a common past. 
Although false, such collective memories are perhaps expressive of some shared 
reflection on a persona that has been discarded with the assumption of the role of a 
more confident learner. 
The exercise made clear that a description of place is achieved largely through direct 
reference, in this case 'a wood, a path, a sunset'. The referents function as metonyms 
(Gibbs 1994) which are used to evoke our schemata of place. We will use these 
schemata to complete a more detailed and evocative scene. A more metaphorical 'it+ 
be + as if structure is used to describe the more abstract relationship of the individual 
to a place and in this case also, to a sense of a point in time. 
A week later, and during another session with the same class, I acknowledged this 
metonymic pattern but related it back to a speech figure with the following 'tree-type' 
diagram: 
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]Xdh 
It vtm as if! vtm about to be lfji done in a s1ranfJ! and dark 
place 
sunset 
Figure 6 
The idea was that the figure of speech should evoke the metonyms around which the 
description had been built. The metonyms should in their turn become a means to 
rebuild the description through the other elements they evoked. Thus, path was 
extended through words such as 'winding', 'narrow', 'dark' and 'long'. 
The students were at first puzzled as to the objectives of these two classes. Some 
suspected that it was an exercise about using the past tense. One student suggested 
that the purpose of the activity was to practise structures with 'like' or 'as if .. I 
explained that since they were learning language as a group, the class should try to see 
themselves as having a common past in that language, one which was, as it were, 
patched together out of the very different types of experience that they had had. One 
student was sceptical and claimed that they had problems with fantasising in this or 
any other context. 
In sum, the lesson and its short follow-up made two useful points. The first is that 
evocations of place through concrete reference cannot be relied upon to evoke 
figurative thought and language. For these purposes, activities are better structured 
towards an evocation of abstract thoughts and emotions. However, an evocation of 
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place is well suited to highlight and practise the metonymic cast of descriptive 
language. Further, one can make a final pitch towards the more abstract zone of our 
relations to place and through these towards the use of figuration and 'as if structures 
to represent emotional states. The second point concerns the student who claims that 
they do not 'fantasise'. I will now address this issue by recounting another technique 
that I have called 'Layering'. 
41.4l.2 
41.41.2.1 
Mletaplb.or aru:ll affect: llayernng 
LayeriJID.g: nntrodluction 
When the activities I have tried involve a use of collective or individual imagination, 
one or two students have often claimed that the do not fantasise. Although fantasy and 
day-dreaming may be to some extent regarded as facets of human structures of mind, 
there are clearly variations in the degree to which this is the case. Further, autism, 
which may occur in very mild and hitherto unrecognised degrees, has a propensity to 
exclude fantasies and daydreams (Hobson 1993 ). The statistical likelihood of 
encountering students affected by this condition in any given class would probably be 
quite great and therefore one cannot discount such students as if they were the victims 
of sad delusion. Nonetheless, imagination can be taken simply as an extension of our 
mental representation ofthe world. A useful response is therefore to ask that student 
to describe a far away place they know or a person who is not there. If their 
description falters, they can be asked for more detail. Often, such students can evoke 
a place in extraordinary and painstaking detail. After, they have exhausted the topic, 
one should simply point out to the student that they have visualised something not 
there and that this was all that everybody else was doing in the exercise. If metaphor-
making is the objective and time is available, then one can hold over the theme to 
another session and initiate another procedure. 
'Layering' involves the superimposition of one form of description upon another. It is 
the enforced rendering of one thing in terms that differ from those in which they 
might be normally expressed. For this, I used reproductions of paintings or copies of 
evocative photographs to encourage students to produce descriptions that do not refer 
to the picture itself but to the impact that it has upon the students. I gave a student a 
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picture and told them to describe it in terms of its emotional impact. I told them that 
they could not refer to anything that is in the picture. They should choose words that 
describe the impact the picture has on them. While one student is making this 
description, the rest of the class try to imagine the picture that has triggered the 
student's response. They try to visualise the emotions that this student has seen. When 
the description is complete, one or two students are asked to describe the picture that 
they have visualised. 
An early mistake with this activity was to 'go in cold'. An advanced student was 
given a picture and asked to describe it in the way suggested. If they understood the 
activity, which was not always the case, their descriptions would be extremely limited 
and often turn around a few abstractions, some of which would be repeated, as they 
felt unable to advance beyond a few basic concepts. I tried to remedy this problem in 
the class described below. 
4.4.2.2 Layering: outline 
Aim: To encourage the expression of emotion, sensation and abstract 
ideas through metaphor 
Procedure: 
1) The teacher selects a picture that makes a strong emotional 
impact. 
2) The teacher does not show the picture but writes words on the 
board that are associated with the impact that it makes (e.g. 
power, love, conquest) 
3) The teacher asks students to describe the words on the board, 
saying what they remind them of. 
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4.4.2.3 
4) The teacher shows the picture to one student only who must 
describe the impact the picture has on them without 
mentioning anything that they see there. The rest of the class 
tries to visualise this picture. 
5) Each student talks about the kinds of picture they have seen in 
the same manner. 
6) The picture is passed around and compared with the those that 
the students have constructed. 
Layering: classroom narrative 
I repeated the activity more recently with a reproduction ofDelacroix's extraordinary 
painting: 'Arab on horseback attacked by a lion'. The picture is evocative of 
movement and terror, with the lion seeming to be about to lift the horse from 
underneath and topple the rider who strikes down with his sword. The background 
suggests a swirl of dust that seems to draw all things into its vortex of fury imperilling 
even the sense of form and identity allowed to lion, horse and rider in the foreground. 
This time, students were given the opportunity to visualise a single emotion before 
they had to express a larger and emotionally confused picture. I had not planned on 
this beginning, but this was an evening class on wet, winter night with me as a 
substitute teacher and the four students who had bothered to turn up. They were 
huddled at the back. I brought them forward and saw the impossibility of introducing 
the planned activity without a longer introduction. 
I wrote 'Power' on the board and the class were asked to say what the word made 
them think of. Most produced the very common metaphor of 'Power is money' and 
since one abstraction was being likened to another, one class member was asked to 
elaborate on how they visualised 'money'. They showed reluctance to engage the 
subject in an extended manner and simply said 'business', then 'big business'. I asked 
them to make a mental picture of 'power' then to describe it. One student came up 
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with 'New York'. I asked them to describe New York. The student confessed they had 
never been there. Untruthfully, I said I had never been there either, but could still 
describe the city. I asked them to imagine they were in New York. The first student 
then talked about 'huge buildings', 'lots of people' and I re-articulated these phrases 
as 'tall buildings, skyscrapers and bustling crowds', writing the appropriate phrases 
on the board. 
I wrote 'Fear' on the board. Somewhat defensively, one male student claimed that 
they never felt fear. However, they made a clear and common association between 
two ideas when they said they were young and never thought about death. I said that 
fear for me was an aircraft that had lost one engine. I described looking out of the 
window and seeing a progressive loss of altitude. With the sentence 'fear is an 
aeroplane that has lost an engine', I cued a metaphor. Other class members took up 
the pattern. One said that fear was a snake, and recalled how she had nearly stepped 
on one while walking in a wood in her native Japan. Three other associations were: 
Fear is exams 
Fear is waking up in England (because the weather is always bad) 
Fear is a walk home at night 
The class was a group of international University students doing some general 
conversation. The most interesting response came from a Korean student who said 
that fear was speaking at a seminar. He recalled how recently he had been asked to 
say something about post-modernism and the construction of feminism in Middle 
Eastern society. He recounted how he understood the topic perfectly and had come to 
the seminar better prepared than many of his peers. However, when his politics tutor 
had invited him to contribute to the discussion, he had simply been unable to speak. 
After twenty seconds of silence he had had to apologise and say he could not 
contribute. I asked him to say what he would have said. He gave a very clear account 
of how post-modernism viewed feminism as 'socially constructed' and through 
techniques of deconstruction offered insights into how that notion was composed and 
could then be perceived from an alternative perspective. I asked him why he had felt 
afraid when he could clearly articulate things so well. A student from Spain further 
reinforced this message of surprise when she said that he spoke better than anybody 
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else in the class. I used this as a pretext to let him lead the main activity, gave him the 
Delacroix picture and asked him to describe it without referring to anything in it. He 
did this with an unusual confidence and a strong sense of what the activity was about. 
He spoke of a sense of confusion and conflict. I supplied the word 'struggle' and 
stressed how this might apply to a conflict where the outcome was uncertain. He said 
there was a struggle and spoke of a feeling of fear. He then elaborated upon the sense 
ofthe darkness and obscurity that pervades the picture. Finally, he produced a 
standard metaphor. The metaphor was not entirely appropriate but testified to his 
extensive command of language. It had clearly been memorised as 'chunk' from some 
other context. He talked of 'walking along the edge of catastrophe'. 
Whether or not, the students had built very different visualisations of the picture was 
difficult to determine. With one exception, they all focused on a war scene and talked 
particularly of the casualties and of the dead. The exception was an account of a 
picture of famine where the student described a confusion of people against a desert 
background. 
The Delacroix picture itself surprised the class when they saw it. None had considered 
the animal contest that was depicted. 
4.4.2.4 Layering: discussion 
Without explicit reference to the notion of a metaphor, the activity had involved the 
metaphor-based process of articulating abstract concepts through visual images. An 
exploration had begun of how we explore what we feel through what we see. An 
implicitly metaphorical process of articulating one type of domain through another 
had also been initiated. A stage where students were denied a recourse to the concrete 
had forced a more extensive exploration oftheir own abstract vocabulary. Perhaps 
most interesting was how when taken as a whole such activities can push student 
language in a multitude of different thematic directions. Issues raised, varied from the 
description of a metropolis to a discussion of the fear of speaking in a foreign 
language in a formal setting. 
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The way in which a lesson can benefit from having a structure that is flexible enough 
to adapt to different themes might also point to some conclusions about how we 
suggest that teachers approach the issue of planning what they do in class. Metaphor-
driven lessons might suggest laterally-structured classes. 
We should perhaps make teachers aware that when they plan classes they should 
develop a sense not of a structure but of a 'semi-structure'. Such a sense entails that 
any lesson plan can become a trigger to the student's own exploration of what it 
presents. The plan must allow students the latitude to pursue the ideas it invokes as if 
chasing down one metaphor's production of another in a stream that is sometimes fast 
and at others choked by hesitancy or silent reflection. 
The class also underscored the key point that metaphor should not be taught as 
language that is shorn of affective power. Metaphor can help a student to mentally fix 
language as if around the moment of its significance to them. 
4.4.3 
4.4.3.1 
Metaphor and affect: metaphors looking for a meaning 
Metaphors looking for a meaning: introduction 
I now look at another activity (Holme 1991) that can help students to locate within 
them their own ability to build metaphors. This activity can also prove an excellent 
way to help students find an emotional response to a metaphorical passage of 
literature. It will further reinforce what I call the grammar of metaphor building, that 
is to say, the structures out of which metaphors and similes are built when they sit 
openly upon the surface ofthe language. 
The core ofthis procedure involves extricating the metaphors from their context. 
and restoring them to their literal meaning. The example used is from Macbeth's 
'candle' speech. 
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4.4.3.2 Metaphors looking for a meaning: outline 
Aim To foster understanding of the metaphorical construction of 
literary text and to use that understanding to help student's 
make an individual and creative response to text. 
Procedure 
1) The teacher takes Macebeth's candle speech: 
Out, out brief candle 
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
And then is heard no more; it is a tale 
Told by an idiot full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing 
and extracts from it the metaphors' vehicles of the metaphors 
but not their topics, for example: a candle going out; a shadow 
moving across the floor; a tired actor who says his piece night 
after night and is then forgotten by his audience; the confused 
stories that idiots tell. 
2) The teacher tells the class about the topics of each of the 
metaphors and asks the students to imagine and to discuss the 
picture and the thoughts that the metaphor evokes. 
3) The class read the poem, allowing its chain of metaphor to 
evoke again the images that they have just discussed. 
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4.4.3.3 Metaphors looking for a meaning: classroom narrative 
I have taught this type of procedure many times and had published a version of it in 
1991. The class I recount here was when I was teaching in central Africa, in the 
Republic of Congo. The class consisted of second-year Congolese University students 
majoring in English. The account is now one of experience at a distance and it is 
mediated by my more extensive thought, not just about metaphor but about my life in 
that country and that place. 
It was a gloomy evening during the rainy season and the classroom had no working 
light. The unending drip of rain from the buildings' metal roof provided a depressing 
backdrop to the class. The students, however, were enthusiastic, as was common. My 
brief was to extend the students' knowledge with some business and technical English 
which was the focus of the much larger project in which I was engaged. The class 
were somewhat surprised by a digression into literature. However, all seemed pleased, 
since they thought the topic more relevant to their studies, which were largely literary 
in nature. This was a curious inversion of the course's objectives, since relevance had 
been its over-riding rationale. 
The class was told they would look at a poem at the end of the session but would first 
consider what it was about. As a start they were asked to think hard about 'a candle'. 
They were to think of how they saw this object. One student talked about a candle in a 
bottle and the bottle collecting wax. Another mentioned a candle burning on a box 
when there was no electricity. I asked them to focus hard upon this mental image of a 
candle on a box in a darkened room. I wanted to point to the middle of the students' 
semi-circle and say the candle was there. But the seats were benches anchored to the 
floor in rows. I moved to the back of the class and asked them to look forward at the 
candle burning on my desk. A student objected that there was no candle there. I 
insisted there was and said look at it. He laughed and shrugged as if to suggest I was a 
harmless foreign teacher who should be humoured. 
I asked the class to stare into its flame for a few seconds and let their minds follow 
wherever their thoughts led them. I asked of nobody in particular: 
'What are you thinking about? 
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A student talked about life being 'not long'. Death so often touches even young 
peoples' experience in Central Africa that, rightly or wrongly, I flinched at dwelling 
on this further and moved the class on by asking why a flame made them think of this. 
One answered to the effect that it was because he could extinguish it. I agreed, saying 
that it might 'put itself out'. I used 'put out' to move them away from their preference 
for the romance form 'extinguish'. 
Next, I asked them to think of a shadow moving across a floor. They were again asked 
to describe what they felt and saw. One linked the shadow to a flickering candle and 
said that they saw the silhouette of the flame as if on a wall. Another student felt a 
feeling of threat and joked, melodramatically, of a sudden shadow falling across the 
floor. I used the mention of a floor to introduce the word 'creaking' and made the 
appropriate sound. I next asked them to think of an actor creaking restlessly across the 
floor of a stage. I paused then again asked the class what they were thinking of. I got 
no response. The actor was not an evocative figure. 
At that time, I was myself rehearsing a part in an amateur production. The part was in 
French and I was finding learning the lines more difficult than I had imagined. In 
miming the actor I mimed myself with a text walking up and down trying to learn 
lines .. One student said I was revising. (In this town, Brazzaville, street and domestic 
lighting were far from universal and in order to work at night students would often 
cluster on the road near the airport where there was a battery of still functioning street 
lamps). I wondered if there was a feeling of desperation about all this learning and 
pacing and somebody replied that exams made them feel desperate but this was not 
why they walked up and down. 
In order to introduce the next image, I asked the class if they could remember any 
particular instances of story-telling. In that culture a ritualised use of spoken language 
was still common. It was customary at Congolese parties, for example, for different 
guests to take the floor and recount some story, perhaps an elaborate joke that evokes 
more interest in the narrative than the punch-line, or an embellished account of the 
mishaps that had befallen a mutual acquaintance. One student mentioned the name of 
another who was not in the class but who was pariicularly well known for his 
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humorous narratives. He appeared to epitomise the story-teller. I then tried to steer the 
thoughts of the group away from this successful stereotype towards an unsuccessful 
one. There was an immediate mutter, as of a name being passed round the class. 
When questioned, the students were reluctant to divulge the name of the person they 
were talking about. I became somewhat anxious at this point, for the class, which was 
quite large, was breaking up into knots of different conversations. I picked on one of 
the more dominant students, and asked what they were talking about. He mentioned 
how some people like to tell jokes when they are not funny and I realised that the 
class had probably been talking about a colleague who was known for trying to 
enliven their teaching with some hopeless humour. 
The class allusion presented something of a problem as the next step was to ask them 
to focus upon an even greater kind of narrative failure, where a story was reduced to a 
meaningless and furious idiocy. In order to put the previous reference out of mind, I 
suggested that they should not think of someone whose stories were inept, so much as 
incoherent or even meaningless. I wanted the background culture to help the class 
forward again. For, in that community, the insane, unless they are actually dangerous, 
are generally left at large and are given food by passers-by. However, the class 
appeared to be fixed upon characters directly known to them and a joke was made 
about a peer who was notorious for not making sense. 
I next recounted a personal anecdote about a picture in a school history book of a 
wizened sailor telling tales on the beach to a boy. I said that I often identified the 
cadences of an idiot's story with those of storms at sea. I explained how I thought of 
stories reduced to a meaningless and battering noise. Such a furious sound could be 
identified with the mad. The evocation of the sea was not vivid in that setting as some 
of the students knew only the river. However, I contextualised the theme by asking 
the students to think for a few moments about the worst storm that they had 
experienced. 
I asked one of the more articulate members of the class to recount his thoughts. The 
student recalled a journey he had made back to their village during the rainy season. 
He had anticipated a difficult journey but was stopped by a swollen river that had 
ploughed a gully through the road. He described sitting in a roadside hut that had 
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filled up with people as several other vehicles had come to a halt at this impasse. I 
asked the students to imagine the sounds ofthe storm. They had little difficulty in 
doing this, particularly as a storm had just passed. Other students soon began to talk 
about thunder and rain on the tin roof under which their classmate had waited with 
other stranded passengers. I inserted a lot of new vocabulary related to the description 
of sound. 
Two ideas fused and I asked the students to think of a madman trying to shout out a 
story against the background noise of the storm. Time was short, the students were 
given a copy of the poem and I read it to them aloud while they followed the text. I 
then asked them to read it silently to themselves. Finally, I asked them to reflect on 
the words 'signifying nothing'. 
If time had permitted, I would have discussed the empty silence, but on reflection, the 
clock might have been a better judge of what was appropriate, since such silences are 
about what cannot be expressed. The class had in fact become a metaphor for the 
poem, shadowing its structure without ever actually referring to it directly, then 
leaving its participants in the same uncertain silence. 
4lA.3.4l Metaplllmrs looking for a meaming: dlnscUission 
This technique places the poem at the centre of the class's attention. By first 
decontextualising the poem's metaphors, I invited the class to chase the many ideas 
that these images release when they are not constrained by the poem's over-arching 
purpose. These images ranged from existential thoughts to anecdotes about 
acquaintances, childhood memories and other incidents. The final reading of the poem 
as a sequence of metaphors allowed the poet his own power to structure thoughts and 
promote an interaction of the students' ideas and the poem itself. The loose structure 
of the class was also brought to order by the much tighter structure of poem. The 
students could thus walk away with an experience that was both free-ranging and able 
to induce practice in a wide variety of contexts but purposeful and targeted by the 
poem's own sense of progression. 
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4.4.4 Metaphor and affect: exploring category construction and 
metaphor 
4.4.4.1 Exploring category construction and metaphor: introduction 
I discussed Lakoffs (1987) notion of a radial category (sections 2.7 and 2.8.12). A 
category such as mother will have a central case where 'all' cognitive 'models' of that 
term converge. This mother will typically be 'female', will have 'given birth to' their 
'child', 'nurtured it' and, in a somewhat dated view, be married to its father (ibid: 83). 
This model may stand as metonym that evokes the larger construction of mother 
(ibid). The central model that evokes the larger category, and the typical construction 
of any given sub-category will be culturally constructed. In this exercise, I have 
started to look at how students model a particular category such as 'building'. More 
ambitiously, I have asked whether we can help students to use the features of these 
more concrete prototypes to build metaphors that describe abstract ideas. 
I have stressed how abstract thought is structured out of our sense of ourselves as 
physical beings (Johnson 1987) (section 2.8.11). The body, the physical world that we 
perceive and the relationships existing among the objects in that world are the means 
through which we conceptualise abstract thought (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
This principle underpins an approach to learning where students could extend their 
awareness of how they model objects, then use those models as the physical resomce 
into which they can embed an extended and abstract vocabulary. In other words, 
students would be helped to understand how they visualise and store physical 
phenomena, then be encouraged to use these as a vehicle to find more difficult 
abstract terms. The student would be invited to unpack a category such as 'building' 
through a description of the stereotype out of which their referent for the word was 
constructed. 
Metaphors construct a sense of similarity between the topic and vehicle term by only 
employing some features of the domain of the vehicle. Thus, our prototypical 
metaphor: 'Juliet is the sun' will exploit such features of the sun's domain as 
'warmth' and 'brightness' by mapping them onto its topic while ignoring other 
features such as shape. Therefore, in the following exercise, the initial intention was 
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that the student would, as it were, unpack a category into kit form, or as a set of 
features, some of which would become the means through which we elucidate another 
abstract idea and some of which would not. The intention was that metaphors would 
work backwards, with students becoming more aware of how a category such as 
'path' would become available as a vehicle for a metaphor because they had achieved 
a clearer understanding of what features it could make available to them. 
4.4.4.2 
4.4.4.3 
Exploring category construction and metaphor: outline 
Aim: graspmg the meanmg of categories and describing category 
models. Attaching topics to metaphors. 
Procedure: 
1) The teacher gives the class some categories, (e.g. 
building and path) then asks different students to describe how 
they picture them. 
2) The class think of some abstract topics (e.g. happiness, 
madness or sadness) 
3) The class build metaphors by matching the abstract topics to 
the categories 
Exploring category construction and metaphor: classroom 
narrative 
This was another evening class with a group too small for the very conventional 
classroom and its cold and forbidding atmosphere. I acceded to this atmosphere of 
indifference, allowed the students to retain their scattered positions and began rapidly. 
I gave the class the word 'building' and asked them to visualise it. I next asked one of 
the students to describe what he saw. 
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The first metonym was a door with columns on each side. The door was fronted by an 
extended flight of steps. The focus then shifted away to the idea of a roof projecting 
over the walls. This elicited two lexical items with which the Italian speaker was 
unfamiliar: 'project' (in this more literal sense) and 'eves'. The description then 
fumbled around an elaborate attempted visualisation of another word, which I could 
not at first deduce. The word was 'chimney' and there was talk of 'circles' and 
'rectangles'. Interestingly, the correct deduction, when made, was also achieved 
through a contiguous rather than an overtly visual relationship of the description to 
what was being described. The student mentioned 'fire' and both I and those students 
who knew the word were immediately able to plug the lexical gap (chimney). 
I next found that I was naive to imagine that a category such as building would of 
itself elicit a culturally stereotypical frame. I turned to a Japanese student in the 
expectation of a description that would somehow be representative of their home 
environment. However, the description that emerged, with its brick walls and entrance 
hall quickly concretised itself around the picture of a very English semi-detached 
house. This was the first home that the student had entered on arrival in England. The 
stereotype was being reconstructed around what was for them a more recent and 
significant event. Perhaps the description was also being influenced by the student's 
conscious or unconscious belief that it would work better if it could be culturally 
shared with the teacher or with what were perceived as the normative references of 
the teacher's mother tongue. 
In respect of my failure to elicit a culturally constructed frame, it might also be 
interesting to remember that a prototypical category will be unstable, not only 
between cultures but within the mind of a given individual. 'Cat' could be framed 
differently by the same person when they are in different places (Ungerer and Schmid 
1996). Thus, when I am on Safari in Africa, the cat might be a lion. When I am at 
home, it might be the pet mewing at my feet. It is impossible to determine for sure 
how far the student had reached towards some stereotypical notion. However, what 
was plain was how her current cultural context had skewed the description. 
I tried a second term. This was 'path'. Again, I failed to elicit any clear cultural frame. 
The first Russian and Japanese paths were similar. As if in expression of some shared 
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atavistic unconscious, both wound into dark woods. A second Japanese path linked 
itself more clearly to a typical Japanese landscape. Less threateningly it led through 
'short' trees. However, more interesting than the description's minimal cultural bias 
was an inappropriate lexical extension arising from a need to express the autumnal 
nature ofthe scene: 'The path was crowded with leaves'. 
On the surface, such a statement might question my previous assertions regarding the 
existence of a metaphorical competence. It might testify to how a metaphorical facet 
of the student's target language competence is failing her because it permits an 
inappropriate extension. However, the difficulty with such an argument is that the 
statement, though undermined by an air of inappropriateness, also has a clear 
meaning. This paradox can partly be explained by some thought about where the 
inappropriateness ofthe extension lies. It is unlikely that this inappropriateness 
evolves out of an unacceptable anthropomorphism, or mapping of the human and 
animate onto the vegetable and inanimate. Such mappings are common to all 
languages and, as constantly stated, are critical to the evolution of abstract and 
grammaticalised meaning in language. 
The error that this sentence reveals does not lie in the process of metaphor formation 
itself but in the understanding of the lexical domain out ofwhich the metaphor is 
formed. The association of the verb 'crowd' with 'people' will entail a sense of 
obstruction at eye-level rather than the simple covering of ground at foot level that 
leaves imply. In this respect, it is notable that the metaphor can be rescued when one 
changes the topic; for example: 'the way was crowded with trees'. The metaphor 
works here because trees can be perceived as standing and as having some of the 
features of a human shape. The description was therefore corrected and a new word 
introduced: 
The path was strewn with leaves 
The final part of this stage ofthe lesson switched to a comparison of the paths. The 
students were reminded of some of the conjunctions associated with comparison and 
contrast; for example: whereas/while/ and the adversative 'but' and 'yet'. They were 
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thus encouraged to work towards the production of sentences such as 'Miko's path 
went through short trees whereas mine passed through tall ones'. 
In the next stage, my intention had been to find a way to persuade the students to map 
their extended categories back onto an abstract topic. Thus, I might have aimed 
towards an utterance such as: 'my life is a path strewn with leaves', then asked the 
class to interpret this. However, I decided to introduce abstract nouns to match the 
metaphors. My problem was then that it at once appeared artificial to bend the 
meanings of these nouns back towards a vehicle with which they had never been 
naturally associated. I therefore allowed the meaning and construction of these nouns 
to take the lesson in another direction. 
I introduced students to the suffix -ness and showed how it could be used to form 
nouns from adjectives. I asked the students to focus on three words: 
Happy -happiness 
Mad -madness 
Useful -usefulness 
I asked the class to try to imagine a cognitive model for these items in exactly the 
same way as with the concrete categories, 'building' and 'path'. The students 
discussed their thoughts for a few seconds with a partner then summarised them to the 
class by supplying the predicate in a sentence of the type: 
x (e.g. happiness) is ........... . 
Some students tended to confuse definitions with metaphorical representation. I 
therefore tried to explain what was meant by metaphor and gave as an example an 
approximate paraphrase of a haiku I remembered: 
'The moon on the branch ofthe tree is a fan'. 
After correction and teacher paraphrase, the following types of sentences were 
produced: 
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Madness is too much drink 
Happiness is too much to drink 
Happiness is lying in the sun 
Usefulness is a car 
Happiness is meeting a girl 
Sadness is when Real Madrid loses to Barcelona 
Next the class tried to build a more extensive list of words using the suffix -ness. The 
list incorporated some of the terms that had previously been used. 
e.g. lonely -loneliness 
happy -happiness 
strange -strangeness 
cold- -coldness 
mad- madness 
lovely- loveliness 
useful usefulness 
bright brightness 
loveless lovelessness 
sad sadness 
wakeful wakefulness 
I asked them to write down appropriate metaphors for each of these concepts. 
As a next phase, the students in turn read out their metaphors without the topic. The 
topic had to be supplied by another member of the class who would produce a 
complete metaphor. 
The first metaphor occasioned considerable discussion: 
..... a full moon over the sea. 
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Most students opted for 'happiness'. One, who had perhaps not fully understood the 
exercise, and was influenced by the romance cognate, tried to build a noun from 
'tranquil' (tranquil-ness is a full moon over the sea). This initiated a digression into 
how adjective stems ending al/illell would generally form abstract nouns through the 
morpheme -ity. The class then reconsidered the metaphor and worked back through a 
more literal interpretation of its grounds to: 
'brightness is a full moon over the sea' .. 
Another student was asked for her ideas, which were transparent and quickly grasped: 
Losing my money in (at) gamble (ing) 
Being without my children 
(madness) 
(loneliness) 
The class focus shifted to another metaphor that after correction emerged as: 
Being in the middle of the Sahara 
And which was easily construed as 'loneliness'. 
The next involved an attempt to translate an idiom, but was not immediately 
understood. The misunderstanding did not relate to metaphor per se but to the words 
out of which it was constructed. 
Turning quickly trying to bite your ear 
Other efforts were fairly transparent: 
To be abandoned at your wedding 
Safeway (the local supermarket) 
(madness) 
(sadness, but provoking the humorous 
intervention: happiness) 
(usefulness) 
The last was another translated idiom. This again caused initial confusion that related 
both to the complexity of the idea being conveyed and to the idiom's literal meaning. 
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'Sitting on a horse facing backwards'. 
The difficulty of literal meaning was quickly resolved with a drawing. The hesitancy 
as to the topic of the metaphor was overcome when I asked the class how they would 
respond if they saw a horse coming down the street outside with its rider facing 
backwards. The topic was then identified as 'madness'. 
The class ended before all the topics could find a vehicle. The end had come on me 
unawares and I concluded in a hurry, explaining how the students could try to 
remember the abstract terms that they had formed through the metaphors to which 
they attached them. Thus, I said, 'Safeway, what do you think? Usefulness.' 
4.4.4.4 Exploring category construction and metaphor: discussion 
The class's drift was from a flawed procedure. The flaw was to attempt an inversion 
ofthe normal process of metaphor creation. One cannot expose an item's field, ask 
students to survey the revealed features and then select those that would make a useful 
metaphor. Metaphor creation is motivated by communicative or conceptual need and 
no such need emerges from this type of procedure. 
However, the lesson did divert into an exploration of some interesting and 
unpredicted areas. It further showed itself to be a useful way to focus thought and 
classroom discourse upon the target language itself and its construction of meaning, 
while ensuring that the class remained an arena where communication could occur. 
Thus, I explored the use ofthe suffix -ness as well as the language in which the 
metaphors were expressed. 
The initial descriptive or framing exercise required a substantial lexical input and 
stressed the language knowledge of the students, forcing them to combine terms in 
novel and, sometimes, inappropriate ways. The exercise was extended in a way that 
stretched the student's figurative resources and begged questions as to how one might 
identify whether words were appropriate to a certain descriptive context. The sudden 
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turn towards 'comparison and contrast' as when the students where asked to compare 
the different ways in which they framed 'path' was unplanned but arose from the 
class's thematic turn. The students felt they had been stretched and stated that they 
were surprised to find that their level permitted a usage that they considered creative. 
To mobilise a student's creativity, even in this quite basic sense, is to give them 
greater confidence to roam freely in a target language and to treat its resources with 
greater familiarity. 
A larger issue raised by the activity is that of how to build classes that explore the 
notion of category construction with its potential for exploring cultural divergences in 
the conceptualisations that underlie language. This had not really figured in my 
original plan. For example, a procedure that could evolve from Rosch's (1975 and 
1978) notions of a category prototype and Lakoffs (1987) construction of a radial 
category might be as follows: 
1) Give different groups of students a set of common categories, such as 'bird', 
'house', 'boat', 'street', 'country' and 'town', 'mother', 'boss' or 'teacher'. 
2) Give the students a piece of paper with a set of concentric circles on it. They 
should have as many sets of circles as there are categories. 
3) Ask different students to describe the same category, in private into a tape-
recorder (this is important to avoid students affecting each others 
constructions). 
4) Play back the tapes and ask the class to imagine that their own description is in 
the centre circle. They should position the other descriptions on different 
points of the circles according to how close or far they are from their own 
prototype. 
5) The class can discuss whether the distances match distances in the students' 
culture. 
An elaboration would be for students to imagine forms of the category that they think 
are far from prototypical, (for example, for 'mother' the new term 'surrogate 
mother'), then to construct subsidiary conceptualisations for these. Thus, they would 
start to recognise the network of schemata with which a given lexical item is 
surrounded when it is fully understood. 
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41.5 limplemellll.thng the approach: tllle la1111.gUJ!age of metaphor 
Here, I address how students can be helped towards using the language with which 
English expresses live metaphor. Inevitably, creating metaphors in language, albeit 
within forms that are in some sense pre-taught, must lead to a scenario where 
metaphor, is, as it were, let loose upon thought with the resultant stimulation of 
language by affect, and the securing of language within the same. Therefore, although 
this exercise begins with a more formal interest in language, it finishes with a 
narrative of a wider exploration of the students' interests and concerns. 
4.5.ll The language of metaphor: the lexico-grammar of metaphorical 
expression 
4.5.ll.ll The iexico-grammar of metaphorical expression: introduction 
Goatly ( 1998) perceives the occurrence of metaphor as often marked by certain 
lexico-grammatical features (see sections 2.3.1-4). Thus, stmctures such as the 
following are cited as common signals of metaphor constmction. 
It was as if .............. . 
It was + ad j + as ......... . 
It was as though ........... . 
It had the feeling of ..... rather than of 
I might have been .. . 
The goal here, as in any linguistic enterprise, would be to give a certain type of 
meaning an identifying lexico-grammatical tag. However, I have also made the point 
that although figurative expressions may sometimes be labelled by the type of lexico-
grammatical construction they employ, this is far from general. Metaphor motivates 
the larger constmction of language, it is not an aberration signalled by the 
employment of certain forms. However, as Goatley ( 1998) suggests, one can reverse 
this and say that some lexico-grammatical constmctions can be analysed for how they 
signal the presence of' live' metaphor. 
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Our concern, then, is with lexico-grammatical features that are employed because a 
given communicative context requires that a metaphor be marked. Thus, a phrase such 
as 'as it were', (Goatley 1998) may be inserted into a text because the writer feels that 
a figurative usage is not entirely appropriate to the genre. For example, a research 
article may aspire to a notion of literal language and could therefore require that a 
figurative usage should be marked, as if by way of apology. Another phrase such as 
'it was rather as if may signal that the interlocutor is uncertain about whether they 
have found a metaphor that is entirely appropriate. Less directly, it may signal that the 
event in question is strange or almost unique because even metaphor expresses it 
poorly. It may also indicate that the speaker is modest regarding their own powers of 
expressiOn. 
4.5.1.2 The lexico grammar of metaphorical expression: outline 
Aim: Using lexico-grammatical expressions that mark figurative 
language 
Procedure: 
1) The students are given a hand-out with expressions 
that commonly mark figurative usage in English (see section 
4.5.1.1) 
2) The students are asked to reflect on events that were either 
extremely happy or extremely sad. 
3) The students are asked to express these events through 
metaphors without actually mentioning what the events were. 
4) The rest of the class can guess what the events were and the 
students who produced the metaphor put them right or not, as 
they wish. 
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4.5.1.2 The lexico grammar of metaphorical expression: classroom narrative 
The class began with an informal conversation. I managed an easy shift from this 
conversation into the lesson, giving out a paper while the group were still talking 
about their sense of isolation during winter nights in the North East.of England. I 
asked the class to provide one sentence that might express this feeling of isolation and 
initiated a conversation that could be summarised as follows: 
Student: 
Teacher: 
Student: 
Teacher: 
Student: 
Teacher: 
Student: 
Teacher: 
Student: 
Teacher: 
Student: 
'I am nowhere' 
'Say that again with 'as if. 
'I don't understand'. 
'Use 'as if. You said 'I am no where'. Say that again with 'as if. 
'I am as ifno-where'. 
'I feel as ifl am nowhere'. 
'Yes, I feel-' 
'But you are somewhere'. 
'A kind of somewhere'. 
'If you were nowhere you would be dead'. 
'Here, I feel dead'. 
Teacher: 'You are using 'dead' as a metaphor because clearly you are alive. 
That's good. The lesson is about metaphorical expression. You are as 
if dead'. 
I next asked the class to think about events that they wished had never happened. 
They should make some notes in English in order to remind themselves of their 
thoughts at a later point. One of the students laughed about 'it being too awful'. I 
reassured them that the event did not have to be tragic but could be simply 
embarrassing, and that they would not be asked to recount the event if they did not 
want to. Next, I asked them to focus on a very positive event that they had learnt 
from. The event had to be really incredible or wonderful. 
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One of the students joked about how she had got married six weeks before, but 
confessed that the event had not been so marvellous because she and her husband had 
been living together for six years. She then stated another more positive event: 
'When I was seventeen I was told I was going to be an aunt'. 
I next gave the students a short hand-out with phrases that signal metaphorical 
expression. I asked them to remember and to ponder an event that was very strange 
and difficult to explain. I explained how they might comment on the event without 
actually mentioning what had occurred. I suggested they do this by using the first 
expression on their hand-out (it was as if..). This appeared problematic so I moved to 
the second structure and asked them to find an adjective that would summarise one of 
their events. A quieter student produced the adjective 'depressing' then made the 
sentence: 
'It was as depressing as failing an exam' 
After some correction, his classmate produced the sentence: 
'It was as embarrassing as a knight falling off his horse in the a big parade'. 
She then recounted an amusing story where she claimed to have witnessed this 
spectacle at a pageant. 
A student asked me about whether the 'ing form' with 'fall' was obligatory. Another 
question concerned whether one could say: 
'I was as embarrassing as a knight falling off his horse' 
which was quickly self-corrected to 'embarrassed' and dictated onto the board. I 
asked the students to try substituting words such as 'ashamed' for embarrassed, but 
with the proviso that they should be kept within the scope of the metaphor. 
I next suggested to the student who first came up with the 'knight' metaphor that she 
might reword it using another more complex structure: 
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'This scene had the (abstract noun) and (abstract noun) of ............ rather than of 
The task was clearly ambitious. Several language problems arose, despite the 
advanced level of the group. 'Rather than' was unfamiliar and needed explanation. 
The class further became flummoxed by the notion of an 'abstract noun'. 
I then asked the students to form nouns out ofthe two adjectives that had been used: 
'ashamed' and 'embarrassed'. The derivation of 'shame' from 'ashamed' required 
help, not because the noun was unknown but because they were searching for a word 
that retained the prefix 'a'. This invited discussion of another language issue, namely 
the meaning of that particular morpheme or affix 'a'. I admitted that I had never 
considered it as a pedagogical point before, but was able to produce another example: 
'credit/accredit' 
I gave the unsatisfactory explanation that the meaning was equivalent to 'performing 
the action the noun+ ing (e.g. performing the action of 'crediting'). I reflected on how 
often the stem words to which this prefix had been attached were either no longer 
current or had never been borrowed into the language with the prefix attached: 
e.g. filiate affiliate (affilier) 
cord (retained as a noun only) accord (accorder) 
I could have discussed 'cord/accord' as an interesting example of how metaphor had 
been involved in meaning creation, building a notion of agreement from that of being 
in a state of being bound, but did not think of this at the time. I moved the lesson back 
to the topic that had triggered this diversion and asked the student who had come up 
with the metaphor to complete the suggested structure with the nouns that they had 
found: 
This scene had the embarrassment and shame of ............ rather than of .............. . 
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I suggested the student repeat this and use 'the knight metaphor' then try adding 
another that was less apt into the second slot. But he said that he had not understood. I 
therefore asked him to repeat word by word: 
'This scene had the embarrassment and shame of a knight falling off his horse at a 
parade rather than of .... '. 
then tried to coax him into completing with a comparison that was not as apt. This 
was also baffling, so the I again helped him through: 
'This scene had the embarrassment and shame of a knight falling off his horse at a 
parade rather than of -I don't know- a man spilling soup over somebody at a dinner' 
I took the students back through the completed sentence. I then asked them to repeat it 
as a disappearing text on the board (Holme 1991 ), getting them to read it with one 
word rubbed out, then with two words rubbed out, next three, and thus until the whole 
text is read without a word being written on the board. 
I shifted the theme to the expression of more difficult memories and the use of a 
different structure. 
'It was as though I was going to die'. 
The metaphor provoked a more reflective tone. Without being prompted, the student 
who had made this statement, recounted her fears as a child in Argentina when the 
junta had forced her family into exile and they had had to seek refuge in Italy. She 
told how her sense of insecurity still followed her. 
Her classmate was clearly affected by this account and became more talkative. He 
was then asked for a metaphor of his own and shifted the subject away towards a very 
different tone by exploiting the hand-out with an accuracy that surprised me. 
'I felt as if I was a bird' 
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He then described his first experience of paragliding. This student, who had had so 
little to contribute to other classes, lost his shyness and took over the conversation. 
The metaphor drew out an obsessive interest that then stimulated a long series of 
questions from his colleagues. The rest of the time passed with his describing and 
being questioned about every aspect of his hobby. He discussed the equipment and its 
technology. The problems of safety and where the best places were to fly. A class that 
had begun with a focus upon some ofthe forms of figurative expression, and diverted 
into an examination of some unrelated structures, now finished as an unstructured 
dialogue with a timid student becoming the focus of interest. 
4.5.1.3 Tlhe lexico grammar of metaphorical expression: discussion 
Metaphors may sometimes mark their appearance in language with recurrent formal 
features. These features are not simply valuable as an advanced pedagogical point in 
themselves. They are also a useful way to elicit metaphors and thus to encourage a 
more creative use ofthe target language. The metaphors are often ordinary in 
themselves but they may be attached to a string of memories and associations. The 
detailing of these memories was simply a natural elaboration of the metaphor. Even 
the reserved find something to discuss. 
I have sometimes been wary of affective or humanistic approaches to teaching that 
focus on personal issues when students may not wish to do so, forcing a more intense 
introspection than might nom1ally fall within the expectations that students have when 
they sign up for a language class. At the same time, I have stressed the weakness of 
methods that deal with virtual lives and threaten to make students virtual by scripting 
their existence with the language of these lives. My language classes work when they 
engage students in issues that are important to them, whether these are of an 
academic, political or personal nature. I have also found that students make a more 
positive response when they feel they are leaving each class with a clear sense of 
having increased their explicit language knowledge. 
In this class, I noticed how a use of metaphor gave students a conceptual freedom 
concerning their own thought. They could if they chose follow the example of the 
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student from Argentina and let the metaphor trawl for the emotions evoked by an 
anxious and difficult moment. If they wanted to express that moment then they could. 
If they wanted to focus on their engagement with a hobby or interest, then they could 
do that. However, the discourse that was stimulated was immediately more intense 
and more elaborate than would have been evoked by some standard lesson on likes 
and dislikes. 
I began this class with an interest in focusing upon linguistic forms that commonly 
carry figurative language. In fact, the scope of the language stimulated by the practice 
of the forms far exceeded the interest of the forms themselves. More generally, one 
thematic focus such as that of the expression of metaphor evokes another such as 
metaphor's affective power. This means that my sectioning ofthe topic is somewhat 
artificial, however, and is more motivated by the organisational need for a primary 
focus than by how a complete picture of topic would actually represent itself. 
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41.6 Impleme1111ting the approach: metaphor all1l(ll teaching nexns 
I now turn to core issues of how teachers can tap into metaphor as the manifestation 
of a cognitive process of meaning creation. I look first at this in areas that could 
traditionally be perceived as belonging more to the area of lexis. I should stress 
however, that the thesis I am putting forward has stressed the emergence of grammar 
from lexical meaning and therefore this traditional division of language into lex is and 
grammar may be less easy to make than was once assumed. 
I look first at a simple example of how teachers can ground abstract meanings in the 
metaphorical origins in order to make them clearer and more memorable. I will then 
turn to the expression of logical argument in English. 
41.6.1 
4.6.1.1 
Metaphor and teaching lexis: when arguments are not ghosts 
Metaphor and teaching lexis: when arguments are not ghosts: 
introduction 
My intention first is not so much to introduce teachers to new ideas as to make them 
more aware of the metaphorical nature of the techniques many already employ, and 
thus to show how they might develop this feature of their teaching in a more infonned 
and consistent manner. I will do this by showing how the ways in which they put 
obscure and often abstract words across may at times be founded upon an intuitive 
sense ofthe way those meanings were constructed in the first place. 
4.6.1.2 When arguments are not ghosts: outline 
Aim: teaching abstract meanings 
Procedure: 
1) Take an abstract word (e.g. substantiate as in substantiate an 
argument). Reduce the word to its original non-abstract 
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4.6.1.3 
meaning by indicating the physical root meaning, (e.g. for 
'substantiate' something that has substance, 'a table or solid 
object') and something which seems not to have (e.g. 'air'). 
2) Rebuild the word's abstract meaning out ofthe physical sense 
by showing how the words with which it eo-occurs can be 
treated as part of the same metaphor (e.g. 'arguments are air 
until we substantiate them- hence the metaphor/idiom: hot 
air''). 
When arguments are not ghosts: classroom narrative 
A lesson was temporally diverted from the study of a written text by a student asking 
for the meaning of the word 'substantiate'. The student's L I was Korean and 
therefore he did not have the romance base from which to partially construct the 
word's meaning. 
I turned first to the core meaning of the word. I tapped the table and asserted how that 
had 'substance'. The student knew the word 'solid', and asked if 'substance' was a 
synonym. I hesitated, said 'no' and carried the explanation closer to the term's core 
meaning. I wrote on the board that 'substances where the things from which 
everything was made'. Whether accurate or not, the statement marked out an area of 
meaning and no one sought to question this, perhaps because the need to think 
metaphorically was implicitly understood. 
I next explained how we treated certain things, people and even ideas as if they lacked 
'substance' or were 'insubstantial'. I explained how words such as 'empty' or 
'vacuous' can be applied to character and other abstract concepts. The word 'ghost' 
was mentioned as if, paradoxically, to frame the group's sense of something that was 
not there. I asked if the students could think of an insubstantial argument. The request 
did not stimulate a response until somebody simply said 'a ghost argument'. I 
corrected this to 'ghostly argument' and at once regretted having dwelt on this 
supernatural reference. I explained that a ghostly argument suggested an argument 
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with a certain power to change minds. An insubstantial argument could not be 
credited with such a power. 
I asked everybody to write down something that they believed to be true. I asked each 
student to state their arguments in turn. The arguments ranged from the need to 'cut 
the necks' of murderers to the belief that University accommodation was too 
expensive. I asked students to think how they might 'substantiate' a colleague's 
argument. As an example, I told them that the argument, 'we should execute 
murderers' was somewhat 'insubstantial' unless one could show that this reduced the 
murder rate. The student who had made the original statement objected to the effect 
that it was a moral issue, and that those who took life had to lose their own life. I 
seized on this statement and showed how the student had 'substantiated' their first 
argument. I then tried to represent the argument by drawing a balloon on the board, 
then showing that it should be tethered to a set of supporting ideas or facts: 
Execute murderers! 
It is morally wrong to let somebody live if 
they have taken a life 
Figure 7 
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4.6.1.4 When arguments are not ghosts: discussiollll 
The case here represents an extended diversion from a class caused by difficulties 
with one word. The problem was how to explain an abstract meaning. The solution 
was to return to a core sense, the one from which the abstract usage had been 
metaphorically extended. This return was more than a straightforward act of 
explaining one meaning through another. It meant a venture into the larger 
schematisation of which the word was merely a part. A larger area of abstract 
language, involving the notion of 'weight' for seriousness (gravity) and the resulting 
conceptualisation of argument and opinion was broached but perhaps not fully 
exploited. The key point is that if teachers have such insights they can immediately 
find ways to structure the presentation of lex is in class and then help students 
integrate it into the grammatical forms with which it will commonly eo-occur. 
4.6.2 
4.6.2.1 
Metaphor and teaching lexis: cause and effect arguments 
Cause and effect arguments: introduction 
As a teacher of academic English, I have often found that my students' inability to 
express deductive argument is matched by a failure to understand the nature of a 
logical relationship in any language. Students may be confronting two difficulties. 
The first is a complicated and apparently random area of language. Why, for example, 
does English say 'depend on' when every romance language derives a phrase with 
'of/from' (de etc.) from the same root? The second difficulty is the abstract and 
problematic nature of logical thought itself, or in this case, what does it mean for the 
validity of a given idea to be dependent on a set of facts. 
Logic, above all, presupposes causation. Causation makes events occur, or links one 
action to another. For Halliday (e.g. 1987, 1993), causation can be expressed by what 
he calls grammatical metaphor. A grammatical metaphor expressing 'cause and 
effect' arises because of the ideas that a process, which is the cause, should be more 
naturally realised by a verb. Yet for a process to be made a cause it must become the 
agent of a sentence. It must make things happen. Agency in the physical world is 
ascribed to 'people and things'. Therefore, in order to precipitate a change of state, a 
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cause must be reified. It is a 'process' realised as a 'thing' as in 'Speaking made me 
tired', where 'speaking', the process is treated as an agent able to alter the state of the 
object. 
Causation must also be bound up with a human sense of ourselves as responsible 
agents able to precipitate actions. It is as if we are vesting a process, causation, not 
simply with the capabilities of an object but with those of a human agent as well. In 
philosophy, causation has always been problematic and, in a now familiar act of 
reification, Aristotle had to conceive of it as an entity within the world (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999). This conception may amount to an unconscious exposition of the 
'nature as agent' metaphor which Lakoff and Johnson ( 1999: 212) see as essential to 
the linguistic stucturation of causal relationships. 
A language student, and the EAP (English for Academic Purposes) student in 
particular, may find in causation the need to express sets of relationships which 
involve difficult feats of conceptualisation that may be unfamiliar in any language. To 
this burden of conceptualisation may be added an unfamiliar set of lexico-
grammatical realisations. A teacher may therefore find the image schematic approach 
that is being suggested of particular use when dealing with causation, logical 
argument and its exploitation of spatial relations and prepositional meaning. To 
conceive of causation, an abstract entity, as an agent, may itself be a difficult feat. The 
difficulty relates to how we are conferring upon an often elusive process the powers 
of self-motivation that are more commonly ascribed to the animate world. 
Lakoff and Johnson ( 1999: 21 0) have identified many metaphors as essential to the 
expression of causation. Of particular importance is 'the path' or what can be 
elaborated as 'the location, event-structure metaphor' and its conceptualisation of 
states and states of being as locations, and actions as self-propelled motions. The 
causal path metaphor can be analysed as follows: 
Self-propelled motion 
Traveller 
Locations 
A lone path 
-7 Action 
-7 Actor 
-7 States 
-7 A natural course of action 
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Being on the path 7 Natural causation 
Leading to 7 Results in 
The end ofthe path 7 Resulting final state 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 21 0) 
An additional causal metaphor is 'changing is turning' as in turning 'lead into gold' 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1999 211) where we have to conceive of 'lead', the resultant 
state, as a load born in a different direction. 
Thus, in a sentence such as 134, below, we should first understand that we treat paths 
as human guides that lead us to places and we treat logical connections as physical 
ones. There we have the conceptualisation that 'logic is a path' and 'paths are guides' 
with the resulting entailment that 'logic is a guide'. 
134 'Deforestation leads to a higher run-off of rain-water and brings about 
deforestation, putting us on course towards poor harvest and recurrent 
flooding', 
Sentence 134, above, could therefore be analysed as follows: 
135 Deforestation is a path. The path of deforestation is a guide that leads to a 
location. The result of deforestation, or the higher run-off of water is the place 
where the path leads. The higher run-off turns into (brings about) and in 
turning comes towards another location or result. A poor harvest and 
recurrent floods are that location. 
All of these metaphors of causation assume sets of spatial relations that are expressed 
through prepositions: 
to7 a state/location 
towards 7 remediable state 
about/around -7 (turning/change of direction) 
on -7 (on the path) 
in -7 (the end state as a container or compound) 
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over 7 (an impediment to movement on the path) 
from 7 (a location as an initial state) 
Equally, we can perceive how phrasal verbs employ particles in a way that can be 
explained through the above schema: 
Comes from (This is a complex and very interesting case. Cause is also expressed by 
a metaphor ofprogeneration {Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 209]. Yet in this case 
progeneration is expressing itself through the path metaphor. We therefore perceive 
an image schematic hierarchy where pro generation is itself a causal relationship that 
employs the path metaphor {'comes from' as in 'where do babies come from?'} to 
express itself then lends this back as a path-type expression of causation affected by 
the idea ofprogeneration as in 'x comes from y') 
Results in/from 
Leads to 
Brings about (perhaps a nautical metaphor in 'bring the ship about', hence causation 
as a change of direction as if to facilitate a link. Lakoff and Johnson ( 1999) also see 
'turning' as a metaphor of causation) 
Equally, there are many verb/preposition collocations. Collocations that may be 
evolving towards phrasal verbs and which.express the path schema. For example: 
• Conclude (from) 
• Evolves (from/out of) 
• Derives from/out of 
e Deduced from/out of (derive and deduce are both in origin Iatin expressions of 
movement or 'leading' away from 'de') 
e Draw from 
These last involve a different re-positioning of the speaker in respect of what they 
describe. We can of course see events or objects depart from a place where we are not 
situated, just as we can imagine them 'leading to' a place from which we have never 
been?. However, the common though not universal evolution of prepositions from 
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body parts (Heine 1997) suggests that we are primarily predisposed towards an 
egocentric need to view ourselves as a centre towards which or from which events and 
objects will travel. 
Equally, the above phrases show once again how metaphorical hierarchies are at 
work. The existence of the container metaphor is clear from the ease with which 'out 
of can be substituted for 'from' with 'evolve' and 'deduce', as with the admittedly 
more marginal case of 'derive'. 'Deduction' itself supposes a 'leading out of, where 
the ideas must be contained within the premises from which they are led out. 
Interestingly, also, 'deduction', as the word's etymology implies, (lead from) suggests 
the existence of a human agent. This action 'leading one point out of another can be 
initiated by a human subject. We therefore engage in bringing the connection into 
existence as opposed to conceiving of ourselves simply as the witnesses of events 
travelling down their particular paths. 
Causation is also schematised through 'upward' or 'downward' movement as in: 'a 
problem has arisen in Bosnia' (Lakoff and Johnson: 1999: 213). Relatedly, one has 
the notion of 'cause' working upwards against gravity in the 'ideas are buildings' 
metaphor (Cobuild Dictionary of Metaphor). 
Downward motion is perhaps schematically more remote and can be found in the 
etymology of the verb 'depend' or 'hang from' and the idiomatic 'hangs on' as in 'it 
all hangs on whether we can get there in time or not'. 
4.6.2.2 Cause and effect arguments: outline 
Aim Teaching the correct use of 'depends on' 
Procedure 
1) Explain the construction of 'depend on' from the physical 
event: 'hang on'. 
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4.6.2.3 
2) Illustrate this with a diagram of the sentences 
'Trees depend on rain. Rain depends on trees. Rivers depend on 
trees and rain'. Where trees are shown as a picture 'hanging' 
from the picture of 'rain', and 'rain' as hanging from 'trees'. 
Cause and effect arguments: classroom narrative 
I have often found that the English collocation 'depend on' baffles romance language 
speakers. A romance speaker's bewilderment is perhaps not simply because they are 
matching cognates: (e.g. dependre de: depends from) but because 'de' (from) is 
schematically more consistent with hanging and supposes the downward direction of 
one object from another. To complicate the matter further, Romance languages do not 
distinguish between the directional 'from' and the 'possessive' of, perhaps because 
they have structured possession out of schema of spatial attachment. Therefore, 
dependency suggests the attachment of one thing to another. 
Recently, a student asked me why English said 'depend on' when 'everybody' said 
'depend of. She asked me this with the same indignation that European students 
sometimes use when they ask why the English drive on the left. The indignation was 
humorous but I took it seriously. I first said that Spanish did not say 'depends of but 
'depends from'. The student challenged this and asked me how I knew it. I asked her 
what 'pender · meant in Spanish. She was an advanced student but temporarily lost the 
English word. A colleague helped out with '(h)ang'. I turned to the class and asked if 
their clothes 'hung oforfrom a hook'. I motioned downwards to show hanging as an 
action and thus gave the answer away. I repeated in a somewhat laboured manner 
'hang from, hang from'. There was a pause. The class had temporarily lost direction. 
The student who first raised the topic said 'yes?', wondering what was coming next. 
I first explained, by curling my finger into a hook and resting another on it, that in 
English we can think of one thing hanging 'on' another. I showed how one of my 
fingers hooked onto another finger. Another student who had been silent said that they 
did not understand anything. I went to the board and sketched a diagram, which I have 
since refined as follows: 
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Cause and Effect Dependency 
dependency 
Figure 8 
For the student I improvised this text: 
X hangs on Y 
(idiomatic) 
'Trees depend on rain. Rain depends on trees. Rivers depend on trees and rain ' . 
Then I indicated the pictures in turn and got the class to build similar sentences. 
Next, I pointed to the ' hooks ' from which ' the tree ' and ' the rain' were suspended and 
showed through gesture how hanging can be seen either as interrupted motion from or 
as pressure on a point or hook. I said how in English it was pressure on. 
4.6.2.4 The expression of cause and effect arguments: discussion 
Some teachers might wonder ifthis was too long a diversion to deal with a small 
lexical point. I think that class time which uses the target language to discuss how it 
constructs meaning is rarely wasted. I also think that helping students to understand 
the schemata out of which these meanings are built will help them to construct these, 
at first explicitly but then as a step to internalising them as implicit knowledge. Also, I 
think the smaller point about 'depend on' was effectively made. 
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It may be the case that the original meaning of 'depend' was lost when it came into 
English. Because English more commonly expresses cause through 'upward 
movement' or 'building', as in 'based on the premise', 'depend' became 'depend on' 
according to the model of 'based on', 'founded on' or 'built on' when it moved into 
English. But, pedagogically, the point was made, even if it was through an inaccurate 
construction of the metaphor, and I did not hear the student repeat the error. 
Interestingly she did correct a French speaker who came later into the class and made 
exactly the same mistake. 
The language of causation, it should now be clear, is one of the most complex and 
interesting areas of analysis in current metaphor scholarship, doubtless because it 
deals with our conceptualisation and organisation of reality itself. Such a rich area 
should demand far more extensive theoretical treatment. Yet it is important also to 
broach the classroom applications of this work, since they straddle not simply 
complex forms of language and the peculiarly difficult area of English prepositions or 
particles but also how we teach logical thought. The above case of 'dependency and 
suspension' illustrates how metaphors of causality can be used to teach both the 
language and conceptualisation of causation. My mention of 'on' as expressing the 
notion of logic as a building, with layers in a vertical dependency raises how that 
metaphor can be used. I will now discuss how one might approach other features of 
this area. 
4.6.3 
4.6.3.1 
Metaphor teaching lexis: cause and effect paths 
Cause and effect paths: introduction 
In this section, I turn from the teaching of cause and effect through one of the 
metaphors through which it is conceptualised, suspension and support, towards others 
that are perhaps even more fundamental, horizontal movement and linkages. These 
are ubiquitous in logical argument. 
My earlier attempts to deal with the language of causation have had a more traditional 
focus in that I have introduced topics that have evoked the relevant language. One 
example of this is to use the old parlour game of 'consequences' (Holme 1996) but 
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with a real or pseudo scientific hypothesis. The students thus write a hypothesis at the 
top of the paper: (e.g. the world is flat). They then pass the paper to a neighbour who 
draws a consequence from the hypothesis (e.g. therefore ships will sail offthe edge). 
This student folds the paper so that only their sentence is showing. They then pass it 
along to somebody else who must draw a consequence from the last sentence (e.g. so 
many people will die in space). The last student to write their consequence must then 
try to reason it back to the original hypothesis. The 'chain' type activities are 
themselves a type of meta-metaphor for the connected sequences they are trying to 
practice. In the following activity I try to give that sequence of 'links' a more concrete 
form; one which clearly supports the language I am trying to teach. 
4.6.3.2 Cause and! effect paths: outline 
Aim: To teach the expression and understanding of 'cause 
and effect' with such phrases as 'leads to', 'bring about' 
and 'turns into'. 
Procedure: 
1) Project a diagram of the events in this sentence: 
Deforestation results in soil erosion. Soil erosion leads to a higher run-off of 
water. The high run-off means that water levels rise in the river. Higher 
water levels can cause flooding and destruction. 
The diagram shows each event as a location and the connection 
between them as a path (see figure 10, below) 
2) Take the class through the diagram by pointing to places 
on the path and getting them to describe the events the path 
connects. 
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<S.6.3.3 
3) Draw a path on the board then get the class to produce a cause 
and effect story. Fill-in points on the path as they tell you the 
events. 
Cause andl effect paths: classroom narrative 
I used another 'cause and effect' chain by working with a short text that had a hidden 
path metaphor built into it because it worked topologically from the 'upstream' to the 
'downstream' consequences of soil erosion. The text was a variation of the following: 
134 Deforestation results in soil erosion. Soil erosion leads to a higher run-off of 
water. The high run-off means that water levels rise in the river. Higher water 
levels can cause flooding and destruction. 
After I became more conscious of metaphors of causation I tried to map this text as a 
diagram that linked the events in a causal chain while trying to elicit the events from 
the students. This lesson had only limited success. The students were keen to carry the 
topic off in their own direction and talked about the benefits of crop planting on the 
deforested hillside. After, they admitted confusion as to the real objective of the 
lesson. The superimposition of the 'stream' as the carrier content upon the metaphor 
of the path as an expression of causality was made less plausible because there was no 
swollen current linking vanished forests to the cities that it overwhelmed. On a second 
occasion I was more directive and mapped out the metaphor in the following manner: 
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Cause and effect paths 
.. 1 
means 
Figure 9 
The original theme was retained. The lesson reverted to a 'PPP' (presentation, 
practice and production) mode. I projected the diagram on an OHP and used it to put 
across the following text: 
135 Deforestation leads to erosion of soil. Erosion entails a high run-off of rain 
water. The high run-off brings about a rise in river levels and flooding. 
Flooding means destruction. 
I presented the text orally while pointing to the relevant part of the picture. This group 
had just begun a two-year programme of preparation for academic study and had had 
little experience with this type of logical chain and probably limited training in the 
larger area of logical reasoning. However, they mastered this chain rapidly so I then 
drew a path without the events or other pictures on the board. The path linked circles 
marked 'x' and 'y'. I then asked them to locate along the path a set of events in a 
cause and effect relationship. I gave a simple example about having overslept then 
missed a bus and been late for a lesson. One of the students had been late that 
morning. Since this was something of a habit, one of his colleagues built a parallel 
story around that. Their only problems were with the construction of the location-
events, for example 'Yusefs sleep leads to late today'. Also 'means' disappeared as a 
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causal expression at the end of the map and another 'leads to' was substituted. As the 
events were provided, I wrote them into the circles and sometimes helped with the 
necessary nominalisation. For example, 'x' (his lateness) led to 'y' (his missing the 
bus). The example was trivial and this made the complex rhetoric sound somewhat 
false. However, the grasp ofthe structure developed rapidly. 
4.6.3.4 Cause and effect paths: discussion 
,'d 
The class said that the lesson using the path was very clear and asked me to come 
back and teach them again. Their emphasis on the clarity of the lesson surprised me, 
because at first glance this type of diagram appears somewhat muddled. However, it 
may be that the conceptualisation of a logical relationship as a physical linkage strikes 
a real and strong chord. It could be that it grounds strange language in a familiar 
conceptualisation. Presentations of my work on metaphor to other teachers have quite 
often cued this type of response. It is as ifthey are being brought to recognise things 
about language that they had already intuited were there. 
After presenting this slide to a teacher development group, it was decided that the 
arrow with 'bring about' was unclear and the reason suddenly to change to the 
semantic expression of causation 'mean' was too abrupt. This last point appeared to 
fit with the students' failure to make use of it when it was tried in class. 
A final version of this map was as follows: 
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Cause and effect paths 
Leads to 
Resultino in~ ~
The event is now a moving banner or balloon that ' leads' a group to the first location 
'high run-off , itself a change of event order. 'Bring about' was mapped in accordance 
with the ' changing is turning ' metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1991: 207) where a 
change of direction expresses a causal relationship. Another 'path' or the ' causes are 
forced movements' metaphor (ibid: 206) was used instead of differently schematised 
' means' in order to create greater consistency. While the finality of the end state was 
expressed as a container with the phrase 'resulting in' . 
A major objective in this version is to give greater meaning to the prepositions. In 
particular 'bring about' was construed as ' turn ' as in 'bring the ship about'. 'To ' and 
' towards ' were related to their spatial schematisations while ' result in ' was given 
sense through the concluding and very final reference to a container metaphor. Only 
the eat' s tail remains as an eccentric expression ofthe idea of entailment. ' Entail ' 
actually derives from the French word, 'entailler' , meaning 'cut or divide ', giving the 
English legal meaning of providing somebody with a portion, or an estate. A fiscal 
entailment also had the meaning of a payment tacked onto another hence developing 
the idea of the indissoluble linkage between two ideas, or the connection that 
underlies cause and effect. Such etymology would provide an interesting example of 
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how one abstract idea can beget another but through their sharing of a concrete 
conceptual base, in this case 'linkage' which is the idea used in this diagram. 
Although a distortion, the eccentricity of the false 'tail' metaphor may also make the 
idea being expressed more memorable while retaining the metaphor of connection 
that anyway lies behind the true etymology of the word. 
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4.7 Implementing the approach: metaphor and teaching grammar. 
I have held that a metaphorical process underlies many of the acts of meaning creation 
and the statements of meaning relations that have been understood by others as a more 
abstract facet of mind. My argument is that of Lakoff and Johnson ( e.g.1999) 
Langacker (e.g. 1994) and Heine ( e.g.1997) that a grammar is not structured by such 
patterns of mind. A grammar is like any system of abstract representation in that it 
depends on our ability to conceptualise its meanings through metaphors born of our 
existence as an embodied mind (see sections 1.1.8.1 0 and 2.8.8.2). 
The pedagogical question that emerges from this concerns how far one can employ 
the metaphorical origin of a grammaticalised item in order to explain how that item is 
used. For example, like other indefinite articles in other languages the English 'a/an' 
has evolved from the word 'one' (Heine 1997). This is clearer in a language such as 
French where the numeral and the article are the same word. Some African languages 
also show how it is quite common for the word for 'one' to be derived from the word 
for 'finger' (Heine 1997). It can also be seen in the English word for number, 'digit'. 
It may also explain the near universal construction of counting systems around the 
number, I 0, since this corresponds to ten fingers. In short, our anatomical stmcture 
becomes the means through which we conceptualise the abstract notion of number. In 
its turn, number is grammaticalised or abstracted further in order to become a form of 
indicative or article, that in English points out the 'one' among the 'many'. 
Articles, definite and indefinite, can be an area of particular difficulty in English for 
students whose Ll does not possess them. Articles are a challenging item to teach, 
perhaps because their frequency of occurrence means that it is difficult to imagine a 
context that would isolate them and make their conditions of use evident. Most mles 
of thumb tend to be abstract and difficult to apply as well as notorious for the number 
of exceptions that they must account for. For example, one can stipulate that 'the' 
should be used when there is a particular item in mind that is known to both the 
interlocutors. But this requires that the speaker operate with a conscious awareness of 
exactly what is meant by a given context and of whether knowledge of the item is 
shared with their listener. 
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Some teachers may already have intuited that a better approach could be to work back 
through the lexical origins of these grammatical terms. Just as 'a' has evolved from 
'one', it seems probable that in almost every language the definite article 'the' has 
evolved out of the demonstrative, 'this' (Emonds 1998, personal communcation). 
Such an evolution is in accordance with the Hallidayan (1987) view of the definite 
article as having a referential function within discourse. 
The pedagogical point that can be evolved will focus on this act of reference. If 
students are having trouble with the definite article, one can simply ask them to 
imagine one example of a given category and to metaphorically point to it, as if to 
where it lies back in their mind. For 'a' one should ask them to imagine first many 
examples of the category, then to select one from among them. 
Students often request grammatical explanations. They would not do so if they did not 
believe that the conscious knowledge of a rule could help them towards a correct 
usage. Some teachers who respond to these requests may do so in the certainty that 
their explanation may not do much to improve the ability of a particular student to use 
the form in question correctly. In this assumption, they may be supported by notions 
of acquisition, and the accompanying belief in grammar as an elaboration of innate 
forms. The reason for the apparently ineffectual nature of much grammar teaching 
may be that, as said, grammatical constructions are finally a concrete meaning that 
has been abstracted over time into the specification of a meaning relation. To offer an 
explanation as to how this specification operates could be to shift towards another 
level of abstraction. Even if largely understood, such explanations may be yet more 
distant from the schemata of concrete things and corporal existences out of which 
such meanings have been built, and to which we gravitate when we require practical 
understanding. Explanation posits another level of abstraction when we should 
perhaps be moving back to the substance that these sets of meaning relations required 
for them to express themselves at all. 
The other traditional solution to the 'grammar' problem is to isolate it as structure and 
to contextualise it as an illustrative situation or example. Thus, we teach 'the' by 
asking students to talk about 'the moon in the sky' or 'the book that they want to give 
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a friend'. The situation has the merit of providing practice rather than encyclopaedic 
knowledge, but assumes that the student will simply be able to generalise from one 
context to another. A further risk remains that the situation will simply absorb the 
structure into itself, making it the property of a particular context rather than showing 
how it might be available for more general use. 
To recast grammar in the metaphors from which it has evolved, on the other hand, 
might be to equip students with a guiding mnemonic that they can carry across the 
particularities of a given context. In this respect, we should also recall that the 
creation of mnemonics has been isolated as one ofthe strategies that permits success 
in language learning (Rubin 1981). The mnemonic is created when ' the ' and ' a' can 
be identified with a referential action that can be given diagrammatic form. In the 
following diagram, the relationship between the indefinite article and the idea of 
number is made clear. 'The book' is ' one' of many. This is contrasted with the 
demonstrative 'the' where the word itself is made to point to the single example to 
which the speaker now wants to refer. 
Give me the book 
Figure 17 
A teacher who wants to embed this type of contrast in a conventional situation can do 
so quite effectively, but should try asking the students to retain this image and extend 
340 
its visual slots to the examples that the situation will unfold. The situation could be as 
follows: 
144 Imagine you are a thief in a rich person's house. You can only take one 
example of anything that is there and just ten things in all. You are a kind thief 
so you will not take something if it is the only one that person has. You will 
not take the video because they only have one. You can take a TV because 
they have three. What will you take? 
As students recount their answers, they should be encouraged to fix in their mind a 
prototypical instance of the action oftaking one (book) from many. Then they can be 
told: 
145 You have spread out all these ten things in front of you. Say what you will do 
with each thing. You have to do a different thing with each one. Imagine that 
you are pointing to it as you are speaking 
e.g. I will give the necklace to a friend. I will hang the picture on my wall 
etc. 
It is clear that such procedures revisit situational methodology in some sense. 
However, my more innovative suggestion now is that teachers could think more 
carefully about how to search for a coincidence between a situation that is illustrative 
of how an item is used, the conceptual or image-schematic origins ofthat item, and a 
metaphor that illustrates its function of use. Further, teachers need to think about 
helping students not simply to retain a situation as an example of use but to treat it as 
a prototype from which to map it to a wider productive phase. The traditional PPP 
(Presentation, practice, production) lesson, with its origin in military training routines, 
would present the structure in a context of use, drill it then proffer a context whose 
object was to stimulate its practice. A more interesting process than repeated practice 
would be to involve students more in the creation of appropriate context by analogy to 
the situation in which the item is first presented. Thus, students would start from what 
is here the prototypical idea of theft endowing stolen objects with their singularity ('a' 
to 'the'). They could then be asked to brainstorm for other analogous contexts: the 
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chosen gift, the selected person, the hapless volunteer, for example, pursuing each 
through its chosen narrative. 
Tense represents another area where metaphor can be used to elucidate quite complex 
rules ofthumb governing use. Two types ofmetaphorisation can be employed. The 
first involves finding a metaphor, such as a time-line, to represent the rule. The 
second entails a closer focus on the process through which a given structure may have 
been grammaticalised. However, in the above example we showed how we can use 
our knowledge of the grammaticalisation of the article to help students use 'the' as a 
demonstrative, then embed that into a visual metaphor. There is thus an attempt to 
make the students build a metaphor of explanation out of the metaphor that motivated 
grammaticalisation. The same can be done with tense. 
Like other 'grammatical' items, tense also offers teachers the possibility of re-
inserting it into the conceptual metaphor by which it was once constructed. In their 
turn these metaphors may proffer a stronger sense of how the item is used. 
I have discussed the relationship of the copula in many languages to a notion of 'life' 
or being. Thus, the statement that the 'book is here' is built out of metaphor of 
'presence' as a kind of reflected existence. Objects live when we see them. By the 
same token, one can speculate that to say 'a child is good' may be to confer upon 
them the status of an existence in a state of grace. 
The present tenses in English cause problems to speakers of languages that do not 
possess their distinction as to the nature of present time. A first step to a fuller 
understanding could be to follow suggestions that have also been made for teaching 
the passive by exponents of 'the lexical approach' (e.g. Sinclair 1991 ). This means 
treating the present continuous not as a tense but as a verb + adjective construction, 
where the subject is described as existing in a state of activity, when activities are by 
their nature of limited duration. Thus, the present simple could be represented as an 
evolution of 'be+ adjective', as through the sequence, 'she is happy; she is dancing' 
with the use of bold type to underscore the relationship between the two 
constructions. This can then be developed through a pictorial reference where the 
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adjective becomes a frame in which the subject takes up temporary abode, as is shown 
in figure 18. 
~ · 
·. 
Figme 18 
The ' time is space ', ' state is location' metaphor is also exploited fully, here. The 
action, 'dancing' is thus presented as if it were itself the time-limiting condition. 
4.7.1 
4.7.1.1 
Metaphor and teaching grammar: the present perfect 
The present perfect: introduction 
Another problematic item that might be more clearly elucidated by reference to the 
schema out of which it has been built is the distinction between the present perfect 
and past simple tense. Different languages structure the past differently and with 
varying degrees of complexity. The present perfect/past simple distinction is far from 
unique but causes considerable difficulty nonetheless. A curious but under-exploited 
feature of both the present and past perfect is their use of a possession schema (Heine 
1993 ). It is as if the possession of an accomplished action represents its 
accomplishment. One has the action in hand. The action 's completion is signified by 
our possession of it. A similar process can be found in the meaning shift of the 
English verb keep Heine (1997). For example: 
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146 they keep the money 
14 7 they keep complaining 
where a notion of possession as storage is shifted from goods to an unfolding action, 
with the resulting sense of the action as maintained or made to continue. By a similar 
process, it could be that the present perfect, the possession signified by 'have, avoir or 
haber' is of the action described by the adjectival (participle) form that it normally 
precedes. Over time, this usage has been grammaticalised into the specification of a 
temporal relationship or tense. 'Have' +verb past participle, thus, signals a temporal 
frame for the signified action without any enduring connotation with the notion of 
possession. 
One method of exploiting this is to reify the verb, or make its past participle an object 
to which the student lays claim. Laying claim to the verb is made synonymous with 
laying claim to the action that it signifies. Reification, as Langacker ( 1994) has shown 
is a key property of language. 
4.7.1.2 The present perfect: outline 
Aim: Teaching the present perfect. Distinguishing the present 
perfect and the past simple 
Procedure: 
1) The teacher tells students the past simple form of a verb then 
asks them to change it into an irregular past participle. The 
teacher writes each past participle and each past simple onto 
separate pieces of paper as they elicit the correct form from the 
students. 
2) The teacher distributes the papers with the participles to the 
students. 
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4.7.1.3 
3) Students say they 'have' (in their hands) their participle, e.g. I 
have 'spoken'. Other students try to remember what they 'have' 
4) The teacher indicates two students, A and B. Student A says 
He/she has 'spoken'. Students B replies either: 'Yes I have', or 
'no I haven't, I have eaten'. 
5) The teacher draws a prison diagram on the board. The teacher 
says past simple forms are imprisoned in the past. Present 
perfect fom1s are being released from the past and brought 
towards the present as if in the subject's hand. The teacher 
suggests a completed past action, e.g. 'I ate my first meal in a 
restaurant' and sticks the verb 'ate' inside the prison then 
suggests one that continues into the present, 'I have eaten' 
putting it outside the prison, on the road to the present. 
The present perfect: classroom narrative. 
I explained this exercise to a colleague and sketched a diagram for her. She took notes 
and agreed to try out the idea with a tape recorder. My account is built largely from 
my listening to the tape of what occurred. 
To prepare this exercise, the teacher tried writing out a set of irregular past participles 
on separate pieces of paper. In order to cut down on preparation time and involve the 
students in the activity, she did this writing of verbs in class by telling the students the 
past simple form of a verb and asking them to change it into the past participle. If they 
managed to do this, they were given a piece of paper with the past participle written 
on it. If they did not, the rest of the students were asked to help until the correct fom1 
was found. 
After all the past participles had been distributed, each student was asked to say which 
verb form they had. They were asked to use the form 'I have' as opposed to 'I have 
got'. At the same time, they were told to try and remember who had which verb. In 
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turns, they then had to point to different members of the class and say what they had 
with the form 'he/she has'. The class could disagree about who had which verb form. 
e.g. Student 1 
Student 2 
Student 1 
Student 3 
Student 4 
He has 'eaten' 
No, I haven't 
Oh, you don't look hungry 
No, she has eaten (pointing to another student 4) 
That's right, I have eaten. 
Inadvertently, the class was practising the present perfect through the schema of 
possession ofthe past out of which it may have been built. Though artificial in 
conception, the class sounded as if it had acquired a curious naturalness, building its 
practice with a steady rhythm that kept the teacher on the periphery. 
When all the participles had been found, the teacher asked the class what tense they 
had been practising. The class correctly identified the present perfect. The teacher 
then explained that they had been building and practising the tense in this way 
because it was really about the possession of the past. They used the present perfect 
when they could touch and feel the past, holding it as if it was in their hands. 
The second stage of the lesson had been planned around distinguishing the present 
perfect and past simple. For this purpose another metaphor had been planned. This 
involved drawing the plan of a prison as a rectangle on the board, (figure 19, below). 
The idea was that the past simple forms would be placed inside it and the past 
participles would be placed upon a drawing of the road outside. The basis for this was 
that past simple forms represented actions that were imprisoned in the past, while the 
past participles were acting as free agents and could be conscripted into actions that 
had been repeated since the past. Students could then use the verbs in the two ways 
that were appropriate to the verbs in question. Thus, a student who took the 
'imprisoned' verb 'read' from the diagram below could have made a sentence: 
148 When I was a child my parents read to me. I have often read to children since. 
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read ~ 
Figure 19 
A more conventional way to represent this difference would be with time lines, 
discussed above (see figure 5 above). However, although metaphorical in themselves, 
these diagrams create a conceptual gap between their generalisation of how to use a 
form and the context in which it should be used. They improve on the simple rule of 
thumb by giving it a visual illustration but they are remote from the type of 
contextualisation that is a feature of both the communicative and the older, situational 
approach. In this exercise, the teacher tried to cast these prescriptions in the stronger 
metaphor of imprisonment in the past and release towards the present. Situational 
methodology might tacitly acknowledge this by making 'the prison' the illustrative 
example for the past simple. However, if, as said, there is a risk when forms are put 
forward as governed more by a situation than a rule, then the student may not perceive 
how they should be generalised to other situations. Equally, there is a risk when the 
rule lurches into an abstraction for whose realisations the learner must fumble as if in 
darkness whenever the appropriate context will arise. A better way must be to set the 
rule in a more concrete metaphor, one to which the appropriate realisation can 
actually be attached, in the way that verb fonns are imprisoned by being stuck to the 
right place on the board. 
This last part of the procedure caused some confusion, because it followed a 
somewhat different approach from the one that had preceded it. In the first exercise, 
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there was an attempt to make structure transparent by taking it back to the metaphor 
out of which it had arisen. Next, there was an attempt to elucidate the point further 
through a metaphor that contrasted one type of context with another. In the second 
stage, metaphors were used to make a more concrete and general statement about the 
type of context that will tend to express itself through a given structure. The metaphor 
links a tense to the circumstances that require its use. In the first stage, the metaphor is 
constructed out of a suggestion as to why a given tense employs the forms that it does. 
The metaphor of possession is an attempt to make a form less arbitrary and perhaps 
more memorable. It may also either lock into a schema or conceptual metaphor of 
'possession is completion' that students may already have, or at least help them to 
construct the same. 
4. 7.1.4 The present perfect: discussion 
When I discussed this class with the teacher, she evidenced a somewhat defensive 
humour. The humour seemed to hold me liable for having given her a lesson plan that 
was not yet properly constructed. She said she may not have carried my ideas out 
properly but my listening to the tape left me with the feeling that the procedure 
required substantial revision. 
The teacher confirmed that the students expressed interest in each of the stages. The 
students were somewhat perplexed by the first stage since a conventional pedagogical 
approach to the appearance of a semantic item (have) in a grammatical role (have 
done) is generally to deny it meaning. A classical notion of grammaticality is 
established upon that denial. As a result, almost all the teachers I have watched 
generally make clear that they are talking grammar or word meaning. They do not 
generally show how grammar may have evolved from word meaning. Conventional 
pedagogy thus disconnects 'have' the auxiliary from 'have' the verb of possession, as 
if any type of connection will confuse. Yet, the teacher did agree that this notion of an 
accomplished action as 'owned', as if in the hand, had made the structure more 
graphic and more memorable. 
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On consideration, I realised that I had confused not just the lesson by overloading 
students with two different and distinct types of procedure but also the teacher in 
respect of how the present perfect had been constructed. 'The possessed action' is a 
participle or adjective. Therefore any notion of possession should attach not to the 
verb action but to the object with which it agrees. Thus, the student should not hold 
the past participle in their hand but the noun phrase that it describes. This is made 
clear in French where the participle agrees with the noun object, as in 'je les ai 
manges'. The present perfect is not constructed out of the possession of an action but 
of a noun or noun phrase and the action that describes it. The fact that the action 
describes the noun phrase is shown by the pattern of participle-object agreement. 
Where there is no object the perfect constructs with 'etre'. Therefore, the procedure, I 
adopted in the above exercise may still have been over-influenced by the old notion of 
grammaticalised verbs being regarded as the main pedagogical objective. This 
structuralist influence ensured that the exercise unfolded in the manner of an old 
substitution drill. The verb as a unit remained the focus of the practice and the 
rationale for the sentence in which it was set. 
A second difficulty arose from a different use of metaphor in each of the lesson's 
stages. The class may have appreciated the explanational power of the prison 
metaphor. Yet, obviously, no notion of past simple construction attaches to the 
metaphor of imprisonment. A more graphic connection would have been made with a 
metaphor of confiscation. Past simple events could be seen as confiscated or put in 
obligatory store. The present perfect could signify their possession and hence their 
release. 
For example, the procedure could be reconstructed around a schema that expresses the 
possession of an object from the past rather than of the action that has been made into 
an adjective in order to describe it. This might give the following procedure: 
I) Write irregular verb past participles on different scraps of paper. 
2) Write common nouns with which the verbs can be easily associated on 
different scraps of paper (e.g. read/the book, drive/the car). 
3) Distribute papers with irregular participles, then give each student a paper 
which has the appropriate object. 
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4) Students indicate their possession of the items as follows: 
I have 'read the book'. 
5) Other students memorise what their classmates have 
6) Other students indicate what their classmates 'have'. 
e.g. She has 'read the book'. 
The above idea could then involve distributing nouns at the same time as the past 
participles. Thus, there would be a preliminary stage where a student who is given the 
participle 'read' would have to request an object with which it could be easily 
associated (e.g. book) and they could then construct sentences 'I have not read many 
books recently'. One class member, 'student A', could then be identified with an 
action and an object. Another, student B would then have to use the same words to 
make a statement about 'A'.: e.g. 'Mamiko hasn't read many books recently'. A 
difficulty arises with intransitive verbs, because English, unlike French, does not 
manifest the metaphorical basis of the tense by constructing intransitive present 
perfects differently (il est arrive versus he has arrived). The question then arises as to 
how one signifies a case of possession of something that does not exist unless by 
constructing a very complex argument where the intransitive case signifies the agent's 
possession of itself through its agreement with a completed action. Yet here one risks 
subverting the aim of this type of distortion, which is to make abstract grammatical 
ideas easier to grasp by restoring them to the lexical roots from which they have been 
metaphorically extended. 
As said, the second stage should probably be more strongly separated from the first 
because it deploys metaphor in a different way. If 'the prison of the past' metaphor is 
used, the incarcerated items should not be actions but actions with their objects (e.g. 
read book, driven car etc.) with their release signalling the use of the present perfect. 
Another possibility would be for students to lift object words (e.g. book, chair, desk) 
from a place in the 'room' that signified their isolation in the past. They would 
acclaim the object's release with a present perfect statement such as: 'I have taken the 
book' or 'I've looked at the chair'. 
Another approach that I have tried with colleagues but not with a class involves using 
the space ofthe classroom to map time. In this, I arranged a group behind one 
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volunteer who sat directly in front of me. I looked at him said, 'this is the end, at the 
end you think of what you haven't done. What haven't you done?' The volunteer 
flinched visibly, surprised, then composed himself and replied that he felt broadly 
satisfied. I wondered if I had chosen the wrong teacher. However, he then 
remembered something and said: 
'I haven't fixed the roof. 
'What else?' I pressed. 
'I haven't taken my children out'. 
He began to recount a few other incidents, which I noted and distributed on pieces of 
paper to the class members sitting behind them. 
'So you're satisfied with your life?' I asked the volunteer sceptically. 
'Yes, I have done most of what I wanted'. 
'What's that?' 
He was vague and talked about fulfilment. 
'You have fulfilled yourself?' 
'Yes, mostly' 
'How?' 
He talked about a sense of spiritual equilibrium. I expressed this as: 
'You found a balanced life?' 
'Yes finally'. They then made a list of more general achievements, both in the 
classroom and outside. I also compiled a list. 
I gave the list to the student in front and asked him to read the first item. 
'I've fulfilled myself, mostly'. I then waved a piece of paper and half-chanted: 
'But you haven't fixed the roof. I made as if to give him the paper then take it away. 
He maintained his equanimity. 
'No'. 
I got another class member to wave their paper and say something else he hadn't 
done. They now did this every time the volunteer in front of them spoke. They began 
to sound like an eerie theatrical chorus. 
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'What have you done?' 
'I have found a balanced life'. 
'You haven't taken your child out'. 
Some of the teachers thought this procedure was too intrusive. The one who had 
volunteered to take the front role admitted to a sense of shock at the opening moment 
and at my appearance as their nemesis. The general view was the idea might work 
better in a more specific situation such as 'I am leaving England tomorrow and there 
is still so much I haven't done'. I worried that this might make the whole experience 
more ordinary and less memorable. I argued how anyway people often thought about 
ordinary things such as not having fixed the roof at moments of crisis but how the 
dramatic background to the thought might make the language in which it was 
expressed more memorable. I also asked the group if the sense of the past event as 
being possessed or owned would make the tense more meaningful. There was some 
scepticism though no outright rejection ofthe idea. 
It may be that the present perfect is now grammaticalised in the sense that the 
conceptual metaphor 'possession is completion' out of which it has evolved is no 
longer active. We do not associate the completion of past events with their possession, 
though the on-going grammaticalisation of 'keep' would argue against this. A more 
active schema could involve the spatial representation of time with subsequent 
entailments of motion forward to the future and motion behind into past. Teachers 
may therefore do better to explore the arrangement of time as classroom space that I 
began to think about with my own colleagues. They could look at movement between 
different zones oftime as they have been mapped onto classroom floor or projected 
onto the board. These could even reincorporate the idea of possession. For example, 
one could frame an area of the classroom as the present and ask students to mime 
certain actions within it while noting or sketching these on pieces of paper in the 
manner suggested above. Then one could bring the student to the very edge of the 
present zone and ask them to look at the papers they 'have' in order to say the actions 
they have accomplished within it. After a lapse of time during which other students 
perform the same activity, the first student could be placed at a distance from the 
present, thus putting the activity in the past. They would finally be asked to recount 
what they 'did' there. 
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It is clear that cognition-based approaches to grammar are very much at the stage of 
suggestion, and that there is as yet little that can be passed on in the form of 
procedures ready for wholesale adoption. My objective here is as much to open a 
discussion as to pass on hard and fast methods about how to approach a given item of 
grammar. In this I am motivated by how my students have often expressed frustration 
at both behaviourist and acquisition-based approaches to grammar. 
Though based on entirely different views of language and mind these have a curious 
coincidence in that both would see a theoretical awareness of how to construct and 
manipulate form as interfering in that fom1's implementation and practise. A student's 
interest in obtaining this type of theoretical awareness cannot be simply ignored 
unless teachers hold that their often repeated assertion that grammar rules and practice 
are useful is entirely without foundation. It would seem a truism that language 
development is motivated by the need to communicate meanings. In order to achieve 
this, metaphors are lexified and lexis is grammaticalised. This process may occur in 
order to represent in-built mental structures or in order to evolve a more effective 
organisation of the mind/world encounters. Teaching grammar through the schema 
from which it has evolved may give students a surer grip upon what is at issue. They 
are, after all, bringing to these forms the same mind that advanced that evolutionary 
process in the first place. 
Teachers can think more about using metaphors rather than situations in order to show 
how a grammatical structure should be employed. Such strategies would form part of 
an appeal to the metaphorical or analogical cast of mind that allows learning to take 
place at all. Such metaphors should thus form part of an approach that merits more 
extended exploration. 
353 
4.7.2 
4.7.2.1 
Metaphor and teaching grammar 2: prepositions and. particles 
Prepositions and particles 2: introduction 
An area where a metaphor-based analysis may lend itself more readily to classroom 
application has already been the subject of considerable research. Lindner ( 1981 ), 
Hawkins (1984), Boers (1996) and Lindostromberg (1998) have all explored the 
image schematic basis of prepositions and their common adverbial use in English 
phrasal verbs. Prepositions are themselves often derived from body parts (Heine 
1997) and have thus been constructed out of the different orientations of the body 
towards the object being described. Vestiges ofthis schema remain in English where 
such parts as 'back' and 'head' are used in prepositions to indicate spatial orientation. 
Some languages will make the centre outside the body as in the use of words relating 
to sky or heaven for 'up' (Heine 1997: 39). Again this schema occurs in English with 
such derivatives as 'heavenwards' or the idiomatic verb 'sky' as in 'he skyed it over 
the bar'. 
Many successful language teachers will already intuit the usefulness of the body as a 
means to centre our understanding of spatial prepositions. For example, the procedure 
of blindfolding a student and steering them round the class is useful for teaching and 
practising left/right, forward/backward orientations. 
Yet English prepositions become more difficult when they are abstracted away from 
the simple representation of spatial relations towards an expression of states of being 
and of mind. In English they are grammaticalised as particles that will profoundly 
modify verb meaning and cause quite deep confusion for learners. They can also give 
expression to the spatial metaphors through which logical and causal relationships are 
expressed. 
Verb particle meanings may have evolved from prepositional ones, nonetheless 
phrasal verbs can appear to be one of the more random features of English. I have 
watched lessons where foreign learners are simply not helped by the folk wisdom of 
their teachers. The teacher will hold that the meanings of phrasal verbs cannot be 
reconstructed out of those oftheir verbs and particles and must simply be learnt as a 
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combination like any other item in the lexical inventory. An added difficulty is that 
the same verb particle combination can have more than one meaning. For example, 
'look up (the information)', 'look up (an old friend)' or 'look up' (and see). While the 
addition of another preposition or particle will create another meaning still as in, 'look 
up to'. 
A text book approach to phrasal verbs such as that of Flower ( 1996) attempts a 
thematic organisation of phrasal verb meanings and also contrasts the different 
meanings of a verb stem such as 'get' when modified by different particles such as 
'on with' or 'up'. The book also attempts some organisation of verbs around their 
particles, contrasting, for example: 'come up', 'go up', 'pick up', and 'make up'. 
However, it fails to recognise that the same preposition may modify its verb 
differently because the preposition is drawing its meaning from a different base 
metaphor, or at least a different entailment of the same image schema. What exactly I 
mean by this, I will now make clear by looking at 'up'. 
A salient feature of the preposition 'up' is that its referent is prototypically dynamic 
(Boers 1996). A static case such as the 'pen is up there' has been studied as occurring 
in only about nine percent of cases (ibid: 135). The majority of verb referents are also 
dynamic. Therefore, unless we are discussing the stative use of the copula or of 
another verb as in 'it stands up there' or 'it is up', the use of 'up' as a particle will also 
generally be dynamic simply because of the nature of the verb that it describes. 
Finally, there is also back-modification, where the particle is to some extent being 
modified by the verb. In this case, the particle is shifted from a dynamic to a static 
reference by the nature of the verb. Thus, the same preposition in 'she is up' and 'she 
goes up' refers to a different schema because the verbs are different. 
It is also important to understand that although 'up' is prototypically dynamic, it is 
often expressive of movement towards an implied, static end-point (Lindner 1981 ). 
Thus, when we say 'lift it up' or 'open it up' we are assuming movement towards a 
final end position. This is an important aid to understanding the fuller, metaphorical 
use of the particle in English, because 'up' thereby extends its meaning to a referent 
or schema that is not so much physically dynamic as indicative of something 
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complete. Thus, one shifts from 'lift up' through 'fill up' to 'clean up' and finds that 
in the last case any sense of a vertical dynamic has been almost entirely lost. 
The above meaning shift is something that teachers can use to rationalise the use of 
verb particles. As in many of the procedures outlined here, our explanational 
departure point is in the physical dynamic. Thus, we show how 'up' refers to spatial 
movement in a verb such as 'go up'. We then show how this spatial movement is 
abstracted towards an idea of completion as in 'fill up'. Both of the usages, 'go up' 
and 'fill up' imply the dynamic of a rising level but the latter extends it towards the 
idea of a point that is completed or attained. This explains how in a phrasal verb such 
as 'clean up', the particle 'up' now has the meaning of an action that is complete. 
4.7.2.2 Prepositions and particles: outline 
Aim: teaching phrasal verbs with the particle 'up'. 
Procedure: 
1) Brainstom1 verbs that use 'up' to express upward movement. 
For example: walk up the hill, go up the steps. The 'up' to 
express a position above the ground. Draw vertical and 
horizontal arrows on the board in order to show which verb 
goes in which category, as shown in the top two circles below. 
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4.7.2.3 
climb up 
rise up 
Pile up 
up is more 
move up 
Gaup 
(temperature) 
is up 
Figure 20 
is hanging up 
up+Q 
stay up 
2) Repeat the procedure with verbs that show 'up' as mcrease, 
then 'up' as end point (e.g. 'draw up', 'split up'). 
3) Explain how we think of what we do not see or know as buried. 
Ideas are lost in the depths of our mind, they must be 'thought 
up' or to be heard must be 'brought up'. Information is buried 
until it is 'looked up'. 
4) The students construct a chain story where each must 
contribute one or two sentences and use a phrasal verb with 
'up'. 
Prepositions and particles: classroom narrative 
In the first stage I brainstormed for verbs that used 'up' to express upward motion, or 
'up' as a physical dynamic. I drew a circle on the board and inside it put an arrow 
with 'up' beside it (see figure 19 above). Students suggested quite obvious examples 
such as 'go up' and 'climb up'. Another quipped 'shut up' and this stimulated some 
metaphorical uses such as 'fed up' to which I responded by asking ifthey were 'fed 
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up' because their teachers had 'fed' them too much English. The student shrugged, 
smiled apologetically, then said that it was just an example. I ignored 'fed up' by only 
writing verbs of upward movement around the arrow in a circle. 'Fed up' uses 'up' as 
an end point. 
To introduce the next phase, I explained that 'up' was not just upward movement, it 
was also being 'up'. I pointed to a poster on the wall and said that it was 'up' on the 
wall. I drew another circle with a dot inside it and a horizontal arrow pointing at it. I 
asked for other examples of verbs that use this 'up'. A student suggested 'put up' (in 
the sense of put up a picture) and it was clear that they had not understood the 
distinction. I therefore squatted down then rose slowly saying 'I am rising up' and 
now I am ...... ' in order to elicit standing 'up'. I then wrote 'standing' next to the 
second circle on the board. Examples were still slow coming so I suggested the word 
'picture' and had to insert the word 'hang' myself. Another student suggested the 
word 'is', reverting to the first example and I wrote it on the board. 
In order to move the class on to some more difficult meanings, I explained that 'up' 
can mean increase as in 'pile up'. The group did not know 'pile' so I gestured with the 
palm of the hand to show something piling up on the floor then pointed to a 'pile' of 
papers left by another teacher in the corner of the class. I then asked if it was 'hot' 
today and the response an unequivocal 'no'. 
Teacher: 
Student: 
Teacher: 
Students: 
But warmer than yesterday? 
OK a little 
So the temperature is going ... 
Up. 
I moved on towards the meaning of 'up' as completion, first as it expresses an end to 
the increase in the quantity of something, as in 'fill up' then with an example 'split 
up' where the metaphorical origin of the term was less clear. 
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I had intended to cover many examples of each category. As many a detached and 
experienced observer might anticipate, a procedure that introduced so many similar 
fom1s at the same time was almost bound to result in 'lexical overload' and cause 
confusion. I therefore modified in class to include a few examples of each schema, 
which the class then tried to blend into a single chain story. I left the last and perhaps 
the most interesting sense of 'bringing up buried thoughts' and of unconscious 
knowledge as 'beneath'. 
The beginning of the story was predictable: 
Student 1: 'I got up in the morning' 
Then it unfolded as a sequence of poorly connected sentences, as is often the way 
with chain stories. 
Student 2 
Teacher 
Student 2 
Teacher 
I hang up a picture 
Hang .... ? 
Hanged 
Hung 
The class did show an ability to discriminate between some of the different uses of the 
particle. However, the initial 'up', representing dynamic upward movement tended to 
dominate, a feature that was perhaps reinforced by the unexpectedly low level of the 
class and their interest in staying in the security of a language constructed out of a 
more salient set of physical referents. 
4.7.2.4 Prepositions and particles: discussion 
It was clear that my first attempt to use this technique meant that my interest in it 
over-rode the need to provide thematic variety and avoid too large a lexical load. My 
suggestion now is that teachers who are introducing these verbs should be wary of 
dedicating an hour and a half to them and should instead allot each schema a separate 
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spot in a class dedicated to another topic. One or more schemata could be revised 
before continuing to the next. 
In addition, as with any issue of metaphor and perhaps of meaning, it would be 
mistaken to view a given schema as a clear-cut organisational category without 
overlap or sets of subcategories with equally fuzzy boundaries. The first approach was 
implemented with lists of phrasal verbs organised according to what appeared to be a 
salient schematic principle. This draws on the linguistic need to organise language 
according to clear categories. In this I was influenced by Lindner's (1981) provision 
of clear and distinct sets of referents for the particle 'up', such as the abstract end 
point of 'clean up', and the physical dynamic 'shoot up' that was just mentioned. 
However, one of the difficulties of dealing with schematic categories out of which 
metaphors build meaning is that these are themselves metaphorical. As I have 
discussed, metaphorical meanings are by their nature extensible, and evolve from a 
blurring of the category boundaries that our schematic principles are trying to re-
institute. The extended 'up is an end point' meaning clearly evolves from the spatial 
referent or 'implied end-point shown in 'lift up', then in 'fill up'. The spatial 'end-
point' is then extended by the 'time is space' image schema towards one that is 
temporal as in 'time's up'. The particle thus becomes a kind of intensifier to 
underscore the proper completion of an action as in 'clean up'. 
My point is not that language learners require this kind of detailed metalinguistic 
knowledge about how each phrasal verb is schematically constructed. I am not setting 
out rules here, so much as helping students to construct a fluid sense of different types 
of conceptualisation that achieve a given linguistic expression. I want to help students 
to do this because they possess the features of mind that were responsible for these 
creations in the first place. 
In order to focus more clearly on my objective and provide students with surer sense 
of the different extensions of 'up' as a particle, I constructed the six worksheets below 
(figures 21 - 27) in order to show how these verbs were organised. I presented these 
on OHPTs at a teachers conference in Italy 1999 to considerable interest. The way in 
which they show order in a seemingly random and unpredictable area of language was 
of a source of positive comment. I tried them again with a group of teacher trainees 
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from Switzerland, during a language improvement session. Contrary to my previous 
conclusion I used them together as a set, building a class in much the same way 
described above. However, this group already had some knowledge of these verbs. 
The idea that they had some organisational principle incited considerable interest and 
their story showed a wider scope and a stronger sense of narrative. Most interestingly, 
in subsequent discussions they started to extend the analytical principle of metaphor 
to other aspects of language, commenting on such 'ideas as deep sleep' when we 
touched on the idea of depth and unconsciousness, or raising other associated 
fragments of knowledge such as 'dig up' an idea. 
The worksheets should not in any sense be regarded as my final word about the 
teaching of phrasal verbs. Rather, they should be treated as a point of departure or as a 
statement for further development. In order to hasten that process, I now set out their 
rationale. 
The first sheet, (figure 21 below) lists a set ofverbs with some sketches of some of 
their possible contextual referents. Two arrows frame the verbs and the pictures in 
order to emphasise the idea of upward movement. Two rockets add a dynamic to the 
same. The implied intermingling of contexts might surprise teachers raised on a 
thematic or mono-contextual view of communicative methodology. Yet, it should 
now be clear that the sense of analogy we are putting forward here entails the 
differently contextualised images that support and reinforce the same point. 
Work Sheet 1: Up as a Dynamic 
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Come ~ 
Sit 
Get 
Stand 
Fold 
Wa lk 
Climb 
Put MA Set 
L_ ~ Leap ~ The Jump 
rocket 
organ1 sat100 goes up 
Figure 21 
The class can use the verbs and pictures in the worksheet as pictorial cues to produce 
sentences that formed a chain story. The teacher will generally have to begin with the 
example: 'the sun came up and I sat up in bed '. The first student would repeat the 
teacher' s opening sentence then add: ' I got up' and the one after ' I stood up ' . 
The shift towards abstraction implied by 'set up' as in ' set up an organisation' caused 
problems when tried in class and implies a change of context that is more difficult to 
incorporate into the story. The teacher however, has the option of maintaining the 
context by offering 'I put up a tent, I set up a camp' while digressing into other ways 
of using 'set up ' such as ' I set up a system or a company' . 
Another link from a physical towards an abstract schema is given in the second 
worksheet (figure 22 below): 
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WS2 
Put up 
Hold up 
Keep up 
Back up 
Figure 22 
Here, the abstract meaning of the last phrase, 'back up', is related to its physical 
referent by drawing one stick figure supporting another from the back while they 
continued to hold up 'the pole'. Students can again be invited to shift from the 
concrete illustration of 'back up' to the more current abstract sense of 'to offer 
support' as in an argument. 
This presentation of 'back up' also underlines the way in which a phrasal verb will 
draw meaning from base metaphors that pertain both to its particle and its stem, or to 
the modification of one by the other. Thus, this notion of support invokes the 
prepositional meaning of 'back' which itself derives from the part of the body of the 
same name. 
The move towards an abstract interpretation of 'upward' becomes more pronounced 
when one considers the sense of 'more is up' then the closely related 'up is positive' 
or 'up is more' Lakoff and Johnson (1980). In putting forward this schema one must 
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also insert the caveat that an increase can be negative as in ' unemployment figures are 
up'. 
The relationship of 'up' is an idea of increase and its common relationship to a 
positive characterisation of mood or social state is given through the verbs grouped in 
the third worksheet (figure 23 below). 
Up is an increase, more can be good, up is good, 
an increase is sometimes bad 
Go up 
warm up 
heat up 
hurry up, tfl 
speed up, 
Grow up 
1 ,2,3,4count ~ 
up 
2+3+4+5 
addup ~ 
::~....,....-
~ ~ ~ ~ 
Save up 
Build up 
Put up (prices) 
Keep up prices 
turn up (volume) 
Figure 23 
WS3 
Live it up 
Cheer up, 
liven up, 
freshen up 
This worksheet groups its subject roughly into columns that with some backtracking 
typify increasing abstraction as one works from left to right. A base metaphor for 
verbs that use 'up' to indicate an idea of increase is given by the isomorphic 
relationship of the upward expansion of mercury in a thermometer to the notion of a 
'rise' in temperature. Four sets of verbs are given, the first expresses ideas of a 
temperature increase, and the second an idea of an increase in speed, the third of size, 
through that of growth, and the fourth of quantity. 
However, as said, 'up' as in 'add' or 'count up' may also be expressive of a final end 
point or an idea of completion. This is dealt with in the next worksheet, but its inter-
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relationship with the idea of increase given here must serve as a reminder that the 
notion of a meaning that is metaphorically extensible entails an extension of the 
schematic frame from which its meaning evolves. This again shows how it is 
therefore difficult to deal with exact notions of schematic equivalence or reference 
when one schema may extend into another, perhaps through a point of transition such 
as is expressed here in a term such as 'count up'. 
The next area deals with the accumulation of money or the 'building up' of capital 
and the last marks a significant extension of the notion of 'increase' 'rise' and 'plenty' 
to that ofhappiness with 'live it up' and 'cheer up'. This last conceptualisation clearly 
overlaps with the one preceding it in that, in both, 'up' posits a static landmark or end-
point whose attainment marks a degree of fulfilment or completion. 
The fourth worksheet (figure 24 below) develops this notion of 'up as accumulation', 
first through the physical example of completion by filling up to a level then through 
an abstraction of the landmark as something mobile and rotated but existing in space 
nonetheless, for example 'keep up' and 'catch up'. Underneath these expressions of 
accumulation, I have listed a set of verbs where 'up' connotes the achievement of a 
landmark that has been abstracted out of any spatial reference. The right side of the 
sheet shows how certain verbs develop this notion of 'up' as signifying a completed 
action but in two opposite ways, that of separation and union, 'split up' is thus 
followed by 'make up'. 
I have ignored how 'make up' of course also extends its verb stem more in 
accordance with its sense of fabrication or manufacture, as in 'make up with lipstick'. 
Thus, somebody makes a new persona or 'face' for themselves and perhaps, thereby, 
'raises their status' as if towards some point of self-completion. This complication 
graphically underscores how phrasal verb meanings, though they can be grouped and 
rationalised through an analysis of their particle, are also subject to an extension of 
the stem, sometimes as a result of its modification by the particle. Phrasal verbs are a 
complex area of meaning and full-scale rationalisation of their meanings according to 
underlying schemata, would be a daunting task. However, it is a task that could 
provide great benefits to the student. 
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WS4 The end point is up 
Full up 
t d fill up 
,, --.--
n 111111 ~:~p up ~l catchup 
Freeze up, mist up, ice up, c lear up, 
clean up, mix up, tie up, use up, burn up, 
dry up, eat up, heal up. do up, seal up 
(time) is up, 
Figure 24 
Split up, break up, divide up 
tearup • 
The fifth worksheet (figure 25 below) develops the schema of ' up is completion' by 
showing the rotation of the attained landmark in order to give the meaning of stopping 
or coming to a halt. The related verbs are given underneath. 
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The end point is up, to be up is to 
stop 
... 
wss 
Slow up, draw up, hold up, ~ r ~~
give up 
Figure 25 
The sixth worksheet (figure 26 below) perhaps marks the most complex schema. The 
landmark for 'up' is presumed to be a visible surface. Therefore the related verbs refer 
to the action of bringing ideas or things to that surface. 'Dig up' is perhaps the most 
concrete realisation of this idea and therefore heads the sheet. The counter assumption 
of this landmark is that the revealed items were hidden or buried. Therefore one needs 
a grasp not just of the assumed landmark and schema but of related schemata 
associating consciousness with 'up' (above the surface) and unconsciousness with 
burial, being beneath or deep down. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 15). 
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WS6 
You can bring up hidden things and buried ideas 
Dig up things or 
unknown facts and 
information 
e-n• ~« 
Look up 
information 
Wake her up, she is 
deep in sleep 
she is deep in thought 
(to be up is to be present 
and in mind) 
call her up, ring her up, 
phone her up 
~ r. ~ •l l.l ~ 
: , ) 
; , 
Figure 26 
Ideas are buried in the 
mind 
think up an idea 
dream up a wild idea 
come up with an idea 
Crops come up, strange 
events are hidden until they 
crop up 
Finally, it must be made clear that there is no sense in which these worksheets could 
be regarded as self-study or stand-alone guides to the area in question. They are above 
all a regrouping of a difficult set of lexical items around the metaphor from which 
their meanings are partly derived. This regrouping does not of itself preclude the 
need for other forms of practice. As stated, teachers need to set up other tasks in 
which these verbs are incorporated. These can take the form of the chain stories 
mentioned above. Another approach is to work with textual synonymy, where the 
teacher tries to elicit or dictate a text that deals with the thematic area of some of these 
verbs but eschews their use. The students then rebuild the text around their knowledge 
of these verbs. 
Lastly, I should stress that I have given only one particle, 'up' quite extensive 
treatment. The objective as in most of what precedes and follows is to foster 
awareness of an approach to language and not to give an exhaustive account of how to 
tackle a single area. Clearly teachers can go forward to build on the work already 
done in this respect and to consider other ways to elucidate this difficult but central 
area of English. The key point is that prepositions and particles do not represent a 
random method of constructing meaning in English, where every instance must be 
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treated as separate from every other. They can be grouped according to metaphorical 
theme and can be learnt as evolving from common schemata. 
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4.8 implementing the approach: towards an image-schematic approach to 
student errors 
4.8.1 Towards an image-schematic approach to stmllent errors: introduction 
The previous sections looked at how a teaching approach built out of our sense of 
meaning as created through metaphor can help to: 
1) Illustrate specific language points and improve students' grasp of the same. 
2) Forge a link between the way in which linguistic meaning has been 
constructed and the manner in which it has been learnt. 
I illustrated these points with an outline of specific techniques and a recollection of 
their impact upon different classes. My data source was the nature of events in 
specific classes. I now want to turn to a very different source of information in order 
to show how teachers can start to understand student errors from the perspective of 
the conceptual metaphors by which they have been produced. I will also look at how 
we can use this understanding to help students to find the appropriate schema and its 
correct realisation. Again, it should be understood that in this last section, I am 
broaching a topic that may require more extensive treatment than can be properly 
elaborated here. In order to explore fully the image-schematic basis of student errors 
we will need a study of the relationship between the conceptual metaphors inherent in 
different student L1s and the errors they make in the L2. My intention, here, is to 
broach what is potentially a quite new area of study and a different approach to error 
correction. 
Initially, error analysis was an activity associated with the now outmoded approach of 
Contrastive Analysis (e.g. Lado 1957). Contrastive Analysis was based on the 
behaviourist hypothesis ofhabit formation. In order to reinforce the new 'habits' of a 
target language, research was oriented towards the question of how those 'habits' 
differed from those of the student's mother tongue. The contrastive approach became 
unfashionable with the demise of behaviourism. Further, many of its predictions were 
held by teachers to be obvious or uninformative (James 1998). The practice of error 
analysis, on the other hand has attempted to describe errors not as a result of transfer 
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but purely in terms of their failure to realise the forms of the MT, and thus in terms of 
the MT alone (James 1998). 
Selinker's (1972) concept of an interlanguage also redirected linguistic and pedagogic 
interest towards student errors. In this instance, errors were viewed more positively, 
not so much as a result of the failure to achieve the forms ofthe TL but as evidence 
from which one could construct the unstable language knowledge that the student had 
achieved at a given point in the learning process. 
Generative approaches to SLA (Second Language Acquisition) have also resulted in a 
number of studies that analyse learner errors in order to demonstrate how they may or 
may not have access to UG (Universal Grammar). For example, Gass's (1979) 
accessibility hierarchy holds that unmarked forms will be acquired before those of the 
marked ones (3.5.2.3). This might be taken as evidence for how the acquisition of 
forms existing in the UG will occur before others. In another example, Bardovi-Harlig 
(1987) refutes this claim with a view that 'preposition stranding', (placing the 
preposition at the end of the sentence) occurs before the marked phenomenon of 
'piedpiping' (placing it at the beginning). 
Because the approach put forward is looking at errors from a new perspective, that of 
their conceptual origins, I have no method derived from the area of error analysis in 
which to ground this study. However, the analytic approach is largely one which is 
derived from other studies of conceptual metaphor, beginning with Reddy (1993: first 
published 1979) then taken up by such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Langacker 
(1994) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999). This approach is largely intuitive since the 
nature of analogical thought makes it difficult to establish objective criteria that are 
able to determine which conceptualisation a given metaphor will derive from. 
The approach will take as its starting point the assumption that there are two forms of 
error that can be described through an image schematic approach to error analysis: 
Errors that occur because the student has selected an image schema that is not 
preferred by the target language for the topic in question. 
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2 Errors that occur because the student has selected an appropriate image schema 
but an inappropriate realisation. 
This assumption is not overly informative as there is currently no way of knowing 
whether the mis-selection is in response to a different entailment of a correctly 
identified schema or to the wrong expression of the same. To say categorically that 
the schema is correct and the instantiation as language wrong is to assume that there is 
a sure method for prising apart language and meaning (or the conceptualisation on 
which a given meaning is based), and clearly there is not. 
It is possible to assume that this mis-selection of a form or schema will have three 
causes. The first two are: 
The generalisation of a form that has been encountered in a context for which 
it is appropriate towards one where it is not. 
2 The importation of a form or structure from the student's Ll into the L2 when 
this is unrecognised by the L2. 
I would suspect that the factors that can cause an error may intertwine to produce any 
given instance. In this discussion, therefore, I will not consider errors in relation to the 
schematisations preferred by the mother tongue. This would first, require a lengthy 
analysis of the mother tongue itself. The analysis would also be overly negative in its 
treatment of error because it would focus on the nature and origins of the error itself 
as opposed to the means through which it can be corrected. A more positive and 
pedagogical approach would help enhance the student's understanding of why a TL 
(in this case English) favours a particular construction and how that schema can be 
generalised or made more productive in helping them to avoid other similar errors. I 
will, therefore, broach how we might make use of these insights in order to produce 
materials and practice routines that steer students towards correct schematisations and 
appropriate realisations. 
My interest in constructive, schema-building routines means that I give only cursory 
thought to the third kind of error. This type of error is: 
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3) the construal of one L1 form as morphologically (phonologically) analogous 
to another when it is not 
From my perspective over-generalisation is more interesting as an instance of how the 
analogy-forming mind will operate when confronted with new materials than as an 
example of how to adopt remedial strategies that are tuned to this mental capacity. I 
can stress the need for teachers to work with traditional groupings of phonological 
analogues (sing/sang, ring/rang). I can suggest that they emphasise the exceptions as a 
type of irritating coda (sing/sang, ring/rang, bring/brought). However, these types of 
analogical clusters are different from those that will be discussed here. Equally, a 
student may over-generalises an adverbial form as in 149, below: 
149 I practise hardly (author's data). 
either because the form 'hardly' exists with another meaning and may have been 
heard in that context (I hardly managed it) or because they have over-generalised the 
'ly' morpheme itself. The teacher may find that a more successful correction strategy 
will be to set this amidst the regular forms to which it forms an exception. They could 
also find some other way to close down the student's instinct for generalisation and 
push them towards memorising the form as itself rather than the instantiation of a 
rule. 
A type of over generalisation that roots in an over-generalisation of syntax may be 
when, for example, a student with L1 Arabic, L2 English and no other language uses 
'precise' as a verb as in 'Yes, I need to precise the analysis' (author's data). Arabic 
does not allow this form, unlike some other languages such as French. Therefore the 
error is not a result of transfer. English is tolerant of one part of speech, a noun, 
'access', for example, being used as another, a verb, as in 'to access the computer'. 
The student has made a generalisation on the assumption that adjectives can be treated 
with equal flexibility, as occasionally they can, as when we 'calm the crowd' or 
'blank out the screen'. For me, the interest of such over-generalisations is more in 
how they provide an insight into the analogy-forming mind, and less in how they 
suggest correction strategies. 
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In the following analysis, I focus on the first two categories of error in so far as these 
can be separated out. I select short extracts from texts produced by FL users in order 
to illustrate each point and I discuss why these errors can be categorised in the way I 
have suggested. The extracts are either taken from the written work of students, from 
transcriptions of their tape-recorded speech or from notes made at the time of the 
subject's speaking. In working through a randomly selected text, I would analyse the 
errors in the order that they were encountered, in the text. Those that did not yield any 
substantial insight were disregarded. Having found one or two significant errors in a 
text, I would then turn to another. I should stress again, that my objective, here, is not 
to set out categories of error founded upon statistical analysis nor even to engage in a 
contrastive exploration. I am laying down the basis of a new approach to error upon 
the basis of the conclusion about language and thought that I have deduced. 
4.8.2 An image-schematic approach to student errors: the event is location 
metaphor. 
I begin by looking at example 150, below: 
150 I started play golf twenty years ago 
Sentence 150 omits the preposition 'to' with the verb infinitive. Because of the 
speaker's low level, it may be that this is as a result of mother tongue interference 
rather than the common confusion of begin/start+ verb+ ing with the infinitive, 
begin/start + to verb (infinitive). The speaker may have no knowledge of these 
alternative English fonns. 
Yet the error may become more interesting if, instead of accepting that it occurs 
because the L1 and L2 grammar are different, one first asks why the infinitive in 
English is constructed with a preposition indicating spatial motion 'to'. It could be 
that the infinitive is actually realising the 'event as location', identified by Lakoff and 
Johnson (e.g. 1999). According to this view, the verb, as representing an event or 
action, is constructed as a place towards which we are moving. 
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Also, there is a more fundamental, 'time is space' schema at play. This metaphor 
means that we express our temporal movement towards an action as a spatial one. In 
fact, as a user of English, I do not know how to describe this in lexis that is not of a 
spatial origin. 
Therefore, it may be possible to see the error in 150 as arising from a failure to select 
the appropriate schema out of which the English 'to+ infinitive' is constructed. It may 
be that the learner would have been helped towards an early and appropriate 
schematisation if they had used a sheet such as the one given below (figure 27). 
Alternatively, this could be handed to students who make such errors so that they may 
collect examples around the image schema from which they arise 
\ came topl~ 
~ 
1 
I began to play 
I started to play 
I wanted to play 
I thought ~ to play 
I hoped to play 
Figure 27 
The motion towards is indicated by the top verb phrase, which also has a metaphorical 
sense and expresses causation through the same 'path' metaphor. The verbs below are 
indicated more strongly as an approach towards an action. The last three, which may 
refer more to an interrupted approach have had another arrow inserted to show the 
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possibility of a diversion before the arrival. The verb-state has been taken out of bold 
to indicate that it is a hypothetical destination. 
The above analysis points out how a correct application of 'the path' image schema 
could help a lower level student grasp the construction ofthe 'to'+ verb (infinitive) in 
English. However prepositional errors with the infinitive would generally be 
considered elementary and are probably far from being the most common since the 
infinitive is often learnt as a 'to+verb' construction. I will now look at a more 
advanced error involving prepositions or particles. 
4.8.3 Towards am image-schematic approach towards stlllldent errors: 'llllp to' is 
a cm:nfrontation, 'with' is 'against'. 
Consider 151, below: 
151 The company has to expect market growth to face with the competition 
'With' normally connotes spatial proximity and by extension possession and 
belonging, as in 152: 
152 The woman with a crocodile handbag 
'With' also had the earlier meaning of 'against' (Lindostromberg 1997). However, the 
closeness of these meanings may derive from the fact that they both indicate spatial 
contact as can be seen from a phrase such as 'the ladder against the wall'. 
'Face' and 'face up to' are both built out of the primary expression of direction 
through body parts. 'Turning the back' signifies retreat, running away and hence, by 
extension, ignoring what is happening. 'Facing' has the meaning oflooking forwards 
(in the direction of the face) and hence of dealing with issues as opposed to running 
away from them. 'Up' may have the positive cmmotation of a raised posture as in 'get 
up and do it!'. 
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Then the student has construed confrontation as ' keeping up with ' or 'keeping pace 
with ' or the idea of against, as in 'fighting with ', instead of the staring down of an 
opponent that precedes a conflict. The manner in which a correct and confrontational 
schematisation will find expression in the appropriate phrasal verb can be shown in 
the following way. 
to 
it 
Figure 28 
As a contrast, ' keep up with' and ' keep pace with' can be shown as follows: 
Up is an end point ~'-------
up 
Keep 
Figure 29 
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Therefore, what has occurred here is that the student has constructed the notion of 
'face' out of a schema of spatial proximity to the issue (or its reification) that must be 
confronted. This may be because they have 'chunked' 'up with', or memorised it as a 
collocation. But in fact the construction does not simply imply proximity but 
movement towards the same. The correction emphasises the idea of that movement. 
4.8.4 Towards an image-schematic approach to student errors: when time is 
not time but space 
I have already discussed how conceptual metaphor takes a role in the construction of 
discourse. By the same token, the choice of an inappropriate schema can also occur 
within the frame of 'Reference', raising issues of text construction. Consider the two 
sentences below: 
153 The education of Ultima Thule may be divided into two parts. The first one 
when all students are taught the same subjects starts at the age of three years 
and ends at the age of thirteen years. 
The anaphoric reference, here, is of 'one' to 'part'. As has been said, most temporal 
constructions are directly or indirectly a spatial conceptualisation. 'Part' typifies this. 
It is a noun with a spatial reference that can also be used to express time. Thus, one 
can talk of 'the right part of the day'. However, in this instance, the 'frame' or 
'domain' of meaning is that of a system or organisation that has temporal stages. Even 
if organisations control temporal processes (e.g. spending 10 years at primary school) 
the organisations are more commonly conceived of as spatial entities, particularly in 
their diagrammatic representation. As I have acknowledged, time and space are 
conceptually intertwined and many expressions of time derive from or still express 
spatial relations. Yet, 'when' has developed a largely temporal reference whereas 
'part' is still predominantly spatial. It may be that the writer is using 'when' because 
they perceive 'one' as referring to a 'part of time', yet their reference is to an 
organisation that is largely perceived as a structure occupying space. Consistency, 
therefore, should oblige them to think of 'one' as a reference to a section of space. 
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Therefore, the correct relative pronoun in this case would be 'where' as in the 'part 
where'. The error is admittedly a fine judgement because 'time' and 'space' are so 
closely inter-related. However, it raises interesting issues about the spatial 
construction of discourse. 
4.8.5 Towards an image-schematic approach to student errors: the possession 
of the object 
The first sentence in example 153, above, also contains another inappropriate 
schematisation that is revealed by the first preposition 'of, 'the education of Ultima 
Thule'. This is wrong because the writer makes it sound as if it is the country, Ultima 
Thule, which is being educated. It reads this way because nominalised processes, as in 
'the storming of the Bastille' or 'the rape ofLucretia' are normally treated as affecting 
the object to which they belong. These structures would seem to emerge from a 
conceptual metaphor of' objects owning the processes that affect them'. This explains 
why English would allow 'the education system a/Ultima Thule' because the Process 
has been taken out of the phrase as a nominalisation. The sentence can also be 
corrected by giving the Process, 'education' a 'place' 'in' which to unfold as in 
'Education in Ultima Thule'. 
4.8.6 Towards an image-schematic approach to student errors: problems are 
impediments 
An example that may do more to unveil the schematisations through which states are 
conceived can be found in 154, below: 
154 The first problem is the comprehensive school because every child has 
variable ability 
155 The first problem occurs in the comprehensive school because every child has 
variable ability 
156 The first problem occurs at the comprehensive school stage because every 
child has variable ability 
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On the surface, 154 could be read as correct. It forms one of those types of error that 
may be dismissed as 'somehow not quite English'. However, the reason why this is 
slightly strange lies in the fact that the student is mistakenly implying that the school 
itself poses a threat to the completion of an educational process when this is not the 
case. The writer mistakenly implies that the school is the problem, perhaps because of 
its architecture, when they mean that the problem arises in the comprehensive school 
stage of the cycle. I know this because the task involves the description of a diagram 
that makes this point clear. Thus, in order to express the diagram's meaning, the 
school has either to undergo a process of abstraction and become the description of a 
stage or it has to be identified as the location of a problem. A correct rendering of this 
sentence would probably be either 155 or 156 above. 
In this instance the selection ofthe image schema is complicated by the possibility 
that the student may not understand the distinct nature of the meaning they want to 
express. The student needs to know the difference between the occurrence of a 
problem in a place or at a stage, and the identification of that place with the problem. 
This distinction is also an image schematic issue. It presupposes the activation of the 
'problems are impediments' conceptual metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1999) as can 
be seen in the idea of a 'problem' or 'issue' that arises in a place to be 'surmounted', 
if it is not to prevent forward movement. This distinction and some of the language 
issues involved could be illustrated to the student as follows: 
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. \!; 
~ 
The place is the problem 
The problem/issue arises 
in the place and we must 
surmount or overcome it 
Figure 30 
In this instance, the problem is represented as a place by the common metaphor of a 
maze, while the second drawing tries to show that the problem is not in fact the maze 
or the place itself, but a barrier which arises to impede forward movement. A barrier 
must have a location. As a form of 'barrier' the problem is located in the place where 
it occurs. 
4.8. 7 Towards an image-schematic approach to student errors: when up is not 
more. 
Many ofthe above examples concern how English uses prepositions to express its 
structuration of abstract and grammatical meaning through the schemata of spatial 
relations. My assumption has been that the error shows a failure to understand the 
schema out of which English has been built. In the next example, that assumption 
does not hold because a plausible schema for the context has been evoked but with an 
incorrect realisation. Consider 151 : 
151 to prevent it (a small incident) from coming up to a large one (author' s data: 
BBC News 12 June 2000) 
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English commonly exploits the universal schematisation of 'up' is more (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980) as in 'we must raise productivity'. This schema, however, may use 
different landmarks. Thus, one considers 'up' as an increase towards a given state or 
'up' as an increase away from a given state. Arguably here, the correct phrase could 
be 'developing into' which presupposes movement along a horizontal axis towards a 
'state as location' and perhaps away from (de) another. Therefore, one might be 
tempted to say that 157 is an example of an inappropriate schematisation. However, 
English does employ the 'up is more' schema in this instance as in 'the problem blew 
up into something larger' or the lexically different but schematically similar, 'the 
problem grew into something larger'. In this last case, one can see the use of the 'up is 
more' schema 'grow' as it overlaps the biological assumption that 'growth is 
increase'. At the same time one finds the assumption of a hypothetical form that 
'growth' is struggling to occupy 'grow into' as if in accordance with a platonic view 
of plant morphology where growing things are occupying a predetermined form as 
opposed to creating it. There would appear, then, to be a mismatch between the 
selected schema and the lexis with which it is realised. In this case, a correction 
strategy could focus on the tie between given types of schemata and their realisation 
in the lexico-grammar. One might thus illustrate, 'develop into' as motion on a 
horizontal plane and 'grow into' as motion on a vertical one, while showing how each 
assumes a hypothetical form that the growing problem is going to occupy. 
Additionally, we could link 'come up' to things that are buried or sunk. Since, in this 
context, the problem is already evident there is no surface towards which it can be 
raised, just a larger form that it can assume. 
4.8.8 Towards an image-schematic approach to student errors: 'I six times 
hit': word order. 
The following errors were collected from an elementary Korean student talking about 
golf. Korean is an SOV language but interestingly the students transfer of an SOV 
word order into English is most common outside the main clause. It is as if he is 
thrown off his ability to reproduce English word order by the difficulty of handling a 
more complex sentence structure. 
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158 If I start line hit, five times my ball in hole is par 
159 Motion is very difficult so I ..... coach's motion see 
Interestingly, SVO languages have a correspondence between their word order and 
the sequence of actions in a typical cause and effect chain. As expressed by 
Langacker's (1994) billiard ball metaphor, the subject, 'the white ball' moves first and 
then 'strikes' the 'red ball' which moves. For teachers of English then, the issue is one 
of using graphic images, 'cars striking cars', 'people hitting people', or whatever, to 
help students map a sequence of actions onto a word order, all while trying to avoid 
the trap of imagining that SV 0 is more natural. For teachers of Korean or 1 apanese 
the issue is more complex for it involves suppressing a temporal sequence in favour of 
a syntactic one, or at least perceiving how a syntactic order evolves according to 
constraints that are not imposed by the sequence of the events they imitate. Word 
order problems, then, can relate to trying to translate the syntax of a given TL back to 
the schematisation of events that it either imitates or transforms. 
4.8.9 An image schematic approach to student errors: conclusions 
James (1998) suggested broadly that there are three approaches to student errors. The 
first is to perceive them as revealing how the student's MT (mother tongue) differs 
from the TL. The second is to describe the errors in terms of their failure to realise the 
forms of the TL. The third is to view them not as failings at all but as indicative of a 
type oflanguage knowledge that the student has constructed, of their inter-language, 
in other words. 
My interest here has been to redirect the teacher's interest towards how some errors 
may evidence a failure to understand the schematic basis of the target language and 
the realisation of this to the forms that language adopts. I have assumed that these 
schemata can be described as the (conceptual) metaphors out of which abstract 
meaning in the TL has been developed. A secondary objective was to show that 
sometimes a schema may be grasped or correctly assumed to be common to both the 
MT and the TL. In these cases, the problem may lie in an incorrect realisation and 
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help can be given if the correct form is embedded in its schema in a way that both 
makes it more memorable and which shows why it has come to take the form that it 
has. However, I have pointed out that in practice this type of distinction may be 
difficult to make. In the example studied, it was evident that English retains one 
schema, 'up is more' but prefers to express change through the metaphor of the 
assumption of a shape, or at least in a conjunction between this and a notion of 
vertical movement. In other words, errors that appear to show an inappropriate lexico-
grammatical realisation of an appropriate schema may actually be employing the 
wrong schema for a particular context or type of expression or at least the wrong 
entailment of the same. I thus showed how a change of state is expressed through a 
metaphor of organic growth 'into' a hypothetical form, but how growth, by its nature, 
also subsumes the metaphor of 'up is more'. In the case of word-order the contrast 
between schema and realisation was more clearly made, since it is clear that, whether 
I am Korean or English, a ball must strike another before transferring energy to it. Yet 
that order of events is not replicated in the same way in each of these two languages. 
The point that emerges then is that one should not undertake this type of analysis with 
an overtly contrastive goal. The question is not whether a schema has been correctly 
redeployed but incorrectly realised. The question is how the student can be steered 
towards an understanding that will help them to construct an implicit knowledge of 
the correct form by first showing how they can explicitly embed that in the 
schematisations by which it was produced. The more general conclusion, is the one 
which emerges from this thesis as a whole. This is that teachers need to think 
metaphorically. Teachers need to think about the schematisations that underlie 
language so that they can rationalise the principles of its construction in a manner that 
is less intellectually arbitrary and is rooted in a more powerful concept of affect. 
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4.9 Pedagogical Explorations: conclusions 
The understanding of metaphor that I sought to summarise can take language 
pedagogy in a new direction. My broadest conclusion is that our new understanding of 
the nature of meaning construction can allow teachers to think less about social 
relevance and more about how pedagogy can appeal to the facets of mind that 
underlie language. Social relevance is ephemeral unless it is perceived in a state of 
interaction with the mind that will carry language through time. We can develop this 
sense of a dynamic entailing mind as a social construct and society as a mental one 
(Vygotsky 1978). We can then perceive the social contextualisation of language as the 
provision of an analogue to as yet unconstructed zones of use. We can also think 
about how to relocate the exemplification of meaning in the schemata from which 
meaning has emerged. 
However, it is also clear that teachers make a quite constant, intuitive use of metaphor 
and expect that their students will do the same. My own exploration of this topic has 
partly done no more than draw attention to successful teaching activities that I already 
use. In this zone, I have cited some early material such as Moskowitz ( 1978) in order 
to show how this understanding has been with us for a considerable time. I have also 
noted how TPR routines involving classroom movement are often metaphorical in 
nature. A further conclusion of this study is therefore simply to reinforce what is 
already intuitively done and to provide a clearer rationale for why it works. 
The forging of a conscious link between the metaphors through which a language is 
conceptualised and through which language can be explained has yielded a further 
quite simple insight. This is that, in doing this study, I became more aware both of my 
own metaphor making processes and of those implicit in the language I have been 
teaching. My conclusion is a very general exhortation to teachers to think 
metaphorically. Such modes of thought enable them to explain what previously 
seemed to be inexplicable, to suggest why 'face up to' has acquired the meaning that 
it has, for example. Metaphorical thought can also stimulate a search for meaningful 
forms of explanation and illustration, looking at how the division of classroom space 
can be mapped onto a language's construction of time or at how emptying a box of its 
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intellectual contents can illustrate the idea of deduction. When discussing this broader 
consequence of a metaphor-based approach with both students and colleagues, it 
becomes clear that this very general mode of analysis can lead to some of this study's 
more successful pedagogical events. 
Once the teacher has begun to explore their metaphor-making capacity they can re-
examine the potential of their learning environment. In this area, it may be that this 
study has a lot to say to those who are exploring computer assisted language learning. 
A more extended sense of spatial metaphor could reinforce the explanational power of 
programmes that deal in grammar teaching, for example. We could use diagrams of 
the concrete to help students construct abstract meanings. This could also hold for 
those who would enhance work already done in the area of metaphor, analogy and 
mathematics teaching by helping to establish better-grounded explanations in CAL or 
WBL (web-based-learning) software. 
However, at root, this re-examination of the role of metaphor is largely without 
resource implications. Space is universally available and spatial relationships are a 
potent vehicle to aid the understanding of how language expresses time, cause and 
effect and many other types of relationship between abstract and concrete phenomena. 
A further, quite broad conclusion is that if we admit to the notion of metaphor-based 
meaning construction that has been put forward, we can no longer retain the idea of an 
isolated language processor in the mind. This makes linguistic and input based 
positions on second language acquisition difficult to sustain. Cognition and learning 
are facets of each other. The interference of cognition in language must therefore 
make it unlikely that language can ever be acquired without the support of cognitive 
processes. As this interference becomes open to conscious manipulation and control 
then it will become a facet of what is normally called learning. This is not to deny a 
role to unconscious or unfocused learning in language or any other area. However, it 
is to assert that it will not suppose the activation of some dumb and purely reactive 
linguistic processor so much as a larger array of cognitive processes many of which 
we can analyse then consciously deploy. Therefore, I would make two related points: 
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o teachers of post-pubertal learners should see their primary goal as the creation of 
an environment oriented to learning not acquisition 
o the pedagogical direction of this study is towards learning and it should not be 
faulted on grounds of a failure to foster acquisition 
This is not in any way a statement that a stress on learning entails a return to some 
teacher-centred, translation based classroom. Input-based approaches do have the 
merit of stressing the primacy of using the target language in the classroom. However, 
a more cognitive view should also make the very basic point that languages are 
systems whose survival is testament to our capacity to learn them through exposure. 
This suggests that we could still be equipped with dormant strategies that require 
exposure to a language ifthey are to be reawakened and used. 
The use of the target language remained pre-eminent in my own classroom 
experimentation with the methods suggested by this approach. Nonetheless, I did 
observe in myself a drift away from the purely facilitative mode that may be 
presupposed by 'strong' communicative theory. 
In Scrivner's (1998) ARC' (Authentic, Restricted, Clarification) model, for example, 
teachers may initially facilitate exposure to a given area of language before helping 
them towards identifying the nature of its construction and its context of use through 
a staged intervention. The current UCLES (University of Cambridge Local 
Examinations Syndicate) CELTA (Certificate ofEnglish Language Teaching to 
Adults) still makes rigid prescriptions about reducing TTT (teacher talking time). By 
this token, a language class is often rated as successful if it runs with only occasional 
teacher involvement, treating the teacher as a dictionary or grammar book to be 
consulted on the odd occasion when communication breaks down. The teacher's work 
is supposedly done outside class or in the opening and closing stages of the activity. 
But this pedagogical retreat supposes a more authoritarian grip on what occurs than 
would result from a dialogic but more active presence. Such a dialogic presence 
emerged as a facet of many of the techniques I sought to employ. It is a presence that 
means cajoling and pushing the class this way and that, sometimes negotiating a 
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change of direction and at other times calling a halt to explore an unexpected point. I 
would call this teaching style more participatory than facilitative. 
A participatory style entails that the teacher is neither follower nor guide. It supposes 
that students and teachers are partners in an analogical enterprise, opening new 
directions for each other and remaining alert not to the dangers of digression but to 
the possibilities of the same. There is a suggestion of experimentation in digression 
and an acknowledgement by all that some of the newly discovered alleys will be 
blind. Teachers may be too well conditioned to treat successful lessons as time that 
passes according to a planned and therefore seamless passage from one phase to the 
next. However, time may be more memorable when the passages are turbulent and the 
class feels challenged by a sudden moment of opacity in the lesson's structure. 
Like many trainers, I tell new teachers that they must learn to 'think on the run' and to 
be able to find rapid explanations for the unpredictable language items that a given 
class will produce. I would now stress how participatory teaching is about being alert 
to the opportunities that arise from getting lost on a detour. It means being able to 
help the class orient themselves amidst the strange topography that such detours can 
suddenly reveal. 
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Conch.JJsions aB11d Suggestions for Furtheli" Study 
This thesis had three broad objectives in theory construction. The first was to explore 
the development of current theories of metaphor and to examine whether it was 
possible to achieve a view that was clear, consistent and available for integration into 
an approach to language teaching. The second was to examine how such a concept of 
metaphor could influence our approach to teaching from a general perspective. The 
third was to explore how that approach would translate into actual classroom practice. 
Although the first ofthese objectives supports the second, and the second, the third, 
each is sufficiently different from the other to merit separate sets of conclusions and 
suggestions for further study. I will therefore treat each of these three objectives as 
separate, while also showing how they relate to each other. 
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5.1 Towards a consistent concept of metaphor for language teaching and 
learning: conclusions 
I looked briefly at the Cartesian mistrust of metaphor as disruptive of its attempt to 
produce a univocal discourse where language could represent the world as if it were 
free from the subjective interference of mind. The aspiration was that a word such as 
'stone' would have the same certainty and the same constraints as the equivalent 
object will have when it is in the hand. Figurative language blurs the conceptual 
boundaries between objects and makes them subject to the manipulation of the 
subjective mind. Therefore, it interferes in the world's self-representation, putting at 
risk the stability of what we deduce from a given observation with the possibility that 
the stone in one person's discourse is not the same as that of another. 
The more recent traditions of logical positivism, formal semantics and generative 
semantics were treated as developments ofthe Cartesian tradition. Tarski's (1956) 
truth-condition semantics, for example, can be viewed as an attempt to tie the 
meaning of a word or statement to the conditions prevailing in the world that it does 
or does not represent. Metaphor is problematic for this enterprise because it is 
disruptive of the meaning and hence of the frame of reference of the statement that 
would thus be tied down, even before that process has begun. We cannot, for 
example, be certain, that an apple is only an apple, if it could also be a reference to 
somebody's head. Elgin (1983) may argue that a truth-condition analysis provides a 
framework for metaphor analysis if we accept that a word can have a meaning that is 
other than its ostensible, primary one; if an apple can mean a head, for example. 
However, this admits instability into the semiotic system, which perhaps undermines 
the primary objective ofthis type of formal analysis. 
It might be tempting to draw a reverse conclusion. The discipline of formal semantics 
attempts to show how we construct and manipulate a stable system of meanings 
according to logical principles. Formal semantics can identify metaphor because 
metaphor disrupts the stability of those meanings. Metaphor arises when we say 
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something that is true and meaningful that is not in accordance with its truth 
conditions. However, we have taken away the underlying assumption of this 
argument. I can say 'That construction is a house', and that the statement is 
meaningful if the indicated construction is actually a house. But metaphor posits that a 
house may actually be a house in one person's conception of that term but not in 
another's. The reference could actually be some hybrid affair that others would call a 
shelter and others a tent. 'House' is extensible. In short, metaphor posits that there is 
not really a stable system of categories for metaphor to disrupt. This is in accordance 
with much recent research on category construction and on Lakoffs (1987) notion of 
a radial category in particular. 
One can of course over-emphasise the instability of meaning. Evidently, most users of 
English have a shared sense of what a 'house' generally means. If they did not, 
communication would be impossible. However, that shared sense is not built up from 
a shared set of features to which house does or does not correspond. It is probably 
extended from a prototypical image of a house, encompassing different examples 
according to the culture, the individual and their context. 
Furthermore, if it becomes difficult to assert where a category begins and ends, then it 
also becomes difficult to know where the literal usage of a word begins and ends. This 
can also apply to how we analyse a sentence. Ifl say, 'that construction is a house' 
and refer to a hole in the ground, it is not just the meaning of house that is at issue. 
'Is' also becomes problematic. It cannot mean'=' because houses do not'=' holes. 
Even the subject, 'construction', is not left untouched. To my mind, constructions 
connote structures that rise from the ground not ones that descend into it. I have called 
this a 'ripple effect'. The ripple effect makes it very difficult to locate a metaphor 
within specific words or even in a specific sentence. 
Therefore, I have three inter-related points: 
I) metaphor threatens the security of deductive argument 
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2) metaphor is not an evident contrary to a use of language that is deductively or 
empirically true 
3) a metaphor is not confined to specific items of language 
These three points yield another more general cognitivist conclusion (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 
Lakoff and J ohnson 1999). We cannot really define a metaphor as a use of language at 
all. Metaphor is better seen as an operation of cognition that takes a linguistic, visual 
or auditory form. 
Another more difficult point is that metaphor posits the mapping of one domain of 
meaning onto another. Such mappings may be schematised within us as conceptual 
metaphors. These conceptual metaphors: 
• account for how we may conceptualise the different attributes of a topic through a 
common vehicle, treating communication as a conduit, for example (Reddy 1993, 
Lakoff and Johnson 1980), 
• produce sets of metaphors for a topic with a common theme. Thus, the time is 
treated as a point or object in space in 'I 0.00 pm is a long way off and '7.00 pm 
is getting near'. 
However, I did not subscribe to the view that we necessarily create and interpret 
metaphor through the relationship between a given text metaphor, '1 0.00 p.m. is a 
long way off and a conceptual metaphor, 'time is space'. I suggested that the 
relationship between a text metaphor and a conceptual metaphor was one that had a 
sense of similarity at its core. Metaphors appeal to our sense of similarity. This sense 
is essential to category formation and hence to our survival. 
The view of Lakoff and Johnson ( 1999) is that we create or interpret the metaphor by 
working it back to a schema through a process of entailment or cognitive 
'inheritance'. My own suggestion, like that of Glucksberg is that these processes are 
in fact forms of feature matching and explain the discovery of different types of 
similarity. If 'love is a journey' we can entail 'love has a destination'. Love has a 
destination because a journey has a destination, this sharing of features between 'love' 
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and a destination is the basis of their being, in some sense, similar. Entailment thus 
explores the nature of the similarity. Clearly, the similarity is relational not physical. 
In my discussion on metonymy, I concluded like Gibbs ( 1994 and 1999) that one 
could view metonymy and metaphor as similar in so far as they both map from a 
source domain to a target domain. As is traditional, I also noted that the relationship 
between the domains in a metonymy was quite different to the one found in a 
metaphor. However, it also became evident that there are very different types of 
metonymy. It would seem that a core or prototypical metonymy is a meronym or 
partonym. This was traditionally known as synecdoche. This type of metonymy is 
typified by the act of naming a cow by its head or a train according to the colour of its 
doors. The doors are attached to the train, the head to the cow. However, a more 
elaborate use of metonymy involves the treatment ofthis spatial relationship as 
metaphoric rather than literal. A relationship based on physical attachment becomes 
one based on conceptual linkage, as between a few trees and the wider forest they are 
held to represent. As this relationship loses all sense of contiguity we move into the 
domain of metaphor and must start grouping things according to their similarities. If 
there are basic prototypical similarity relationships as between twins or slightly 
different models of the same car, then there are stretched conceptual ones as between 
love and a journey. 
Lakoff and Johnson (e.g. 1999) stress that the facts of our physical existence form a 
conceptual basis for abstract thought. We can see that in metaphor itself, the act of 
matching the features between different phenomena begins in establishment of 
physical and visual similarities and is then extended out into the abstract and 
relational domain. In short, metaphor is itself constructed out of a metaphor of 
similarity. Likewise, metonymy begins in contiguity then is stretched to a conceptual 
picture ofthe same. 
Like, Glucksberg and Keysar (1993) and Glucksberg and Mcglone (1999) and 
Holyoak and Thagard ( 1995), I have also argued that similarity links metaphor into a 
form of class inclusion. Like a class inclusion statement a metaphor attributes one 
phenomenon to the category of another. We are saying that something belongs to a 
given family because it shares a resemblance with other members of it. A resemblance 
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could be visual, functional or relational. It is an attribution of common properties of 
some kind. It could also be an isomorphic relationship, where two things respond in 
the same way to a given intervention. In isomorphism, we find not so much a 
functional or relational similarity but an equivalence of response. 
For our purposes, however, the most important conclusion is that ubiquitous presence 
of metaphor in language reflects an active metaphor-making mind. This has a set of 
radical but straightforward consequences: 
o language has taken the form that it has because of the operations of metaphor-
making mind 
o as Petrie and Oshlag (1993) found, learning deploys a metaphorical capacity to 
model new knowledge according to whether it is like or unlike what is already 
Metaphor also finds an equivalence in the way the mind interprets new knowledge 
to itself 
0 the capacity of mind that extends language to cope with new meaning cannot be 
disassociated from that which uses old knowledge to create metaphors that 
interpret new knowledge to its epistemological system 
e there is an interesting parallelism between the nature of language as a storehouse 
of past metaphorical processes and the learning mind as active user of these 
processes 
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5.2 A concept of metaphor in language teaching and learning: suggestions for 
further study 
The foregoing conclusions are tentative and require further empirical exploration. 
There is a need for further study in many areas, but to my mind, the following could 
prove the most rewarding: 
1) The issue of metaphor and category formation: Lakoff ( 1987) looked at some 
of the stranger examples of categories in language. The Japanese 'hon' for 
example, seems to group phenomena that are related only through being long 
and thin. One interesting line of study could involve the creation of false 
categories and asking subjects to deduce the reasons for the attribution of 
terms to each. Conversely one might ask subjects to attribute additional items 
to these categories then to justify their selection. One might thus explore how 
subjects dealt with category formation when its basis was overtly 
metaphorical. 
2) Conceptual contiguity and relational similarity: it would be interesting to look 
at how well subjects group forms according to whether they are physically or 
conceptually contiguous and visually or conceptually contiguous. Reaction 
time tests might be useful in order to establish the physical relationship as the 
stronger, prototypical one onto which is mapped the more abstract search for 
other types of grouping 
3) Metaphor, metonymy, literality and autism: work already done (e.g. Happe 
1995) has established how the extreme literality of autistic language reveals 
the function of metaphor in more normal thought processes. Further work 
needs to be done relating studies on autism, category formation, generalisation 
and metaphor formation. While autism is now a much-studied condition, it 
seems less well connected to current advances in the area of metaphor and 
cognitive science. There is also the reverse consideration of how the lateral, 
metaphor-making capacity may impede that acquisition of the discrete 
processes of symbol manipulation and calculation at which higher-functioning 
autistics can be very good. 
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4) Analogy, hypothesis formation and interlanguage: more research into the basis 
of learners' suppositions about the TL, particularly in the mechanisms through 
which they represent it to themselves and the metaphors they employ as well 
as an analogy-based approach to how they construct it in relation to the Ll. An 
anecdote from my own experience would be a useful basis for research. My 
son started acquiring French at age four after having been brought up bilingual 
English and Portuguese. I noticed that he intuitively used Portuguese lexis in 
French and asked him why. He replied that Portuguese was 'like' French. 
More work on such bilingual subjects would also be interesting in order to 
find which language is intuitively employed as an analogue when learning an 
L3. This would provide evidence for how a sense of analogy is employed in 
learning another language. 
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5.3 The relevance of metaphor in language teaching and learning: 
conclusions 
My examination ofthe relevance to language teaching of my perspective upon 
metaphor had two phases. The first concerned a general discussion of how metaphor 
research as a key facet of current advances in cognitive research should affect the 
teaching and learning of language. In order to achieve this, it was essential to argue 
that we cannot see post-pubertal second language acquisition as a purely linguistic 
process that is achieved in isolated faculties of mind. I therefore built a case against a 
view that treats SLA as linguistic in the sense of being isolated from other cognitive 
processes within a faculty dedicated to language. This view is typified by the 
generative approach. This enabled me to stress the cognitive nature of the language 
learning process and to underscore its conscious nature. I thus prepared the ground for 
a view of learning oriented to a conscious arousal of interest in the metaphorical 
construction of language. 
The second phase was an exploration of pedagogical methods. It did not set out as a 
search for proof as to their effectiveness. The objective was the elaboration of an 
approach into a series of classroom techniques. I assessed how useful the techniques 
were according to my perception of how the class received them. In line with 
common action research criteria, I also modified them according to the same criterion. 
I now set out the key features that have emerged from this two phased discussion and 
suggest how it could be carried forward. 
5.3.1 The relevance of metaphor in language teaching and learning: 
conclusions: metaphor in teaching and learning theory 
I found the linguistic view of acquisition to be unsustainable because: 
• generative views of acquisition are contradictory in respect of their theoretical 
base 
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o linguistic views of acquisition are not supported by either ontogenetic or 
phylogenetic analyses of the role of metaphor in language development and 
change: metaphor as a cognitive process suggests an extra-linguistic influence on 
acquisition 
o as Cook (2000) attests, language learning requires psycho-linguistic and socio-
cultural analysis. It is inherently variable and unstable and cannot be reduced to a 
staged repeatable series of events calling for a singular method. 
Because metaphor and metonymy have both been implicated in the processes of 
meaning creation in language and learning, it is clear that we need to give more 
coherent consideration to how they should be incorporated into teaching 
methodology. Their incorporation should not be as features that extend a task oriented 
to the achievement of a linguistic competence but as processes that can change how 
we think about the inter-relationship of language and learning. One change involves a 
consideration of how we can recreate the context of learning out of the image-
schematic origins of what is to be learnt. Thus a tense built from the propositional 
schema of possession would be taught through the context ofthe same. 
The core of any further studies would involve the construction and testing of a theory 
of language acquisition and learning that involved a full contribution from the areas of 
metaphor exploration discussed. I have attempted this only in the briefest outline. A 
fuller exploration of the following issues would be of great benefit. 
A larger series of studies concerning the role of metaphor in acquisition and learning 
could be as follows: 
1) The conscious use of metaphor as a cognitive process in the construction of 
new language knowledge 
2) The unconscious or intuitive use of metaphor in the construction of new 
language knowledge 
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3) The relationship between metaphor formation and the generalisation of new 
knowledge 
4) Further exploration of the relationship between the view of mind from which 
metaphor is held to emerge and the construction of language learning theory. 
For example, I have not touched upon connectionist views ofSLA here (e.g. 
Ellis and Schmidt 1997). However, connectionist views emphasise 
associative patterns rather than rules (Mitchell and Myles 1998) and this 
emphasis is more sympathetic to the view of metaphor with its tolerance of 
vagueness and imprecision as opposed to harshly circumscribed meanings or 
plus/minus semantic computations. 
5) A more profound exploration of the links between metaphor, affect and 
learning. Our new understanding ofthe ubiquity of metaphor in language has 
placed emphasis upon its structure and its relationship to core image schema. 
The treatment of metaphor as a common event has distracted somewhat from 
why artists make such constant use of it. It would be interesting to know more 
about why it can make an emotional impact and how that impact can be used 
to enhance all structured learning. 
5.3.2 The relevance of metaphor in language teaching and learning: 
conclusions: metaphor in classroom practice 
A final pedagogical point is that trying to re-locate an item that is perceived as 
'grammatical' within its image-schematic roots is a more problematic task than 
dealing with lexis or related issues of text structure. This difficulty in grammar may 
originate in a quite fundamental difficulty with the grammaticalisation thesis (e.g. 
Traugott and Heine 1991) and the approach of Lakoff and Johnson ( 1999). I have 
described how studies that take metaphor as their central plank will tend to 
overemphasise the instability ofthe semiotic system (5.1 above). A further point is 
that in taking language back to the conceptualisations on which it is based, we will 
constantly emphasise the concrete and the physical. Such an emphasis may under-
stress the reverse process of abstraction that has also motivated the development of 
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language. The issue is not how far abstract meaning takes form in or is created out of 
concrete metaphor. We can accept Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) quite radical view 
that abstract structures are discovered as an entailment of concrete metaphors. 
However, we are still left with the problem of what motivates that tendency to 
abstraction either generally or within the specific metaphor through which it is 
realised. In short, we would appear to have an abstractive tendency that is treating the 
physical world as its plaything. It may be that the strength of that tendency has taken 
some facets of language too far from its image-schematic origins for it to be clarified 
by being relocated within them. But that is not a question I can begin to answer here. 
5.3.3 Metaphor in classroom practice: suggestions for further study 
Since this thesis is an exercise in theory construction, it clearly leads to various ideas 
for extensive empirical study. Even so, before such studies could be constructed with 
any degree of success it would be invaluable to devise, try out and adapt a clearer and 
more extensive set of techniques. These techniques could be adapted according to the 
following categories: 
1) Fostering an understanding of lexis through conceptual metaphor. 
2) Learner-training in how to identify conceptual metaphors in relevant areas of 
study and how to mind-map lexis and idiom accordingly. 
3) Identifying the conceptual underpinning of language 'chunks' such as 
collocation, lexical phrases while using concordances to identify metaphorical 
and non-metaphorical usage (why we say 'focus on' rather than 'focus in', for 
example). 
4) Exploiting the larger conceptual metaphors that underlie written text 
construction: the argument as dialogue, for example. 
5) Understanding and exploiting the use of metaphor to create cohesion in text. 
6) Techniques that foster the use of analogy in argument (this is a neglected area 
in EAP argument construction. However, analogy formation is a key skill in 
the construction of successful argument, both in science and the arts). 
7) Researching into the pedagogical benefits of treating genres as the features 
that identify their exemplars as analogues of each other, or as members of 
cognitive categories (Swales 1990). 
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8) Illustrating the use of grammar rules-of-thumb within metaphor. 
9) Teaching grammatical structures by placing them in the conceptual metaphors 
from which they are derived. 
1 0) Developing an understanding of how to enhance pedagogical explanation with 
metaphor. 
11) Teaching metaphor as hooks that facilitate student understanding of written 
and spoken texts. 
12) Analysing and addressing errors according to their image-schematic basis. 
13) Addressing the issue of metaphor in language in order to consider it as a 
purveyor of cultural values. 
Little has been said about metonymy or analogy in respect of their classroom 
relevance. I have already introduced techniques that help students to construct then 
express analogical arguments in the manner suggested in point 6, above. Thus, 
students are given a set of circumstances in one context and are asked to construct an 
analogous set in another. They are also given introductory practice in assessing 
analogies as to whether they are false or true. This work requires development. 
Some teachers may be interested in introducing a stronger sense of cross-cultural 
awareness into their classrooms either in respect of the construction ofthe target 
language and its contrast with the MT or in respect ofthe students' evaluation oftheir 
own identities. Such teachers might want to take a closer look at the area of category 
construction, ICMs and the prototypes through which they are represented. The 
exploration of the prototype of a given category can provide an extensive source of 
classroom interest, exposing how students locate a given term in quite variable forms 
of category. 
The above types of technique could call for quite different forms of empirical study. 
For example: 
1) Boers (2000) has shown how one can do quantitative studies on the 
recollection of lexis that was taught by being grouped around the conceptual 
metaphors from which it had been derived. Similar studies could be done in 
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respect of the teclmiques proposed here. One could, for example, look for 
ways to quantify the successful use of metatext and the related control of 
metatext after its having been taught or not taught in the manner proposed 
here. However, it must be acknowledged that such studies will always provoke 
scepticism because ofthe variables involved. 
2) As in any study of teaching methodology, it would be difficult to control the 
many more variables that would arise from studying the broader deployment 
of metaphor-based techniques against a control group that did not employ 
them. Nonetheless this is a subject for consideration among those who would 
seek a broad quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of what I am 
proposing. 
3) A more manageable type of study would involve a qualitative examination of 
a class that had a high proportion of their teaching delivered through the 
techniques described above. Such a study would track the responses and 
feelings of the class as well describing how the items taught in this manner 
were or were not recycled in their discourse. 
4) Action research type studies could be done in respect of the individual 
techniques or for groups of the same. 
The field of metaphor is wide, well-researched and interdisciplinary in nature. The 
manner in which it can be carried forward into language education is now a subject of 
consideration. I have formulated the theoretical base upon which we can start to 
construct a series of techniques. The exact form that these techniques will take, how 
they will be implemented and researched must vary according to the nature of the 
future context in which they unfold. 
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